While the previously described contributions attend to Mindfulness and Mindlessness in philosophical understandings, centred around experiential qualities of consciousness; these are further supported through findings in the field of cognitive science. As described through neurophenomenology, richer understandings of such complex phenomena can be gained through a comparison of both findings in cognitive science and philosophical and phenomenological understandings; or more simply as described by Varela (p344, 1996) if “Φ [an observable phenomena] looks like Ψ [a reported phenomena] ⇒Φ explains Ψ”. In the following Section 2, neurophenomenology provides the basis of methodology in development of physiological measurements of Mindful and Mindless states during interaction.
This division (and specific inclusion) of consciousness and cognition in the provided definitions and their grounding serves as the distinction between Mindful and Mindless actions and provides (a partial) biological and evolutionary basis for such qualities, an understanding lacking in previous definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. Such understanding (and incorporation to the definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness) additionally facilitates the application of objective methods of analysis from cognitive science in measuring such states.
While the above holds position for understanding Mindfulness and Mindlessness in a broader sense of human (or indeed any conscious agent) processes, here the specific interest is how these states inform and alter actions with technologies, namely through their influence upon how technologies affordances are revealed and utilised. As noted by Shanahan (2010) affordance is “cognition”, a position echoing that of Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s (1991) notions of Enaction, whereby we
equipment – Chapter 1.9.2). Shanahan (2010) further proposes the use of a combinatorial structuring of objects in our environment (applied as tools Chapter 1.9.1) that draws upon a higher level of cognition including a sense of ‘self’; here assumed to be a Mindful act of conscious-cognition according to that described by Århem and Liljenström (1997).
Such positions strengthen the argument for Tools and Equipment as differing states of action within an environment; Tools revealing a combinatorial structures and planning (conscious-cognition) and so Mindful; and Equipment drawing upon rapid cognition and the previously known (i.e. memory) and Mindless. Consequently their utility in the pragmatic definitions provided offers support to the philosophical perspectives, though draws upon learnings from well-established domains (i.e. cognitive- and neuro-science) which may be validated through methods of those domains, such as observable physiological changes and characteristics.
In the same vein, global workspace theory of Baars (1993, 1996, 1997) is drawn upon to provide a broader integration of consciousness and cognition akin to that of Århem and Liljenström (1997) and Anderson (1992). It is proposed that a specific information processing architecture exists in all agents with cognitive and conscious capacities. This is comprised of multiple sets of parallel specialist processes (which are sub-/non-conscious optimised cognitive processes) working and competing together to enter a state of control over the global workspace, which is a conscious (potentially Mindful) event. This global workspace then broadcasts (Shanahan, 2010) back outward through the network (directing toward action) as conscious intent guiding actions (as opposed to solely reactionary). Indeed the segregated and specialist human brain processes conform to such physiological architecture as noted by Shanahan (2010).
Such positions strengthen the biological underpinning of how Mindfulness and Mindlessness might be measured through physiological observation, and consequently further justify the application of methods of analysis derived from cognitive and neurosciences (as performed in Section 2). This attribute of their inclusion and utility is lacking in previous definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness and here offers potential for the objective measurement of these states. Equally significant here, cognitive science perspectives, such as the positions of Baars (1993, 1996, 1997), Århem and Liljenström (1997) and Anderson (1992) (and others), draw a balance between Mindfulness and Mindlessness in terms of their positive and negative functional attributes. This balance is often overlooked or skewed heavily toward Mindfulness as optimal in all circumstance in previous perspectives; yet through the supporting literature (of Section 1) it is evident that Mindlessness offers an equally significant and beneficial role, should the situation be appropriate.
It was highlighted use of consciousness (and unconsciousness) in cognitive science is easily replaced by Mindfulness (and Mindlessness) respectively. Mindful perception enables access to widespread cognitive sources of information and (and to the ‘‘observing self’’ – reflective consciousness. However, and significant to the following Section 2, when in states of automaticity, Mindlessness, the ability to self- report on sub-/non-conscious events becomes diminished as noted by Shanahan “Some are accurate, but some are just guesses, and some are plain wrong” (p71, 2010).
From the above contributions of Section 1 support is given to the overarching contribution of the first section of this thesis - the defining of Mindfulness and Mindlessness within human-computer interaction:
Mindfulness, is defined as a state of broad reflective-conscious awareness upon the present context and content of information and stimulus. Information and technologies are explored and combined through concerted deliberation in novel categorisations of distinctions and action potentials as an abstract-tool.
During interaction mindfulness is slow yet analytical whilst being receptive to change, whereby constituting elements are consciously present through use and application of a fluidic-tool.
Mindlessness is defined as an intuitive understanding that exists in non- conscious processes, with failure to account for contextual dependencies through premature cognitive commitments; where information and technologies hold a functional fixedness viewed as absolute through equipmental-fixedness.
During interaction, mindlessness is without conscious deliberation through sub-conscious automaticity, developed from a cognitive fixation upon previous well-learned solutions. Such actions are performed before, faster than or without concerted conscious awareness in phenomenological invisibility; resulting in the inability to develop novel solutions and the application of technology through equipmental-transparency.
Both of these states are defined as the opposing ends of a spectrum of which activities may move from one to another end and between. While these definitions are presented here as grounded within the previously described findings (of Section 1) they are expected to develop with future research and further inquiry to the field, and through the advancement of knowledge in the contributing disciplines.
be evaluated. The definitions produced in this first section of this thesis sought to reduce the ambiguity of previous definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. This was achieved through grounding from supporting and well-established fields. Similarly, a number of lexicon are provided (e.g. for differentiating conscious and
cognitive states; Abstract-tool, Fluidic-tool, Equipmental-fixedness, and,
Equipmental-transparency) to better describe Mindful and Mindless interactions and engagements with technologies. Finally, ambiguity of the phenomena is reduced through ensuring the definitions hold interaction as a central tenet in their formation. Consequently, the definitions are equally centred toward describing specific instances and qualities of interactions. Through the incorporation of supporting knowledges from well-established fields further understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness is also provided as those fields advance their understandings. Primarily the division of cognition and consciousness, within an approach akin to a neurophenomenological methodology, allows for understandings gained through philosophical learnings support where cognitive science currently lacks. Through this methods for analysis of these qualities from their respective fields can be applied (as demonstrated in the following section) and enhanced as knowledge in these areas increases.
Consequently, the definitions provided in this section of the thesis not only meet the previously described criteria needed in offering a greater suitability in describing Mindful and Mindless interactions; but additionally (as described above and demonstrated in the following) provide utility in methods of analysis and understanding previously missing.