Being cannot be reduced to a single kind

The claim that being is one-and-many is one of the very first claims Plotinus makes in VI 2. It is asserted right from the start, on the basis of the denial that being is the One.357

Plotinus does not argue for it, he simply refers to ‘Plato and others’ who have explained why this is the case.358_{Crucial is that this claim is immediately linked to questions about}

the structure of the kinds of being, that is: whether being can be reduced to a single kind or whether it necessarily involves a plurality of kinds. At the beginning of VI 2, 2, Plotinus gives a general characterisation of what is meant by ‘one-and-many’, and correspondingly outlines three possible ways of conceiving the structure of the kinds of being. Let us quote

352.For a general account of ousia in Plotinus, see Chiaradonna (2014), esp. pp. 220-225.

353.Passages that suggest that ousia and to on are used interchangeably are for instance VI 2, 17.23-24 where Plotinus, in a reference to the famous passage of Rep. 509b9, says about the Good that it is

ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος as opposed to ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, as in Plato’s text. We can also quote VI 2, 5.24-25, where ti on becomes tis ousiain the following line. Passages, however, which suggest that

ousiaandto onare not used interchangeably are passages in which the two words are juxtaposed like at VI 2, 10.29, where it is hard to see in the juxtaposition of to on and ousia a mere effect of insistence 354.VI 2, 2.9. I quote the passage later.

355.VI 2, 8.25. 356.VI 2, 5.23. 357.VI 2, 1.6.

358.VI 2, 1.14. As we have seen in Chapter III, Plato does, indeed, examine, in the debates with the Eleatics, the claim that Being and the One are one and the same. Plotinus nonetheless dedicates several sections to the question whether the One-Being is a kind of Being or not, and to the question of the relation between Being and the One. See VI 2, 9-11.

the passage:

Ἢ ἓν ἅµα καὶ πολλὰ λέγοµεν, καί τι ποικίλον ἓν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν ἔχον.

2 3 Now we say that it is at the same time one and many, and that it is a richly

variegated one keeping its many together in one.359

From there, Plotinus distinguishes three possibilities, which all reflect a different way being can be said to be one-and-many: either (i) being is one through the kind and multiple through the species, that is, there is just one kind Being and multiple species of being subsumed under it; or (ii) there are several kinds, but they are all subordinated to one primary kind, namely Being itself; or (iii) there are several kinds, all on the same level, that is, none of them is subordinated to any other kind, nor does any have primacy over the other kinds, and all together they form a unity, namely Being. These three options present three different ways Being can be said to be one. Option (i) simply consists in saying that Being is one, but that there are many species of Being. There is just one single kind and its many species. Options (ii) and (iii) differ from (i) in that, according to them, there is plurality among the kinds. A crucial difference between (ii) and (iii) is, however, that in (ii) the multiple kinds are, ultimately, reducible to one single kind, namely Being, whereas on (iii), this option is ruled out and the plurality of principles is maintained; they are not reducible to one kind.360

Plotinus himself defends option (iii). I shall not go into his criticism of the other two options here. For present purposes, it suffices to say that according to Plotinus, the hypothesis that there is a single kind (genos hen) of Being leads to the consequence that there is no plurality under this kind, no species or individuals which can come out of it.361

Let us now take a closer look at what Plotinus says about (iii):

359.VI 2, 2.2-3. Armstrong’s translation.

360.See Plotinus’ criticism of (ii) at VI 2, 2.32-44. 361.VI 2, 2. 32ff.

ἢ πλείω µὲν γένη, µηδὲν δὲ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον περιεκτικὸν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτό, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῶν γενῶν ἐλαττόνων ὄντων ἢ εἰδῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἀτόµων, συντελεῖνν ἅπαντα εἰς µίαν φύσιν καὶ ἐκ πάντωτῷ τῳ νοητῷ κόσµῳ, ὃν δὴ λέγοµεν τὸ ὄν, τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, οὐ µόνον γένη ταῦτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἅµα ὑπάρχειν· γένη µέν, ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτὰ ἄλλα γένη ἐλάττω καὶ εἴδη µετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄτοµα· ἀρχὰς δέ, εἰ τὸ ὂν οὕτως ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχει. 6 10 14 or that there should be more kinds, but none of them subordinated to any

other, but each including those below it (whether they themselves are lesser kinds or species with individuals [grouped] under them) and all contributing to a single nature; the intelligible universe, which is certainly what we call being, would be constructed from all of them. If this is so, these must certainly not only be kinds but at the same time also principles of being: kinds, because there are other lesser kinds under them and subsequently species and individuals; principles, if being is thus composed of many and the whole derives its existence from these.362

