In recent years,various paperless techniques are evolved for communication.All data is stored in electronic media.This invention of internet leads people to do transaction online.Online transaction is more cost efficient than the previous techniques.But this invention may suffers from the problem of hacking on the central database to steal information.Then this stolen information can be used for the unethical purpose.So there is need of security mechanism[17]. Attribute basedaccesscontrol is one of the good technique available for encryption purpose. Attribute BasedAccessControl defines an accesscontrol paradigm. In this access rights are granted to users through the use of policies which combine attributes together. The policies can use any type of attributes (user attributes, resource attributes, object, environment attributes etc.). This model supports Boolean logic, in which rules contain ”IF, THEN” statements about who is making the request, the resource, and the action. ABAC[1] is further divided into two parts viz. Key policyBasedAccesscontrol and Ciphertext PolicyBasedAccessControl.
Multimedia data and information systems manage, communicate, and present multimedia data including text, images, audio and video. We need to ensure that the data is protected from unauthorized access as well as malicious corruption. Digital watermarking techniques that insert hidden copyright messages into the multimedia data are needed. Furthermore, since multimedia data is being used for security applications such as surveillance and monitoring, protecting privacy of the individual is crucial. This paper will discuss the security of multimedia systems using accesscontrol policies. An accesscontrol space represents the permission assignment state of a subject or role. Nowadays, three kinds of accesscontrol, discretionary accesscontrol (DAC) mandatory accesscontrol (MAC) and role-basedaccesscontrol (RBAC) have been proposed. In RBAC, there are role hierarchies in which a senior role can perform the permission of a junior role. Role BasedAccessControl (RBAC) is a popular model for accesscontrolpolicy and is used widely as it provides a convenient way to specify entitlements corresponding to specific meaning. One of the biggest issue in RBAC is authentication is for ensuring secure exchange of information and preventing illegal modification. In this paper, the description of an accesscontrol algorithm and a system architecture for a secure multimedia system are presented and also the method for securing information exchange in multimedia system.
Easier [9] is a design that supports fine-grained accesscontrol policies and dynamic cluster membership by victimization CP-ABE theme. A lot of works are projected to style versatile ABE schemes There are two methods to comprehend the fine-grained access management supported ABE they are KP-ABE and ABE. In KP-ABE the cipher text consist of some descriptive attributes which are labeled by the sender and the trusted authority issues a user’s private key and the accesspolicy is involved in the private key which specifies the decryption of the cipher text with the key. Here the disadvantage of this encryption is that the accesspolicy is constructed into user's personal key. So data owner does not have the option on who can decrypt the data except encrypting the data with the set of attributes. Hence it is not suitable for certain applications as the information owner must trust the authority who gives the user’s key. The KP-ABEis secure beneath the final cluster model because it is monotonic access structure and additionally it cannot categorical the attributes to reject the parties with whom the knowledge owner didn’t have to share the knowledge from membership. To overcome this weakness cipher text policy attribute based encryption has been created that is proved to be secured below the quality model. In CP-ABE the accesspolicy is made within the encrypted data and also the attributes is with the user’s private key. The attribute based encryption will be divided into monotonic or nonmonotonicbased on the sort of the access structure and based on the accesspolicy the schemes will be classified as key policy or cipher text policy. The ideal attribute based encryption must support data privacy, scalability, fine-grained accesscontrol, user accountability, user revocation and collusion resistant. But the provided access policies are not appropriate for the scalable media content.
Implementing role assignment and task delegation in a nomadic environment, Reference [8] suggested the use of a Role BasedAccessControl mechanism where the rights an employee has are determined by its position in the enterprise. The decision to grant or deny access is delegated to the server, which maintains the mapping between agents and roles, and a database listing the privileges of each role. Also, Reference [9] proposed a concrete design of a mechanism that supports policies for regulating access to information via corporate Intranet. They argued that in order for corporate webs to reach their full potential, accesscontrol mechanisms that can express regulations and practices governing businesses are needed and showed that current web technologies provide only limited support for this purpose.
