In this chapter, I consider the impact of strategies of political violence on the survival of ZANU-PF. I use a combination of survey data from the Afrobarometer and content analysis to test the second part of my theory of domestic exit. In chapter three, I argued that voter exit in the form of emigration bolstered the ruling party by weakening the support base of its core
opposition. In this chapter, I show that ZANU-PF used strategies of political violence to weaken the opposition base and simultaneously mobilize their supporters to vote for them. First, I detail the patterns of violence in Zimbabwean elections over time. Then, I show how ZANU-PF has in the last decade used direct and indirect forms of violence to maintain power.
An analysis of the survival of Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF would be greatly lacking if it did not consider the impact of strategies of intimidation and violence by the ruling party to maintain its hold on power. Indeed, much of the conversation about Zimbabwean politics has focused on the decline of democracy. In particular, it has focused on the multiple incidences of
imprisonment of Morgan Tsvangirai and other key opposition actors, Operation Murambastvina in 2005, and the bloody runoff election in June 2008 that resulted in the formation of a coalition government between ZANU-PF and MDC in 2008. In addition to making policies that benefited ZANU-PF electorally, such as the indigenization and land reform acts, the ruling party has also strategically used repression and political violence to silence dissenting opinions (Michael Bratton & Masunungure, 2012; Kriger, 2005; LeBas, 2006; L. M. Sachikonye, 2002b). Kriger (2005) suggests that the analysis of the role of violence in Zimbabwe should begin at
independence rather than just in the last decade. Kriger also argues that violence has always been an active strategy used by ZANU-PF even in the absence of a strong opposition. I would add that
any such analysis must also consider the historical implementation of strategies of violence prior to independence. However, I also caution that the use of violence does not always result in good outcomes for the incumbent party. For purposes of this dissertation I focus my analysis on the use of survival strategies of violence by ZANU-PF in the last decade, beginning in the late 1990s.
I theorize that there is a link between the use of intimidation and other strategies of violence and party survival. Strategies of political violence and intimidation by political parties can force voters to enter or exit the political process, and both voter exit and entry can sustain parties in ways that benefit incumbent regimes. The use of intimidation and other forms of electoral fraud played a dual role in sustaining the life of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwean politics in the last decade. Prior to this, Zimbabwe had generally been a peaceful country in the sense that even at its worst during the years of the liberation struggle, fighting between the official
Rhodesian soldiers and fighters for ZANLA and ZIPRA was contained. However, starting in the late 1990s we have seen an increase in incidences and impact of violence. Zimbabwean violence is often a form of state terrorism, which Sachikonye (2011) describes as violence in which “the state turns against its citizen, state executed terrorism on its citizens.” In all incidents of violence since 1980 the state has indeed turned against its citizens, either by using the military, the police, or civilians with official government mandate to unleash violence on non-retaliating civilians. And, more importantly for this dissertation, nearly all violence recorded in the last decade has been election-related, occurring in the time surrounding elections.
There is a growing literature on the role of violence in elections. This interest is motivated by the realization that violence related to elections has been a common feature of developing world elections. Scholars are interested in understanding when, why, and how
politicians use violence to secure ballot success. Do politicians use violence before, during, or after elections? Is electoral violence used like any other campaign strategy, or are there special circumstances under which politicians use violence? Bermeo (1997) makes an important
observation that elections are inherently violent, especially where political institutions are weak. Syder (2000) offers a similar argument. In his seminal work on democratization Dahl (1971) cautioned that the introduction of political competition in a previously closed system “invites the potential for conflict between [parties] and each weighs the costs of violence and toleration.” Collier (2009) argues that elections increase violence and goes on to differentiate between the impact of violence on supporters of incumbents and those of the opposition. Straus and Taylor (2009) find that electoral violence is quite widespread, occurring in almost 19 percent of elections in Africa. They also find that when violence occurs it is usually perpetrated by the incumbent, and the violence that occurs after elections tends to be more severe and might involve challengers.
Collier and Vicente (2010) provide an excellent review of the more recent literature on violence but some of the main works are important to highlight here. Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) focus on the use of violence after elections. They argue that politicians use violence after elections because the expected violence after elections shapes voting behavior. Voters
anticipating post-election “punishment” from the incumbent will vote for the incumbent. For Robinson and Torvik (2009), the targets of violence are swing voters. Both the incumbent and the challenger will use violence to suppress turnout of swing voters who they fear might support the opposition. And Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2014) argue that violence is used as a strategy when politicians face losing an election and feel they have no control of decision- making institutions. The general question here is whether or not violence helps sustain ruling
parties. More specifically, did it help sustain ZANU-PF in a context where they should have otherwise been defeated? In attempting to answer this I will borrow significantly from the literature just reviewed.
ZANU-PF used violence before, during, and after elections with varying degrees of intensity. Consistent with Ellman and Wantchekon’s (2000) expectations, ZANU-PF used violence in the post-election period in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2008 for the purpose of punishing voters. In rural areas the goal was to punish the base for a) not turning out to vote or b) voting incorrectly. In urban areas, post-election violence was used primarily as a punishment for voting for the opposition party, MDC. Over the last decade, ZANU-PF lost control of their monopoly on democratic institutions (e.g. courts and the electoral commissions), and in response to the weakening of their power they used violence to silence dissent. Hafner-Burton, Hyde and
Jablonski (2014) find that as the Zimbabwean government weakened there was an increase in the incidence of violence affecting politicians and civilians.
Collier and Vicente (2010) have built a formal model of political violence and fraud. I share their assumption that political parties care about winning elections and establishing their legitimacy. I do not necessarily think that those wins have to be super majorities, but incumbents prefer indisputable wins. In their model, violence is aimed at suppressing the turnout of
opposition supporters and, in some cases, swing voters.16 They argue that intimidation has no impact on hardcore voters of either the incumbent or challengers, but swing voters can be swayed by violence. They define hardcore voters as co-ethnics, arguing that in the majority of African elections voters tend to support candidates of the same ethnic group. My model of election violence differs in a few ways. First, I argue that swing voters do not play an important
16 Evidence of violence reducing election outcome is also found in works by Wilkinson (2004), Bratton
role in Zimbabwean politics because the majority of voters identify with either the ruling party or the opposition. Second, voters are more aligned along an urban/rural divide than they are on ethnic lines, though the two cleavages have some overlap. Thus the majority of ZANU-PF’s hardcore supporters are in rural areas, while the majority of the opposition’s hardcore supporters are urbanites. Using data from the Afrobarometer, the table below demonstrates that ZANU-PF support is divided along regional lines.
A key assumption of the Collier-Vicente model is that incumbent autocratic parties, such as ZANU-PF and Nigeria’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and sometimes challengers to those regimes use violence to suppress turnout of swing voters. I add that violence can also be used as a tool for voter mobilization. A weak incumbent facing a strong opposition (high
possibility to lose an election) will use violence to boost turnout among their base. In established democracies, elections can be combative, but politicians generally act within the parameters of democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is unacceptable to send militia to attack your opponents in a democracy. In the absence of strong political institutions that can curtail violence, it is possible that passionate verbal exchanges may turn violent.
Figure 16 ZANU-PF Support 1999-2009