Does Jaspers Commit a Category Mistake?

As we noted in Chapter 3, there is a problem with Jaspers’ assertions regarding his concept of Existenz and its attributes. Jaspers often speaks about Existenz as if it were the same kind of entity as a human individual, for example, ‘Existenz understands itself’, ‘Existenz warns me’, and so on. In these statements, it seems as though Existenz ‘understands’ and ‘warns’ just as a human being does. Such state- ments attract criticism, particularly from philosophers in the analytic tradition. If taken literally, a statement like ‘Existenz does such and such’ is indicative of a category mistake. It would be regarded as such because Existenz is a technical term used to refer to an aspect of the human being, not an entity that is capable of ‘doing such and such’.

What is a category mistake? Categories are said to be the most fun- damental features of reality, which cover all modes of being. A cat- egory mistake can simply be defined as the placing of an entity in the wrong category. Category mistakes can also refer to attributions of properties to entities that those entities cannot have. For example, according to Aristotle one must distinguish between different cat- egories, such as substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, and so on, and for him,

an attribute that can belong to entities in one category cannot be an attribute of entities in any other category.22

The term ‘category mistake’, introduced by Gilbert Ryle, is in general used for statements which are grammatically well formed, but never- theless may be quite naturally classified as nonsense. For example, statements like ‘the number 7 is red’ or ‘this mirror is a prime number’ involve a misunderstanding of the nature of entities being discussed, even though the grammatical structure of the statements is sound. According to Ryle, a category mistake is not a ‘meaningless noise, but a statement that is somehow out of place when its literal meaning is taken seriously’.23 _{In Concept of Mind, Ryle defines a category}

mistake as the presentation of facts ‘belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another’. Antony Flew, one of Ryle’s students, takes up this issue and makes a further point:

. . .we can be misled by purely grammatical structure into unwar- ranted beliefs, such as the belief in the subsistence – a sort of shadowy existence – of actually non-existent entities.24

In view of all this, to what extent do these comments apply to Jaspers’ concept of Existenz? Can one claim that one’s Existenz has

‘a sort of shadowy existence’? Or is it an unwarranted belief that one’s

Existenz has a form of subsistence in accordance with the above quo-

tation? In the account of metaphysical issues this kind of confusion often occurs. In a sense, one’s Existenz appears to have a form of sub- sistence because Jaspers makes various assertions about one’s

Existenz as if it were a human individual, even though it is nonexist-

ent as an entity. This is precisely where the problem lies. On the one hand, it can be interpreted in such a way that one’s Existenz has a form of subsistence because it can be actualised momentarily in boundary situations. On the other hand, one’s Existenz is not an entity in any form; it is a mode of human being. As Jaspers tells us, it does not belong to universal categories. It is simply an existential term used for an aspect of the human individual. Jaspers admits that exist- ential concepts such as Existenz can give rise to confusion. He often refers to the misunderstanding of one’s Existenz placed under general categories. This indicates that he was well aware of the problem of category mistake, and that is why he tells us that one’s Existenz does not belong to general categories. But despite this, he repeatedly uses the term Existenz as if it were an existing being. In his discussion of the difficulty in expressing existential concepts, particularly as regards to Existenz, Jaspers shows awareness of the problem involved in categories. He recognises that Existenz can be misconstrued as an objective category.

Jaspers acknowledges that we cannot avoid using objective con- cepts and categories as means of expression in the articulation of metaphysical issues. Although in his writings Existenz seems to perform actions, one is aware that Jaspers does not mean that

Existenz literally ‘understands’, ‘warns’ or ‘does’ anything. What he

means is that the individual human being, as Existenz, ‘understands’, ‘warns’ or performs certain actions. Jaspers is aware that Existenz cannot have properties which belong to a human being; or can

Existenz perform actions like a human being. It is only man who

makes choices and decisions and who takes action. The idea that

Existenz performs actions would be a misunderstanding of Jaspers’

concept of Existenz and his existence philosophy.

The concept of category itself is not problem-free. There are some language-related difficulties. The problem of a category mistake is ultimately related to linguistic distinctions and the focal point is the notion of meaning and how it is used. According to Lacey, if cat- egories exist at all, ‘they must belong to the world and not to lan- guage, because they must be found out and not created by us’.25_Lacey

thinks that category is a pompous term for ‘class’, as often happens in ordinary speech. This is a valid point and it brings us back to the linguistic difficulties in expressing metaphysical concepts and termi- nology, and their objectification in ordinary speech. Jaspers insists that in the elucidation of Existenz one cannot speak of Existenz in terms of general categories. As he says, Existenz is neither general nor generally valid because it does not belong to an objective category.

