Getting from a draft to a final strategy 1999 – 2000

A New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was approved and officially launched in March 2000. The period between the public announcement of a draft strategy, in January 1999, and a final strategy launch, fourteen months later, involved public engagement, re-drafting, negotiations between officials and with ministers, lobbying, and a change of government. These influences affected in different degrees the timetable, orientation, and content of the strategy.

During 1999 two intersecting strands of policy development related to the biodiversity strategy were progressed. The first was the overall strategy itself (led by DoC). The second was how best to

advance protection of biodiversity on private land (led by MfE).

The draft strategy was subject to a round of public consultation accompanied by public submissions. The consultations involved fifty meetings and attracted 7,800 submissions, of which 437 were substantive.522 _{The overall feedback from meetings and submissions called for stronger commitment} to reversing the decline in indigenous biodiversity and raising the goal level above the objective in the draft of “stabilising” decline.523 _{DoC and MfE reflected this feedback in a revision of the draft,} completed by August 1999. This occasioned further inter-departmental debate, which took place against a background of an impending general election, and a desire by the Ministers of Conservation and Environment to have the strategy completed and approved before then.

Some officials felt that Cabinet shouldn’t consider approving the document, as major policy, so close to an election, but MfE, also representing DoC and with Ministerial support, argued otherwise.524 Debate also took place about content. MAF officials expressed unease at the way the revised draft appeared to be being rammed through and thought the document too ‘protectionist’ and too oriented to indigenous biodiversity. Te Puni Kokiri repeated the comments it made in 1998 that the draft should strengthen the Maori role, direct management agencies to enhance their relationship

521_{Biodiversity and the role of biosecurity, 8 April 1999, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/biodiversity-and-}

role-biosecurity (accessed 4/12/2012).

522 _{DoC, "New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy." P.136.}

523 _{Ibid. See also summary of submissions prepared by Tonkin and Taylor. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 68.}

Significant in the public consultation was engagement with Maori through nationwide hui, and an influential one involving the Maori Queen and Tumu Te Heu Heu at Hopu Hopu.

524 _{This particular debate occurred in the Officials Economic Committee, which had the responsibility of}

considering draft Cabinet papers with economic implications, before those papers were put to Cabinet. Memo MfE to DoC. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 69.

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with Maori, more consistently implement and state that the Treaty of Waitangi was the overarching principle under which the Strategy was developed, and to provide an avenue for active Maori participation in biodiversity management. Minfish asked for changes to expand the marine theme.525 The biggest difference conceptually came in the views of the Treasury officials. They were no longer critical of the overall principles behind the strategy. Now they focused on what they regarded as structural matters. On 17 September a Treasury official wrote to DoC saying,

The quality of the overall strategy from a biodiversity perspective is good. In particular the interventions around the goal levels have been extensively peer reviewed by technical workshops during the consultation process and appear to be of a reasonably high standard.

But Treasury now had concerns that the regulatory impact assessment was inadequate; roles and responsibilities were too central-government orientated; management, governance and

accountability structures were not yet developed; costings had increased since estimates in 1998 and were very vague; and “we have no means to assess efficiency or effectiveness.”526

Furthermore, they were concerned about how the goals had been changed. Shifting goal levels from “a minimum set of representative populations of indigenous species in selected habitats” (which was consistent with a goal of stabilising decline) to “populations across their natural range” (which had been done to reflect the weight of public submissions and was consistent with a goal of halting a decline) would greatly increase costs, they said. Treasury noted that the previous estimates for stabilisation were $37-45 M per annum over 20 years but these had now grown to $45-55M per annum over 20 years. What in fact DoC and MfE had done in the new draft was indeed shift from the “stabilisation” goal, but also they had altered the wording of the original “halting “goal. The new draft now committed to “restoring and protecting remaining representative habitats and

ecosystem”, which was less ambitious than committing to “populations across their natural range”. However, it allowed ministers to describe the goal as “halting” without the full cost of maintaining and restoring all remaining natural habitats as described in the draft goal objective for “halting.”527 Treasury was also critical of some language in the draft. For example, they also took issue with the draft’s statement that intervention was a core government role. In their view “as previously discussed with DoC and MfE”, the criteria should be identification of market failure, and where government intervention provided a positive net benefit. If the intervention met the two criteria then it was a core government role. If it did not meet the market failure criteria then it was not a core government role and should not be undertaken.528 _{Treasury officers, in proposing this, had} revealed their policy prescription for the delivery of biodiversity protection, based in neo-classical

