In the absence of an overarching strategy, Turkey and the Palestinian territories depict how the EU has adopted different approaches to securitysectorreform (SSR) which have not facilitated the consolidation of a common EU foreign policy, though the situation might soon change given respective SSR-related documents from the Council and Commission. This report contributes to the securitysector debate by stressing that in conflict and post-conflict scenarios endurable SSR requires fomenting synergies between the police and judicial sectors and the inclusion of DDR, in tandem with the institutional implementation of transparent, accountable and democratic oversight mechanisms. There is an adamant need for constructive consistency when applying this central facet of EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean basin and beyond. SSR is an emerging phenomenon in conflict, post-conflict and development scenarios that has acquired a prominent role within the policy agendas of key international actors. As a prelude to the two case studies, and in order to better understand the EU’s end goal, a brief analysis of the two pivotal European SSR documents is provided with particular emphasis on their contribution to develop a more coherent and effective EU presence in this field. More specific consideration is then given to the role played by SSR-related matters within the framework of two EU foreign policy mechanisms towards the Mediterranean: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The two case studies - Turkey and the Palestinian territories - are exceptional due to the nature of their geopolitical position in regional and international politics. Both demonstrate different levels of state development and different degrees of monopoly over the legitimate use of force, which have contributed to the development of different EU approaches to SSR, tailored to the specific needs of the local context in which the Union is operating. Both cases also demonstrate how the EU emphasizes democracy or security depending on the respective circumstantial differences. Turkey exemplifies by and large the EU accession process of fulfilling democratic reform in return for EU membership. The Palestinian case illustrates how security demands precede democratic apertures. Together, both highlight the lack of a consistent and comprehensive EU SSR strategy, the lack of which continues to impede the emergence of a common EU foreign policy.
Socialisation, as was noted in Chapter 2, is a means used by external powers to promote peace and establish initial stages of security communities. It is a complex process through which norms, rules and values are transferred between international actors and are internalised as patterns of domestic policy-making and foreign policy-formation (Kavalski 2008: 65). In the Western Balkans the EU came to exercise its socialising powers through bilateral and regional initiatives. These initiatives are meant to strengthen the statehood of local actors and make peaceful relations a norm in the region (ibid.: 95). The interconnection between two levels of the EU’s interaction with the Western Balkans – levels of states and the region – is both strong and complex. While each state is required to engage in regional cooperation and build good neighbourly relations to progress with the integration into the EU, the EU evaluates every state’s success on the individual basis. In many respects, amicable relations between Western Balkan states develop because of changes in domestic policies, which are often, but not exclusively, promoted by the EU through bilateral contractual relations, e.g. expressed in SAAs. On the one hand, considering the fragility of states in the region, the EU’s policies are aimed at building their capacity and improving the efficiency and efficacy of their institutions (securitysectorreform is an example of this approach). Such activities are sometimes interpreted as an effort at member state-building (Keil and Arkan 2015). The recent history of conflict in the region, on the other hand, prompts the EU to also focus on fostering the introduction and maintenance of peaceful foreign policy practices among regional members (Kavalski 2008: 95). The combination of these two approaches has initiated the emergence of security community in the Western Balkans, which forms the extension of the European zone of peace, i.e. it is not a separate security community but a part of the European one. Since the recipients of the EU’s policies tend to be mainly state elites, the Western Balkans currently represents an elite or, in other words, embryonic form of security community. Such a security community is based not on a common identity, but on elite cooperation (ibid.: 80- 81).
A final aspect of EU engagement in SSR in Central Asia can be related to the OSCE and NATO due to the large overlap of membership and both regional security organisations’ activities in Central Asia. Cooperation between the EU and NATO is limited in Central Asia and non-existent when it comes to SSR. All five countries are members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), but only Kazakhstan is actively engaged in SSR activities through the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) that it agreed with NATO and which incorporates aspects of security-related reform of armed forces and oversight mechanisms. Kazakhstan also participates in the PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan – Defence Institution Building) initiative in which NATO liaises with partners from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Kazakhstan on good governance of the defence sector. NATO holds consultations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on defence and securitysectorreform, but is not directly involved through substantial cooperation or assistance programming. NATO’s interest in Central Asia largely equals that of the EU – partnership, stability and security – but its activities are mostly constrained to some military cooperation and, most importantly, political dialogue and diplomatic exchanges with a view to increase access to Afghanistan for NATO’s ISAF mission.
