Death is the Absolute End of the Human Being

According to this view, death is the absolute end of a person and there is no transcendent or psychic elements that endure after death, let

alone the person as a whole. This view represents the denial of any form of afterlife. In other words, one’s death is considered to be empirical but with the further qualification that there is no further dimension to it. The ‘unknown’ is transformed into the certainty of ‘non-existence’ beyond death, leaving the individual to pursue worldly activities in the here and now. In this section, we shall briefly look at only two perspectives: the Epicurean/Lucretian argument and the Heideggerian existential view.

The views of Epicurus (300 bce) and Lucretius (1 ce) exemplify the belief that death is the absolute end of human existence. The Epicurean/Lucretian argument states that death is beyond sensation and not a rational object of fear; consequently any assumption that death occurs within human experience is regarded simply as incon- sistent. This argument is based on the assumption that the dead can ‘know’ nothing because death is equated with the permanent lack of experience. Both thinkers insist that man should face the fact of death with serenity and need not be troubled by hope. Epicurus and Lucretius also claim, as a reaction to the dualism of Plato, that at death the soul perishes with the body.

Thus the well-known Epicurean argument puts forward a case for the total acceptance of death, which at the same time encourages people not to be afraid of it. Epicurus argues that ‘when death is I am no more, when I am there is no death’ since one cannot experience one’s own death. Generally speaking, Epicurus’ argument gives a rational account for the acceptance of death. In his Letter to

Menoeceus Epicurus writes:

So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.28

Lucretius adopts a similar line of argument:

Rest assured, therefore, that we have nothing to fear in death. One who no longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has never been born . . . Pain and sorrow will never touch you again.29

In this passage, Lucretius makes an additional point by comparing ‘non-being’ after death and ‘non-being’ before birth. Generally speak- ing, one’s attitude towards these two periods is quite different. On the whole, one seems to be more affected and concerned with one’s future non-existence than the thought of nothingness before one’s birth.

Given one’s natural orientation towards the future, as most of one’s everyday activities are directed to the future, it is not surprising that one may feel more concerned about non-existence after death than about pre-natal non-existence.

At first glance, the Epicurean/Lucretian argument seems plausible, in that death is not considered as evil as it does not cause suffering for the one who dies. Some philosophers take the view that this argument is strong and worth defending. It is true that from the first-person viewpoint death remains impossible to experience. But is it also true that the fact of death has no relevance in one’s life as Epicurus claims? One may accept that if one no longer exists then death can do one no harm, though not everyone concurs.30_{According to Lucretius, death}

does not concern the living because it is a ‘not-yet’ event. But is it true to say that death is no concern to us just because we cannot experience it? We are concerned with future events that are ‘not-yet’ present, including our own death. And this orientation towards the future is one of the most significant features of the human being. The Epicurean argument seems to neglect this important aspect. Furthermore, it does not deal with the process of dying as there is a clear distinction between death and dying.31 _{Not every death is a}

clear-cut case as the Epicurean argument suggests. It is nevertheless true that if we no longer exist we cannot experience death. Although Epicurus’ argument may appeal to some, it may be argued that it does not bring relief to one’s death-Angst.

Having looked at the Epicurean/Lucretian argument, let us now move on to the Heideggerian existential approach to death. Strictly speaking, it is questionable whether Heidegger’s position regarding the notion of death in Being and Time can simply be identified with the view that death is the absolute end and there is nothing beyond it. Heidegger seems to have developed an evasive strategy in this respect. Although he acknowledges that death is the end of one’s being-in-the- world, he does not assert whether there is or there is not anything beyond one’s worldly existence; on this he maintains silence. Most philosophers interpret Heidegger’s silence as an indication of Dasein’s existence only in the here and now. Heidegger, of course, might claim that he is concerned only with the ontology of Dasein. That is, he is only interested in death as an end to worldly existence and in the phe- nomenology of human comportment towards death. For Heidegger, issues regarding Dasein’s beliefs about any form of afterlife are ontical matters which do not concern the ontological structure of Dasein.32

world. He is not interested in the question of which attitude should be adopted. In his view, Dasein understands its self as a mortal being in the world and it has to face up to it.

Heidegger’s analysis of the phenomenon of death is firmly grounded in his fundamental ontology. He inquires into the basic problems of Being, human existence and truth. He gives an existen- tial analysis of Dasein in terms of its ontological structure. Human existence, for him, is the key to interpreting philosophical questions about Being. According to Heidegger, the ontological structure of Dasein can be established on a purely phenomenological basis without reference to a deity or the concept of immortality. In his approach, Heidegger avoids any form of transcendent explanation of death. For him, Dasein’s existence is permeated by awareness of death, and death is faced in the here and now.

Heidegger’s analysis of death is not concerned with how people feel when they are about to die, nor with death as a biological event, but with the meaning and the existential-ontological significance of death to Dasein in the light of its ‘being-in-the-world’. Heidegger interprets the existential significance of death as follows. For Dasein, death is the ultimate possibility in a three-fold sense:

• it is one’s ownmost possibility and one dies alone; • it is non-relational, i.e. it cannot be shared; • it is inevitable, it cannot be outstripped.33

For Heidegger, understanding the phenomenon of death involves grasping the being of Dasein as a whole. If Dasein’s potentiality ‘to be’ is understood existentially, then it becomes clear that Dasein’s being in its totality is ‘being-towards-death’. Being-towards-death is Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’ and its ‘being-towards-the-end’. According to Heidegger, Dasein understands what it means ‘to be’ through facing death.

Heidegger, like Epicurus and Lucretius, holds that Dasein cannot experience its own death. He acknowledges that facing one’s own death is radically different from being concerned with the death of others. My own death means the end of my possibilities, the total end of my ‘being-in-the-world’, not the end of ‘world’ itself. The Heideggerian concept of ‘my ownness’ (jemeinigkeit) is important. For Heidegger, the fear of my own death comes from the fear of my extinction as a human being. I may be able to face other people’s death, but find it virtually impossible to come to terms with my own death. However, not all existential thinkers concur with the

Heideggerian view of death. Sartre, for example, argues that death is a contingent fact which belongs to one’s facticity, and that death is as absurd as life is. Death cannot be one’s possibility, he claims, as it always destroys all other possibilities. It is clear that Sartre sees death as a destructive force which cannot be regarded positively. He does not deny the reality of death but does not think that it is particularly important.34 _{Sartre further disagrees with Heidegger that death}

belongs to the ontological structure of Dasein.35

According to Heidegger, then, ontological analysis enables us to have an understanding of our finitude, and the awareness of our finitude makes authentic existence possible. For Heidegger, death becomes meaningful when one perceives one’s existence in the light of Being. Although his existential approach to death is intelligible, it does not seem to satisfy the human need to understand and conquer death and death-Angst. For thousands of years people have striven to transcend the human condition in order to grasp the mystery of death. The need to search for something beyond worldly existence is a feature of the human being. Heidegger seems to over- look this need.