Anderson (1983) proposes central themes of framing memory (and its recall in enaction). Firstly he proposes that memory is formed of cognitive units, understood as units of memory. These cognitive units are formed in associative links, existing as a unit node plus a set of elements (as arguments/augmentations of the node). As stated by Anderson (1983), when part of a cognitive unit is formed in long-term memory, all of it is (i.e. The node and its elements); and so when it is recalled it is recalled in full. For example, a node of the word train, may have element of -station, and so the memory recall or trigger will draw this association. However, the introduction of the new element (augmenter) e.g. Train-ticket, will create a new cognitive unit in memory. Reuse of the cognitive unit will increase its “strength” (its availability of recall). Anderson further states that there is a retention whereby the cognitive unit once formed is not lost, though it looses its strength as a decay over time. Thus a cognitive unit once formed may have a strength of e.g. 1, though with additional (successful/meaningful) recalls calls this increases e.g. “train-station” here now has 2, and “train-station” now has 3.
Here I present a thought experiment that can be used to exemplify the operation of such cognitive units, their recall and decay:
Think of your last journey by train and suggest an augmenter to the word “train-”.
“train-station” would be most obvious, as would “train-ticket”, a previously established cognitive unit e.g. See footnote 6, is probably not the one that was most obvious choice.
As noted by Anderson (1983), working memory contains information currently available for “processing”. This combines current environment, inferences, current goal information, and traces of long term memory (p263). A “spreading activation process determines the level of activity in long term memory”(p263). Working memory elements are sources of activation, e.g. As perceptual events or internal concept processing's. These activation events spread form the corresponding cognitive unit node to associated elements as a network of elements and cognitive units i.e. Current stimulus triggers a network of associated long-term memories. An automatic process is the making of information (long-term memory) available on the basis of an associative relatedness (to present working memory) (p264, Anderson, 1983). This can be understood through the process of priming, i.e. a suggestive primer (in the previous thought experiment “journey” in combination with “train”) activates a network of associative memory (“Train-station”, “train-ticket”, “taxi”, “travel”). The primer activates the network of associations without need for conscious control or concerted thought. As previously described, the cognitive units of most frequent use present as the stronger association, though strength decays over time. Anderson (p263, 1983) additionally states that the activity (strength) of associative nodes (working memory elements) will determine the speed in which they are processed i.e. The less strength a node has the longer it will take to be processed, or more simply put; the least commonly used association will take the longest amount of time to become apparent. As noted:
“… ACT clearly makes the prediction that overlearning will increase the probability of retention and speed of retrieval - predictions which are equally clearly confirmed”
(p623, Anderson, 1983)
In summary of ACT (Anderson, 1983); an “…experience establishes a network of nodes connected by links of varying strength. This network consists of cognitive units encoding various facts.” (p627). The activation of a network of nodes reflects the relationship to the source node (of activation). “The speed with which information in any part of the network can be processed is a function of its
6 Train-of-thought: by drawing upon ‘locomotive train’ associations in the preceding paragraph
there is a priming for that area of thinking, consequently the ‘train-of-thought’ is less prominent as an option.
activation” (p627).
From this we can understand that over repeated application a network of activation gains strength and so also gains speed in its processing (or execution). This network is dependant upon a combination of triggers composed of incoming activations (stimulus) as current environment, inferences, current goal information, and traces of long-term memory. The more that an action/behaviour/information recall is performed from a specific stimulus the faster it is to perform in future and the more dominant (and automatic) it becomes. As previously described, the strength of an activation / cognitive unit fades over time without re-activations. When the source nodes changes (i.e. A new greater strength stimulus or activation of cognitive unit) a spreading activation adjusts the levels of activation to achieve a new asymptomatic network pattern of activation. Thus, we do not become inert to all stimulus that falls below any previously established maximum strength, and so we can adapt to new stimulus or context that do not fit the current network of activation (i.e. Forget and move on to new challenges and goals).
This understanding through ACT is consistent with Århem and Liljenström’s (1997) understandings of cognition and conscious-cognition and the role of the brain (and central nervous system) as prioritising differing sensory information (from nervous system) and filtering the "nonsense" toward a selection of the most appropriate and significant stimulation (the mediation between sensation and perception).
ACT theory holds to the positioning of this thesis in that it establishes a foundation that cognition (schemas as concepts and understandings) may form automatic learned behaviours that become deep-routed in our capabilities of reaction and action. The more that we repeatedly use a technology in a specific manner toward a specific goal the less available the options toward conceiving novel alternatives are. Thus, where once a new technology revealed a vast range of actions, with repeated use it moves beyond the tool toward equipment. While “conscious conditions” facilitate a flexibility of behaviours, automatic processes are “rigid and stereotypic” and so less able to manage such novelty (p85, Shanahan, 2010); i.e. Flexibility to novelty will not be incorporated into an automatic act but will require a conscious element to facilitate / initiate flexibility. Thus, Mindless actions do not hold an active conscious element (sub-/non- conscious) and so are fixed and rigid; but a Mindful positioning toward such actions (conscious/reflective-conscious) introduces a contextualisation (through incorporating more sensory and mental elements) and facilitates flexibility and novelty.