SSR is all the more important given the elusive stability of Central Asian states. Even with a robust securitysector that guards rulers against unexpected protests, events such as the sudden death of a president or otherwise could lead to unrest and severe instability. However, Central Asian leaderships are likely to continue thinking about short-term profits and clinging on to power instead of reforming their countries and security sectors. SecuritySectorReform is thus part and parcel of a democratisation process that Kazakhstan stalls, Kyrgyzstan struggles to get off the ground and that Tajikistan largely blocks. Whereas the U.S. has been relatively active in SSR programming in Central Asia, often focussing on the ‘hardware and training’ aspects, European actors have been less involved and their programmes have tended to emphasise the ‘soft’ aspects that often only relate indirectly to the securitysector: general support to rule of law or civil society. The exceptions are border control and police reform. In both cases the European Union (EU), member states individual support and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have taken an active approach.
In the twenty years since the end of the Cold War, Australian not-for-profits (NFPs) have found a range of ways to support societies manage transitions from warfighting postures to modes of peaceful coexistence, and from military governments to civilian-led democracies. In managing the transitions, these societies have relied heavily on the expertise and relative neutrality of national and international civil society organisations. These organisations have helped national political and military leaders find and return to a path of reconciling former combatants and enemies, and deciding how to re-establish viable security institutions that respond to civilian control and enjoy sufficient public trust. Very little information has been collected to understand the nature and scope of these experiences, however, so in 2013 the Australian Government tasked the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) to commission a survey of Australian NFP work in support of securitysectorreform (SSR). Specifically, SSR is understood to be a concept that ‘evolved over the last two decades to describe a range of efforts to improve the security of a state and its citizens, through an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent securitysector. In all cases, but particularly for conflict-affected states, SSR is about the governance of the securitysector.’ 1
Like other major donors, the US supports SSR in Congo bilaterally and through its support for MONUC/MONUSCO. (See Box 6, “MONUC and MONUSCO” and Appendix 2, “MONUSCO mandate and terms of engagement.”) As a permanent member of the Security Council, the US has been and continues to be a critical actor in shaping MONUC/MONUSCO’s mandate. Also, the US pays 27 percent of the mission’s costs as part of its annual assessed peacekeeping contributions, giving it considerable interest and leverage in shaping the mission and its objectives. MONUC/MONUSCO’s involvement in SSR is relatively recent. In 2008, the Security Council added SSR to MONUC’s mandate and tasked MONUC to provide human rights and IHL training to newly integrated FARDC brigades in eastern DRC and to “contribute to the efforts of the international community to assist the Congolese [g]overnment in the initial planning process of the securitysectorreform, to build credible, cohesive, and disciplined Congolese armed forces, and to develop the capacities of the Congolese national police and related law enforcement agencies.” 71 The SSR mandate, however, did not translate into
According to article 117 of the Iraqi Constitution, regions are allowed to establish their own security services. Th erefore, the Peshmerga should not be recognised merely as a regional security force but as a separate Kurdish defence system. Th e internal sovereignty of the Kurdish Regional Government, its legal system, and security forces suggest that the Iraqi Kurds often seem to act as an independent state. Th e Peshmerga, in particular, operates entirely independently of the Iraqi government, e.g. it has deployed its forces not only in areas disputed with Iraq but also abroad – from Turkey to territories controlled by Syrian Kurds. Peshmerga forces are supplied (in some cases directly, without Central Government permission) by Western governments, e.g. U.S., France, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy and Holland (Smith 2018). Nevertheless, in line with international humanitarian law, Peshmerga is an integral part of the Iraqi Army (Smith 2018). Th e state-centric orientation of the securitysectorreform could be unsatisfactory (e.g. Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, Libya, Sudan) for two reasons. Firstly, it carries out models that do not correspond to local interests. Secondly, it attempts to rapidly change a local community (Paris 2004; Barnett and Zürcher 2009). As each entity deﬁ nes security in response to its own national goals (Sedra 2010 p. 18), this paper intends to provide a political and historical context of the obstacles for the reforms.
