Three pairs of value terms

In the Protagoras, as in other Platonic dialogues, each of three pairs of value terms is at certain times distinguished from and at certain times lined up with one or both of the others:

agathon, kakon (good, bad); kalon, aischron (beautiful, ugly; or, noble, shameful); hêdu, aniaron

(pleasant, painful).1 Agathon/kakon, like our ‘good/bad’, is the most abstract and flexible of the three pairs: it can be used to express the idea that something serves or thwarts one’s self-interest, as well as to express the idea that something is good or bad for the community, or good or bad absolutely; the idea that some food is beneficial or corrupting to the body, as well as the idea that some habit or practice is beneficial or corrupting to the soul; the idea that someone is good or bad at some particular occupation, as well as the idea that he is a good or bad person.2 Agathon is the standard adjective corresponding to the noun aretê (goodness, virtue). Kalon/aischron, though somewhat less all-purpose than agathon/kakon, is also fairly flexible: it can be used to express the idea that someone is physically attractive or repulsive, as well as to express the idea that some action is noble or base. Of the three adjective pairs, it is the one most closely tied to notions of praise, blame, honor, and shame and, in general, to what I called in chapter 2 the ‘manly’ frame of mind. Hêdu/aniaron is the most immediately sensual pair of terms: while its range does extend from bodily pleasure and pain to spiritual joy and sorrow, and while it can be

1

What follows is a brief discussion of the differences between these terms. For a more detailed discussion, see K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 51-3 and 69-73 especially.

2 _{Cf. the use of agathos and kakos in Simonides’ poem (339b1, 344c4, 344d8, 344e7-8, 346c3) and in Socrates’}

used to refer to an objective quality about which a person may be mistaken (e.g., the sweetness of honey), it is the one of these three pairs that is most tightly bound to subjective sense

experience.1

Most children, whether ancient Athenian or modern American, whether taught to use the words agathon, kalon, hêdu or the words good, beautiful, pleasant, are sufficiently familiar with but also sufficiently confused about these three pairs of value terms that they are inclined at times to unite each pair with each of the others, but also at times to set each pair at odds with each of the others, depending on the “diet” of examples they are fed2; and many such children turn into adults who retain these inclinations. Someone who is skilled at asking questions can easily exploit this kind of confusion, as Socrates does, I think, in the courage-wisdom section.3

1 _{The following passage from Plato’s Laws illustrates some of these differences in range of use and meaning (though}

the view expressed by the Athenian at the end is far from the conventional ancient Greek view):

ATHENIAN: . . . Granted that a man is brave, strong, handsome (kalos), rich, and can satisfy every passion of a lifetime, do you deny that, if he is an unjust and arrogant man (adikos . . . kai hubristês), his life must inevitably be dishonorable (ex anangkês aischrôs an zê[i]n)? Or possibly you would go so far as to concede the dishonor (to ge

aischrôs).

CLINIAS: Readily.

ATHENIAN: And inevitably [bad], too (to kai kakôs)? Would you allow that? CLINIAS: No, that is not to be so readily admitted (ouk an eti touth’ homoiôs).

ATHENIAN: And, further, unpleasant (to kai aêdôs) and inexpedient for himself (mê xumpherontôs autôi)? CLINIAS: How can we possibly carry concession to that pitch?

ATHENIAN: How? Apparently only by the intervention of a god to produce a concord as complete as our present discordance. For my part, dear Clinias, I find it even more certain that these truths are beyond question than that Crete is an island. (661e-662b, A. E. Taylor’s translation.)

2 _{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §593: “A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one}

nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.”

3 _{To illustrate this point and to help prepare the reader for what is to come, I offer this made-up exchange}

between a Socrates-like questioner and an answering child:

When your head or stomach hurts, does that mean that something bad has happened to your body, or something good? —Something bad. When you hit your brother on the head or punch him in the stomach, hard enough to make him cry, what do your parents say: that you’ve done something good, or something bad? —Something bad. So whether it’s you who’s feeling pain or somebody else, pain goes together with badness? —Right. And pleasure goes together with goodness? — Yes. When your father makes you eat your vegetables, or when your mother makes you get a shot at the doctor’s, do you like it? —No, I hate it. It pains you? —Yes. Then since pain goes together with badness, when your father tells you to eat your vegetables, he must say something like this: “Eat your vegetables, they’re bad for you.” Isn’t that what he says? —No, he says the reverse; he says they’re good for me. Well, but when your mother takes you to the doctor’s, surely she doesn’t tell you that the painful shot you’re getting is for your own good? —But that’s just what she does say. Then do you still think that pain goes together with badness? —No, maybe not.