CHAPTER 5. PARTY ORGANISATION IN THE UK
5.2. The Conservative party
5.2.1. History and change in the Conservative party
The Conservative party has without any doubt been the most successful political party of 20th century British politics. When John Major was defeated in 1997, the party had been out of power for only 29 years since 1900 (Garner and Kelly 1998: 56). This is an even more considerable feat when we consider that this party, associated with wealth and privilege, has managed to survive and even benefit from the enfranchisement of the working-class, which did not at first seem to be natural Conservative constituency.
Figure 5.2. Share of the vote and share of the seats of the Conservative party, 1900-2005
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
1900 191 0 Jan
1918 1923 1929 1935 1950 1955 1964 1970 1974 Oct 1983 1992 2001
% vote % seats
The Conservative party is the heir of the Tory party, one of the ruling parties of the 18th and 19th centuries. Its official name is the Conservative and Unionist Party, a legacy of the merger with the Liberal Unionist Party in 1912 as a result of the party's opposition to Home Rule and the independence of Ireland. The party is now commonly called the Conservative party, but the term 'unionist' was still used in Scotland until 1965, where the Scottish Unionist party was the face of the conservatism.
In the 19th century, the party was originally associated with the landed aristocracy and its core values were tradition, hierarchy, natural inequalities and order. These beliefs were shaken under Peel's government (1841-6): contrary to the interests of the landed gentry, Peel repealed the Corn Laws, which supported agricultural revenues by imposing import limits but increased the price of grain (Leach 1996: 108). As a result, Peel attracted a new and much needed electoral base to the party, the middle classes that believed in self-reliance (rather than state protection), individualism (instead of hierarchy) and thrift. As a result, the Conservatives came to represent the 'haves' of the country (Garner and Kelly 1998: 59).
At the end of the 19th century, Disraeli managed to open the party's appeal even wider with his brand of 'One nation' Conservatism. By emphasising state intervention and state provision of services to improve the condition of the poorest and at the same time strengthening the party's patriotic message around the defence of the
institutions and the empire, Disraeli managed to attract a new working class constituency to the Conservative party (Norton 1996: 76-7; Garner and Kelly 1998:
60-1). This strategy transformed the Conservative party into the most working-class party in Britain until Second World War.
The party consolidated its structure during the 19th century, first by establishing central headquarters in order to coordinate candidates in 1852 and then by linking constituency associations and their membership throughout the country (Rasmussen 1998: 1). The creation of the National Union of Conservatives and Constitutional Associations in 1867 was the first example of a national party organisation in Britain and was a consequence of the extension of the franchise in that same year. The National Union aimed at integrating the working class in support for the then government and organising the party on the ground. In 1870 the party's Central Office was created (Blake 1970: 2).
Conservative party: contemporary organisation and principles
Between 1945 and 1997, the Conservative party has been in power for a total of 35 years. It has largely dominated British politics first shortly after Second World War (1951-64) and then during the Thatcher and Major premierships (1979-1997). These two periods stand in sharp contrast to one another. While the Conservative party contributed to the maintenance of the post-war consensus on the welfare state and Keynesian economic management in the 1950s and up to the 1970s, the second period was dominated by what was to be called Thatcherism, which is a mix of monetarist, pro-market economic policies, authoritarian social values and strong leadership style (Gamble 1994: Chapter 3; Norton 1993: 31-2).
In 1997, the Conservative party became an English party without a single MP from either Scotland or Wales. After this defeat the party entered a period of instability. The party changed leader three times between the 1997 and 2005. John Major resigned after the 1997 election and the parliamentary party elected William Hague, a young MP with only two-year Cabinet experience, to replace him. His leadership period has been rather harshly described as the party's 'most futile period in Opposition in the last one hundred years' (Collings and Seldon 2001: 60). The fact is that he failed to provide the party with a clear set of coherent policies and to establish himself as a potential prime minister. At the same time, the party publicly displayed its divisions between Eurosceptics and Europhiles, Thatcherites and 'wets', social traditionalists and libertarians (Ashbee 2003: 45). As the 2001 election only brought one extra MP to the Conservative parliamentary group, Hague resigned.
