CHAPTER I: The non-coreferentiality of Kinêsis and Stasis
1.2. The Giants and the problem of change and rest
As we said at the beginning, the debate with the Giants does not begin with the problem of change and rest, and it is only with the Friends of the Forms that this issue becomes central. In this section, we shall first examine how the problem emerges for the Giants. In particular, we shall see that the Giant’s initial position amounts to the view that there are only changing beings, to which they apply Kinêsis. Then, we shall move to the reformed Giants, and focus on their use of Stasis. This will lead us to reconsider once more the final argument at 249b5-c9. On the whole, I shall argue that just like the Friends of the Forms, the Giants also use Kinêsis and Stasis in a non-coreferential way.
1.2.1. How the problem of change and rest emerges for the Giants
At the beginning, the Giants do not describe themselves as holding the view that being is changing or unchanging, and any reference to change and rest is remarkably missing from the debate with them. Even thedunamisproposal, which is immediately understood by the Friends of the Forms as a claim involving the mutability of beings, is not introduced as a statement about change and rest, but as an attempt to find what is common to both corporeal and incorporeal things. That their position nevertheless amounts to the view that only Kinêsis is included into Being can be shown from several passages. To start with, it can be seen from the Friends of the Forms’ comment on the Giant’s initial position. At 246b9-c2, the Friends of the Forms say about the Giants that what they take for being is actually only becoming, and at 248a12-13, they characterise becoming as being subject to
change. Likewise when the dunamis proposal is introduced, and accepted by the Giants, the Friends of the Forms immediately associate it with the claim that being is subject to change. Two further passages allow us to identify the Giants with the view that there is only Kinêsis in being. A first passage is 249d1-2, and is part of the conclusion of the Gigantomachia. Before drawing the final conclusion, the Stranger starts by reviewing the different positions which have been examined throughout the debate, including a reference to the Eleatics, whose views have been examined before the Gigantomachia, at 242c.39Let
us quote the passage:
{ΞΕ.} Τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα µάλιστα τιµῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα µήτε τῶν ἓν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὂν κινούντων µηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινηµένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναµφότερα λέγειν. 249c10 249d1 249d4 STR: To the philosopher, and to those who honour these things most, it is
necessary on these grounds, it seems, neither to approve the supporters of the One or the many Forms who say that the totality is at rest, nor to listen to those who in turn say that being is in every way changing, but just like in the wish of children, we should say that being and the totality are both together everything that is changeless and everything that is changing.
In this passage, we can see that the Stranger draws a clear line between those who think that being is at rest and those who, by contrast, think that being is changing. Note in passing that both the Eleatics and the Friends of the Forms are characterised as holding the view that everything is at rest, although they do not agree on what those beings are — the One for the former, the many Forms for the latter; this will be important to remember when we come to the conclusion of the Gigantomachia. From what we already know about the Giants, we can safely assume that the thinkers, who are here described as holding that being is in every way changing, are the Giants.40 Later in the dialogue, at 252a5-10, the
same division among the thinkers is repeated:
39. I shall examine the debate with the Eleatics in Chapter III.
40. Here, I take it that pantachê(i) goes with to on, and so do Diès (1925) and Cornford (1935). Rowe (2015), by contrast, readspantachê(i)as related to the Giants’ attempt and translate ‘people who will do anything and everything (pantachê) to bring change to what is’. I think Diès and Cornford’s reconstruction is more natural, but in any case, the non-coreferential reading that I am defending does not depend on the beings being changing ‘in every respect’, for as I have argued since the beginning, I do not take Kinêsis to refer to a property that beings may or may not have.
{ΞΕ.} [...] πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἅµα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἓν ἱστάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατ' εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ µὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἑστηκότ' εἶναι. 252a5 252a10 STR: [...] everything is turned upside down, whether for those who have the
totality changing, for those who make it one and resting, or for those who bring the things that are to Forms that are always the same in the same way, for all of these people add in ‘being’, the ones saying that things really are changing, the others saying that they really are at rest.41
Once more, the divided line between the thinkers is that between those who hold that being is changing and those who hold that being is at rest, and the Giants are described as siding with the former view.42 What the last line also makes clear, through the hoi mên...hoi de
contrast, is that one holds the one or the other view, but not both. On these grounds, we may conclude that the Giants initially use Kinêsis in a non-coreferential way, that is, to refer to a group of being that they recognise, namely the changing beings, as opposed to another group of beings whose reality they deny, namely unchangeable beings.
1.2.2. Do the Giants ultimately recognise unchangeable beings?
Having seen that the unreformed Giants’ view amounts to the claim that being is only changing, let us now turn to the reformed Giants. The reformed Giants have been led to acknowledge that there are not only corporeal beings, but also incorporeal beings, like justice,phronêsis, the rest of the virtues and their opposites.43Are those incorporeal beings
changing beings, unchangeable beings, or both? Nothing is said on this point in the first place, but we know from the conclusion that everything that is is ultimately reduced to Kinêsis and Stasis. Thus, we must discover where the point is made, and whether the reformed Giants use Kinêsis and Stasis in a non-coreferential way or not. The passage to look at is again at 249b5-c9. Critics have generally assumed that this passage is mainly addressed to the Friends of the Forms, for it starts off with the claim that if everything is unchangeable, then nous does not come to be anywhere, which is precisely the point that
41. Rowe (2015)’s translation, modified and emphasis removed.
42. Note here that the verb histêmi is used as a synonym for ‘being always the same in the same way’. 43. Soph. 247b1-2.
has just been made by the Stranger against the Friends of the Forms.44 No doubt that the
passage is in the first instance addressed to the Friends of the Forms, but it is crucial to see that it is also addressed to the Giants, and, hence, is a preparation for the general conclusion, which is addressed to both sides. Again, this will be something to remember when we turn to this passage.
