Reflections on the Existential Interpretation

The Existential Interpretation closely follows Jaspers’ views on the eternal aspect of the human being and ‘deathlessness’. In this regard explanations of, and support for, Jaspers’ views rest on the distinction between subjective and objective time. Accordingly, if one adopts this perspective, and if one can accept the Augenblick experience as a sub- jective existential moment in objective time, then Jaspers’ view on death can be considered less problematic.

For some philosophers, however, the transcendent aspect of the human being will always remain problematic. In particular, the exis- tential experience of the Augenblick generates some legitimate ques- tions. Let us consider some of these. The first difficulty arises from Jaspers’ assertion that the actualisation of Existenz occurs in a split- second in the Augenblick, which is sometimes expressed as timeless duration. One objection here might be that in order to experience something, the experience has to have duration, otherwise one could not experience it. But when we use the term ‘duration’ we are refer- ring to objective time and attempting to explain this existential experi- ence within the confines of ordinary language. Custance addresses the problem of object-language in expressing the notion of ‘eternity in time’ and ‘duration’.100_{He gives an example to demonstrate this par-}

ticular difficulty:

Physicists have recently discovered a particle that has independent existence of about one-fifteenth of a billionth of a second! Is this long enough to say that this particle, called an antiomega-minus baryon particle, is a reality? How long must a thing last to have real existence? Surely reality of existence in eternity is not measured by ‘how long’?101

This passage demonstrates that the term ‘duration’ needs to be con- sidered in a wider context and outside object-language. As we have already pointed out, the difficulty lies, in the fact that ordinary language is inadequate for metaphysical explanations. If we suppose, as we proposed at the outset, that this momentary experience is

understood not in terms of objective time but as non-temporal dura- tion, then what Jaspers says regarding eternity becomes clearer. One has to remember that this subjective experience is private and unver- ifiable – private in the sense that it is personal, internal and not open to empirical inquiry. It is conceivable for man to have an existential experience of timelessness, even if it is almost impossible to express it successfully in the language of objective time.

The second difficulty arises from Jaspers’ statements regarding eternity and its temporal appearance. In Philosophy he writes:

The paradox of the existential sense of historicity – that fleeting time includes eternal being – does not mean that there is an eternity some- where else, aside from its temporal appearance.102

The problem stems from Jaspers’ use of the term ‘eternity in time’, which seems ambiguous. Some philosophers might argue that the existence of eternity is an important philosophical issue and should be addressed clearly. Jaspers’ assertions regarding eternity might be considered to be contradictory. On the one hand, he tells us that eter- nity does not exist apart from its temporal appearance. On the other hand, we are told that we can experience a moment of eternity when eternity cuts across objective time, i.e. in the Augenblick. The diffi- culty is that if eternity cuts across objective time, there must be some- thing called eternity. Indeed, if one were able to experience even a moment of eternity, then there must be eternity as such to experience. Has eternity always existed since we can have awareness of it? If it has always been there, then it points to some kind of endurance, i.e. endless duration. If it has not been there, as Jaspers suggests, then it cannot be called eternity as eternity is generally understood to mean endless time that has always existed and will always exist. But this objection, as it stands, does not necessarily undermine Jaspers’ views. First, Jaspers emphasises that eternity in time is not a contradiction because the intersection (i.e. quer zur Zeit) implies a relation to objective time, and is expressed metaphorically. Thus the only rela- tion we can establish between objective time and eternity is at the point of intersection. Second, Jaspers may reiterate that this kind of metaphysical concept cannot be expressed in object-language. Eternity cannot be thought of as an object to be directly encountered, even though one may have awareness of it. In other words, eternity manifests itself in the individual’s awareness of it. It seems that what might sometimes appear to us as a paradox or contradiction can perhaps be grasped only in subjective experiences.103_{It is possible that}

there are language-independent relationships detectable by the indi- vidual, depending on his degree of awareness.

