Although in our model the agent cannot understand ex ante the effect of more information on his welfare, he is aware of all of his available actions and the associated payoffs. Therefore, he can perfectly understand and evaluate ex ante any lottery over outcomes that is generated by an information structure and his actions in the interim period. What he cannot do is determine which lottery is associated with which information structure. In other words, there is nothing problematic about measuring the value of information using ex ante expected utility, even though the agent may have different levels of awareness in the interim period. The bounded rationality constraint imposed by unawareness is that he has an incomplete mapping between the available information structures and the lotteries over outcomes they generate.
The value of information is examined in a risk-sharing environment with unawareness and complete markets. Information and awareness are symmetric among agents, who have a clear understanding of their actions and deterministic payoffs. We show with examples that public information can make some agents strictly better off at the expense of others, contrasting the standard results of Hirshleifer  and Schlee  that the value of public information is negative for all when risk averse agents are fully insured. We identify the source of this problem to be that, as awareness varies across states, it creates an awareness signal that the agents misunderstand and treat asymmetrically. As a result, risk-sharing opportunities that are available when this signal is not used, vanish when it is used. We identify a property, Conditional Independence, which we show is sufficient for the value of public information to be negative for all.
Our results provide new insights on the value of public information in exchange economies where equilibria are not necessarily fully Pareto efficient. Gottardi and Rahi  show that with incomplete markets a Planner can obtain ex-post improvements for any initial information structure, by locally changing the information agents receive before trading. In our setting, constrained ex-post improvements are possible only under special circumstances: the uninformative equilibrium interest rate needs to be above the equilibrium interest rate for every signal of the informative information structure. In the main result of the paper we show that ex-ante improvements exist if the common prior is sufficiently close to the threshold dividing first best equilibria from equilibria where the savings constraint and short-sale constraint are binding. These ex-ante improvements are not marginal in nature. We consider a situation where posterior beliefs can be far away from the prior, in fact one of the posterior beliefs is equal to one. Finally, we have shown that the study of the value of information in exchange economies can be simplified by adopting the techniques used in the literature on Bayesian persuasion. The simplification lies in realizing that information structures can be defined as a vector of beliefs and a vector of probabilities of the beliefs such that Bayes plausibility is satisfied. By taking the Planner as the sender and the agents as the receivers, whose actions affect the Planner’s payoff by changing equilibrium prices and the constrained feasible set, we can relate the value of information to the concavity of the Planner’s utility function, the Pareto frontier. The difference between our model and the standard problem in the Bayesian persuasion literature is that on top of Bayes plausibility, the sender has to make sure that the utility levels he assigns to the unconstrained agent, leave her indifferent with respect to the uninformative equilibrium.
In this section, we study the eﬀects of liquidity restriction on the investor through numerical simulation and then derive some implications of our model. We focus ﬁrstly on investor’s optimal portfolio strategy in the presence of restricted stocks, and investigate how the intensity of the arrival of relaxing restriction aﬀects his optimal demand for risky assets. Then, we investigate the welfare eﬀects of trade restriction and calculate numerically their economic costs, which we interpret as the illiquidity cost or the price of illiquidity. We further delve into the relationship between the share of illiquid equities X and the discount on illiquid equities. Finally, we discuss the value of information on the relaxation of SOEs.
V M M , it can immediately be seen that the value of information sharing increases along with the average variability V and the size of the Club n. Both parameters V and n are measures or indicators of the volatility of underlying risks in terms of aggregate claims. With the finding in this paper that homogeneity facilitates optimal realization of the value of information sharing, it is without loss of generality to conclude that the more volatile the insurance risk is, the more competitive the mutual insurance becomes.
Toktay et al. (2000) consider the real case of new circuit boards for Kodak’s single use re- manufactured camera. The goal is to have an ordering policy that minimizes the procurement, inventory holding and lost sales costs. A six-node closed queueing network is employed to rep- resent Kodak’s supply chain. Accordingly, the returns of cameras depend on past sales by a return probability and an exponential time lag distribution. Some of the procedures of Kelle and Silver are used to predict the unobservable inventory at the customer-use network node. The au- thors compare several forecasting methodologies with different levels of information. This paper provides an exact and more general analysis of the impact of (mis)information. Furthermore, the four methods of Kelle and Silver are compared numerically for a wide range of parameter values with respect to misinformation. Therefore, besides an intra-method comparison, here an inter-method analysis is also presented.