In order to control the access of their own data stored on untrusted remote servers (e.g., cloud servers), the end-users have used encryption-basedaccesscontrol. It is a very effective method, where data are encrypted by end-users and only authorized users are given decryption keys. This can also prevent the data security during the transmission over wire-less networks which are vulnerable to many threats [13]–[15]. However, traditional public key (PK) encryption methods are not suitable for data encryption because it may produce multiple copies of ciphertext for the same data when there are many data consumers in the system. In order to cope with this issue, some attribute-basedaccesscontrol schemes [3], [5] are pro- posed by leveraging attribute-based encryption [6], which only produces one copy of ciphertext for each data and does not need to know how many intended data consumers during the data encryption. Moreover, once the cloud data are encrypted. Some searchable encryption algorithms [16], [17] are proposed to support search on encrypted cloud data.
Recently, attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been developed as a cryptographic primitive for the provision of fine-grained accesscontrol to encrypted data. In ABE, a set of system attributes are used to define user access rights or data access policies. ABE thus appears to be a promising tool for the protection of data in cloud storage environments. However, existing ABE schemes have some practical limitations with respect to the efficiency and scalability of certain operations that are critical to cloud storage environments, in particular revocation of access rights, key refreshing and revocation. In this paper we propose a deployment model (SB- CP-ABE) for ABE which enables management of access rights as well as efficient key refreshing and revocation. This model can be generically adapted to suit ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes.
to wait in the intermediate nodes for a substantial amount of time until the connection would be eventually established.For storage and replicate the data storage node is introduced [5][6]where authorized mobile nodes can access the necessary information quickly. Many military applications require increased protection of confidential data including accesscontrol methods that are cryptographically enforced [7], [8]. In many cases, it is desirable to provide differentiated access services such that data access policies are defined over user attributes or roles, which are managed by the key authorities. Multiple key authorities manage their attribute independently in DTN [9], [10]. The concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [11]–[14] is a promising approach that fulfils the requirements for secure data retrieval in DTNs. ABE features a mechanism that enables an accesscontrol over encrypted data using access policies and ascribed attributes among private keys and ciphertexts. Especially, ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) provides a scalable way of encrypting data such that the encryptor defines the attribute set that the decryptor needs to possess in order to decrypt the ciphertext [13]. Thus, different users are allowed to decrypt different pieces of data per the security policy. However, the problem of applying the ABE to DTNs introduces several security and privacy challenges. Since some users may change their associated attributes at some point (for example, moving their region), or some private keys might be compromised, key revocation (or update) for each attribute is necessary in order to make systems secure. However, this issue is even more difficult, especially in ABE systems, since each attributes conceivably shared by multiple users (henceforth, we refer to such a collection of users as an attribute group). This implies that revocation of any attribute or any single user in an attribute group would affect the other users in the group. For example, if a user joins or leaves an attribute group, the associatedattribute key should be changed and redistributed to all the other members in the same group for backward or forward secrecy. It may result in bottleneck during rekeying procedure or security degradation due to the windows of vulnerability if the previous attribute key is not updated immediately.
Accesscontrol is generally said to be policy or procedure that allows, denies or restricts access to a system [2]. It also identifies when the unauthorized users trying to access the system. The mostly used accesscontrol methods are identity basedaccesscontrol models [2]. Accesscontrol in cloud depends on the cloud storage and its data security and the access option becomes very necessary option in cloud. Accesscontrol is very important part in the data center of government and business. It is also important to understand that accesscontrol alone not a solution for securing data so the encryption of data also important. There will be a difference between policy decision and mechanism. Access policies are an always high level decision that determines how access are controlled and access decisions are made.
Accesscontrol policies (ACPs) express rules concerning who can access what information, and under what conditions. Traditionally, ACP specification is not an explicit part of the software development process and often isolated from requirements analysis, leaving systems vulnerable to security breaches because policies are specified without ensuring compliance with system requirements. In this paper, we present the Re quirements- basedAccess C ontrol A nalysis and P olicy S pecification (ReCAPS) method for deriving ACPs from various sources. This method integrates policy specification into the software development process, ensures consistency across software artifacts, and provides prescriptive guidance for how to specify ACPs. To date, we have validated the method by applying it within the context of four operational systems. This paper reports the results of an empirical study in which we evaluated the usefulness and effectiveness of the method.
