Multi-level party competition

The simple existence of a second set of elections at the regional level affects the state-wide parties' strategies and organisation. Regional elections generate the need for another level of organisation and create a new level of intermediary party elites. The electoral system in use for regional elections is likely to have a great impact on the parties, as it either facilitates or hinders the challenge posed by regionalist parties or simply regionally-based parties that decide to use this new opportunity structure to advance their interests. When regional elections produce different results from the national elections and when the set of actors involved in national and regional elections differ, state-wide parties may perceive a need to adjust their structures to the regional level of competition because the differentiation of the regional political arena means that political parties increasingly need to adapt their strategies to the regional context. This form of adaptation may be more difficult to operate from the centre, and the national party may consider it more efficient to give regional elites some level of autonomy in the management of regional elections.

2.3.1. Electoral system and multi-level party competition Electoral systems and party centralisation

The direct influence of electoral systems on party organisation is rather scarcely documented, and the existing literature bases its affirmations more on observation than on any theoretical perspective. For obvious reasons, the emphasis is principally on intra-party methods of candidate selection and then on how candidate selection affects the larger organisation of the party.

Duverger first expressed the link between electoral system and party organisation. He argues that electoral systems with single-member constituencies encourage constituency autonomy, while list systems require some level of co-ordination above the local level (Duverger 1976: 96-7).⁴ List systems therefore facilitate a form of articulation above the local level in order to elaborate the lists.

They reduce the importance of personalities and increase that of ideas and programmes. As a result, list systems encourage the development of a national, state-wide organisation (Duverger 1976: 97). On the other hand, single-member constituencies strengthen the role of the candidate and focus electoral campaigns on local issues at the expense of more general issues and programmatic considerations.

4 'Le scrutin de liste, fonctionnant dans le cadre d'une grande circonscription, oblige les comités ou les sections locales du parti à établir entre eux une articulation forte à l'intérieur de la circonscription, afin de s'entendre sur la composition des listes. Au contraire, le scrutin uninominal, fonctionnant dans une circonscription étroite, tend à faire de chaque petit groupe local du parti une entité indépendante, et par conséquent à affaiblir l'articulation de celui-ci' (Duverger 1976: 96).

Single-member electoral systems undermine the overall articulation of political parties and encourage constituency-level autonomy.

Farrell reformulated this by making a distinction between on the one hand candidate-based systems, such as single-member but also single-transferable vote systems, and on the other party-based electoral systems. Party-based systems facilitate top-down control over candidate selection: the elaboration of party lists requires a level of co-ordination that makes central control possible, and individual list candidates tend to rely more on the party machine as personal campaigning is unlikely to make any real difference to their chances of being elected (Ware 1996: 291-6).

When electoral systems require that voters choose between candidates, the emphasis is more on the legitimacy of the individual candidate.

Recent studies on changes in party organisation show that parties tend to emphasise grassroots involvement in candidate selection at constituency level (Scarrow 1999; Bille 2001; Hopkin 2001). Mair (1997: 113-4) however points to a paradox: at the same time as party members are balloted on candidate selection and leadership selection, an increasingly atomistic conception of party membership emerges. Members are consulted via postal ballots rather in local meetings, and the role of local party elites and activists is undermined. Consequently, the autonomy of party leaders increases, as they owe their position and legitimacy to the membership vote, and organised leadership challenges are less likely to be successful. Other trends in party change also indicate an increased centralisation of party processes and the evolution of campaigning techniques point to a tighter control of the central party apparatus over campaign processes and a tendency for central party leadership to have some level of oversight over candidate selection (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000).

These observations all relate to national elections and focus on constituency-level autonomy and national party control. In federal or regionalised systems, the issue is whether this oversight or control over candidate selection happens at the central or regional level. Regional party units and regional party leaders seem to have more autonomy over candidate selection in federal systems (Gallagher 1988: 257). However, some evidence also point to a strengthening of central party powers over candidate selection for federal elections in the cases of Canadian federal parties and the Australian Labor Party (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000: 141). Overall, the direct effect of electoral system on the vertical organisation of political parties and the distribution of competences is difficult to predict. However, if the logic of regionalisation were to be respected with regards to candidate selection, and given the well-documented contemporary changes in party organisation, we could expect that the central party controls or oversees the process of candidate selection – but also campaigning at the local level – for general elections, while the regional party branches have more autonomy to select their candidates and develop their own electoral programme and strategy for regional elections.

Electoral systems and party systems in a multi-level environment

In parallel, an abundant literature stresses the crucial importance of electoral systems on the structure of party systems. This section only aims at emphasising the most crucial aspects of this literature, at the risk of over-generalisation. Nevertheless, it intends to stress how electoral systems influence the territorial organisation of state-wide parties, using the party system as an intervening variable.