525 _{Memo MAF to DoC; memo TPK to DoC; Memo Mfe to DoC re Minfish views. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 72.} 526 _{Memo Treasury to DoC 17 September. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 72.}

527 _{See Cabinet committee paper ECO (99) 135. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 72.} 528 _{Memo Treasury to DoC 17 September. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 72.}

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economic theory, less state intervention and application of market principles. As a general prescription, however, it was beginning to be questioned in some New Zealand policy circles.529 By the 23 September Treasury officials’ views had firmed up such that they wanted MfE to be the lead agency for the strategy. They wanted the Minister of Finance to be on any Ministerial oversight team. They favoured reconsidering how the funding should be administered. They felt funding, and funding levels, should be “neutrally evaluated” to determine whether this would provide for more effective long-term management of biodiversity assets on particular important sites than the current arrangements. “How those interventions are managed and who implements them should be based on who can most efficiently and effectively do so on a case-by-case basis. This will often not be central government” and, “the Biodiversity Strategy is about managing biodiversity trade-offs at the national, regional, and local level and between alternative economic uses.” Finally, in their view, the strategy needed “concrete realistic proposals including funding.”530

The inter-departmental debate reflects the process of bargaining and negotiation that was going on in the bureaucracy amongst mid-level officials, the various ideological orientations of the

departments, and a degree of tactics and maneuvering. All this was taking place in a climate of urgency with the election due. Furthermore, the second strand of the strategy, dealing with biodiversity on private land, was increasing the tempo.

Simon Upton had appointed a ministerial advisory committee (MAC) in early 1999 to look at the issue of private land biodiversity protection. The committee’s brief was to recommend ways to promote effective and sustainable management of biodiversity on private land. By September 1999, and after discussions with various interested parties, it had prepared a draft report and discussion document that promoted national and local accords on biodiversity, a national policy statement, non-statutory guidance, and government action and incentives.531 _{The advisory committee’s report was due to be} considered by a Cabinet committee at the same time as the revised draft of the strategy.

The draft biodiversity strategy and the advisory committee’s report were considered together by the Cabinet Economic Committee on 11 October, with split recommendations about the strategy from officials.532 _{The committee recommended Cabinet approve the strategy. They noted it would cost} $45-55 M per annum (DoC and MfE’s preferred funding level) to be met either by savings or a new budget bid next year. It supported DoC’s and MfE’s proposal to raise the goal level. But it also supported the Treasury recommendation that a Ministerial oversight team should include the

529 _{See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3.}

530 _{Memo Treasury to DoC 23 September. DoC files BDY0003 Volume 72.}

531 _{MfE, "Bio-What? Preliminary Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee," (Wellington: Ministry for the}

Environment, 2000). Pp.7-8 & 89-91.

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Minister of Finance, and that MfE should be the lead agency, not DoC. The Cabinet committee watered down Treasury’s recommendation for independent oversight and evaluation, benchmarking, and contestability of funding. The committee instead “invited” the Minister for the Environment to report back on how the strategy would be implemented to ensure funds are used efficiently and effectively on priority activities, on approaches to encouraging broad community participation, on best mechanisms to coordinate central and local government and the community, on approaches to encourage innovation, on monitoring and evaluation, and on realistic funding proposals that could be considered against other priorities as part of the government’s overall budget process. It also

recommended the report of Upton’s ministerial advisory committee (MAC) be released for public submissions.533

Thus, after nearly five years of preparation and debate, a strategy was nearly complete. With some redrafting, a final document, including a foreword for signature by the Prime Minister Jenny Shipley, was prepared for full Cabinet consideration in early October.

