Criterion (horos) or definition ( logos ) of being?

Having seen reasons to doubt that the questionsposa te kai poiaat 242c5-6 set the agenda for the Gigantomachia, and having reminded ourselves that the question ‘what is being?’ is raised at 246a1-2, let us turn to the evidence that the Gigantomachia is also addressed to the latter question. A major objection put forward against this is the use of the word horos instead of the word logos in one of the most disputed passage of the Gigantomachia, namely the dunamis proposal. In what follows, I shall argue that one cannot conclude, on textual grounds, that horos is used for criterion as opposed to definition. Instead, we shall see that the passages which have been interpreted by critics as giving a criterion of being can be also naturally read as attempts to give a definition of being.

98. There are two main ways of reading the Hot and Cold passage: either these thinkers hold that there are exactly two beings, and these beings are the Hot and the Cold, or what they mean is that all the beings are hot and cold. I side with the former reading. On this point, see also Crivelli (2012), p. 73.

In the passage, there are at least four positions about being which could be interpreted either as criteria of being or as definitions: (i) the initial position of the Giants, according to which ‘this only is that which offers contact and touch; they define (horizein)

ousia and body as the same’ (246a10-b1);99 _{(ii) the initial position of the Friends of the}

Forms, for whom ‘some intelligible and incorporeal forms [...] are the true ousia’ (246b7-8);100 _{(iii) the dunamis proposal, according to which ‘beings are nothing but}

dunamis’ (247d8-247e4);101 _{(iv) the conclusion of the Gigantomachia, which asserts that}

‘we should say that being and the totality are both together everything that is changeless and everything that is changing’. Of the four, thedunamis proposal (iii) is the one which has received most attention, and it is used as the chief evidence for the criterion reading. As already explained in the introduction, and setting aside the choice of the question which we have addressed in the previous section, the criterion reading is based on two main claims: first, that there is a systematic distinction betweenhorosandlogos, such thathoros

is consistently used for criterion and never for definition; second, that a criterion does not deal with the nature of being, its function being only to distinguish between the beings and the non-beings. Cornford is a good example of this view: ‘The wordὃροςis used at 247e8 and again at 248c, not λόγος. It is a mark, not a definition’.102 _{He then adds that even in}

cases where horos ‘comes to mean a definition’, we should nonetheless see a difference between these two definitions, forlogos‘is the definition giving the explicit statement of a complex content or meaning.’103_{In what follows, I shall not endeavour to show that each}

of the four passages mentioned (i)-(iv) is in fact a definition, and not a criterion. Rather, I will first remind the reader that there is no support for a systematic use of horos as

99. Soph. 246a10-b1: τοῦτο εἶναι µόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶµα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόµενοι. 100.Soph. 246b7-8: νοητὰἄττακαὶἀσώµαταεἴδηβιαζόµενοιτὴνἀληθινὴνοὐσίανεἶναι· 101.Soph. 247d8-247e4: Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν [τινα] κεκτηµένον δύναµιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ'εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σµικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου,κἂν εἰ µόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτοὄντωςεἶναι·τίθεµαιγὰρὅρον [ὁρίζειν] τὰὄνταὡςἔστινοὐκἄλλοτιπλὴνδύναµις.

102.Cornford (1935), n. 3 p. 238. The distinction betweenhorosandlogosis actually not the only argument that Cornford (1935) puts forward in favour of the criterion view. At the end of the very short paragraph dedicated to this question, he adds that it is clear that the dunamis proposal is not ‘the definition of “real”’, because ‘in a later section (249d ff.) the question, what does reality (Being, Existence) mean? is put by the Stranger to himself and Theaetetus as still unanswered’ (p. 239). Of course, this is not a good argument at all, for unless one argues that the dunamis proposal is accepted by the Stranger and the Friends of the Forms, and thus carried forward in the dialogue, the question whether it is a criterion or a definition does not depend on its ultimate acceptance as ‘the’ definition of being, just like in the

Theatetus, the first attempt to define epistêmê is said to be a logos, though it is ultimately rejected. 103.Cornford (1935), n. 3 p. 238.