Duverger provided a very explicit formulation of the impact of electoral systems on the party systems and the number of parties in particular. What came to be known

as 'Duverger's law' states that: 1) proportional representation (PR) and two-round majoritarian systems favour multi-party systems and 2) single-member plurality systems (SMP) encourage the development of two-party systems (Duverger 1976:

291). There are actually two effects that generate the tendency of SMP to generate dual party systems. There is first a mechanical effect in the way votes are translated into seats. SMP tends to have a high level of disproportionality in the votes/seat ratio, which is beneficial to a limited number of big parties, often two. Accordingly, small parties are disadvantaged by SMP. There is also a psychological effect in the way strategic considerations influence voters, who understand that voting for a third party could be a 'waste of votes' (Duverger 1976: 315-6). As a result, third parties tend to have difficulties in gaining seats in SMP systems, unless their electorate is geographically concentrated. But then, their number of seats is inevitably limited to the number of constituencies available in their region.

On the other hand, PR systems are supposed to benefit smaller parties by providing a more proportional translation of the number of votes into seats. However, the proportionality of PR electoral systems depends on a number of factors. The number of seats allocated to each electoral constituency (the district magnitude) is probably the single most important factor affecting list-system proportionality (Taagepera and Shugart 1989 chapter 11) and the rule is that the greater the district magnitude, the more proportional the electoral system (Taagepera and Shugart 1989:

19).

In a multi-level setting, state-wide parties may be confronted with different electoral systems for different elections. The existence of different electoral laws for different elections means that 'some parties might not have the same chances to elect candidates in regional or national elections' because of several factors, such as district magnitude and election timing (Deschouwer 2003: 223). As a result, they would have to adapt their procedures and strategies to the different electoral systems.

Moreover, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that when a polity is characterised by cultural, ethnic or religious cleavages, the most likely electoral system is some form of proportional representation. The logic of this argument is that cultural cleavages do not accommodate well with the 'winner-take-all' logic of majoritarian democracy. They argue that 'the deeper the [cultural, ethnic or religious] cleavages the less the likelihood of loyal acceptance of decisions by representatives of the other side' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 32). Such differences would then lead to the adoption of a proportional electoral formula, whereby minorities would have more chances of getting some of their representatives elected. Regionalist parties would then find it easier to obtain seats, in particular in regional elections, when the district magnitude is often higher than that of national elections. The more proportional the electoral system the more state-wide parties will face the competition of regional parties.

In a multi-level system, parties may choose to adapt their organisation and give some autonomy to their regional branches if more parties, and in particular regionally-based parties such as regionalist parties, are able to gain representation in the regional parliament thanks to a more proportional electoral system. Indicators such as the effective number of parties represented in national and regional elections and the deviation from proportionality in regional and general elections may come to help us explain how electoral systems affect party strategies and organisation.

2.3.2. Regional elections in the general electoral context

Another issue with regard to regional politics is the relative importance of regional elections vis-à-vis general elections. In general, regional elections cannot be taken completely independently from the national political context, and there is a level of dependence of regional politics on national politics. When regional elections are of secondary significance compared to the national elections, they are often said to be 'second-order' elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). The significance of regional elections in the wider electoral context can depend on a number of factors. It has been argued, for instance, that the electoral cycle influences electoral results in regional elections and causes varying levels of interconnection between national and regional elections.

Second-order elections

Regional elections belong to a cycle of elections than range from local elections to national and even European elections. State-wide political parties compete in all of these elections in most of a country's constituencies. As a result, they represent a link between these levels, presenting voters with clear, identifiable labels and a sense of continuity and political coherence. The degree to which regional elections are connected to the wider political context is a crucial element in the study of regional politics. The existence of a link between electoral results at different levels is also likely to affect the organisation of state-wide parties.

The literature on second-order elections considers whether regional elections are elections 'in their own right' or whether their results depend on national debates and electoral considerations. The notion of 'second-order' elections was first developed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) for the study of European election. In this seminal article, they argue that national elections are the most salient elections and dominate all other electoral contests, including 'by-elections, municipal elections, various sorts of regional elections, those to a 'second chamber', and the like' (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8). The connection between the two levels means that voters do not only vote according to the stakes of the regional elections, the candidates and the regional situation, but also according to the national situation. Their explanation goes beyond the sole effect of the electoral cycle.

The framework for analysis of second-order elections is based on the idea that there is 'less at stake' in second-order elections than in national elections, which serve as reference for voters but also for party strategies. Second-order elections have three characteristics:

1) Lower levels of electoral participation. Because the stakes of second-order elections are lower, fewer citizens make an effort to vote. At the same time, the campaign is likely to have a lower intensity and media-coverage than national elections. The result is a lower turnout rate.

2) Small and new parties fare better in regional elections. Because the stakes are lower, voters feel free to 'experiment' with smaller parties that reflect their positions better but have little chance of becoming significant political forces in national elections.

3) Government parties lose while opposition parties see their share of the vote increase, in particular if regional elections are held around the middle of the national electoral cycle.

Reif and Schmitt recognise that some election-specific elements must be taken into account, such as whether the same parties compete at both levels, whether the same parties are in power, whether similar patterns of coalition-building are at play at both levels (1980: 10-1). However, their interpretation of voting patterns and electoral

results makes it virtually impossible to reach a conclusion other than that non-national elections are second-order elections. For instance, they expect lower turnout, but higher turnout is also possible if a country uses a PR electoral system. The fact that voters tend to vote for smaller parties is interpreted as 'experimentation' and not as a possible voters' calculus that these parties are more likely to have an impact on regional politics or represent them better in the particular circumstances presented by the election.