This article explores the relationship between SecuritySectorReform (SSR) and institutional transition in post-conflict countries, drawing on a case study of Kosovo. The study focuses on the institution-building of core security institutions and the role of international community in SectorSecurityReform in Kosovo, reviewing the ways in which security, the rule of law and political context have been intertwined. The article first outlines the context of the international mission in Kosovo, in particular transformation of Kosovo Liberation Army through Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration before proceeding to consider how the objectives, needs and constraints of international and local actors have influenced the reform of the security institutions and the security in general. Then, article explores the establishment of Kosovo Police Service and the reform process of this and other relevant security institution. In the first line, article will discusses concepts of SSR and overview an overall process of democratic transition with a main focus on securitysector. After the presentation of a brief development of the SSR in Kosovo since the end of war with focus on the role of international community, article will be completed by the main findings and conclusions of this research
There are two EU documents on SSR, the 2005 EU Concept for ESDP Support to SecuritySectorReform (henceforth ‘Council SSR Concept’) and the 2006 A Concept for European Community Support for SecuritySectorReform (henceforth ‘Commission SSR Concept’). As explained later in the chapter, these documents were brought together under a common policy framework in 2006. These two SSR concepts build on various EU reference documents, including the European Security Strategy that advocates a Union ready to engage in a larger variety of missions. Moreover, securitysectorreform, within a broader institution-building approach, is mentioned in the strategy document as one of the possible approaches to fulfil EU objectives, including preventing and/or resolving violent conflict, combating terrorism and address- ing state fragility. A similar message can be found in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 document, endorsed at the December 2004 European Council. It calls for going beyond Petersberg-type missions to include, among other things, support to SSR and DDR. 7
In the Central African Republic, a dysfunctional and poorly governed securitysector has been identified as one of the root causes of conflict. Discussions on DDR were therefore couched in the broader frame- work of SSR and encouraging a national dialogue process was identified as a first step in addressing this issue. As part of this process, a national seminar was held from 14–17 April 2008. The seminar was prepared by a national SecuritySectorReform Committee consisting of government officials, rep- resentatives of CAR’s security and justice services, and members of civil society. The seminar resulted in a roadmap for SSR implementation and also set up an evaluation mechanism to review progress. It provided a framework for many of the decisions in subsequent discussions and agreements. The seminar was held at an opportune moment as it was able to guide discussions on other critical aspects of the peace process. A working group session on DDR/SSR linkages contributed to crystallizing in the minds of the various stakeholders the need to avoid thinking about these issues separately.
Security-SectorReform, CSDG Working Paper No 1, 1999; Bonn International Center for Conversion, SecuritySectorReform, Brief 15, June 2000; Clingendael Institute, International Alert and Saferworld, T owards a Better Practice Framework for SecuritySectorReform: Broadening the Debate (London/The Hague, 2001); Tim Edmunds, ‘Defining SecuritySectorReform,’ Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Network Newsletter, No 3 (October 2001), pp 3–6, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/CMR%20Network/ cmrn3.htm#New_Agenda; OECD, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Paris, 2001); ‘Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Policy Coherence’, The DAC Journal, Volume 2, No 3, 2001; UNDP, ‘Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace,’ Human Development Report, 2002 (New York, 2002), Chapter 4, pp 85–100; UNDP, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, Justice and SecuritySectorReform: BCPR’s Programmatic Approach (New York, November 2002), www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/jssrprogramaticapproach.pdf; Hans Born, P. Fluri and A.B. Johnsson, Parliamentary Oversight of the SecuritySector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, Handbook for Parliamentarians No 5, (Geneva/Belgrade: DCAF/Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2003); and Clingendael Institute, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the SecuritySector: An Institutional Assessment Framework, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Hague, 2003)
The changing global environment has obliged virtually all African governments to consider some degree of reform. New constitutions sanctioning more democratic governance frameworks for security systems have come into being which have created the need to develop more effective responses to security problems, although this is taking place in a variety of terrains. This commitment to ‘good governance’ includes the adoption of democratic norms for the governance of security. Most of these reforms are intended either to reduce budget deficits or to channel more public resources into development or as part of political transitions following regime change or peace agreements. The trickledown effect of this is that indi- vidual reform activities are currently happening in many African countries. Several of these have launched far-reaching reforms of their security institutions, though these differ substantially in terms of sponsorship, philosophy and focus, not to mention the different and ever-changing contexts such as the political balance of power (e.g. in coalition governments, parliament naturally assumes greater importance as most issues have to be negotiated). Some degree of reform is occurring (or is allowed) in response to: growing international pressure for democratization and a desire to enhance human rights; the need to develop more effective responses to security problems, including crime; fiscal reforms and civil service reforms intended either to reduce budget deficits or to channel more public resources for development or; as part of power sharing agreements following the conclusion of war.
