Normativity as Reflexivity

Hutcheson believes that we have the “moral sense”, a faculty of mind, which is an “internal sense” distinguished from “other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing” (Hutcheson 2004, 23), and it exercises the normative power. It is by the moral sense that we can experience benevolent motives and approve of them as we experience external sensations by sight or touch. Hutcheson says as follows:

We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And the Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will. (Hutcheson 2004, 90)

However, we can raise a question why the moral sense responds only to benevolence among all the natural dispositions, thus generating moral sentiments. Hutcheson answers that the divine providence guarantees our moral sense to respond to the benevolent affections of agents:

If it be here inquir’d, “Could not the DEITY have given us a different or contrary Determination of

Mind, viz. to approve Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?” There seems nothing in

this surpassing the natural Power of the DEITY. … For if the DEITY be really benevolent, and desires the Happiness of others, he could not rationally act otherwise, or give us a moral Sense upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own benevolence Intentions. (Hutcheson 2004, 195-196) That is, for him, the authority of the moral sense comes from God’s benevolent intentions. Only when we presuppose the supernatural apparatus like the divine providence, the moral sense can exercise its normative power.

However, if we do not accept this kind of supernatural apparatus, the moral sense cannot avoid losing its authoritative power. Hume compares Hutcheson’s moral-sense-based theory to his own sympathy-based theory as follows:

Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619)

According to him, the reason why he thinks that his sympathy-based theory is superior to Hutcheson’s is because his own theory can reflect on itself and approves of itself. And he believes that the normativity of his moral system derives from this reflexivity.

It requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive, that a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul, and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition. But this sense must certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those principles, from whence it is deriv’d, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin. (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619) Annette Baier says, “Successful reflexivity is normativity” (Baier 1991, 99-100), and continues, “The religious, in any case, do not take the moral point of view of an outside judge, external to the judged. It is bearing God’s survey, not bearing their own survey, that they aim at” (Baier 1991, 216). In this sense, Hutcheson’s moral theory fails “to meet the Humean test of successful reflexivity” (Baier 1991, 216). By contrast, Hume’s moral theory can “bear its own survey” (T 3.3.6.6, SBN 620). Baier explains how his theory can bear its own survey as follows:

We trust the “testimony” of our sense, more or less as we do the testimony of our fellows. We learn from experience, and from reflection on that experience, that most testifiers can, in some conditions and on some matters, speak falsely, and maybe that some few rarely speak truly. … We reflect together on what points of view we should take as standard, as ones from which we correct what appears from other points of view. (Baier 1991, 119)

That is to say, according to Baier, whether or not a moral theory bears its own survey depends on others’ affirmations of it and Hume’s sympathy-based moral theory bears its own survey by taking up the general point of view.

Christine Korsgaard also agrees with the idea that Hume attempts to establish “normativity as reflexivity” (Korsgaard 1996, 61). She says, “Now Hume clearly thinks that the understanding fails this test”, “But the moral sense passes the reflexivity test” (Korsgaard 1996, 62-63). However, she holds that after all, Hume’s moral theory fails to pass the reflexivity test. According to her, the aim of the reflexivity test is to establish the moral laws or principles, which we ought to follow:

According to Kant, as each impulse to action presents itself to us, we should subject it to the test of reflection, to see whether it really is a reason by determining whether we should allow it to be a law to us. And we do that by asking whether the maxim of acting on it can be willed as a law. … The test of reflective endorsement is the test used by actual moral agents to establish the normativity of all their particular motives and inclinations. (Korsgaard 1996, 76)

This is because by taking the reflexivity test, what we get in his moral theory is only “general rules” which are driven by custom and others’ affirmations in our society. But the general rules cannot play a normative role in our lives just as moral laws do. She says as follows:

The difficulty in this case is not, strictly speaking, a difficulty with the reflective endorsement strategy. It arises most immediately from something particular to Hume’s view: the fact that the moral sentiments are supposed to be influenced by “general rules.” Rules that do not hold in every case. Such rules cause us to disapprove of certain dispositions or character traits, which are themselves tendencies of a general kind. But that disapproval will be transferred to each and every exercise of the disposition in question only if we forget that the rules that cause it are merely general. (Korsgaard 1996, 88)

However, in my view, when Hume’s moral theory takes the reflexivity test, what it depends on is not general rules but its universality. We could say that his moral theory can bear its survey and pass the reflexivity test because he introduces the concept of universality in his theory.