Discussion

The narrative of New Zealand’s oceans policy shows, in summary, a period of policy-forming taking place comparatively quickly over a period of four years, and the completion and near approval of a comprehensive strategic environmental framework for oceans management around New Zealand. The proposed strategy was derailed by a related coastal and marine management issue of Maori rights. A long tail of policy development followed, drawing on the previous work but conditioned by political and bureaucratic caution arising from the way Maori rights had overturned the original proposed policy. After the M/V Rena disaster in 2011, however, policy work sped up. Even then, a less comprehensive policy in environmental terms emerged compared to that envisaged in 1999 and certainly in 2003. What can we make of the factors that influenced these various permutations of New Zealand’s oceans policy?

Issues associated with developing a more integrated approach to oceans management were not especially complex, initially. What complexity there was early on arose from tension between commercial and environmental interests. This was manifest in the ideological toing and froing between economic objectives (which assumed dominance in 1999) and environmental objectives (which assumed dominance in 2000). Awareness and visibility of the policy problem was not very high at the start, and only became more so after the report of the ministerial advisory committee in 2000 and the policy work undertaken at the same time. The development of better knowledge and awareness seems to have helped reduce conflict potential over policy prescriptions within the machinery of government, in that it identified problems to be addressed, but paradoxically, increasing the visibility of the issues in the wider public arena may have contributed to raising the conflict potential. Where the oceans policy became more complex was after the foreshore and seabed controversy. The controversy did not arise from the proposed oceans policy itself. Nevertheless, it elevated the conflict potential hugely. This event awoke nascent Maori concerns about their rights. These were successfully translated onto the political stage, resulting in lower political priority for an oceans policy where it risked exacerbating Maori concerns. The influence of events is also apparent as a result of the 1999 and 2008 elections, in that 1999 increased an environmental emphasis and 2008 decreased it. The grounding of the MV Rena in 2011 (combined with growing interest in offshore oil and gas exploration) were events that increased the policy priority, but this didn’t necessarily translate into significantly greater environmental priority owing to an emphasis in government on economic values compared to environmental ones. Events thus increased complexity. Together, these intervening variables affected cognitive features within government, increased the priority of political rationalities over environmental ones (as well as economic ones), and constrained the influence of institutional and agency features.

5: Oceans policy

In examining the intra-government sources of environmental policy effectiveness (the dependent variable), it is instructive to contrast the policy that nearly emerged in 2003, with the one that emerged by 2012.

In terms of environmental effectiveness the 2003 policy would have established environmental values as the principal priority, and, by saying that other legislation had to give effect to this principle, would have firmly integrated environmental values into the way New Zealand authorities approached ocean’s management. The 2012 EEZ legislation established environmental values as a priority, but it perpetuated a sector-based approach rather than an integrated one, hence decreasing its environmental effectiveness.

In terms of potential policy effectiveness, the 2003 proposal set out clear authorities, law, rules, tools and means of implementation, via a proposed Oceans Act, strategic direction through a

national oceans plan (a form of mandatory national policy statement), and an oceans minister and an oceans agency to carry out oversight and policy coordination. It is, of course, difficult to judge the support base for these proposals because they were never finalised. Clearly there was some support, given the findings of the Ministerial Advisory Committee, the consciousness raising effect of their public hearings around the country, and the calls for better oceans management from the PCE, environmental NGOs, and from some in the petroleum and mining sectors who wanted more certainty about rules that applied to their activities. In contrast, the fishing industry was cautious at best, and as events transpired, Maori support was highly conditional.

The 2012 legislation was less integrated both internally and externally, in that while it established the EPA as a regulator, its role was confined to those activities not already controlled under other

legislation, and was more limited in its rules, tools and implementation compared with what had been proposed in 2003. It had a support base in industry and Maoridom because it either met or avoided impinging on their interests. It had (just) satisfied environmental groups by changing the purposes of the legislation at the last minute, but its lack of overall integration caused those who wanted a firmer environmental focus to oceans management to be qualified in their support. The influence of intra-government features (the independent variables) on the 2003 ocean policy proposal and the 2012 approach are revealed to be different in effect.