The leader elected under the new rule (see below) was Iain Duncan Smith, who was most famous for having been one of the rebels against John Major over Europe.
He adopted some themes from the US Republicans, most notably the notion of 'Compassionate Conservatism' but failed to seize on the governments' increasingly visible weaknesses. He then tried to position the party on the issue of social justice but this new strategy failed to produce any headway in the electorate (Norton 2006: 38).
The 'quiet man', as he described himself in his 2002 Conference speech, never managed to establish himself as an indisputable leader and failed to renew the party's electoral appeal. The parliamentary party did not leave him the time to be tested at the poll, and he lost a confidence vote in October 2003 (BBC News Online 29 October 2003).
Former Home Secretary Michael Howard then replaced Duncan Smith. Both Hague and Duncan Smith unsuccessfully followed the same strategy: they started by
presenting new policies but lurched to the right when these policies appeared not to produce the expected results in the polls (Watt 2003). Michael Howard failed to fare any better than his predecessors, his policies sometimes seemed at odds with Conservative principles (opposition to the introduction of university tuition fees) or his previous positions (most notably on gay rights), and the party strategy changed from positive campaigning to a negative, tough form of opposition (Norton 2006: 41-2; Seldon and Snowdon 2005: 729-31). Again, when the election approached and the party appeared to lag behind Labour in the polls, Howard veered to the right.
The 2005 election marked a very limited progress for the Conservative party.
They won 32 seats but only one seat in Scotland and three in Wales, and they failed to improve their share of the vote in the Midlands and the North of England. In many ways, Biffen's prediction made in 1974 has been confirmed:
'Today the Conservative party no longer receives the support of MPs from Northern Ireland, its representation in Scotland is lower than at any time in this century and in England it has barely a Westminster toe-hold in the large industrial cities. There is a real danger that the Tories will become the middle class party of the English shires' (in Gamble 1994:
92).
The 20th century has been described as the 'Conservative Century' (Seldon and Ball 1994), but the start of the 21st looks rather grim. However, the party has proved to be a survivor. It has often proved pragmatic on policy in order to increase its electoral potential. However, in order to return into power, the Conservative party will have to expand its electoral appeal beyond the limits of Southern and rural England.
5.2.2. Organisation at the central level, state-wide party processes
The Conservative and Unionist Party underwent a wide-ranging process of re-organisation after Hague's accession to the leadership. The document that led to the reform, The Fresh Future, 'amounted to the most significant restructuring of the party's internal structure since the Maxwell Fyfe reforms of 1945' (Butler and Kavanagh 2002:
42). The most crucial change was the unification of the party. The Conservative party did not exist as a legal entity until 1997. There were a National Union of Conservative Associations (the voluntary party), the parliamentary party and Conservative Central Office (Kelly 2003: 82), but the Conservative party had no legal existence. The reform of the Conservative party first and foremost consisted in unifying these different branches under a single entity. The other aims of this reform were to democratise the party and encourage membership participation, which it has only managed to do to a very limited extent.
In terms of territorial organisation, it maintained the special status of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party, which is affiliated to the Conservative party, participates in UK-wide party processes but organises independently and manages its own internal processes. In Wales, the Fresh Future created a Welsh organisation integrated in the Conservative party.
Constitutional guarantee
The constitution of the Conservative party does not describe in detail the division of powers between the UK party and its Welsh and Scottish branches. The only exception is to be found in schedule 6, where it is stated that the provisions for candidate selection for Westminster elections do not concern Scotland (Conservative
Party 1998a). The party constitution can be amended by the party's constitutional college, which comprises the members of the national convention (which is the body that represents the voluntary party with the chairmen of all the constituency associations and the regional chairmen40), the party's MPs and MEPs and members of the House of Lords (Schedule 9, Conservative Party 1998a). In theory, the UK party could decide the distribution of powers between the levels without the involvement and consent of the regional party branches. However, the constitution is relatively difficult to change: an amendment can be adopted if it is accepted by 66% of those voting and at least 50% of those eligible to vote. For provisions regarding the leadership, the board, ethics rules and changes to the constitution, a qualified majority of two-thirds of the members of the National Convention, two-thirds of MPs voting and 50% of those eligible to vote is required.