‘criterion’ in dialogues other than theSophist, though we might acknowledge tendencies to use horos more in that sense than in the sense of definition. I shall then focus on (i) and (iii), which are the two statements about which the term horos is clearly used, and show that in these two cases, there is reasonable evidence for the claim that Plato is not simply giving a criterion of being there, but also a proper account of what being is. Finally, I will point out that, although a majority of critics have denied that (iv) is a definition of being, the termlogosis, in fact, used about (iv) and that this supports a definitional reading of this conclusion.

Let us begin with the first point, namely the use ofhoros. To begin with, as many opponents of the criterion view have already pointed out, and as even some supporters of the criterion view have also acknowledged, Plato does not systematically distinguishhoros

fromlogosin other dialogues.104_{It seems, rather, that there is a certain flexibility in the use}

of these terms. Of course, there are, in the corpus, some passages where horos is clearly and only used in the sense of limits, and hence, where logos cannot be used interchangeably. For instance, horos is used in the sense of delimiting the city at Rep.

423b4.105_{Moreover, it is even likely thathoros is more often used in contexts where Plato}

is not yet dealing with a properlogos. In a survey of the early dialogues, Dancy carefully observes that of all the occurrences ofhorosorhorizesthaiin those dialogues, the majority cannot be suitably translated as ‘definition’.106_{Nevertheless, as he acknowledges, there are}

some notable exceptions to this tendency, which makes him conclude that ‘the vocabulary by itself tells us nothing about how the distinguishing [definition or boundary, mark] is to be done’.107_{According to Dancy, one reason for this is that ‘the notion of definition is here}

in the process of construction’.108 _{However, there also are examples of uses of horos as}

definition in late dialogues. For instance, at Tht. 187c5, Socrates asks Theaetetus ‘You define (horizê(i)) epistêmê as true opinion?’.109_{Here, there is no doubt that we are in the}

context of a search for the proper definition of science and the translation of the verb by

104.For instance Owen (1971). Brown (1998), pp. 192-193, also acknowledges this fact, which makes her come to the conclusion that ‘we cannot decide the matter by looking at Plato’s terminology’. For the evidence of the use ofhorosas definition, Owen quotes:Phdr.237d1 (cf. c2-3);Plt.266e1, 293e3, and for horoi esp. 414d.

105.See for instance Rep. 423b4, in relation to the size of the city.

106.In fact, Dancy (2004), p. 24, goes so far as to say that ‘in almost all cases, “definition” is plainly wrong’. 107.Dancy (2004), pp. 23-24, mentions Charm. 173a9; Lach. 194c8; Rep. I 331d2-3.

108.Dancy (2004), p. 25.

‘define’ is natural.110 _{As a result, the flexible use of horos for definition is not a}

characteristic of the early dialogues only but can be found in the whole corpus. It is, thus, possible that the use of horos in the Gigantomachia is one of these examples.

There are two main uses ofhoros in the Gigantomachia. The first occurrence is at 246b1. Introducing the Giants, the Stranger declares that, to them, ‘this only is that which offers contact and touch; they define (horizein) ousia and body as the same’.111 _Many

scholars have interpreted the Giants’ position as being that tangibility is the criterion for being and have denied that they offer an answer to the questionti esti to on. For instance, Brown stresses the necessity of translatinghorizeinin the Giants passage as ‘marking off’: ‘The giants [...] mark off body and being as the same’.112_{There are several reasons to doubt}

this reading. First, the sentence seems to be one of these cases wherehorizeincan naturally be translated as ‘to define’. On that note, Owen has already pinpointed that even Cornford, who otherwise defends the criterion reading, translates horizein as ‘define’ in this passage.113 _{The translation as ‘define’ is all the more natural as formulating definitions}

usingtautonis common in Plato. In theTheatetus, Theaetetus’s attempt to defineepistêmê

as sensation, which is explicitly recognised as a logos at 151e8, is later reformulated by Socrates as saying that ‘epistêmêand sensation are the same’ (163a7-8; 164a6-7), without there being any doubt that the Theaetetus’ proposal is considered as a definition, even if it ultimately turns out that this is not the right definition ofepistêmê.114_{Second, just after the}

