Party organisation and change: a framework for analysis

A great deal of literature addresses party change and how new pressures on established political parties give rise to new organisational forms. Change can take many forms from wholesale change to small-scale change in some aspects of the party's structure or programmatic orientation. At this stage, it is important to define a term that is often related to change: adaptation. Generally, this term is used to refer to change made in response to environmental changes. However, it is interesting – and more fruitful – to broaden its definition so as to include 'change intended to better suit the party to its environment or to some other circumstance which the party cannot immediately or directly alter' (Harmel 2002: 139). Change would then refer to any alteration to the organisation of a political party, whatever its source and scope. Here the focus will be on the organisational aspect of adaptation and change and the issue of programmatic change, however interesting and important, is left aside.

Theories of party change and adaptation all argue that many factors shape, or at least influence, the organisation of political parties. The main issue relates to the

respective role of environmental factors and party agency. The framework adopted here emphasises the important role of historical and environmental factors in processes of change and adaptation. The environment encompasses a wide range of factors, from the legal-institutional framework of a country to social trends and the political environment, such as the party system and conditions of electoral competition. However, an element of agency needs to be included in order to avoid presenting parties as passive institutions. The framework also considers that without some action or decision taken at the leadership level, no change can happen.

1.2.1. The context of party formation and institutionalisation

The third wave of democratisation has led to the renewal of scholarly interest in party formation and consolidation. In the new South European democracies of Spain, Portugal and Greece as well as in the Central and Eastern European post-communist democracies, political parties have come to play a crucial role in the process of democratic transition, the formation of governments and the consolidation of the democratic regimes. The comparison between the organisation of these parties and the models of party organisation and change of their older West European counterparts proved to be rather problematic as new democracies provide very different constraints and opportunity structures (van Biezen 2005: 149 and 154).

The neo-institutionalist school argues that history and institutions play a crucial role. After Panebianco (1988), van Biezen (2003: 16) argues that the historical and institutional context in which parties operate is a key element in the understanding of party organisation and party change. Panebianco (1988: 50) argues that 'a party's organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor'. History is important as it sets the context in which parties are born and develop.

The level of institutionalisation of party organisations depends on the context of party formation ('the genetic model') (Panebianco 1988: 55). Institutionalisation can be defined as 'the process by which an organisation, from being a means to an end, becomes an end in itself' (Hopkin 1999: 2). Janda defines an institutionalised party as 'one that is reified in the public mind so that "the party" exists as a social organisation apart from its momentary leaders and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it' (Janda 1980: 19). This definition sees the development of attachments to and identification with the organisation as a crucial aspect of party institutionalisation. In his operationalisation of the concept, Janda emphasises the importance of the passage of time (Janda 1980: 19-20). The longer the party has been in existence and the higher its value in the eyes of its members and supporters the higher the degree of institutionalisation of a party. An institutionalised party has ceased to be an organisation used only in order to achieve personal objectives but rather a stable and valued structure (Hopkin 1999: 2-3;

Panebianco 1988: 53).

Three main factors contribute to a party's genetic model: first, the pattern of territorial construction of the party, that is, whether the party formation occurs through territorial penetration (from the centre to the peripheries) or diffusion (local elites form build local political associations that are later integrated into a single, national organisation); second, the presence (or absence) of an external sponsor (such as a trade union or the USSR Communist party, for instance) that influences the leadership's legitimacy and authority; and third, the role played by a charismatic leader in the party's formation (Panebianco 1988: 50-3).

Territorial penetration is likely to produce more highly institutionalised parties, as central elites control the formation of the party structure. On the other hand, parties built through territorial diffusion are more likely to have a complex mode of unification and be under the influence of local organisations that jealous guard their original autonomy. Territorial diffusion is likely to give rise to more decentralised political parties. The presence of an external sponsor organisation is likely to hinder the formation of a strongly institutionalised party, as the party remains dependent on an external organisation. The existence of an external source of leadership legitimacy leads to indirect forms of loyalty within the party as the party comes second to the 'sponsor'. However, evidence has shown that parties with an extra-national external sponsor (like Communist parties) could be strongly institutionalised parties. Finally, the creation of a party as a vehicle for a charismatic individual is likely to result in weakly institutionalised parties. Organisations based on 'pure charisma' are characterised by a strong level of centralisation but they are weakly institutionalised because institutionalisation would require a transfer of authority from the leader to the organisation itself. As a result, they are unlikely to survive their leader (Panebianco 1988: 50-3, 63-7).