For Jaspers, metaphysical concepts are pure signs which need to be unfolded and interpreted. Here he is referring to ciphers. He argues that although one’s Existenz is non-objective, it is necessary to use object-language in the elucidation of Existenz. He states that vocab- ulary and concepts of object-language can be ciphers, but as ciphers they do not belong to general categories. And it is important that ciphers are used to make existential assertions regarding Existenz, because only through ciphers can one have an understanding of the transcendent realm, even though it is limited and mediated.26

In view of what we have said so far, is Jaspers guilty of making a category mistake? As already mentioned, he attributes certain proper- ties to Existenz, which is a mode of being that cannot have those attributes. Although Jaspers’ statements in this respect are grammati- cally well formed, they would be considered mistaken or false if taken literally. Jaspers’ critics would argue that attributes that belong to the human being cannot be predicated of Existenz. His assertions in this respect may mislead the reader into the belief that Existenz is an actually existent human individual, as both Ryle and Flew suggest. Although Jaspers reiterates that Existenz is a mode of being of humans throughout his works, he consistently refers to Existenz as if it were a human being. Why does Jaspers write in this way? One can only assume that his consistent use of the term is for reasons of convenience and simplification. It may be deliberately written in this style in order not to break the flow of thought in his elucidation. If one has to specify in each statement that Existenz is not an actual human being but a mode of being, and that it is not Existenz but the human individual as

Existenz that does ‘such and such’, then it may lead to unnecessarily

long and dull passages that do not express one’s thoughts effectively. Although Jaspers seems to commit a category mistake in his char- acterisation of Existenz, it is not clear whether his assertions actually constitute a category mistake. In reading Jaspers, one is aware from the outset that he is discussing a particular mode of human being when he refers to Existenz. One is also aware of the inadequacy of object-language.

Ehrlich, for example, welcomes any contribution to clarity and precision in the elucidation of Existenz. However, he holds that to think about ‘different realms of what there is’ requires ‘different modes of clarity and precision’. He continues:

‘existence’ has functioned predominantly as a category . . . i.e., cate- gory in the sense of ‘form of concepts, or of conceptualization’. But note: Jaspers knows that, and precisely for that reason he distin- guishes the categorial use of ‘Existenz’ from that which pertains to what he does in Philosophy vol. 2: Existenzerhellung.27

Ehrlich is right in thinking that Jaspers was aware of the complexity of categories. According to Ehrlich, speaking about Jaspers’ existen- tial concepts is a matter of

phenomenological reflection and characterization . . . and the char- acterization is a matter of metaphorical circumscription. ‘Existenz’ is such a metaphor. Instead of ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’, Jaspers speaks of ‘signa of Existenz’.28

‘Signa of Existenz’ refers to Jaspers’ concept of ciphers which are nec- essary in the use of object-language in making metaphysical asser- tions. Thus, if Existenz is considered as a metaphor rather than categorised as a human being, then Jaspers’ characterisation of

Existenz in terms of ciphers may not be regarded as a category

mistake. As Jaspers says, ciphers do not belong to a category that complies with a conceptual scheme. Ciphers are open to individual interpretation and represent what cannot be expressed directly.

Existenz and Transcendence are not translatable into universal cate-

gories, yet they can be partially comprehended through existential experiences by means of ciphers. Even then, this kind of experience can only be expressed in indirect language. For Jaspers, ciphers are central to existential human experience in order to elucidate the nature of the transcendent realm symbolically. The reading or inter- preting of the ciphers of Transcendence indicates the depth of the metaphysical aspect of Jaspers’ existence philosophy.

As Ehrlich observes, Jaspers is not insensitive to the need for pre- cision in thought and linguistic expression. In the The Reading of

Ciphers section of Philosophy Jaspers discusses the difficulty of

expressing metaphysical experiences clearly. For Jaspers, the ciphers of Transcendence and their meaning have reality for Existenz alone. He states that without Existenz the signs are ‘not just empty; they are nothing’. The question is whether one can achieve conceptual clarity through intuitive experiences, as Jaspers suggests. If such experiences

are merely intuitive how can they be brought out of their vagueness and ambiguity? How can the individual’s subjective interpretation of ciphers be clarified? It can be said that ciphers signify a kind of meta- physical objectification of the transcendent realm by giving subjective meaning to them. But how are these ciphers to be interpreted, and how are they to be expressed, since the object-language is inadequate? Jaspers addresses these questions by postulating the ‘three languages’ in which ciphers are conveyed.