Giants and the Friends of the Forms have been introduced for the first time, the Stranger declares that, from both parties, they now want to ‘receive an account’ (logon lambanein) about what they posit asousia.115_{Admittedly, logon lambanein is a fixed expression, and}

we should not put too much weight on the use oflogos here. Nevertheless, the expression is worth noticing, because the ability to give an account is, indeed, something that Socrates usually emphasises against his interlocutors.116 _{Again, this suggests that what they are}

110.Owen (1971), n. 14 p. 330, also gives the example of Plt. 266e1.

111.Soph. 246a10-b1: τοῦτο εἶναι µόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶµα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόµενοι.

112.Brown (1998), p. 186 and n. 5 p. 186.

113.Owen (1971), n. 14 p. 330. Cornford’s translation of 246b1 is ‘They define reality and body as the same’ (Cornford (1935), p. 230). Owen uses this phrase against Cornford’s claim that thedunamisproposal is a ‘mark of being’ and not a definition.

114.Tht.163a7-8:εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήµη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον.; 164a6-7:ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶἐπιστήµηταὐτὸνὡµολόγηται.

115.Soph. 246c5-6: λάβωµενλόγονὑπὲρἧςτίθενταιτῆςοὐσίας. 116.On this point, see Cornford (1935), p. 184.

searching for is alogosof being. Finally, is there any reason to think that the Giants fail to give ‘the explicit statement of a complex content or meaning’ here, as Cornford puts it? None of the supporters of the criterion reading has given any argument for this.

The second and main example of the use of horos in the Gigantomachia is the

dunamis proposal, and it is the central case for the criterion reading. Just like in the previous case, I shall first show that the translation as ‘definition’ is a natural one, both on the basis of the context and the formulation of the dunamis proposal itself, and then examine the philosophical reasons put forward by the supporters of the criterion reading. First, as Brown herself acknowledges, the question that prompts thedunamisproposal is ‘a formula often invoked in the search for a definition’, her sole defence against that is that ‘it

can be read as asking only for what in virtue of which various things can be classed as

onta, not for what it is to be a being’.117 _{Indeed, by asking about what is common to both}

bodily and non-bodily beings ‘by nature’ (sumphues, 247d3), ‘intrinsically’, the Stranger is asking for a general formula concerning something which belongs to the very nature of those things. Second, the answer to this question is expected by the Stranger to give something ‘towards which they are looking (eis ho blepontes) in order to say that both are’.118 _{This sentence is a clear example of a requirement for a standard in comparison by}

which one can determine whether or notxisΦ. As we will see in detail in the next section, this is a usual Socratic requirement for answering theti estiquestion. Of course, a criterion is also something which can be appealed to in order to determine whether or not x is Φ. However, the difference between a criterion and a standard is that the criterion forΦis not itself Φ, as opposed to the standard. A standard — the word often use by Plato is

paradeigma — is itself an instance of Φ, albeit a perfect one, it is a model for Φ. Admittedly, the wordparadeigma does not appear in the passage, but the key is provided by the verbblepein, that is, ‘to look’. If it does make sense to use the verb ‘to look’ in the case of a standard, it can only be understood metaphorically for a criterion. It is not impossible that blepein is used metaphorically, but taken together, these points make the case for the definitional reading stronger. I will come back to the relation between the ti esti question and the search for a standard, and the difference between a standard and a criterion, in the next section. Finally, the definitional reading finds support at 247d6, where

117.Brown (1998), p. 193, my emphasis.

the Stranger announces that they are going to see whether they would agree that ‘this is what being is’ (toiond’ einai to on, 247d6).