Category three tasks are mainly unstructured. Aspects of computer-based information m ay be useful but, in some cases, the task is perform ed better if rational dictates of hard data are ignored. Depending on the adm inistrative structure of the organisation, tasks in this category directly im pact all levels from line and m iddle m anagem ent downwards. For users in this category decisions m ay depend as much on intuition, experience and personal judgem ent as on formal hard data. The key informationvalue objectives here are relevance, reliability, good presentation and instant access w hen required. Because single errors or lapses are more likely to be costly than in the other situations, feedback is often instant and evaluation is m ore qualitative and pragm atic than quantitative. The main quantitative perform ance criteria are in term s of budget constraints applicable to various departm ents or sub-units. The m ain functional role is m onitoring and control, w hich includes short to m edium term process planning. Because many of the tasks are reactive rather than planned, it is difficult to determine their full inform ation requirement. Sometimes, it is even m ore difficult to assess the contribution of new inform ation to task outcomes. Staff in this category tend to be graduates or employees w ith considerable work experience in the organisation or in a similar position elsewhere. Because they are in charge of whole departm ents or functional units, these users consider themselves as crucial players in the organisation and some of them attribute successful outcomes m ore to their individual abilities to perform their jobs than to the inform ation resources they utilise in perform ing their duties. Situations that feature C4, C5, L4, H2, H3 and H5 fall into this category.
considered to be the most important ingredients to success in business. While we generally agree with this notion, we think that it does not always hold for financial markets. 70 years ago Cowles  was the first to find that the vast majority of stock market forecasters and fund managers are not able to beat the market. Subsequent studies by Jensen  and Malkiel [3,4] confirmed this finding. On average about 70 percent of actively managed stock mar- ket funds are outperformed by the market, for bonds the number is even higher at 90 percent. Passive investment yields on average 1.5 percent per annum more than an actively managed fund . How can we explain that the highly paid, professionally trained and, above all, well in- formed specialists managing these funds are not able to perform better than the market? The question whether more information is always good for market participants is highly relevant not only for fund managers, investment banks and regulators, but for every individual investor as well. In this paper we present results from experimental and simulation studies which allow improving our under- standing of the relationship between information and in- vestment success in markets. Our model features several innovations: First, our model is a multi-period model and therefore dynamic. It thereby overcomes one of the ma- jor weaknesses of earlier research relying only on static environments. Second, we use several information levels instead of only two used in most of the literature on the topic (e.g. Refs. [5,6,7,8]). This is critical to go beyond the straightforward (and not surprising) result that insid- ers are able to outperform uninformed investors. As we
Note that there is a discontinuity at c = 0. If the seller sets the penalty payment to zero, then every bidder bids v, but since the seller remains uninformed, he cannot distinguish between high risk and low risk bidders. Therefore, c must be positive in order to generate heterogeneity in valuations such that low risk bidders have a higher value for the contract than high risk bidders do. However, if c is too large, competition among bidders becomes less intense, and the seller’s share of the surplus is reduced. This may explain why the letter of credit required by PDVSA was for such a small amount in relation to the value of the operations contracts.
The paper’s findings can be summarized as follows. Our main result shows that a profit sharing rule exists which subdivides realized team output un- evenly among all team members in symmetric equilibrium. This rule ensures the communication of relevant private information by one team member— whom we call the ‘team leader’—and subsequent efficient effort exertion by all team members (including the leader) although efforts are not assumed to be contractible. Moreover, the proposed profit sharing rule allocates the entire realized output among the team members and thus balances its budget in and out of equilibrium. The derived sharing rule depends on some statistic of exerted efforts on which team remuneration can be based, for instance, the precision of a contractible ranking of partners’ efforts interpreted as a contest among team members. 6 This result is derived for a general environment only
This note develops a model in which a firm has to decide whether to undertake an irreversible investment. The firm has the option to delay it's decision in an effort to observe the actions of other firms. It is shown that a problem, akin to the herding phenomenon also applies, despite the endogenous time framework. In the context of an investment decision this manifests itself as the failure of a positive−payoff project to be undertaken. The most novel finding is that attempts to overcome this difficulty by further information gathering will, as a side effect, generate additional delay which may be enough to offset the gains of any new information.
During a new outbreak of an infectious disease, epidemiological models are generally utilised to inform policy decisions. However, such models are normally developed and parameterised using data from previous outbreaks. Whilst these models provide useful information, each novel crisis is likely to unfold in a unique way dependent on the factors particular to that epi- demic. In the United Kingdom during 2001 there was a major epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), a highly infectious disease of cloven-hoofed animals caused by infection with the virus Aphthae epizooticae. The most relevant information about the 2001 FMD outbreak came from analysis of the dynamics of that particular outbreak as it occurred [1–3]. Between outbreaks, research can be focused on minimising future outbreak uncertainty. Value of infor- mation (VOI) analysis is a method that allows a decision maker to place a value on reducing the level of uncertainty, by measuring how much the expected outcomes from the decision could be improved if uncertainty could be reduced . This allows for the identification of uncertainties that are important to management. Research to resolve those important uncer- tainties can then be prioritised. Value of information methods were initially developed in eco- nomic and process control settings in the 1960s, but have since been applied in health risk management , natural resource management  and other fields. The application of value of information methods in infectious disease management has only recently been explored [6–8].