1. The reading of the first language manifests itself in a general way in the Augenblick experience. Jaspers writes about this metaphys- ical experience as follows:

There is nothing demonstrable about a metaphysical experience,

nothing that might make it valid for everyone.29

And he goes on:

What is conveyed in this language, however, is conveyed by way of generalization; even the man who heard it originally will understand it only in generalized form.30

2. The second language manifests itself in existential communica-

tion. What is conveyed is transferred as ‘a narrative, an image, a form, a gesture’ from Existenz to Existenz. In other words, it becomes a shared language that is objectified.31

3. The third language is in the form of metaphysical speculation which is the thought that is itself a cipher, but must be expressed in objective form. The content of thought itself is a symbol con- veyed in the form of language. This does not indicate ‘cognition of transcendence’. Jaspers claims that speculation is ‘a thinking that drives us to think the unthinkable’.32

Thus, the interpretation of ciphers takes place at three levels, and these metaphysical experiences are expressed through generalised form, existential communication and metaphysical speculation. The import- ant point in Jaspers’ discussion here is that one is not able to grasp Being itself whatever the level of language used; one can only speak of the symbolic representation of the transcendent realm. This is due to the necessity of thinking, interpreting and articulating one’s subjective experiences in object-language. It seems that metaphysical speculation enables one to interpret the language of the cipher only in a limited way. If one considers Existenz as a cipher, for example, any assertion about it will inevitably be in object-language, and any assertion made

about it will be open to misunderstanding. As a result, Existenz may be thought to be placed in a general category because of its attributes. Inevitably, then, Jaspers will be accused of committing a category mistake. If Existenz is regarded as a metaphor, however, then perhaps committing a category mistake will not become an issue.

Does the interpretation of metaphysical experiences through ciphers in three languages make the concept of ciphers and their inter- pretation any clearer? To what extent does it help to grasp Existenz as a metaphor? Jaspers’ analysis demonstrates the necessity of using ordinary language in the expression of metaphysical experiences. However, it does not adequately clarify the concept of ciphers and their interpretation in such experiences. First of all, it is not clear whether the three levels of language occur in a particular order or are used interchangeably. Is there a clear-cut separation between each level or do they overlap? On the one hand, it appears that they are three distinct ways of conveying the interpretation of ciphers. On the other, they seem to complement each other. The common point is that the interpretation of ciphers is possible only when one achieves

Existenz in the Augenblick experience. It is possible to construe that

both existential communication, which manifests itself in the second

language, and metaphysical speculation, which is expressed in the third language, can occur at the same time in one’s subjective exist-

ential experience. Jaspers tells us that generalisations do not apply to

Existenz, since Existenz is a unique and historic mode of being. Yet

we are told that in the first language the interpretation of ciphers is conveyed ‘by way of generalisation’. This seems to be incompatible with the characterisation of Existenz.

There is another unclear point regarding ciphers. Sometimes ciphers refer to the language of the transcendent realm by means of which we read or interpret things in the world. Sometimes, however, they refer to the entities that exist. Jaspers does not provide a clear dis- tinction between Transcendence as a cipher and ciphers expressed as a language of Transcendence. A clear differentiation between the two would be helpful. Furthermore, how does one differentiate existential ciphers from specific religious ciphers? These two concepts are inter- twined and difficult to distinguish. Such difficulties do not seem to be adequately addressed by Jaspers. In response, Jaspers might argue that ciphers are ‘listened to, not cognised’. He would also suggest that it is up to the individual to interpret ciphers within their subjective expe- riences. What Jaspers writes about ciphers provides valuable insight into metaphysical thought and experiences. Ciphers also provide a

form of mediation between one’s transcending-thinking and Being itself. Finally, whether Jaspers is committing a category mistake is contentious. If one considers the reaction of some analytic philoso- phers, such as Flew, to the characterisation of Existenz, Jaspers seems to be making a category mistake, at least according to their criteria. However, having considered Jaspers’ awareness of the issue of cate- gories and the inadequacy of object-language, I concur with Ehrlich’s view that Jaspers’ characterisation of Existenz does not constitute a category mistake. Since this is a matter of interpretation, it is difficult to give a definitive answer to this question.