In [24], multi-criteria assessment model capable of evaluating the suitability of individual workers for a specified task according to their capabilities, social relationships, and existing tasks has been proposed. Candidates are ranked based on their suitability scores to help administrators to select qualified workers to perform the tasks assigned to a given role. The task assignment policy described in this paper focuses on the role-assignment for a task while at the same time defines the specific requirements for a role based on either workers’ capabilities or process properties. The result can be the input into a multi-criteria assessment model for selecting qualified staffs.
with cipher text policy scheme. Tarai et al. (2013) proposed a concept on Role BasedAccessControl(RBAC) policy that instead of accesscontrol through role assigned to the users, the users are assigned some level of accesscontrol. The proposed model assigns different category of roles under some levels of a system with the concept in view that a particular level can be granted authorization up to a certain maximum level described by Database Administrator. The proposed model uses two components namely Static Separation of Duty (SSD) relation and Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD). Static Separation of Duty (SSD) relations, adds relations among roles with respect to user assignments. The constraints on the relations between elements take the form of Static Separation of Duty (SSD) relations and Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) relations. The Static Separation of Duty (SSD) relation specifies the constraints on the assignment of users to roles. Once a role is authorized to a user, then the user can not be the member of a second role. The Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) relations place constraints on the roles that can be activated in a user’s session. If one role that takes part in a Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSD) relation is activated, the user cannot activate the related (conflicting) role in the same session. Rosic et al. (2015) proposed the Role Base AccessControl Area of Responsibility(RBACAOR) model, which was developed and tested on the Windows operating system platform using .NET Framework role-based security. The Role Base AccessControl Area of Responsibility(RBACAOR) system comprised two processes, authentication and authorization, which are combined to ensure that resources are accessed only by authorized users. The Role Base AccessControl Area of Responsibility(RBACAOR) model authentication framework utilizes .NET Integrated Windows authentication (IWA) as a first step toward gaining access to the system. The Role Base AccessControl Area of Responsibility (RBACAOR) authorization framework consists of independent authorization processes which are combined to determine the final accesscontrol decision based on information encapsulated into the Role Base AccessControl Area of Responsibility (RBACAOR) security principal.
ABE was developed by sahai and Waters in the year of 2005 and their goal was to provide accesscontrol and security. In this scheme it allows encryption and decryption of data that depends on attributes of users. The ciphertext produced is completely based on these attributes like age of a person and city they stay etc. Decryption is possible only if users attribute matches with the attributes of ciphertext. Problem with this approach that owner has to use public key of every users. This is complicated to implement it in real time[2].
In order to solve above problems, the identity-basedaccesscontrol for digital content (iDAC) is proposed in this paper. iDAC is based on cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption which is an identity-based encryption. In iDAC, the access structure which declares the rating system is embedded into the encrypted digital content. Only users with the identity-based key satisfy the access structure could decrypt the digital content.
179 Multi-authority CP-ABE is more appropriate for data accesscontrol of cloud storage systems, as users may hold attributes issued by multiple authorities and data owners may also share the data using accesspolicy defined over attributes from different authorities. For example, in an E- healthsystem, dataowners may share the data using the accesspolicy ‘‘Doctor AND Researcher’’, where the attribute ‘‘Doctor’’ isissued by a medical organization and the attribute ‘‘Researcher’’ is issued by the administrators of a clinical trial. However, it is difficult to directly apply these multi-authority CP-ABE schemes to multi-authority cloud storage systems because of the attribute revocation problem. In multi-authority cloud storage systems, users’ attributes can be changed dynamically. A user may be entitled some new attributes or revoked some current attributes.And his permissionof data access should be changed accordingly. However, existing attribute revocation methods either rely on a trusted server or lack of efficiency, they are not suitable for dealing with the attribute revocation problem in data accesscontrol in multi-authority cloud storage systems. The existing algorithm performs following steps
the task by the subjects in the two groups, we can safely conclude that the results are not merely due to one group focusing on the problem for longer. It is of course possible that the ReCAPS subjects paid more careful attention and used the time they had more effectively and would have done so with any instructions at all. However, this residual effect is unlikely for the following reason. The Hawthorne Effect is most likely to arise in a repeated measures design where the subjects are aware of the nature of changing treatments. (The original interventions at the Hawthorne Plant, from which the effect gets its name, are a classic example of subjects being aware that they were being subjected to one treatment after another.) In such a case, a control condition is manifestly less a treatment than an experimental condition. However, in an independent group design, such as the one used in the current study, the subjects in the experimental condition had no experience of the control condition with which to compare it. Subjectively, therefore, they were as likely to improve their performance as the ReCAPS subjects. We conclude that the difference between the ReCAPS and control groups can be attributed to the ReCAPS process and heuristics and not to any methodological artifact. Such a conclusion requires future replication before it can be accepted as definitive, but it is better supported currently than alternative explanations.