Public expenditure management – In many cases, the starting point for securitysectorreform may be to address problems outside the securitysector, relating to wider questions of administrative capacity and political governance. For instance, public expenditure management reform seeks to enhance democratic control of security expenditure, improving financial accountability of the security services. It addresses any inappropriate roles played by the security services in the economy, such as their involvement in natural resource exploitation. When linked to a broader security needs assessment, change in this area can generate widespread public and political support for reform. Practitioners should be aware, however, of the potential risks of focusing on expenditure levels, as governments can seek to hide security/defence spending off budget or through other non-security related Ministries – thus making security budgets less transparent and therefore less accountable. Public sectorreform – There are strong linkages between public sectorreform/pay reform and the underlying political structure and processes that are relevant to SSR. Poor, irregular and inadequate pay are common challenges in developing countries and affect governments’ capacity to make security services work for the poor. Where donors are planning or implementing support to partners for pay reform and broader civil-service improvements, there is an opportunity to integrate SSR-related objectives. The level of political competition, the degree to which public revenues are diverted into patronage politics, and the quality of institutions will be the key determinants of the policy options available in the specific context. Peace Agreements – Post-conflict environments or instances of state crisis can provide a good opportunity for security-system overhaul. In many cases the resistance to reform has been swept away with the former regime. How to incorporate SSR into peace agreements remains a challenge that needs further research.
entitles them to seed and implement the international designed health objectives in a faster and better, simpler and cheaper, transparently and profitably manner. In this respect, the goals are oriented are to: a) sustain the global security and avoid all sorts of disaster and pandemics; b) encourage the social justice to reinforce the social value and humans’ rights; c) empower the patients to create a participatory, procreative, aware and committed behaviour, for sustaining both the universal rights and the care in using public money; d) develop a new generation of partnerships to make prevention fundamental and long life integrated together with a profitable medical education. It is true that efforts scarcely touch the good finality of their suitable purposes. Often they are disproportioned and not quite visible when the wish to do well is present. Despite the fact that the great and continual effort of social energy is directed to supply and sustain the organic structure of central and local authorities, the recurrence of perturbations, instead of sustain an adaptive changing process, is frequent enough and continue to damage the development of good ideas and the implementation of decisions. Thus the administrative and managerial disturbances cause more dysfunctions within the entire system with unimaginable consequences for the future. Often, the damage is even worse when manipulative activities jeopardize the system as a whole.