The problem is that subjective experiences cannot be intersubjec- tively confirmed. As Jaspers says, there is nothing demonstrable about a metaphysical experience, nothing that might make it valid for everyone. Some might insist that without proof of the existence of eternity, one has no reason to believe that one can have aware- ness of eternity, let alone experience it. Some might further argue that even if we grant that eternity as such exists, what if one has no awareness of it? Should one accept the testimony of others? Furthermore, it is possible that one’s subjective experiences could be deceptive. One may think that one has awareness of eternity, but this can be self-deceptive. These are valid points; however, they do not establish that there is no eternity to be experienced just because the experience of eternity cannot be intersubjectively confirmed. Is it not possible to infer the existence of something even if one does not encounter it directly? For example, there are certain subjective mental processes quite distinct from observable behaviour. Each person has some kind of awareness of his own mental processes and experiences, but these experiences cannot be publicly verifiable. Above all, one must recognise that existential timeless moments may be experienced by at least some people.104 _{This is analogous to}

saying that some people are able to see (physically) and some are not. By the same token, perhaps some people are blind to awareness of a timeless moment of eternity.

Furthermore, is it not conceivable that there are other states of human awareness through which once can experience things in a new way? William James, for example, argues that

our normal waking consciousness . . . is one special type of con- sciousness, . . . there are potential forms of consciousness entirely dif- ferent. . . . no account of the universe can ever be regarded as final which leaves out these other forms of consciousness. Nor can any view of ourselves be final if we accept that our present consciousness is final.105

The existence of other states of consciousness is not logically impos- sible. Our ordinary consciousness engages with experiences related to ourselves and to things we are familiar with. But during sleep the quality of our consciousness changes and when we are awake the degree of awareness and the form of relation change again. It is indeed conceivable that there might be other forms of consciousness that

may enable us to have qualitatively different kinds of experiences from temporal experiences.

Another objection regarding the Augenblick experience is as follows. According to Jaspers, one can, as Existenz, experience eter- nity in a vanishing and yet eternal moment in the Augenblick. It can be argued that Jaspers’ assertions seem to imply that he may be equat- ing eternity with a moment of eternity. There may be an objection on the grounds that eternity cannot be identified with what is experi- enced in the Augenblick, namely a moment of eternity. In other words, eternity is not the same as a moment of eternity. This is a rea- sonable objection. However, it requires a closer look at the terms. In the first place, to say that ‘the vanishing Now is eternal’106_{does not}

necessarily mean that it is identical with eternity. It may merely rep-

resent eternity, or, as Jaspers says, reveal something eternal, or have

some eternal attributes. Second, whenever Jaspers refers to a moment of eternity, this transcending moment is experienced in the world as timelessness. It is indeed difficult to avoid the word ‘moment’ since there is no other word to substitute, or to give the exact meaning to the word ‘moment’ in metaphysical language to explain this existen- tial experience. We have to remind ourselves that the existential moment Jaspers discusses is different from what we understand when we use the word ‘moment’ in objective time. So, the problem of the limitation of language resurfaces once again. In fact, the objection itself is put in ordinary language. The term ‘moment’ in objective time does not cover the meaning of eternity that Jaspers is proposing; it has to be seen in a wider context. What, then, is this transcending moment of eternity? In Jaspers’ terminology, a moment is to be conceived as timelessness or non-temporal duration in the awareness of Being that can be experienced as Existenz. (We shall return to the issue of what Jaspers means by the existential moment in terms of non-temporal duration in detail in Chapter 4.)

