Institutional features

Institutional features influenced the nature of policy development in each of the three case studies. This section looks at three intra-government institutional features specifically: organisational ones; institutional frameworks for environmental management; and the rules of engagement for policy development. Analysis draws on ideas discussed earlier in the thesis that intra-government institutional arrangements can be constraints or strengths; constraints if those arrangements inherently confine environmental values compared with other collective values, or strengths if they hold open opportunities to recognise environmental values and the need for their integration in policies.

Organisational factors played a significant role in the biodiversity strategy and the proposed 2003 oceans strategy. In each case, there was evidence of the following features: internal reorganisations; collaborative structures between the two environmental departments; clear internal (and external) environmental mandate; mobilisation of resources; and assigned leadership roles. Improved organisation provided a platform to counter different institutional and cognitive influences that might otherwise have marginalised the policies’ potential effectiveness.

In the case of the final 2012 oceans policy, institutional organisational factors were less influential from an environmental perspective when compared with other intra-government features or extra- governmental lobbying.689 _{With freshwater policy, internal organisational institutional influences had} more of a constraining influence. More specifically, at potentially opportune times such as the early

689 _{This assertion comes with a caveat, as pointed out in Chapter 5. When the record of departmental views and}

inter-departmental exchanges are made public, it may be that one or more departments’ repeated advocacy of stronger environmental provisions was influential in last minute changes that strengthening of the 2011 policy’s environmental provisions.

8: Conclusions

and mid-2000s, shortcomings in MfE’s internal organisational arrangements meant the Ministry was slow to take advantage of a political climate favourable to environmental quality improvement. In these examples, the organisational shortcomings constrained how officials were able to perform, and lengthened the time taken in policy development.

Institutional frameworks for environmental management influenced development of freshwater policy and the biodiversity strategy, especially where it was proposed to apply to private land. Frameworks conditioned departmental thinking about appropriate policy tools. In this sense the institutional frameworks can, where they give priority to environmental goals, support

environmental effectiveness but detract from policy effectiveness. MfE, for example, was at odds with the preferences about policy tools of some potentially influential ministers like Upton, late in his time as Environment minister, or Parker in 2007.690 _{The post-1987 New Public Management –based} structural design of MfE as a policy ministry and fourteen regional councils as regulatory and implementing agencies, combined with regional council opposition to central direction or national standards, gave rise to a particular voluntarist policy approach as a standard response. It was an example where ideology became institutionalised, and constrained further thinking, whereas emerging environmental problems often call for new ways of thinking. In the freshwater case, the MfE/regional council structural framework in particular channelled policy thinking, and notably combined with MfE’s organisational shortcomings, contributed to policy delay in the mid 2000s. Equally, the nature conservation and fisheries management structural frameworks influenced how DoC and Ministry of Fisheries approached policy tools for biodiversity protection and oceans management. Both departments displayed a preference for a more directive approach and

standards-based provisions (fisheries applied through market based instruments, and conservation through national rules via locally derived but compliant plans). This is not to say that one approach is better than any other. What this shows is the influence of these institutional arrangements on subsequent policy proposals. They may be a strength or a constraint to environment policy effectiveness depending on policy design. Which approach is adopted depends on the political assumptions about policy tools at the time (a cognitive feature) and on the effect of rules of engagement.

Rules of engagement around the policy process are a third important intra-government institutional influence in the case studies. The formal policy development rules that govern interdepartmental engagement are meant to ensure relevant government interests are brought to bear on a policy

690 _{See Chapter 7. Upton argued that he had begun to support firm national standards, but was not supported}

by MfE. Young, Values as Law: The History and Efficacy of the Resource Management Act. Upton earlier in his political career had advocated neo-liberal policies. Parker has said he had to unblock freshwater policy in 2007. Red Alert blog, 30/7/2012, http://blog.labour.org.nz/2012/07/30/i-seek-leave-to-make-a-personal-

8: Conclusions

issue. But, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the process is not a level playing field. Some departments are more powerful than others, and some are more capable than others. This is evidencedin the case studies: for example, the greater power of Treasury relative to MfE and DoC in the biodiversity strategy; of DPMC relative to the combination of MfE, DoC and Minfish in the early oceans strategy work; and the influence of MAF on MfE in freshwater policy development. Progress was made environmentally in each case study where there was a cross-departmental team, under the leadership of one or both of the environmental departments, headed by senior personnel able to commit resources, negotiate with authority with other departments, and linked directly to ministers. Another feature was where the more powerful economic or political management departments (essentially Treasury or DPMC) were either suborned into, or had internally developed, a supportive view. It wasn’t necessarily a question of formal power (because the Treasury’s formal power, although exercised, didn’t eventually result in their preferred views being imposed on the

biodiversity strategy) or resources (because despite considerable resources, freshwater and oceans policy both took an extraordinarily long time with mixed results). What was important from an institutional perspective was when environmental departments’ organisation and operating procedures promoted agility in dealing with the rules of engagement and dominant policy approaches.

Overall, the case studies show organisational arrangements, environmental structural frameworks, and rules of engagement can detract from environmental effectiveness and potential policy effectiveness. There can be organisational shortcomings that lengthen the time taken to address issues and develop policy. Structural frameworks can shut out new ideas. Rules of engagement can present barriers by being dominated by other rationalities. But such institutional constraints can be overcome by organisational capacity where the following features are present:

 A clear mandate to achieve an environmental result, not necessarily at all costs or to the exclusion of other priorities, but a result where environmental priorities are emphasised;

 Resources such that the policy focus is not starved, but at the same time is not over- resourced (too few resources seem to be a problem, as in the mid 1990s, but generous budgetary provisions, such as those in the 2000s, may not necessarily assist progress);

 Concentration of effort in policy processes such that it enables using the rules of engagement in ways that advance environmental objectives;

 Capacity to recognise strengths and weaknesses arising from departmental institutionalised cognitive perspectives and internal ideologies, as well as those of other departments, and to bring this to bear in processes of bargaining and negotiation.

8: Conclusions

Looking at institutional features, however, does not give a full picture. Focusing on institutions alone is too deterministic. How institutions are changed, and skill in applying organisational capacity, and navigating around rules of engagement are agency features. Hence agency and political assumptions, and how these are interpreted, also play important roles in the degree of potential environmental effectiveness.