The description of the transition is somewhat more complicated than that of the terminal steady state. The reduction in the social security payroll tax rate is assumed to apply to all workers in period 1, thus immediately reducing the aggregate contributions used to pay benefits. Members of cohorts J − 2 to j * − 2 are alive and retired in period 1. They have been promised social security benefits determined by their earnings history under the old policy regime, and it is assumed that the government continues to pay them benefits at least as large as those promised. Members of cohort 1 and later work only under the new policy regime. Upon retirement, they will collect an annuity P financed by their contributions to individual retirement accounts. In the case of partial social security privatiazation they will also collect social security benefits. As under the original regime, these benefits are determined as a piecewise linear function of average indexed earnings over the working career. Under the new regime, the replacement rate along each segment of the benefit schedule is assumed to be roughly equal to τ τ ∞ s / 0 s times the original replacement rate. 6
In relation to the reformed Security Services in Sudan, a combination of mechanisms might be best suited to enhance accountability. These should consist of an independent review body that seeks to ensure the lawfulness of security services’ conduct through access to secret information for the purpose of review. This body, or a separate body, would ideally also have the power to receive and act on complaints brought by individuals who claim an infringement of their constitutional rights by the security services, for example in the course of surveillance operations. Such a complaint mechanism should have the power to recommend: an end to specific measures, appropriate forms of redress, and systemic reforms needed to prevent future violations. The judiciary should also be able to act an an oversight capacity by exercising investigative measures over violations by members of the services who, in addition, should be subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and any internal disciplinary mechanisms. In cases of serious human rights violations, such as torture, alleged victims should also have recourse to effective judicial remedies.
The second possible modification would be to focus or target the defined benefit pension on those with unsatisfactorily low Tier 2 defined contribution pensions instead of giving the full defined benefit payment to all retirees. Stated differently, this part of the overall pension could be a conditional defined benefit -- filling the gap between the defined contribution annuity and the level of retirement income that is regarded as acceptable. If such a reform has the effect of focusing these benefits on the lower income half of annuity recipients, the financing cost would be cut by more than 50 percent.
To quantify the extent to which Social Security redistributes resources, we calculate internal rates of return on Social Security benefits and taxes for the college- and non college-educated. Column (0) of Table 3 shows that the existing system is already fairly redistributive, with annual returns of 1.61% and 0.54%, a difference of 1.1 pp, for those without and with college degrees, respectively. Our estimates contrast with Goda et al. (2011) who calculate returns using Social Security earnings histories. They find rates of return to be moderately progressive (i.e., decreasing in lifetime earnings) for women and slightly regressive for men. (Our mortality rates apply to both sexes.) A major reason for the difference is that our model accounts for benefit taxation and DI. Removing these two elements causes our estimated rate of return for the non college-educated to fall to 0.87% and our estimated rate for the college-educated to rise to 0.62%. Our results differ more from S´ anchez-Romero et al.’s (2019) estimates for men born in 1960, which are fairly regressive, with rates of return for the 2nd and 4th income quintiles of 1.1pp and 2.4pp, respectively (Table 4, case DB-II). It seems unlikely that the differences are due solely to the modelling of Social Security benefits, as the ratio between the top and bottom quintiles of lifetime Social Security benefits reported by S´ anchez-Romero et al. (2019, Figure 2), 1.8, is similar to our 90-10 ratio for the PIA, 1.79. DI and benefit taxation again account for some of the difference.
These steps would be welcome developments. However, as long as there remains a significant gap between domestic prices and the average export netbacks across the cycle, there are more efficient ways of trying to maintain equilibrium within the two markets. One option would be to shift control over Gazeksport from Gazprom to the state, while leaving it as the sole channel for Russian gas exports to non- CIS markets. It would need to become a small and transparent company, separate from Gazprom and having only one task: buying gas in Russia and exporting it. Such a structure could ensure that all Russian gas companies enjoyed equal opportunities to export a share of their production, which would stimulate activity in the gas sector. Alternatively, the state could allow all producers direct access to export markets but under the condition that price formulae for all exporters were set via negotiations between European consumers and a single consortium of gas producers. 74 While neither of these options is without its problems, both would appear to be preferable to the status quo. Under either arrangement, it would be important for the authorities to consider carefully the allocation of the differential between domestic and export prices. In the case of the latter option, this would probably involve modifying the existing 30 per cent export tax so as to make it more sensitive to fluctuations in export prices. Such a change could help to counter the distortion of producers’ incentives created by the wedge between domestic and export prices, at least as long as this wedge remains significant. As more gas is sold on the domestic market at free prices, it would also be possible to use such a modified export tax to link domestic prices to external prices and thus provide producers with incentives to respond to developments on international markets. At the same time, it might serve as a stabilising mechanism, dampening the impact of large short-term movements in gas prices on the domestic economy.