1.12.5: Global Workspace Theory
The global workspace theory of Baars (1993, 1996, 1997) proposes a specific information processing architecture comprised of multiple sets of parallel specialist processes within a global workspace (through a similar framing to that of ACT). The specialist processes (which are sub-/non-conscious) work together and compete to enter dominance/control of the global workspace (as a conscious event). This global workspace then broadcasts (Shanahan, 2010) back outward through the network (directing toward action) (See figure 1.20 below and figure 1.21 following). Therefore, consciousness (in global workspace theory) directs action, attention and awareness toward specific events or goals. As noted by Shanahan (p96, 2010) the global workspace theory holds two central tenets; 1) the human brain (and that of some other animals) “conform to this architectural blueprint”; and 2) “[…] the conscious/unconscious distinction mirrors the division between processing that is mediated in the global workspace and processing that is localised within the specialist”. That is to say, processes when localised and specialist will not enter conscious/reflective-conscious awareness until they hold dominance over the global workspace. Furthermore, multiple specialist processes unconsciously and continually happen at the same time.
Figure 1.20; interpretation of strongest process (red) amoung many dominating control of the global workspace and broadcastings it back out to the wider network, this is an interpretive image and should be understood alongside the previous image examples (Chapter 1.5 -)
As noted by Shanahan:
blend of broadcast and competition at its core fosters integration among otherwise segregated brain processes.”
(p96, 2010)
The specialist processes are not and do not need to always be consciously processed, if all input, actions and potential actions are held within this network it would be impossible for them all to be conscious; i.e. with every possible action and stimulus at the forefront of awareness we would not be able to decipher quickly enough the possible actions. This can be exemplified through recall of a simple task such as riding a bike, not only would conscious awareness be required of gripping handle-bars, moving legs (and each of the individual muscles), breathing (and awareness of CO2 in the blood stream and so appropriate rate of breathing); but further conscious awareness of bodily temperature (and sweat production, dilation or contraction of blood-vessels to maintain), intestine control (as the digestive system is functional) etc.. What we actually experience (when conscious of events) is an orientation toward limited (or singular) events or sensations e.g. an obstacle in our path, the sound of our name being called. The processes held in conscious awareness forms part of the continual competition to control and direct the global workspace and further guide the supporting specialist processes toward the optimal action. Should a process in conscious experience be of lesser importance (activation) than a stronger competing event it will be replaced. Thus, the specialist processes competition informs the requirement of conscious attention moving the most critical/dominant process from sub-conscious (automatic) to consciously deliberative and potentially further toward reflective-conscious; or as put by Baars (p292, 1997) “[…] focal consciousness acts as a ‘bright spot’ on the stage, directed there by the selective ‘spotlight’ of attention”. Thus, while events may be in our awareness they do not necessarily feature in the spotlight of attention; the environment is the theatre, awareness the stage, but attention is the spotlight to what we see potentially focused toward one actor or case wide upon the stage.
Figure 1.21: “The global workspace architecture with separate sensory and motor processes, and accommodated within a sensorimotor loop. Direct
connections between the conscious condition is mediated by the global workspace” (p102, Shanahan, 2010)
As noted by Shanahan (previous above) this system allows rigid or fixed automatic behaviours but additionally facilitates novelty as the specialist processes may be focused upon to inform new behaviours (opposed enacting automatic) that integrate all available competing information (elements of the wider stage) which is then broadcast back into the network through conscious deliberation as guided thought and voluntary action. As highlighted by Baars (1997):
“One dramatic contrast is between the vast number of unconscious neural processes happening in any given moment, compared to the very narrow bottleneck of conscious capacity. The narrow limits of consciousness have a compensating advantage: consciousness seems to act as a gateway, creating access to essentially any part of the nervous system. […] Conscious experience creates access to the mental lexicon, to autobiographical memory, and to voluntary control over automatic action routines. […] All these facts may be summed up by saying that consciousness creates global access.”
(p292, Baars, 1997)
This notion of global workspace theory is highly supportive to the positioning of Mindfulness and Mindlessness and informs how such systems are conceptualised to operate in duality, drawn upon to unify the qualities found in the position of Århem and Liljenström (1997, Chapter 1.11) and Anderson (1983) (Chapter 1.12.4).