The third comparison raised by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) is upon the works of Dewey. Dewey distinguishes stimulus from sensory excitation exemplified as an animals sensing toward a scent where the response is localised to the sensory organs (nostrils dilate, inhalation draws scent to olfactory receptors etc.). This is understood as localised "Because there is no disequilibration, there is no need for readjustment of the organic and environmental factors of the total experienced situation." (p31, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998). However, should the animal experience a global disequilibration a more demanding "stimulus- and-response" event occurs and provokes a motive or action to return to equilibration. Thus disequilibration exists as a tension of motives or stimulus to be resolved, with the degree to which the disequilibration exists as leading toward action or inhibition of action.
It is understood that while the above may present the role of disequilibration as a totality, a task or goal may hold several minor disequilibrations during the course toward achieving equilibrium (the broader primary goal). Yet as noted by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998):
"…Dewey thought that organic reequilibration is sequential and not merely serial. It therefore plays an essential role in the formation of new habits. Even though an organism may experience repeated occurrences of excitation-response behavior, such behavior does not contribute to readjustment within a total experienced situation. For there to be readjustment, there must first have been a breakdown of organic energy relations. The consequent struggle for reequilibration is then the basis for reformation of habits. In such cases, closure or consummation involves a consolidation of past experiences with a view to their potential use in future breakdowns of relevant types. In the case of nonhuman animals, habit formation is "pushed from behind", unreflectively. Among humans, however, habit formation is "pulled from beyond" by reflectively constructed ends-in-view. For Dewey, life, especially life that involves complex organizational factors, is a continuing process of breakdown and reconstruction of habits.
Dewey observed that humans often attempt to recover equilibrium in ways that do not promote growth. Faced with a breakdown, they often retreat to more primitive levels of behavioral response rather than moving forward onto behavioral plateaus that are more richly meaningful."
Thus, for Dewey a human is capable of a reflective-conscious understanding that often addresses a longer (temporality) or wider encompassing goal as opposed to resolving sensory excitation (primitive levels of behavioural response). Such perspectives of actions developing from sensory excitation are parallel to cognitivist views as will be discussed later in chapter 1.11 (see: Århem and Liljenström (1997)).
Many actions are reliant upon previously developed habitual responses in resolving equilibrium, with challenges presented being the breakdown and reconstruction of habits. However, humans often attempt to recover equilibrium through means that do not promote growth and fall reliant upon previously developed habits; they respond sequentially through previously learned methods, and so do not develop practices that are more richly meaningful. To achieve growth a level of "inquiry" is required that is a reflective level of action (and thus reflective- conscious) and facilitates development and improves the response towards a required action. Therefore, a breakdown for Dewey is not only an obstacle in an objective but is additionally "…the occasion for the formation of new habits, including enriched technologies of all sorts, ..." (p32, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998).
A visual interpretive example of how Dewey’s position compares to the previously defined differing states of conscious awareness is provided in the following figure 1.13.
Figure 1.13; Interpretation of how the position of Dewey might be understood in terms of the previously defined (Chapter 1.5) differing states of consciousness. To be noted is that enriched new equilibrium state is of a different colour to the previous habit as it is of a new and modified habit.
Thus, through Dewey's understanding, while challenges and breakdowns may pose difficulties towards agents should they move beyond habitual and pre-learned responses the breakdown or challenge offers opportunity to develop a broader understanding and growth.
Using the example of a delivery driver responding to the vehicles engine struggling to maintain speed or achieve acceleration requiring a gear change; a level of inquiry and growth is required to ease such situation i.e. Learning to change gear prior to such events e.g. seeing an approaching roundabout and adjusting the vehicles gears and speed to ease efficiency and manoeuvrability.
Through Dewey’s understanding instances of breakdown are seen as observable facts of life (and learning) in the formation and improvement of habits toward cessation of disequilibration and opportunities facilitating enriching experiences.
1.6.2: Heidegger, Leont'ev And Dewey Agreements And
Disagreements
While the three understandings (Heidegger, Leont'ev and Dewey) differ in their framing of breakdowns there are commonalities that are applicable to the research presented here. Specifically this can be understood as a breakdown causing a deliberate contemplation upon a tool or task as a disruption to non-reflective and habitual (sub-conscious) processing. Additionally each of the models of breakdown hold intentionality toward a goal as a congruent theme, thus a breakdown can only occur in the context of a directed activity. Should a breakdown occur outside of the aims of a goal (in that it does not impact the immediacy of the activity) then it will not alter the actions of the agent or their experience in the activity. Therefore, here normal functioning and breakdown are understood as necessitating a context in the directedness toward “something” (i.e. a goal or technology) rather than abstract experience. As Mindfulness and Mindlessness are here understood as states of consciousness it further supports the positioning that an agent can be Mindful or Mindless toward a goal or technology (as a state as opposed to a trait).
These philosophical understandings are useful toward a pragmatic definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness as they facilitate understanding the phenomena within well-established domains, through modalities accessible beyond constrains of empirical investigation (given the challenges of understanding consciousness through conventional scientific inquiry), and in ways applicable to the use of technologies and so the field of HCI. Through situating Mindfulness and Mindlessness alongside these philosophies we are equally able to reduce the ambiguity (through richer descriptions) of what phenomena is being described and where.
While the positions of Heidegger, Dewey and Leont'ev are not directly framed within Mindfulness and Mindlessness they are able to be compared through