The Scottish party has a special status in the overall party structure. Its voluntary organisation only affiliated to the National Union in 1976 but remained autonomous thereafter. The Fresh Future (Conservative Party 1998b) stated that the Scottish party's failure to return any MP and the forthcoming devolution of power to Scotland required that the Scottish party reformed its organisation following the organisational principles of the party in the rest of the UK. The constitution submits members of the Scottish Conservative party to its rules for the processes that relate to the participation of Scotland in the UK party. For the rest, Scottish party members are subject to the rules of the Scottish party, and the Scottish party can elaborate its own rules.
There is no such provision for Wales, which is completely integrated in the UK party, of which it has always been a weak element. However, the Fresh Future established a Welsh Conservative party with its own power structure, as a consequence of the party's electoral weakness in the region and in anticipation of devolution. The constitution of the state-wide party does not contain any information as to how the Welsh party should be organised, and the Welsh party has developed its own structures and chosen its own procedures, which are however very similar to those of the state-wide party.
The Conservative party therefore receives a score of 0 for the process of revision of the constitution and a code of 3 for organisational freedom (even though the Scottish and Welsh branches have a different status within the party, both were free to organise as they wished).
Selecting the party leader
Originally, Conservative party leaders used to 'emerge' from among the parliamentary party. Until 1963, an informal process of consultation run by senior party figures led to the appointment of the leader by the parliamentary party (Punnett 1992: 27). In 1965, the party adopted written rules for the selection of the leader after the selection of Lord Home caused controversy in all sections of the party (Punnett 1992: 41-9).
Between 1965 and 1997, the parliamentary party was in charge of electing the party leader. Rules established in 1975 also provided for the possibility of a contest in the case of a vacancy or at the beginning of a parliamentary session. Initially, a contest could occur simply if a challenger emerged. After the challenge to Thatcher's leadership, a new rule required that at least 10% of the parliamentary party should
40 The regional chairmen chair the party's organisational sub-units of England, Scotland and Wales.
support any challenger (Punnett 1992: 54). Successive ballots were held until a candidate obtained the absolute majority and a 15% lead over the second candidate.
In 1997, as part of the wider process of party reform, the Conservative party changed its procedure of leadership selection. The constitution states that the leader is elected by party members. The presentation of candidates to the party is the responsibility of the 1922 Committee (Conservative backbench MPs, together with frontbench MPs when the party is in opposition). This provision has been interpreted by the 1922 Committee and the party executive (the Board) as a right of the parliamentary party to select the candidates who are presented to the vote of party members.
The new procedure was used for the first time in 2001 to replace William Hague, who resigned after the party's second consecutive defeat. The leadership campaign lasted a whole three months. The candidates reflected the various ideological strands of the party: Michael Portillo appealed to the party's neo-liberals and the so-called 'damps' (the party's left wing, economically moderately statist, socially liberal and pro-European); Ken Clarke represented the party's 'wets', that is, the economic statist, socially conservative and pro-European strand; David Davis and Iain Duncan Smith both represented the social conservative Thatcherite wing; and Michael Ancram, the party chairman, represented a consensus candidate (Norton 2006: 35-6).
In the third ballot, Portillo was narrowly defeated (53 votes), and party members were left to chose between Duncan Smith (54 votes) and Clarke (59 votes). The two candidates then toured the country, campaigning to attract the votes of party members. However, Clarke had little chance of winning in spite of his popularity among the electorate. His pro-Europe position made him unelectable: a large part of the rank and file disagreed with him, and his election could split the party very deeply.
Duncan Smith therefore won with 61% of the votes (Norton 2006: 38).