In the meantime, the President of Federated farmers had written to the Prime Minister, repeating concerns expressed in 1998. These were that:

1. The consultation process had been inadequate. It was an attempt to ‘sell’ the document. No link between the desire of individuals to conserve and a commitment to bear the cost. 2. The policy framework was based on regulatory control and DoC’s command and control. 3. There were no links to mechanisms for trade-offs.

4. There was not enough about the government’s resource commitments

5. It didn’t have enough on use or development of resources. The legitimate value for biodiversity is one which optimises the social, economic and cultural needs of the community.

6. It needed to provide a net benefit. It cannot be at the expense of economic and social goals. “Strategy must explicitly acknowledge that biodiversity values need to be balanced and prioritised with economic and social values”.

7. The government must fund and communities be allowed to continue to prioritise relative to local social and economic constraints.

8. It must give more emphasis to QE 2, Streamcare and Landcare groups, supported by landowners. The emphasis needs to be on non-regulatory methods.

9. Landowners must be recognised as the key to achieving desired outcomes on private land. 10. Secure property rights are essential.

11. The federated farmers were opposed to an NPS and only support a light one if the government provided funding. A consistent approach to significance is needed but local communities need to be allowed to prioritise. 534

In the event, Cabinet deferred approving the strategy or releasing the MAC report, noting that representations had been received from Federated Farmers.535 _{Simon Upton met with Federated}

533 _{Cabinet committee minute ECO (99) M19/7 and ECO (99) M19/8.}

534 _{Federated Farmers submission. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 73. See also Hartley, Conservation Strategies for}

New Zealand. The book was commissioned by the libertarian thinktank , the New Zealand Business Roundtable

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farmers in an effort to placate them and reported back to Cabinet. But on 1 November Cabinet formally decided to defer further consideration of issues until early 2000; in other words, after the election.536

The November 1999 General Election resulted in a centre-left coalition of the Labour Party and the minority Alliance Party forming the government. They also established an agreement of support with the Green Party, but that party decided to remain outside the government. The new government was presented with an opportunity to take advantage of the proposed biodiversity strategy and a

programme that had already been extensively debated and worked through. It was one that was broadly compatible with the sympathies of the new government. What appeared to happen is that both external interests, and those inside government advocating the strategy, seized the initiative. DoC and MfE recommended to their new ministers that the strategy should be approved and the advisory committee’s report released. DoC emphasised the importance of the strategy, and that it should be funded by an additional $45m per year over 20 years.537 _{Environmental NGOs immediately} lobbied the new Minister of Conservation, Sandra Lee, asking for copies of the draft.538 _{They wrote to} her in January 2000 wanting the strategy made more ambitious, and what they called “Treasury speak” language removed. Suggestions of a funder-provider organisational model was, they said, “dangerous and should be rejected.”539 _{In December and January there was a flurry of activity around} process and strategy content. The new Minister of Conservation pressed for action. DoC in particular, but also MfE and Minfish, seemed to respond quickly. Lee’s Office wrote to the Prime Minister’s chief of staff saying Lee wanted to re-submit the strategy to Cabinet in January 2000 as a matter of

urgency saying it was a critical issue for the Conservation portfolio.540 _{While the Cabinet Office} thought there should be another round of departmental consultation, DoC successfully argued otherwise.541 _{On the issue of who should lead the strategy, Environment or Conservation (recalling} the previous October Cabinet decision that it should be the Minister for the Environment), DoC was

536 _{In a commentary on 18 November, perhaps deliberately timed to coincide with the election which took}

place on 27 November, the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society issued a press release saying, “Cabinet rejects Biodiversity Strategy”. The release said it was a “huge setback for National’s two green ministers. Forest and Bird believes it was overturned by development minded ministers and backbenchers supported by ACT and Federated Farmers”. ( on DoC file BDY0003 Volume 73) Nick Smith mentioned to me later that the Forest and Bird release was close to the truth, and that he and Upton felt a positive election opportunity had been sacrificed.