In both cases agency was a significant driver, especially from a number of influential ministers: Upton in 1998 by getting oceans management on the policy agenda and driving an environmental emphasis; Hodgson in continuing the drive between 2000 and 2003 with a policy-process emphasis; Mallard in 2008 with a political emphasis to deliver on promises to produce some (any) sort of policy; and Smith in 2009 to 2012 because he promoted the value of an oceans policy and to deal with the political,

5: Oceans policy

environmental and financial risks arising from the M/V Rena disaster.466 _{Leadership within the} bureaucracy was evident in the period between 2002 and 2003, particularly from senior managers of MfE. Otherwise there is no evidence that it was consistently strong. In fact, in the mid-2000s it was minimal.

Evidence a strong positive environmental institutional effect is apparent in the period between 2001 and 2003. For much of the rest of the time it was comparatively limited. There is evidence that the institutional arrangements up until 2002 served to delay things, not deliberately, but by emphasising policy processes at the expense of policy substance, and awkward organisational arrangements with the policy run in effect from DPMC in 1999 and for nearly two years by an ad hoc arrangement involving Hodgson’s office. Between 2002 and 2003, however, environmental and policy effectiveness were enhanced by re-organised arrangements which focused resources, gathered together officials of both seniority and capability, and an assigned leadership role for MfE. After 2003, there was limited environmental institutional drive unless prompted from a political level. The last minute changes to the legislation in a more environmental direction in 2012 were the result of external lobbying, not a concerted institutional drive from departments or ministers.

Cognitive features - views and priorities about environmental values and how these are interpreted - emerged in what was described above as the “toing and froing” between economic and

environmental objectives. Economic values came to the fore in 1999 and seemed on track to focus on opening up opportunities for offshore oil and gas exploitation and seabed mining, although acknowledging the environmental protection dimension. Environmental values came to the fore in 2000 and prevailed until 2003. Political priorities dominated until 2008, although an environmental dimension remained alive. Economic priorities reasserted themselves after 2008, even more strongly than they had in 1999.

Finally, it is interesting to observe how much time was involved in producing any oceans policy. It took about fifteen years. Australia and Canada had produced similar policies much more quickly. These provided models which New Zealand could have copied without embarking, as it did, on developing a policy from first principles. Furthermore, by not pressing forward with more urgency, oceans policy became subject to the exigencies of events, and led to greater complexity. This brings into question both the capacity of the departments charged with developing this particular policy (an institutional feature), and a proposition advanced in some New Zealand literature that the

centralised nature of the New Zealand government system means that, potentially, it can produce

466 _{It should be remembered that Smith had been involved, along with Upton, in promoting oceans policy}

between 1998 and 1999, and as opposition spokesperson for environmental matters between 2000 and 2008, he had promoted an oceans policy, from an environmental perspective.

5: Oceans policy

policy quickly.467 _{These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 8 dealing with the overall analysis} of what the case studies show.

In conclusion, actors (agency) and their views (cognitive perspectives) were the key factors that explain the more limited oceans policy that emerged in 2012, which in turn were very strongly conditioned by events, especially the foreshore and seabed controversy. This introduced significantly greater non-environmental complexity to dealing with oceans management.

However, in the 2003 proposal, institutional features, especially roles (acting as advocates), resources (seniority and numbers of staff), the way they organised (structure), views and priority applied by MfE and DoC (and Minfish), provide a contrasting set of key factors that would probably have explained a stronger environmentally oriented oceans policy if in fact it had eventuated. Using the framework from Chapter 4, key factors influencing the 2012 policy are represented in figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Oceans policy 2012 influencing factors (scaled to small A, moderate

A

or large

A

)

467 _{Mintrom, "Participating in Agenda Setting." P.608.}

W

Wickedness/ Complexity

D

Developments /Events I Institutional factors

A

Agency factors

C

Cognitive factors

+

E Environmental effectiveness

P

Policy effectiveness Intervening variables Independent variables Dependent variables

5: Oceans policy

Using the framework from Chapter 4, key factors influencing the 2003 policy are represented in figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Oceans policy 2003 influencing factors (scaled to small A, moderate

A

or large

A

)

W Wickedness/ Complexity D Developments/ Events

I

Institutional factors

A

Agency factors

C

Cognitive factors

+

E

Environmental effectiveness

P

Policy effectiveness Intervening variables Independent variables Dependent variables

6: Biodiversity policy

In document Inside the black box: the influence of government executive forces on environmental policy effectiveness in New Zealand (Page 121-126)