In our discussion of various aspects of eternity, the transcendent realm and Jaspers’ concept of the all-encompassing, there is a general presupposition that a transcendent realm exists and is unknowable. This raises an epistemological question. How does one know that there is a transcendent realm which is unknowable? Jaspers tells us that one can pick up signals, or rather ciphers, emanating from Transcendence, and that through these ciphers we form ideas about certain metaphysical notions, for example eternity in time. They are regarded as windows into eternity as it were. This assumption is based on the premise that the human being has an awareness of a

transcendent dimension in human existence. Some critics may argue that if the transcendent realm is unknowable and ineffable we have no reason to assume that it exists at all. One might even argue that the only thing we can be certain of is that we have ideas about possi- ble sources, but we have no secure grounds for assuming that there really is a transcendent realm that generates these ciphers.107

This is a difficult objection to deal with. Indeed, there is no certain knowledge about the existence of the transcendent realm. Given this uncertainty, it would perhaps be a more cautious approach for Jaspers to have stated that he was hypothesising rather than eluci- dating Transcendence as if its reality was unquestionably accepted by all. However, one must reiterate that Jaspers is concerned with the individual’s philosophical faith and its manifestation, not with the indubitable certainty of the existence of such metaphysical concepts. For Jaspers, the above-mentioned objections do not seem to be problematic because, arguing from his theory of ciphers, he can assert that everything around us, including temporality and eternity, is a cipher from Transcendence. Since one’s inner experiences are individ- ual and subjective, they cannot be explained in objective terms. For Jaspers, ciphers are not meaningless, unintelligible symbols of the transcendent reality but are open to interpretation for each person. He connects one’s existential experience with the unity of ‘remembrance and foresight’, which are modes of cipher reading.108_{‘Remembrance’}

signifies one’s existential awareness of the depths of the past, and ‘fore- sight’ indicates one’s possibilities and unconditional choices. They become a cipher in the Augenblick experience in absolute conscious- ness. He asserts that however incoherent some existential concepts may appear, man is capable of deciphering ciphers with the help of the inner apprehension of Existenz.109 _{Thus Jaspers always has a way}

out of philosophical difficulties by means of interpreting ciphers. Accordingly, almost everything in the world, including Existenz, is capable of becoming a cipher, and can be read in multifarious ways depending on the individual’s level of awareness and interpretation.

In defence of Jaspers, one can argue that the subjects we are dealing with here are metaphysical issues, rather than objective knowledge. Furthermore, there is not one single absolute truth for everyone and no absolute knowledge about Transcendence. Transcendence emerges from the individual’s direct existential engagement in the world. In his view, as Existenz we become aware of ciphers all around us and inter- pret them, and this interpretation forms our beliefs about reality as it appears to us. Jaspers insists that it is up to each individual how he

interprets ciphers in the world. It will suffice to say that metaphysical concepts are connected with one’s subjective experiences; they cannot lead to empirical certainty. As we mentioned in our discussion of philosophical faith, some philosophical concepts cannot be cate- gorised together with empirical theories and cannot be shown to be true within a scientific framework. Scientific theories lead to predic- tions that can be used to settle some disputes, whereas metaphysical studies rely on a priori arguments. Metaphysical concepts are intel- lectual constructs of the mind which help us to understand, interpret and make sense of reality. Furthermore, they are supposed to give meaning to our temporal lives.

While the Existential Interpretative model provides an explanation which closely echoes Jaspers’ existential concept of death, clearly it is liable to some objections. Let us consider some more questions. If

Existenz is one’s true being, the inner aspect of the self, it must have

some kind of actuality. If one accepts that one can achieve selfhood at a particular existential moment in time, what kind of reality will

Existenz have in eternity? When Existenz is actualised how does it

sustain its reality in the Augenblick? What happens to Existenz when man is in his mundane mode of Being? Jaspers’ reply would be that

Existenz acquires actuality in a split-second and only in the existen-

tial experience of the Augenblick, when one makes contact with Transcendence. But even then it may be unclear what happens to

Existenz when one dies, since Existenz is not subject to death, and

since it cannot perish nor can it last in eternity. If Existenz perishes with Dasein, then it cannot be said to be deathless and eternal. But one must remind oneself that Existenz is not an empirical entity. If

Existenz is understood as a possibility, then death, perishing and

lasting forever in the traditional sense are not applicable to Existenz. The validity of the presence of Existenz belongs to the human being in the world, not in the afterlife. Jaspers emphasises that a sense of ‘deathlessness’ can be experienced by the individual in the existential moment of eternity in the Augenblick. In this respect, the Existential

Interpretative model fits well with Jaspers’ view of the eternal aspect

of the human being.