The main reason for thinking that the passage is also addressed to the Giants is the debate over stasis. Having restated that nous cannot be in anything if there are only unchangeable beings, for nous comes to be in a soul and souls are changing beings, the Stranger moves to the converse claim, namely: if all things are in motion (pheromena) and changing (kinoumena), thennousis not one of the beings. In contrast to the first half of the argument, Theaetetus does not immediately give his consent to this, but asks for an explanation (pôs). This is surprising if Theaetetus is acting here as the mouthpiece for the Friends of the Forms, for it is part of their initial position that there are unchangeable beings.45 The only ones who are likely to be willing to resist this claim are the Giants, for
this claim is new to them. Indeed, the reformed Giants have included incorporeal beings, but as we have seen, nothing indicates so far that they take these incorporeal beings to be unchangeable. Moreover, the distinction between ‘moving’ and ‘changing’ suggests that the argument is also addressed to the Giants, forpheromenê is precisely the word used at 246c2 by the Friends of the Forms to describe their opponents’ view about being.
Admittedly, the main difficulty with this reading is that if the point that the incorporeal beings, which the Giants have previously accepted, are also unchangeable beings is made here, as I am suggesting, then Plato is guilty of arriving at this conclusion too quickly and of providing almost no argument.46 It is all the more problematic that it
seems that the dunamis proposal precisely shows that the Giants do not take incorporeal entities to be unchangeable, otherwise they would have rejected the proposal, just like the Friends of the Forms did. About the latter point, note that in itself, the dunamis proposal does not directly imply that everything is changing. As critics have already noted, the
dunamisproposal is formulated in such a way that beings can have either (eite) adunamis
to act or (eite) adunamis to be affected. This is important, for if to be affected is without doubt incompatible with unchangeability, this may not be the case for the dunamis to act
44. See for instance Crivelli (2012), p. 92. 45. Soph. 248a10-13.
on something. As Brown points out, even Plato describes the Form of Beauty as ‘making’ the other things beautiful atPhd. 100d5, while at the same time maintaining that the Form Beauty is immutable.47 As a result, we may refrain from concluding, on the basis of the
reaction of the Friends of the Forms alone, that the Giants also understand the dunamis
proposal as implying that everything is changing. Coming back to our original point, the only way I can make sense of the lack of a proper argument for the unchangeability of the Giants’ incorporeal beings is that it shows that for Plato, the crucial step, and the one he thinks is really difficult to achieve, is to make the Giants accept that there are incorporeal beings, that is, that there are beings of which they can have no sense-perception. That he thinks the first step, namely there being not only corporeal beings but also incorporeal beings, is the difficult step to obtain can be seen from the fact that he explicitly admits that not all the Giants would accept it. He makes a distinction between the ‘better’ (beltious) Giants, the ones the Stranger and Theaetetus are actually arguing with, and the other Giants, the ones who would never accept that there are incorporeal beings. The distinction between the two groups is introduced at 246d5, and it is repeated at 247c3, that is, after the point has been made that some virtues are incorporeal: the better Giants have been reformed while the other Giants stick to the claim that everything is corporeal. The discussion then continues with the ‘better’ Giants alone, while the other Giants are left aside and do not come in again in the Gigantomachia.48
Now, it remains to be seen on what basis the Giants would be ready to grant first, that there is such a thing asnous, and second, that nous can only be about unchangeable beings. That they accept that there isnousis not surprising, fornous is likephronêsis, and the two are used in a similar way in the argument. Earlier in the debate, the Giants had been persuaded to admit thatphronêsisis among the beings, as one of the things that come to be present and cease to be present in the soul and make it wise. In our present passage,
nousis used exactly in the same way, namely as something that is present in the soul and causes it to havenous(nous echein).49As a result, the Giants can easily grant the first half
of the argument, which says that nous does not come to be in anything if there are only unchangeable beings, for they takenousandphronêsisto come to be in the corporeal soul. But then, why would they think that nous has unchangeable objects? It is almost
47. Brown (1998), p. 199. Leigh (2010) quotes Brown on that point, p. 69. 48. I thank Jamie Dow for bringing this point to my attention.
impossible to justify it if one thinks that by accepting this, the Giants commit themselves to the existence of Platonic Forms. But this need not be the case. It seems that the argument allows that they takenousitself to be an unchangeable being. Indeed, in contrast to the first part of the argument, which says that nous does not come to be in anything if there are only unchangeable beings, the second half simply says that if everything is changing and moving, thennous(touto) is suppressed from the beings. On this reading, the only thing that they are conceding is that these very things that they had included earlier, e.g. nous, phronêsis and justice, which are of a type other than corporeal beings, are not only incorporeal but also unchangeable. It is still a quick move that Plato is making here, but it is a reasonable move if we think that the Giants are only granting thatnousitself is an unchangeable being, and not that nous has unchangeable objects.
All in all, the point is that the Giants are led to recognise that there are not only changing beings, but also unchangeable beings. The latter are the incorporeal virtues that they included earlier. In the end, the Giants still use Kinêsis and Stasis in a non- coreferential way: they use Stasis to refer to incorporeal unchangeable beings, which come to be in the soul, like virtues and their opposites, while they use Kinêsis to refer to corporeal changing beings including the soul.