Panebianco's 'genetic' model of party change (1988) emphasises the 'stickiness' of organisational forms and rules. As a result of 'organisational resistance', a party's genetic structure would continue to prevail through subsequent stages of party development and hinder (or slow down) attempts to change party organisation and in particular internal power balance (Wilson 1994: 532; Hopkin 2003: 228). Path dependency implies that each organisational decision taken by political parties (and organisations in general) restricts the range of available options and potential organisational changes in the future. Today's party organisation and options for organisational change are partly determined by the organisational decisions taken in the past and the organisational stage in which the parties are (formation, institutionalisation or consolidation). For instance, it may be difficult for a party that has given some voice or privilege to a group to rid this group of its advantages. Unless there is a broad consensus in the rest of the party and the section of the party in question is not ready to fight hard to keep its position within the party (see for instance the trade unions and the Labour party at the beginning of the 1990s), such a change may be difficult.

As a result, and in the words of Hopkin and Paolucci (1999: 309), 'Historic political parties, whist responding to the opportunities and constraints of modern electoral competition, remain rooted to their original identities, and are unlikely to jeopardise their electoral and social foundations for unpredictable short-term gains'.

However, the limit of this emphasis on the 'genetic model' of party organisation is that it does not account well for the incentives for party change (Ware 1996: 104).

1.2.2. Institutions, society and electoral competition

Neo-institutionalists emphasise the role of environmental factors. Parties are said to respond to their environment and are expected to adapt to it (van Biezen 2003: 15;

Panebianco 1988: 19-20). Keefe went as far as saying that 'parties are less what they make of themselves that what their environment makes of them' (Keefe 1972: 1, quoted in Harmel and Janda 1982: 7). There are three main elements in this environment: the structure of the state, the social environment and the competitive electoral context.

The structure of the state, often constitutionally entrenched, is a first factor. It influences such things as the vertical articulation of political parties, the importance of the parliamentary and presidential (when applicable) electoral contests for the parties and the respective role and power of the parties' elected representatives in the executive and legislative branches. Some constitutions mention political parties and recognise their role in the exercise of democratic rights and the government of the country. At the same time, this recognition is often supplemented by legal restrictions or obligations. Parties are also affected by an increasing amount of legislation regulating their behaviour, in some cases their methods of candidate selection and more often their finance (van Biezen 2004).

Sociological explanations have also been put forward: parties change in response to changes in the structure of society. For instance, Kirchheimer (1966) observes that the weakening strength of traditional bonds and ideologies leads to the loosening of the ties between leaders and party members, which in turn pushes parties to transform their structures so that ordinary party members are less important and the party leadership gains in power and autonomy. Likewise, the emergence of the 'cartel party' model is supposed to result from political, socioeconomic and technological trends, such as the increasing disaffection of the electorate vis-à-vis political parties, decreasing levels of participation in party activities, declining party identification and changing patterns of electoral competition and party funding (Katz and Mair 1995: 15-6). As the levels of party membership decrease across the board (Mair and van Biezen 2001) and the costs of electoral competition increase, political parties are expected to change their organisation and also change the rules of party competition in order to reinforce their position and limit entry into the political arena for small and new parties.

The cleavage structure of society has been singled out as a crucial factor in the development of the party system and the development and relative strength of political parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Changes in social alignments and in the class structure of society have an impact on the structure of party competition and political parties. For instance, Lipset (2001) showed how changes in the economy produced changes in the occupational structure of society like the growth of the middle classes and the subsequent decline of the industrial working class, which, in conjunction with the development of post-materialist values, led to the decline of class conflict and what he calls the 'Americanisation' of European social-democratic parties.

Finally, other theories of party organisation and change emphasise the role of inter-party competition. A particular example of this is the 'contagion hypothesis':

parties change their organisation in order to mimic the organisation of other, more successful, parties. Duverger (1976) expected cadre parties to transform themselves into mass parties because mass parties were more efficient in the post-enfranchisement era of mass politics. In a time of mass democratisation, the organisation of mass parties seemed better suited to the new conditions of party competition. In this case, the pressure comes from the integration of new social groups in democratic politics, other parties and the developments of modern party competition. While he disagreed with Duverger on the direction of party change, Epstein (1967) considered that the integration of new voters and the new methods of communications were likely to produce a 'contagion from the right'. Epstein therefore expected political parties to adapt their structures to resemble American political parties, that is, less institutionalised parties with a more flexible organisation and less permanent membership structures. For Epstein and Duverger, while social factors influence the way parties organise, change from one type of party to another is the

result of the pressures of party competition. While both turned out to be wrong (there was no general convergence of political parties towards one model or the other), electoral competitiveness remains a strong incentive for party change (Ware 1996:

104).

There are several consequences to this assumed role of the environment. First, all the parties of a country are expected to display a number of common characteristics as they are all under the influence of the same institutional and social environment (Harmel and Janda 1982: 44-5). Second, this image of party change assumes a clear causal primacy of the environment (Harmel and Janda 1982: 11). This first point will be discussed in the light of the evidence provided in the empirical study later. The second point, on the other hand, needs to be mitigated, as it may give the impression that parties are expected to adapt automatically to their environment.