Turning to the dunamis proposal itself, the proposal is split into two parts: a first formula, starting withΛέγω δὴ(247d8), says that whatever has anydunamisto act or to be affected really is; a second formula, starting withτίθεµαι γὰρ(247e3), continues by saying that the beings (ta onta) are nothing but dunamis. The second formula raises problems for the criterion reading. To begin with,οὐκ ἄλλο τί is a common formulation for a logos in Plato. AtTheaetetus 151e2, when Theaetetus formulates the first logos ofepistêmê which is going to be examined in the dialogue, he declares that ‘epistêmê is nothing but (allo ti estin) sensation’. Most importantly, even Cornford admits that the formulation is not proper to that of a criterion, but is more naturally read as a definition. In a footnote, he writes that the construction of the sentence is ‘difficult’ because ‘I think the sentence ought to mean that the mark of real things (not the real things themselves) is nothing but power’.119 _{But this is not what the Greek says, for the text is explicit that it is the onta}

themselves which are ‘nothing else but dunamis’. Cornford acknowledges this, and accordingly translates the sentence as ‘they [ta onta] are nothing but power’.120_{As a result,}

we should resist the reduction of the dunamis proposal to the first formulation, which obscures the fact that thedunamis proposal is presented as saying directly what the beings are.121 _{In addition, theγὰρ also goes against the reduction of the dunamis proposal to the}

former, for it assigns the explanatory role to the latter. Finally, note that the order in which the two formulae are introduced is actually the same as in the description of the initial position of the Giants, where tangibility is introduced before the Stranger asserts that bodies and ousia are the same. In the case of the Giants, I have already argued that the latter formula indicates a definition.

119.Cornford (1935), n. 1 p. 234.

120.Cornford (1935), p. 234. Brown (1998), p. 190, also remains faithful to the Greek by translating the sentence such that it is the beings — though she translatesta ontaas ‘that what is’ — which are nothing butdunamis. Nevertheless, in n. 11 p. 191, she adds that it is possible to construe the sentence such that it is thehorosand not the beings which aredunamis. But she gives no support for this. On the contrary, Cornford (1935), n. 1 p. 234, while suggesting two other ways to render the sentence, such thatdunamis

is related tohorosand not to the beings, nevertheless admits that none of the renderings he proposes are ‘defensible’. In spite of this acknowledgement, he continues to defend the criterion reading in the rest of the book.

121.The reduction to the first formula has been adopted by Brown (1998), p. 190. Brown defends the criterion reading, and she declares that since the two formulae are ‘no doubt intended to be equivalent’, she can focus on the first one only, which she takes to be no more than ‘a more accurate formulation’ than the second one. However, if she was right, the γὰρ would certainly have to apply to the more accurate formula, not to the less accurate one, as in fact it does.

The philosophical argument put forward against the definitional reading is that a

dunamis can only be something that a being has, it cannot be what it is to be a being. Consequently, thedunamisproposal can be at best a criterion of being, but not thelogosof being. This point has been made most clearly by Brown, ‘things have powers in virtue of what they are’, but it is also found in Cornford who, relying on the conclusions of the work of Souilhé, declares that thedunamisis for Plato ‘the property or quality which reveals the nature of a thing’, thereby implying that it is not thedunamis itself which is the nature of the thing.122_{This is, however, a disputed point, even among the supporters of the criterion}

reading, and it is a pity that Brown does not argue for this claim, nor does she give any indication on what her view is based on.123 _{Bluck, who otherwise sides with the criterion}

reading, accepts Cornford’s point that the dunamis ‘reveals in its action the nature of a thing’, but unlike Cornford, what he concludes from this is that thedunamis ‘might easily be identified with the thing itself. The “being” of a thing is simply the function that it performs’.124_{Rijk goes in the same direction as Bluck: ‘To view a thing’s true nature in its}