So far we have examined the features of Existenz and discussed some philosophical problems arising from it. This was followed by an examination of the relationship between Existenz and death. We argued that this relationship was to be seen within the context of the

Augenblick experience through which one can become aware of a

interpretative models of Existenz’s deathlessness. It was argued that if Existenz is not subject to death and is eternal, then there must be an explanation regarding its ‘deathlessness’ in some form or another. In this respect two interpretations were considered: the Mystical

Interpretation and the Existential Interpretation. I suggested that

according to the first model, Existenz’s immersion in eternity and being part of the overall totality can be construed as a form of mys- tical explanation. I brought out certain similarities between the Sufis’ mystical outlook and Jaspers’. Nevertheless, it was noted that the first interpretative model, despite certain similarities, is not compatible with Jaspers’ intended meaning of Existenz’s ‘deathlessness’. I con- cluded that one’s eternal aspect would be better understood if one could give an account of it without sinking into the mystical realm.

In the second interpretative model, the eternal aspect of man is explained in terms of the existential experience of the Augenblick. Accordingly, this momentary subjective experience takes place in objective time. Here the focus of the argument is on the distinction between the two notions of time. For Jaspers, this existential moment is the instant in which one can achieve selfhood. The actualisation of

Existenz is essential in this context, because in Jaspers’ view, eternity as

a sense of timelessness is experienced by one’s Existenz within the tem- poral realm, and this experience can occur only in the Augenblick. I pointed out that despite some objections, the Existential Interpretation of ‘deathlessness’ is in line with Jaspers’ views. I also argued that the main objection to the eternal aspect of Existenz stems from the defini- tion of eternity as endless duration. In the next chapter, Jaspers’ asser- tions about the eternal aspect of one’s Existenz will be analysed in terms of non-temporal duration within the framework of the Existential

Interpretation of ‘deathlessness’.

Notes

1. It is the direct translation of ‘Existenz weiß keinen Tod’ in Philosophie

II, p. 2, which is translated as ‘Existenz is unaware of death’ by E. B.

Ashton, Phil.2, p. 4. Both translations indicate the ‘deathlessness’ of

Existenz as opposed to Dasein’s finitude.

2. Jaspers, Phil.2, p. 4.

3. A category mistake is defined in The Cambridge Dictionary of

Philosophy, p. 123 as ‘the placing of an entity in the wrong category’.

If one takes Jaspers’ statement ‘Existenz does such and such’ literally, it may imply a category mistake because Existenz is a technical term used to refer to a mode of being. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.

4. Although one endeavours to avoid such assertions (e.g. Existenz does such and such) at times it is inevitable that they will appear in this book either in quotation marks or they may occasionally slip into one’s own explanatory statements. Expressions of that form should be inter- preted as ‘the human individual as Existenz does such and such’. 5. Jaspers, Phil.2, p. 12. 6. Ibid., p. 14. 7. Jaspers, Phil.2, p. 4. 8. Jaspers, PSP, p. 153. 9. Jaspers, WW, p. 71. 10. Ibid., p. 45.

11. Grene, Introduction to Existentialism, pp. 137–8.

12. Jaspers connects decision-taking with ‘the unconditional attitude’ towards the self. He also connects lucidly taken decisions with one’s participation ‘in the eternal’, which indicates decisions taken as

Existenz. This, for Jaspers, points to authentic existence. Jaspers, WW,

pp. 56–8.

13. Hersch, ‘Gesture’, p. 4.

14. Jaspers, PSP, p. 71. Regarding existential freedom, Olson suggests that as one begins to grasp freedom as one’s possibility, one may gain insight into authentic subjectivity which includes ethical actions in everyday life. It is important to bring out this point because in Jaspers’