Congruities

One way in which my account of akratic behavior does harmonize with this part of the text is that the three pairs of value terms that figure so prominently in this part of the dialogue (hêdu/aniaron, kalon/aischron, and agathon/kakon) imply three different sources of motivation that correspond fairly well to the animal, manly, and epistemic frames of mind. It is only through a careful manipulation of these value terms—making heavy use of ‘manly’ language in order to lead Protagoras to deny knowledge-akrasia, omitting all such language when leading the many to endorse a vulgar form of hedonism, uniting all three value terms in the final courage- wisdom argument—that Socrates is able to carry his line of questioning to its conclusion. Indeed, the three most prominent characters in this part of the dialogue—Socrates, Protagoras, and ‘the many’—roughly correspond to the epistemic, manly, and animal frames of mind, respectively. The many are depicted as the lowly, childish mass of mankind who are easily led to agree that all they really care about are pleasure and pain; Protagoras is depicted as a person who looks down on the many with a superior air, responds strongly to ‘manly’ language, and insists that courage or manliness (andreia), the manly virtue par excellence, is not a kind of knowledge; while Socrates is portrayed by Plato as pushing for an epistemic unification of all three values—pleasant, noble, and good—and of the five conventionally-recognized human virtues, all of which he wishes to identify with a single kind of knowledge.1 Consider in addition that the many do not normally see themselves as ultimately caring only about the total balance of pleasure over pain in their lives as a whole, but that this is something Socrates must bring them to see. If, as I earlier argued, Socrates is able to lead the many in this hedonistic direction only on account of their moral-motivational confusion, a confusion which also makes it possible for a

1

skillful questioner like Socrates to lead them down a ‘manly’ path, where honor and shame are most prominent, then the many themselves may be said to inhabit what I have called a ‘semi- organized hodgepodge’ frame of mind.

Another way in which my account of akratic behavior harmonizes with this part of the text is that although Socrates does not explicitly distinguish ignorancee from ignorancek, he does

suggest that both are involved in akratic behavior. Not only does Socrates clearly state that knowledge (epistêmê) will prevent the kind of flip-flopping that characterizes certain kinds of akratic behavior,1 he also says that part of the many’s problem is that they do not even occupy a knowledge-oriented frame of mind with regard to their problem:

Accordingly “to be overcome by pleasure” means just this—ignorance in the highest degree (amathia hê megitstê), which Protagoras here and Prodicus and Hippias profess to cure. But you, through supposing it to be something else than ignorance (dia to oiesthai allo ti ê amathian einai), will neither go yourselves nor send your children to these sophists, who are the teachers of those things—you say it cannot be taught (hôs ou didaktou ontos); you are chary of your money and will give them none (kêdomenoi tou arguriou kai ou didontes toutois), and so you fare badly both in private and in public life (kakôs prattete kai idia[i] kai dêmosia[i]).2

The reference to the sophists here is clearly tongue-in-cheek, but if one replaces the playful ‘You ought to be paying money to the sophists’ with its earnest Socratic equivalent, ‘You ought to be spending your days in the pursuit of wisdom,’3 Socrates’ overall diagnosis begins to look somewhat like mine: Akratics “fare badly” not just because they lack epistêmê, i.e., not just because they fail within the epistemic frame of mind (insofar as they may be said to inhabit it),

1 _{See 356de. Cf. Terry Penner’s discussion of this passage, op. cit.} 2 _357e2-8.

3 _{Cf. the end of the initial appeal to Cleinias in the Euthydemus 282a-d. Cf. esp. 282cd: “How good of you to relieve}

me of a long inquiry into this very point, whether wisdom is teachable or not teachable! So now, since you think it is both teachable and the only thing in the world that makes men happy and fortunate, can you help saying that it is necessary to pursue wisdom (anangkaion einai philosophein) or intending to pursue it yourself (autos en nôi echeis

but also because they do not even try to acquire epistêmê, i.e., because they do not even (fully)

inhabit this frame of mind. As for failing to realize that one ought to inhabit the epistemic frame

of mind (with regard to a given activity), that is included here, too. The many do not try to acquire epistêmê, because they falsely think that what will fix their problem is not a teachable thing (didakton) and that therefore epistêmê will not help them.1

Another implied distinction between inhabiting the epistemic frame of mind and actually possessing knowledge may be found in the first courage-wisdom argument. Socrates speaks of people who dive boldly into wells on account of their knowledge. He also speaks of people who dive boldly into wells on account of their radical ignorance; Protagoras calls them mad. The people who are obviously inbetween are those who recognize that this is an activity that is properly governed by knowledge but do not take themselves to have that knowledge, and so approach the activity with a healthy sense of ‘epistemic’ fear. Like the expert divers, such people inhabit the epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of diving, but like the ‘mad’ divers, they lack the knowledge that properly governs the activity.

Consider as well the distinction that Socrates draws between the measuring art and the power of appearance. Someone who uses the measuring art as his guide to making choices in life will carefully assess the pros and cons of each of his options, make the necessary

calculations, and act in accordance with the results. He will try to live a knowledge-guided life, and he will succeed. What about the person who uses the power of appearance as his guide? Will he assess the pros and cons of each of his options, make careful calculations, and act in accordance with the results which he thinks come closest to knowledge? In other words, does the person who uses the power of appearance as his guide to his choices in life possess the meticulous knowledge-oriented habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that characterize an

inhabitant of the epistemic frame of mind? If so, Socrates has failed to describe the typical akratic, who surely does not have these habits. If not, Socrates’ contrast between the measuring art and the power of appearance is not so much a contrast within the epistemic frame of mind as a contrast between an epistemic and a non-epistemic frame of mind.

Finally, consider what Socrates is trying to bring the many themselves to see. Socrates is trying to make the many realize that the only thing they ultimately care about is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain over the course of their lives as a whole; that the best way to do this is by calculating relative quantities of pleasure and pain by means of a measuring art; and that what they therefore ought to do is place all their trust in the guidance of this art, i.e., this technical knowledge. Is this the kind of argument that Socrates would bother making to people who already inhabited a knowledge-oriented frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life? Or is the intended effect of this argument precisely to bring the many to inhabit this frame of mind with regard to this activity? If so, this suggests that one of the things that Socrates thinks is responsible for the many’s misunderstanding of akratic behavior—and, not incidentally, for their own akratic behavior—is their failure to inhabit an epistemic frame of mind with regard to the activity of living a human life.