Whereas it can easily be admitted that the environment in which political parties are embedded has a strong effect on their organisation, the environment alone cannot explain how parties organise. An argument against this strong institutionalist paradigm is that parties are also purposive agents that are capable of changing their environment. The institutional structure of the state, from the regime to the level of centralisation, is often the result of the government or parliamentary action of political parties. This aspect of the environment-parties interaction will be mostly left aside, as the focus of this dissertation is instead on what influences the structure of the political parties rather than how the political parties influence their environment, but it shows that parties are not passive organisations and it helps emphasise the active role played by political parties in the political system.

Finally, if parties are shaped in the first place by their environment, any change – at least, any change of a significant nature – in the environment should result in some adaptational change on the part of the parties. The argument is that 'parties do not exist in a vacuum' (Lawson, 1976: 27) and that the most striking and influential aspect of their environment is the institutional framework of the polity. Whereas some changes are too important to be ignored by the parties, others may be met with more resistance. As a result, there is a hierarchy of environmental changes that are likely to generate party change.

1.2.3. Intra-party power relations and leadership effect

This hierarchy of environmental factors is not innate and there has to be some decision taken by the parties in order to determine what kind of change is worth transforming the party organisation for. Party change can be a long process, as some formal rules have to be followed and the assent of various sectors of the party organisation has to be secured. In the process, party change can turn out to be divisive for the party if the internal balance of power or the party's core values are to be altered by the proposed changes. As a result, political parties are likely to select the type of environmental factors that have sufficient significance for the party to transform itself and embark on a potentially divisive process of party re-organisation.

This means that the parties themselves are responsible for processes of party adaptation and that a level of agency should be added to the framework.

The next questions are then: under which circumstances do parties change, and what or who are the triggers of change? A framework is therefore needed to establish the 'micro-foundations' that explain internal relationships within political parties and the motives of party actors in processes of organisational change (Kitschelt 1989: 43;

Kitschelt 2000: 150). At the same time as he emphasises the role of history and

institutional factors, Panebianco describes intra-party dynamics, that is, the relations between party leadership and party membership, in terms of strategies and power relations. Power is relational and is an unequal exchange relation between the leadership and the membership (Panebianco 1988: 22). Power is relational because it is not an attribute: leaders only have power insofar as they have a membership to exercise it on. At the same time, the existence of a membership conditions the exercise of the leaders' powers over it, and it is therefore the source of the members' power.

The exchange relation is unequal because the leadership is the group that benefits the most from the exchange. Leaders receive selective incentives, i.e. benefits that are distributed to only some of the participants, such as elective positions, possible government portfolios and high-ranking positions within the organisation. In contrast, party members only receive collective incentives, that is, benefits – or prospects of benefits – that the organisation distributes equally among its members (Panebianco 1988: 23). The leaders and elected officials of the party are those who benefits from 'private goods' and the party membership receives mainly 'public goods' (Gaxie 1977).³ Party bureaucrats also benefit from selective incentives, as their employment is dependent on the party's survival and may also depend on the party success if the party's resources are highly dependent on public funding (the amount of which is often dependent on the parties' shares of the vote and number of elected officials).

From this account, we understand that the leadership has more resources than the membership and is able to devote more time to the maintenance and administration of the organisation than party members. Thanks to the resources they obtain from the organisation, the leadership acquires a greater ability to affect the party and influence its decisions. The role of the party leadership is a disputed issue.

For instance, van Biezen (2005: 153) argues that 'the behaviour of party leaderships and party strategies cannot be seen to be independent from the structural context in which the party is embedded' and concludes that studies of party formation and change should focus on 'environmental factors external to the party as key determinants of party formation'. On the other hand, a number of authors consider that party leaders, or the dominant coalition, play a crucial role in the process of party change (Wilson 1980 and 1994; Panebianco 1988; Deschouwer 1992; Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel 2002).

The leadership group is more than simply the party leader and his deputy. It is what Panebianco calls 'dominant coalition', that is, an alliance of groups of national, local and regional leaders, and also sometimes leaders of ancillary organisations, who 'control the most vital zones of uncertainty' (Panebianco 1988: 38). Panebianco argues that the leader is never alone and that he is at the centre of a coalition of forces that come together to rule the party (Panebianco 1988: 38-9).

For instance, Gunther and Diamond (2001: 33) emphasise the role of party leaders in processes of party change and the way their decisions may run counter to 'trends' in party organisation and produce different types of party responses to the same institutional factors:

'while socioeconomic and technological developments may create circumstances favourable to the development and progressive dominance of organizationally thin parties, they cannot predict precisely what kind of party is likely to emerge, let alone become a dominant model. Elite decision to pursue different strategies of voter mobilization or different

3 For a full explanation of the role of collective goods in organisations, see Olson (1971).

goals altogether (like, constituency representation instead of vote maximization) can lead to the adoption of a much more sharply defined ideological or programmatic stand'.

Leadership-driven party change occurs in three situations: change of party leadership,

Leadership-driven party change occurs in three situations: change of party leadership,