authorization rules (OASIS 2013). It promotes standard- ization, expressiveness, granularity, interoperability, and efficiency (Abassi et al. 2010). This flexibility, on the other hand, has introduced implementation complexity. Solu- tions proposed to aid in the ABAC policy authoring task have ranged from GUI policy authoring tools to APIs and plug-ins (Turner 2017; Axiomatics 2017). These tools generally provide a higher abstraction level that obscures much of XACML’s complex syntax. The former set of tools, i.e., the GUI aids, are designed as fill-in forms or spreadsheets that present policy authors with lists, or other graphical formats, populated with valid options of policy elements (i.e., subjects and objects attributes). The assumption is that a non-IT specialist would easily be able to construct a policy by selecting its constituent attributes from drop-down menus (Turner 2017). The lat- ter set of tools is mainly designed for developers as it borrows much of its structure from common program- ming languages (Axiomatics 2017). Either way, the goal is to automatically generate XACML equivalent policies with the help of the tools. While such aids can provide a better authoring experience, they heavily rely on back- end attribute exchange providers. This strong assumption raises the question of: where do the required attributes come from? Upon closer inspection of the ABAC autho- rization policy lifecycle (Fig. 1), policies are introduced to a system at the earliest stages of its development lifecycle as use-cases. At this point, accesscontrol policies, as well
The traceability support between requirements, ACPs and designs is a prominent ReCAPS feature. Figure 5 portrays the traceability links across various artifacts. When an ACP is derived, we establish a link between the policy and its sources (e.g., a particular requirement, a particular section of the security policy or privacy policy, or a particular table/field in the database design). When we employ RE techniques to elaborate requirements, we also build requirements traceability links between each requirement and its origin, goals, scenarios and stakeholders. By establishing the links across these artifacts, we can manage policy and/or requirements evolution. In the event of a change in a policy or requirement, our approach allows analysts to quickly locate the affected requirements or policies for subsequent modification. By ensuring consistency between ACP, requirements and software designs, our approach improves the quality of ACPs and helps bridge the gap between requirements and design.
like Google, Microsoft and facebook have their own clouds where data is available in bulk. As Cloud computing is becoming more popular many business organizations are migrating to Cloud. It requires minimum investment for any business to run on Clouds. Cloud Computing is a technology which provides software, data access, and storage services and that even does not require user to know the physical location and configuration of the system that delivers the services. To provide the security, fast access and privacy are the big challenges in Cloud Computing. In the cloud, due to multi- tenancy architecture, data from multiple clients are stored and managed by the same software[1] . When the software makes mistake, clients may access private data of other clients. Furthermore, data stored in a cloud may be available to cloud administrators and they may modify data for their own benefits. The multiuser environment has increased security risk due to the sharing of software and data schemas by multiple users. This is the responsibility of the cloud providers to ensure that one customer cannot break into another customer’s data and applications. AccessControl methods in Cloud basically allows access only to the authorized person. It is mechanism that provide the security so that user cannot access the resources for which user is not authorized. Various accesscontrol models are in cloud computing are Mandatory AccessControl (MAC), Discretionary AccessControl (DAC) and Role BasedAccessControl (RBAC) [2]. Accesscontrol models is a means by which ability is explicitly enabled or restricted in some way. Computer basedaccesscontrol models can prescribe who have access to a specific system resource, but also the type of access that is permitted.
Access Control) [36], RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) is also a policy mechanism which are based 240. on the role of users in the system and the permissions given to them [37][r]
RBAC & CW BasedAccessPolicy: is to ensure that 1) the data owned by a user of one sub-cloud wouldn’t be accessed by any unauthorized users of other sub-clouds in the PSC, and 2) the data owned by one firm in PSC wouldn’t be crossly accessed by other ones, and this policy could be easily customized to fit variant requirements in enterprises. This policy is based on RBAC (Role BasedAccessControl) and CW (Chinese-Wall policy). It defines a kind of organization label (CW-org), which is assigned to all users and data of the enterprise in the PSC, ensuring that any user associated with a different CW-org cannot access the data in the PSC, and vice versa. It defines a series of roles (RBAC-roles) for subjects (e.g. users) and security tags for objects (e.g. files) both with inheritance relationship. All data in a sub-cloud are assigned to the same set of tags. For any role r associated with subject s, only when all tags of object o meet the logical expression of permission defined by the role manager of the PSC, could the data be accessed by s.