Recent studies on regional elections have come to add some nuance to the notion of second-order election. For instance, Jeffery and Hough (2003) and Detterbeck and Renzsch (2003) have shown that the territorial cleavages and levels of regional identification also play an important role in determining the level of independence of regional election results from state-wide results. Studies on Spain and Germany reveal some evidence that regional elections are more self-standing when voters have a higher level of identification with the region or national-regional double identity (Jeffery and Hough 2003; Pallarés and Keating 2003). When a region displays high levels of regional identification, voters are more likely to vote for a regionalist party but they are also more likely to be interested in regional politics and to be aware of the stakes of the election.

Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that the level of interest in sub-national elections depends on the stakes of the election. The stakes are higher when the election is likely to elect members of a parliament or assembly and regional government with significant powers and competences over regional policy. If a regional government has some influence over the way people live, people will be more interested in the election, and this should be reflected by rather high levels of electoral participation (or at least not significantly lower levels than the national turnout rate).

When the stakes of a regional election are high, voters are more likely to distinguish between regional and national elections and vote on regional issues only rather than react to the policies of the national government. As a result, regional elections may present different results than those of the national election for different reasons than those assumed by Reif and Schmitt. Distinct voting behaviour is actually in this case a rational choice made on the basis of the regional situation. More distinct patterns of voting behaviour and different electoral results are to be expected in regions with important competences over regional policy. On the other hand, when a region has little power to determine its own policies, the election is more likely to be dominated by national factors.

Finally, regional elections are more likely to be interconnected with national politics if their results directly affect national politics. This is especially the case when there is a second chamber that includes representatives of regional governments, like the German Bundesrat. When the national and regional levels are interconnected for policy development and implementation, the regional elections are likely to be influenced by national considerations (Scharpf 1995: 33). In such cases, national party elites are likely to be more involved in the campaign and the national stakes of the election are ever present in the regional campaign. The opposition parties are likely to present the election as a referendum on the national government, and the media focus on the election will emphasise the national consequences of the poll.

All these considerations have an effect on political parties and their organisation.

If regional elections are seen as second-order, or if they have an impact on the national level, either directly as in the case of the Bundesrat or indirectly if opposition parties use regional elections as electoral tests in prevision for the next national election, then state-wide parties will be inclined to keep a close eye on what their

regional party branches do in terms of candidate selection, electoral programme and campaigning. In such a case, state-wide parties will be more integrated and the national leadership will have some level of control over the party's leadership and candidates at the regional level to ensure that they are in the same party faction or agree with the dominant party group at the national level, but also over the programme, in order to enhance party cohesion and policy coherence across the country (Chandler and Chandler 1987: 98).

On the other hand, if the two electoral arenas are disconnected and regional voters vote on regional issues for regional elections, state-wide parties are more likely to adopt a regionalised structure, giving their regional branches more autonomy to adapt their programmes to regional circumstances. This is also likely to be a self-reinforcing cycle, as successful regional leaders will gain more legitimacy and clout over their party branch and the national leaders will find it more difficult to have a say over regional party affairs. This process may take place some time after the establishment of a set of regional institutions, as the electorate needs some time to adapt to and understand the powers of the new regional bodies and political parties need time to register those changes as well.

Electoral cycle

The timing of elections is also likely to have a crucial impact on whether regional elections are overshadowed by national considerations. Observations of the results of American midterm elections have suggested that electoral support for government and opposition parties follow a cycle. After a 'honeymoon period' in which its level of support remains stable, the party of the President loses support with an all-time low at the moment of the midterm Congressional elections (Campbell 1960: 408). The American example is particularly symptomatic of this phenomenon: '[w]ith the single exception of the 1934 election, the president's party has lost congressional seats in each midterm election since the Civil War' (Campbell 1987: 965).⁵ The party starts to recover support shortly before the next presidential election (Johnston 1999). During the same period, opposition parties see their electoral support increase, with a peak around the midterm point. A number of explanations have come to explain this pattern: lower intensity of the midterm election (Campbell 1960), support for the

The timing of elections is also likely to have a crucial impact on whether regional elections are overshadowed by national considerations. Observations of the results of American midterm elections have suggested that electoral support for government and opposition parties follow a cycle. After a 'honeymoon period' in which its level of support remains stable, the party of the President loses support with an all-time low at the moment of the midterm Congressional elections (Campbell 1960: 408). The American example is particularly symptomatic of this phenomenon: '[w]ith the single exception of the 1934 election, the president's party has lost congressional seats in each midterm election since the Civil War' (Campbell 1987: 965).⁵ The party starts to recover support shortly before the next presidential election (Johnston 1999). During the same period, opposition parties see their electoral support increase, with a peak around the midterm point. A number of explanations have come to explain this pattern: lower intensity of the midterm election (Campbell 1960), support for the