Are the Friends of the Forms committed to the claim that Forms change in a certain respect?

Having seen that the Friends of the Forms initially use change and rest to mark the distinction between two tiers of reality, we now need to consider how their position is revised. Indeed, we know from the conclusion that the Friends of the Forms are ultimately persuaded to include some change into being. The question is, thus, how the Friends of the Forms arrive at this conclusion. There are two main options: either they are forced to admit that their candidate for being, namely intelligible unchangeable Forms, are also subject to change in some respects, or they are forced to admit that there are beings, other than Forms, that are changing beings.19 _{On the former option, the Friends of the Forms}

ultimately use Kinêsis and Stasis in a coreferential way, that is, as both applying to Forms. On the latter option, there are two possibilities: either those new beings are exclusively

18. Phd. 78d6-7: [..] ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαµῇ οὐδαµῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεµίαν ἐνδέχεται;

19. The view that Forms are subject to change in some respects has been supported by Moravcsik (1962) and Owen (1966). For a criticism of these views, see, in particular, Brown (1998).

referred to as changing beings, or they are referred to as both changing and at rest.20 _Only

the first possibility is compatible with the non-coreferential reading. In what follows, I shall argue for this, starting with the denial that the conclusion that Forms are subject to change is ever drawn in the passage.

The revision of the Friends of the Forms is a two-step process, which starts with the Friends of the Forms being confronted with the conclusion of the debate with the Giants, from 248a4 to 248e5, and then continues with an objection related to the possibility of

nous from 248e6. Starting with the first step, the debate with the Giants ends with the Stranger offering them a characterisation of being supposed to apply to both the corporeal beings and to the incorporeal beings that they have been compelled to include in their ontology. This characterisation of being, known as thedunamis proposal, is spelled out at 247d8-e4. It consists in the characterisation of being as what has thedunamiseither to act

(to poiein) on another thing or to be affected (to pathein), be it only once, in the slightest way, by the most insignificant thing.21 _{These few lines have provided fodder for much}

debate among critics. A first issue concerns the question of whether thedunamis proposal offers a criterion for being, or a proper definition of being. I shall set this issue aside, as we shall examine it properly in Chapter II. Another issue is the question of whether the

dunamis proposal is accepted by the Friends of the Forms, as it has previously been accepted by the Giants, and whether or not it implies that Forms are subject to change. The latter two issues are, of course, closely related. With respect to these issues, it seems that all possible positions have been defended. It has been argued that: (a) thedunamisproposal is accepted by the Friends of the Forms and it implies that Forms are moved (Moravcsik (1962), Owen (1966)); (b) thedunamisproposal is not accepted and, hence, Forms remain unchangeable (Politis (2006)); (c) thedunamis proposal is not accepted, but it could have been accepted, because it does not imply that Forms are subject to change (Brown (1998)); (d) thedunamisproposal is accepted but Forms are not subject to change (Vlastos (1973); Leigh (2010)). For present purposes, I need not decide on the question whether the

20. Keyt (1969), Frank (1986) and Politis (2006) are clear examples of critics who support the former view, while Buckels (2015), for instance, supports the latter. However, many critics, like Brown (1998) remain unclear on the matter. While she argues that Forms, from beginning to end, remain unchangeable, she does not say whether Stasis applies to physical beings in some respects, or not.

21. Soph. 247d8-e4:Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν τινα κεκτηµένον δύναµιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σµικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ µόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεµαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναµις. I follow the text edited by Diès and do not bracket τινα (247d8) and ὁρίζειν (247e3).

dunamisproposal is accepted by the Friends of the Forms or not. All I need to show is that, regardless of whether the dunamis proposal is ultimately dropped or not, the claim that Forms are unchangeable is left untouched.22_{By this, I mean the claim that Kinêsis does not}

apply to Forms at all, that is, that Forms are not subject to any sort of change, even changes like external changes or Cambridge changes, which, as some critics have argued, are compatible with Forms remaining the same.23 _{As a result, the interpretation I shall defend}

is compatible with views (b), (c) and (d). Only (a) has to be rejected. Regarding (a), this view has already been criticised by Brown.24 _{She argues, first, that this reading of the}

dunamis proposal relies on a non-substantial reading of ‘to be affected’, according to which something can be ‘affected’ by merely being the subject of a predicate, and this, she says, is not supported by the text. Second, she objects that the passage following the

dunamisproposal proves this interpretation wrong, for not only does it show that a strong reading of ‘being affected’ is required, as opposed to a non-substantial reading, but also, the unchangeability of the Forms is reasserted at 249b12-c1.25 _{Following Brown, I shall}

argue, on textual grounds, that the claim that the Forms are unchangeable is maintained, by which I mean that the Forms are neither changed nor affected.