537 _{Brief to incoming Minister 1999, p.20, http://www.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/about-doc/role/policies-}

and-plans/a-briefing-for-theminister-new--of-conservation-(dec.-1999).pdf (accessed 8/8/2012). There was no mention in the brief of funding from within baselines. See also MfE 1999 Briefing to Incoming Minister, www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-oct99.pdf.

538 _{Sandra Lee had previously been on the Executive of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society before}

entering Parliament.

539 _{Webber/Wallace letter to Lee. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74.} 540 _{Memo Campbell to Simpson DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74.} 541 _{Memo Campbell to Johnston. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74.}

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able to convince MfE that it should be the senior minister – who happened in this instance to be Lee. Hence DoC cemented its role as the lead department.542

There then followed a series of meetings between ministers and officials and some departmental exchanges prior to a cabinet committee paper being submitted in late January 2000. Treasury officials thought it was premature to send the papers to Cabinet so soon in view of the October 1999 decisions.543 _{Their concerns about how the strategy should be implemented and ensuring funds were} used efficiently and effectively, as well as “realistic funding proposals”, were retained in the paper, but the Cabinet paper now noted that instead of an option of funding the strategy from

departmental baselines (one of the options agreed in October), funding should “should take priority for additional environmental expenditure.”544

At the end of January 2000 the Cabinet Business Committee recommended releasing of the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, but asked the Ministers of Conservation, Environment, and Forestry to revise some wording “ to align it with current Government policy.”545

At a Cabinet meeting on 31 January the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was approved. It was launched officially in March 2000.546 _{However, two significant issues remained outstanding: funding;} and the policy work started on biodiversity protection on private land.

The goal level and actions approved by Cabinet had been costed. Furthermore, Cabinet had already agreed to recommendations that the strategy should have first call on any new environment funds. What happened between February and May 2000 was that operational departments bid for new resources, and were successful. A total budget package was agreed on 15 May 2000.547 _{In bald terms} it involved $187 m over five years. The largest proportion went to DoC for weed and pest control, species recovery, and habitat security/restoration. Minfish received substantial resources for marine management. Other initiatives involved funds to support biodiversity protection on private land, resources for new information systems, and funding to produce an oceans strategy (see Chapter 5),

542 _{DoC/MfE brief to Lee. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74.} 543 _{Memo treasury to DoC. BDY0003 Volume 74.}

544 _{Cabinet Committee paper CBC(00) 7. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74.}

545 _{Cabinet minute CAB (00) 2/7.DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74. Those amendments included a Labour Party}

election commitment to end indigenous forest logging on publicly owned land, and commitments to address and manage use of genetically modified organisms. Another commitment was included to protect 10 % of New Zealand’s marine environment in a network of representative marine protected areas by 2010. Also included was a concept of kiwi sanctuaries (thus satisfying the campaign run by the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society in 1999). Language in the document was changed to promote property-owner “responsibilities” as well as “rights” and to emphasise the interests of society and the public as well as landowners and, in the marine environment, “rights holders.”

546 _{Cabinet minute CAB (00) M2/7. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 74. Introduction of Prime Minister at Biodiversity}

Strategy launch, (accessed 8/8/2012).

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and a new strategic approach to biosecurity, all of which were regarded as important to help halt the decline in indigenous biodiversity.

Besides the budget, there were also the private land issues that the ministerial advisory committee had been established to address. The initial report from the committee, although held over from October 1999, was released for public input in March 2000. It was followed by extensive

consultation.548 _{This provided an outlet for concerns about the strategy and an NPS expressed to the} previous National Party-led government. The draft report by the advisory committee had

recommended an NPS. Their final report recommended against one.549 _{The committee argued that}