Much has been written about the value of information and the benefits of increased access to it. There is an extensive literature on the value of library and information services, and a growing literature on the costs and, to a lesser extent, the benefits of more open access to research publications. To date, less attention has been given to the value of open curation and sharing of research data, although a few studies exist. There is also a rapidly growing literature on the costs and benefits of providing open access to public sector information (PSI). Each of these literatures suggests possible approaches to economic valuation, although some are more directly relevant than others. Our purpose here is to draw ideas from this literature and assess what methods might be most useful.
There are so many search engines that are used by internet user to retrieve and seeking websites with special keyword. There are so many record in world wide web that related to one keyword that entered by user then how google.com, yahoo.com, bing.com decide to show which site got top in list of result during key-word searching. In this document we will work to explain a way to change value of information for search engine, after that we can see good result of searching because there are not good searching in present time by any search engine because it targeted certain criteria particularly targeted traffic, hit and view. This criterion is achieved by any website by using simple tricks and by using third party that give insurance to website for top searching taking fees for SEO.
medical treatments which justifies the use of a pure adverse selection model. Consistent with Doherty and Thistle, we find that the private value of becoming informed is positive in our model. More surprisingly, the social (ex ante) value of information may be either negative (as in the normal insurance model) or positive and we describe the scenarios and construct examples for both possible sets of cases. The intuition why additional information might lead to a Pareto improve- ment is as follows. Suppose there are three groups, high risks, low risks and initially uninformed individuals who may be high or low risks. Suppose that in the reference situation only high risks buy life insurance (this is possible since the premium might be unacceptably high for low risks and uninformed individuals); hence the premium will be based on the high risks’ probability of death. Now suppose a test for uninformed consumers becomes available. If consumers were not to adapt their insurance purchases to their new information, their ex ante expected utility would be unchanged. However, although uninformed consumers who test negative (i.e. learn that they are low risks) will still not buy life insurance, those testing positive (the high risks) will. Therefore, the ex ante expected utility for uninformed consumers is increased by the new testing opportunity.
There are numerous studies on tourism information based on tourists’ perception, some of which involve the in- formation value. According to Cees (2000), tourists fulfill their needs for value by information searching, and simultaneously, their perception value for goods or service which emerges during the process of consumption significantly affect their choice preference for products . The information can be more easily accepted and increase the chances of purchasing (Diehl & Zauberman, 2005) . Vogt and Fesenmaier (1998) suggested that once the tourists approve the value of information they have searched, they will further search for more related information to elaborate their travel decision .
An empirical study on value relevance with the aim of comparing German GAAP and IFRS carried out by Schiebel (2007) by using listed companies on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The results show that German GAAP is statistically more relevant than IFRS. Mousa and Desoky (2014) examined the value relevance of IFRS using the case of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries, Bahrain. The research adopted two models: Stock return model and price earning model. The stock return model showed a minimal difference in the value relevance of accounting information post- IFRS adoption while the price earning model showed improvement in the value relevance of accounting information after the adoption of IFRS. In Nigeria, Umoren and Enang (2015) examined the effect of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of financial statements of Nigerian listed banks. Ohlson model was adopted for the research work. It was found out that both book value for equity and EPS became more value relevant after IFRS adoption which was confirmed theoretically by Mohammed and Lode (2015). Adzor and Abanyam (2014) examined whether investors’ perceive financial statements as important in stock valuation and whether IFRS adoption has led to a marginal increase in the value relevance of financial statements in Nigeria. Ohlson model was adopted. The result indicated that there is a positive relationship among EPS; book value of equity and SP and the value relevance of accounting information have improved after the adoption of IFRS.
Goals are the building blocks of business strategy, where strategic choices emerge from looking outside as well as inside the organisation (see Figure 2). External and internal factors clarify the operational environment, enabling the management do better and mission its desired future. External analysis is the essence of competitive strategy, where external stakeholders including customers, competitors, suppliers, and regulators have an impact on profit potential. Internal factors influence the organisational capacity in achieving goals. Technology is a part of the competitive environment and is always changing, making existing ways of doing things obsolete. The role of information technology in business modelling and business strategy cannot be ignored.
Numerous value relevance studies have established, one stream of literature focuses on whether the value relevance of accounting information has declined/increased over time. Prior research provides conflicting views. On the one hand, several prior literatures have found that the value relevance of accounting information has declined in recent years (Core, Guay, & Van Buskirk, 2003; Ely & Waymire, 1999; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Graham & King, 2000; Ho, C-S Liu, & Sohn., 2001; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Marquardt & Wiedman., 2004; Thinggaarda & Damkierb, 2008). On the other hand, A number studies also have been carried out in recent years that showed value relevance of accounting information has increased. Qystein and Frode, (2007) evaluated the relevance of financial reporting over a relatively long period (over 40 years ). Their research results showed that the value- relevance of Norwegian GAAP was non-declining throughout 1965 to 2004. Dung (2010) tested the value-relevance of financial statement information on the Vietnamese stock market. The results showed that the value relevance of accounting was statistically meaningful, though somewhat weaker than in other developed and emerging markets. Filip (2010) investigated the impact of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the value relevance of accounting in Romania. Findings suggest that the implementation of IFRS increased the value relevance of earnings.