The point of this passage is to connect the claim about the structure of the kinds, namely that they are not hierarchically ordered and that they all contribute to form a single nature, with the claim that they are not only kinds but also principles. This confirms that the structure has implications for how closely related the kinds are with one another.

In the next passage, Plotinus explains what he means by ‘kinds’ and ‘principles’.363

By ‘kinds’, he means that the kinds of being have species, and particulars, subsumed under them. This does not only mean that there are species of Being, and also particular beings, but that each and every kind of being also produces its own species and particulars. For instance, there are species of Kinêsis, and species of Stasis.364_{As we shall see more clearly}

in the second part of this chapter, Plotinus takes this criterion very seriously, and it is not abandoned later on, although it raises a problem related to the issue of how the kinds produce species, and, in particular, where the specific differences that produce species come from. By ‘principle’, Plotinus means that Being consists of them (ek pollôn) and that the whole exists from them (ek toutôn ton holon huparchein).365_{Here, ‘principle’ is used in}

the sense of ‘element’ (stoicheion), as can be seen from the comparison with the four

362.VI 2, 2.6-14. Armstrong’s translation, slightly modified. 363.VI 2, 2. 12-14.

364.VI 2, 19.11-12. 365.VI 2, 2.13-14.

elements (fire, water, earth, air) that Plotinus makes immediately afterwards.366 _{In other}

words, the kinds of Being are the constituents of Being, what Being is made of. By contrast, the kinds of Being are not what is common (to koinon) to all beings, and Plotinus twice rejects that ‘what is common’ to many or to all beings is a kind of Being.367

This shows that when Plotinus says that Being is one-and-many, it means that Being is a single nature that is made of several constituents. In this respect, the expression

mia phusisis highly reminiscent of the Sophist. Now, we have argued that Plato uses this expression to characterise a particular form of unity, namely that which unites a whole to its parts in cases where the whole is over and above its parts. There are in Plotinus’ text other elements that suggest that this kind of part-whole relation might be what he has in mind here. First, the word for ‘whole’ (holon) is used in the last sentence of the passage, and most importantly, it is used in relation to the claim that the kinds of Being are also the principles of Being. Indeed, the parts compose the whole, such that the whole consists of the parts, but is nonetheless not reducible to them. Second, it goes well with the claim that none of the kinds is subordinated to any of the others, but can have sub-kinds and individuals under it. Indeed, there is no hierarchy among the parts, but none of the parts is empty, they all have an extension. Third, it also provides a suitable structure to support the claim that all kinds are on the same level, for in a part-whole relation, not only are the parts not subordinated to one another, but neither are the parts subordinated to the whole, without thereby implying that they all play the same role. Rather, parts and whole are mutually interdependent, for the parts are what they are only in the context of the whole to which they belong, and the whole depends on its parts, for the whole consists of the parts. In this way, neither the parts nor the whole are reducible to one another.

If Plotinus is here thinking of something like part-whole structure, then he cannot conceive of the whole as being identical to its parts, but must follow Plato in taking the whole as a unity over and above its parts; and that he does so is confirmed in the next passage.368 _{There, Plotinus examines how the kinds are related within the whole. The}

question is whether in the whole, all the kinds are mixed together or whether they remain one and distinct. Plotinus’ response is that ‘they [the kinds] will be by themselves and pure

366.That ‘principles’ are ‘elements’ can also be seen from the passage at VI 2, 3. 21-22. 367.See for instance VI 2.10.32ff about the One-Being, and VI 2.17.11ff about the Good. 368.VI 2, 2. 19-27.

and their mixed-up members will not abolish them’.369_{Plotinus postpones the explanation}

of how this is possible, but what is clear is that he does not take the whole to be simply a mixture of everything, but rather, to be something which has a structure such that all kinds remain distinct while combining.