When first proposed to the Giants, thedunamisproposal is introduced as an attempt to find what is common to the Giants’ corporeal and incorporeal beings. However, as soon as the Friends of the Forms enter the debate, the discussion immediately shifts to the problem of change and rest. The Friends of the Forms’ immediate reaction is to reject the

dunamisproposal, on the grounds that this is not an appropriate characterisation ofousia, only of genesis. To them, it is straightforward that the dunamis proposal amounts to the claim that everything that is is subject to change. The crux of the argument is that if knowing (to gignôskein) is a case of acting (poeien ti), then it necessarily follows (anankaion sumbanei) that what is known (to gignôskomenon) is in turn affected (paschein).26 _{Hence, the following consequence:}

22. I thank D. Meißner for this helpful suggestion.

23. See, for instance, Moravcsik (1962); Owen (1966); Runciman (1962); Reeve (1985); Künne (2004); Buckels (2015). Against the claim that with respect to Forms anything like Cambridge change is relevant in the Sophist, see Brown (1998); Leigh (2012b).

24. Brown (1998), pp. 190-192.

25. For Moravcsik (1962), p. 37, ‘anything which can be a subject or a predicate in a genuine assertion exists’ is affected; for Owen (1966), p. 339 ‘it is a sufficient condition of change that something should become true of the subject at some time that was not true before’.

{ΞΕ.}[...] τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκοµένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ

τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαµεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεµοῦν.

248e2 248e4 STR: [...] therefore by this argument when being is known by knowledge,

insofar as it is being known, it is to that extent being changed, namely through the fact of being affected, which is something we say could not happen in relation to what is at rest.27

This passage is interesting for several reasons. First, as we shall see in the next paragraph, the passage prepares for the last argument (starting at 249b5), before the conclusion of the Gigantomachia. Second, it makes the connection between being affected and being subject to change. Third, it shows that the unchangeability of being must be understood in the strongest sense, for even the minimal sort of change that is here implied is enough for the Friends of the Forms to reject thedunamisproposal. Finally, the word ‘stasis’ is not used in the passage, but being is here described as to êremoun, which is a synonym for being at rest.

From this passage, it seems clear that the Friends of the Forms stick to the claim that Forms are unchangeable. Finally, support for this comes from the last argument before the conclusion of the Gigantomachia, at 249b5-c9, in which we find the same expression as we spotted earlier, namely being the same in the same way and in the same respect, which is again applied to beings which are only described as stasima, and not also as

kinoumena. Let us start by quoting the passage entirely, for we will also need it when it comes to the Giants:

{ΞΕ.} Συµβαίνει δ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν µηδενὶ περὶ µηδενὸς εἶναι µηδαµοῦ. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Κοµιδῇ µὲν οὖν. {ΞΕ.} Καὶ µὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόµενα καὶ κινούµενα πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρῶµεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσοµεν. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς; {ΞΕ.} Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἄν; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐδαµῶς. {ΞΕ.} Τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόµενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἥκιστα. 249b5 249b10 249c1 249c5

STR: It follows, then, Theaetetus, that if <they> are unchanging, there is no nousin anything anywhere and about anything.

THT: Certainly.

STR: And yet, if we concede, instead, that all <things that are> are moving and changing, by this argument too we shall be removing this same thing [= nous] from the things that are.

THT: How so?

STR: Does it seem to you that, what is the same in the same way and about the same, could ever come to be without stasis?

THT: Not at all.

STR: Well then, without these conditions, do you seenous being or how it could ever come to be anywhere?

THT: Not in the least.

The Stranger’s point is the following: on the one hand, if everything is at rest, then there is nonous, but on the other hand, if everything is changing, then there is no nouseither. Let us set aside the first half of the argument for the moment, and focus on the second half. The Stranger is considering the hypothesis that everything is subject to change, from which it follows, he says, that there is nonous. The reason he gives is that if everything is subject to change, then there is nostasis, and if there is nostasis, then nothing ‘is the same in the same way and about the same’. With regard to the move from ‘everything is subject to change’ to ‘there is nostasis’, the Stranger cannot mean by this that if beings are changing in some respects, then they cannot be at rest in another respect, for this would be absurd. Rather, he must mean something along the following lines: that if everything is a changing thing, then there is no room for unchanging things. This reading finds some support in the second move, namely the move from ‘there is nostasis’ to ‘nothing is the same in the same way and about the same’. Indeed, the expression is reminiscent of the one we found earlier in the dialogue, which, as we said, was used to characterise the Forms as unchangeable beings set in opposition to the realm of becoming. Admittedly, the formulation differs slightly from the first occurrence of the phrase, in particular, it lacks the word aei. One may wonder whether this may be a sign that the expression is now used to refer also to things that are subject to change in some respects. This, however, is unlikely. First, let us remind ourselves what we observed earlier, namely that in the Phaedo also, the phrase is not always used in its full-version. Second, the similarity between the two occurrences is striking: the first passage where the phrase is used is a passage about the soul having communion with what is unchangeable, and the second occurrence is about nous, which comes to be in a soul, and whose object is the unchangeable. Finally, if the point were that

the object ofnous is no longer unchangeable, but also changing in some respects, then we should expectkinêsisto be mentioned together withstasis. We may conclude, thus, that up to the last argument, the Friends of the Forms stick to the claim that Forms are unchangeable, that is, that they are not subject to change at all, and that Stasis is used by the Friends of the Forms to refer to a group of beings, the unchangeable beings as opposed to the changing beings.