Duncan Smith failed to impress the electorate and opposition to his leadership rapidly mounted among some sections of the rank and file and the parliamentary party. Stuart Wheeler, a very important party donor, went public saying the leader had to go (Ahmed 2003). A vote of confidence was triggered and MPs voted on 29 October 2003.41 Duncan Smith had used the argument that a leadership battle would be too divisive to save his own leadership (Katz and Happold 2003). While it failed to save him, Tory MPs still listened to the argument. They all rallied behind Michael Howard, whose name had been mentioned as a potential replacement for many months. Ironically, while OMOV had been introduced in the selection process, Conservative MPs returned to the old ballot-free method of candidate selection.
Michael Howard 'emerged' from among the parliamentary party as the consensus candidate (Kelly 2004: 401). As a result, they saved the party from another leadership campaign that would have publicly displayed the party's internal divisions once again.
In the process, they deprived party members of their right to choose their leader, even though many may have been relieved to see an end to the infighting (Freeland 2003).
The regional branches are at no point involved in this process. It is mainly in the hands of the British parliamentary party, in which Scotland and Wales are weakly present. As a result, the Conservative party is given a code of 0.
41 The party leader can only be removed after losing a vote of confidence of party MPs. A vote of confidence can be triggered by 15% of the parliamentary party. With 166 MPs, it meant that only 25 members were needed.
The party's central executive: the Board
The reform of party organisation established a new executive body in charge of managing the extra-parliamentary party. It counts at least 14 members, five directly elected by the National Conservative Convention (the Chairman of the NCC acts as deputy chairman of the Board), three directly appointed by the party leader (the party chairman, someone who acts deputy chairman and the treasurer), the elected chairman of the 1922 Committee, the Conservative leader in the House of Lords, the elected deputy chairman of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party, the co-ordinating chairman for Wales, the elected chairman of the Conservative Councillors Association, a senior member of staff of the party appointed by the chairman, and up to two additional members appointed by either the board or the leader (Conservative party 1998). The Board is in particular responsible for the management of the party with regard to party organisation, appointment of senior party staff, campaigning, fundraising and finance, membership and the maintenance of a national list of candidates for England and Wales.
Part of Hague's strategy to improve internal democracy and involve lower level activists into the party, 'the board was supposed to bring a bit more party democracy to party headquarters' (Kelly 2004: 401). However, none of the members of the Board is actually directly elected by the membership. Moreover, the Board can easily be marginalised by the party leader. For instance Iain Duncan Smith appointed a number of party staff himself and created new positions, placing some of his allies in key positions without the Board's assent. The leader's managerial rule for manoeuvre therefore remains large in spite of the new rules. The role of the representatives of the Scottish and Welsh parties is therefore very limited. The party receives a score of 1 for the presence of one representative each for Scotland and Wales.
Candidate selection for Westminster parliamentary elections
Candidate selection has always been the key function of constituency organisations, and Hague's organisational reform has maintained the main characteristic of candidate selection in the Conservative party, constituency-level autonomy, even though a central screening system was established.
Since 1998, the party board appoints a Committee on Candidates responsible for establishing and maintaining a list of approved candidates for Westminster parliamentary elections. Constituency associations in England and Wales must select their candidate from among this list. While this indeed implies a certain centralisation of the candidate selection process, McKenzie (1955: 250) reported that it was not uncommon for constituency chairmen to go to Conservative Central Office when a vacancy emerged. They would then inform Central Office about the type of candidate they were looking for and Central Office would in return provide support and suggest promising candidates.
Constituency selection committees make a shortlist of around 20 candidates from which three are selected after interviews. These three candidates are then interviewed by the executive committee of the constituency association, which votes to put forward to the vote of party members at least two of them. Finally, a general meeting of the constituency association (meeting of the party members) is held and a vote taken to select the candidate.
Candidate selection remains principally a prerogative of the constituency associations, and the leadership and Central Office find it difficult to influence constituencies. Kelly (2004: 402-3) gives the example of former Foreign Secretary
Malcolm Rifkind as an illustration of the limited authority of the central party over candidate selection: supported by the central party, Rifkind applied for selection in the
Malcolm Rifkind as an illustration of the limited authority of the central party over candidate selection: supported by the central party, Rifkind applied for selection in the