Socrates

I argued in Part One that while conversing with Protagoras, Socrates is somewhat caught up in the manly frame of mind, even as he also inhabits the epistemic frame of mind. In arguing for this claim I did not help myself to any evidence from the section on Simonides’ poem, yet this section contains some of the strongest evidence. Observe how Socrates reacts when he seems to the audience to have been refuted:

This speech of his won a clamorous approval from many of his hearers (eipôn oun tauta pollois

thorubon pareschen kai epainon tôn akouontôn); and at first I felt as though I had been struck by a

skilful boxer (hôsperei hupo agathou puktou plêgeis), and was quite blind and dizzy (eskotôthên te

kai ilingiasa) with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause.”4

1 _{339c3-4: “Nor does the saying of Pittakos / have, in my view, the ring of truth, though spoken by a wise man}

(kaitoi sophou para phôtos eirêmenon) . . . .” (Andrew Miller’s translation in Greek Lyric, Hackett, 1996.) At 343a Pittacus is included in a list of the Seven Sages.

2

344b: “[L]et us go over its general outline and intention, which is assuredly to refute Pittacus’s saying (hoti pantos

mallon elengchos esti tou Pittakeiou rêmatos), throughout the ode.” 345d: “[A]nd in this vehement tone (houtô sphodra) he pursues the saying of Pittacus (epexerchetai tôi tou Pittakou rêmati) all through the poem . . . .” 346e-

347a: “Hence I should never reproach you, Pittacus, if you would only speak what is moderately reasonable and true. But as it is, since you lie so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth (sphodra gar

kai peri tôn megistôn pseudomenos dokeis alêthê legein), on this score I reproach you (dia tauta se egô psegô).” 3 _{Cf. 345b5, 345d9-e4.}

4

Socrates describes himself, perhaps ironically, as having been thrown into a different state of mind, a state of mind in which he cannot see clearly or find his bearings. From within this altered state of consciousness Socrates experiences what has just taken place in characteristically ‘manly’ terms: ‘A violent act of athleticism directed against me has won my opponent vociferous praise from the crowd.’ If an author wished to dramatize the experience of slipping suddenly into the manly frame of mind, it would be hard to compose a more perfect description.

Consider as well two passages in which Socrates uncharacteristically masks a lack of sure-footedness:

Then do you think the second agrees with the first?

So far as I can see, it does, I replied (at the same time, though, I was afraid there was something in what he said [kai hama mentoi ephoboumên mê ti legoi]). Why, I asked, does it not seem so to you (atar, ephên egô, soi ou phainetai)?1

Then—to tell you the honest truth (hôs ge pros se eirêsthai t’alêthê)—in order to gain time for considering the poet’s meaning (hina moi chronos engenêtai tê[i] skepsei ti legoi ho poiêtês), I turned to Prodicus . . . .2

Normally Socrates pretends to be less dialectically capable than he actually is.3 Here it certainly looks as if, for fear of coming off badly in the debate, he is pretending the opposite. Now, it may be that Socrates is purposely going out on a ‘manly’ limb in order to achieve a larger ‘epistemic’ goal (e.g., protecting Hippocrates from Protagoras). But presumably Socrates could have found a graceful way of confessing that he did not have a ready answer. As for the first passage, Socrates might have adapted a line of his own from an earlier point in the dialogue:

1

339c7-9.

2 _339e3-5.

3 _{Cf. 334cd, where Socrates calls himself “a forgetful sort of person,” a comment which Alcibiades later dismisses}

I . . . believe that virtue is not teachable [substitute: ‘that Simonides does not contradict himself’]: but when I hear you speak thus, I am swayed over (kamptomai), and suppose there is something in what you say (oimai ti se legein) . . . .1

That Socrates behaves as he does suggests to me that (with regard to the activity of conversing with Protagoras) he has at this point fallen more fully under the sway of the manly frame of mind.

But in the very section in which he comes across as most ‘manly’ and out of character, Socrates also expresses his most ‘epistemic’ and characteristically Socratic views about

knowledge.2 Thus the section on Simonides’ poem only strengthens the case for a claim made in Part One of this chapter: that while conversing with Protagoras, Socrates is somewhat caught up in a manly frame of mind, even as he also inhabits a knowledge-oriented frame of mind.3

1

320b4-6.

2

As I noted just now, he attributes these views to Simonides (345b5, 345d9-e4).

3 _{Patrick Coby, among others, has pointed out several similarities between Socrates and Pittacus and between}

Protagoras and Simonides (“Protagoras has so much in common with Simonides that it may be warranted . . . to treat Simonides as a surrogate for Protagoras”—Patrick Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment, p. 111). But few scholars seem to have noticed that Simonides is in some sense standing in for Socrates and that Pittacus is in some sense standing in for Protagoras. Protagoras, like Pittacus, is an older ‘wise man’ whose reputation for wisdom is already established. Socrates, like Simonides (at the time of writing his poem, according to Socrates), is a younger man who has yet to make much of a name for himself. Socrates says (343c1) that Simonides is “ambitious to get a name for wisdom (hate philotimos ôn epi sophia[i])”. Protagoras says (361e4-5) to Socrates, “I say I should not be surprised if you won high repute for wisdom (ei tôn ellogimôn genoio andrôn epi sophia[i]).” In the final line that Socrates puts into the mouth of Simonides (346e-347a) it is hard not to hear a Socratic rebuke of

Protagoras: “Hence I should never reproach you, Pittacus, if you would only speak what is moderately reasonable and true. But as it is, since you lie so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth (sphodra

gar kai peri tôn megistôn pseudomenos dokeis alêthê legein), on this score I reproach you (dia tauta se egô psegô).”

For what it is worth, both ‘Simonides’ and ‘Socrates’ start with sigma, while ‘Protagoras’ and ‘Pittacus’ start with

pi. It is probably going too far to claim that just as Simonides is attacking a famous dictum of Pittacus’s, so Socrates

(and through him, Plato) is attacking a famous dictum of Protagoras’s (e.g., his ‘man-measure’ dictum, quoted by Socrates in the Theaetetus, 152a: “Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.”). Nevertheless, the idea is not as far-fetched as it seems. At 361ab, when the personified ‘upshot’ (exodos) of the argument is charging Socrates with self-contradiction (cf. Simonides’ seeming self-contradiction), it says that Socrates has been trying to show that “all things are knowledge” (panta

chrêmata estin epistêmê). This, as Adam and Adam point out, is something of an exaggeration, “as if Socrates held

!,)*(-µ- to be the #&.- of the universe . . . .” (Adam and Adam, p. 192). C. C. W. Taylor writes that this “is surely intended to recall, and to signify Plato’s rejection of Protagoras’s famous dictum ‘Man is the measure of all things’ (pantôn chrêmatôn metron estin anthrôpos).” (C. C. W. Taylor, p. 214.) Whether or not this supposed allusion exists in the Protagoras, there is an allusive passage in the Laws (716c) that is clearly intended to recall, and to signify Plato’s rejection of, this dictum: “Now, God is the measure of all things (ho dê theos hêmin pantôn

To summarize: In light of Socrates’ description of the Spartans and Cretans, his

characterization of Simonides, and his own behavior, it is fair to say that multiple distinctions in this section correspond to my distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘manly’ ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.