Normativity as Universality

In Hume’s moral theory, the concept of sympathy plays a significant role. It makes us share others’ feeling and have a concern for others’ benefits regardless of our own interest. But, it is wrong to say that all the results of sympathy are moral sentiments. Only “certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure” can be moral sentiments (T 3.3.1.3, SBN 574). This is because in order to be moral sentiments, it is required to pass the reflexivity test. Hume says as follows:

In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thought, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582)

We take up the general points of view by reflection and carry on the reflexivity test. Some results of sympathy fail to pass the test, and Hume calls them “Weak Sympathy” (T 2.2.9.17, SBN 388). The other results of sympathy successfully pass the test, and he calls them “Extensive Sympathy” (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). At this point, let’s come back to Korsgaard’s doubt. She worries that Hume’s moral theory fails to pass the reflexivity test because she believes that Hume’s reflexivity test only depends on the “general rules” which “do not hold in every case” and, thus, cannot be moral principles. Thus, according to her, the results of “Extensive Sympathy” also cannot be moral sentiments in a strict sense.

However, Korsgaard’s doubt should be confined only to the Treatise because in his later work, the Enquiry, Hume changes his own moral stance and introduces the concept of “universality” in his moral theory. Thus, in my view, his moral theory in the Enquiry meets the requirement of Korsgaard’s version of reflexivity test because of the normative power of the concept of “universality”. Hume equates “moral sentiments” with

“universal sentiments” (E 9.8, SBN 274). He says, “The notion of morals, implies some sentiment common to all mankind”, and continues, “It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind” (E 9.5, SBN 272). Thus, we can say that for Hume, the universality of sentiments is the source of normativity. And it pass the reflexivity test:

He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. … The humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures. (E 272-273) However, one question is raised. Is Hume’s concept of the universality of sentiments the same as the Kantian version of university? It is not. In my view, Korsgaard makes two mistakes. First, she misinterprets Hume’s reflective activity as the Kantian concept of reflexivity test. In my view, the former is a kind of experimental method of reasoning concerning experience, which we have seen in the previous section, whilst the latter is a formal, universal procedure of rationality. Second, she presupposes that the Kantian concept of normativity is the only source of normativity. It is true that Hume’s concept of reflective endorsement does not meet the Kantian requirement of normativity. However, we should bear in mind that Hume does not attempt to establish the Kantian concept of normativity. For Kant, the reason why universality can be the source of normativity is because it is the result of a formal, procedural reasoning. By contrast, for Hume, the reason why universality of sentiments can be the source of normativity is because it is found in experience by following the experimental method of reasoning.

3.5. Conclusion

On my reading, Hume is a reductive naturalist and a moral cognitivist. He introduces himself as an “anatomist” and his own philosophy as “science of human nature”. The title of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature, has the subtitle “Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects”. At first glance, Hume’s claim that there is a logical gap between “is”-propositions and “ought”-propositions seems to allow us to interpret him as a moral non-cognitivist. However, in my view, he still applies the experimental method of reasoning to the moral area. For him, “ought”-propositions are also matters of fact, but the difference between “is”-propositions and “ought”-propositions is that the former is “the object of reason” and the latter is “the object of feeling”. That is, although it is true that Hume claims that there is a logical gap between “is”- propositions and “ought”-propositions, it is not because he does not take a reductive naturalistic view on moral subjects, but because they are different kinds of matters of fact.

As we have seen, it is important to understand Hume’s distinction between particular facts and general facts. For him, the feelings of approbation and disapprobation are particular matters of fact which are not derived from reasoning but from feeling. But in order to generate general matters of fact, that is, general rules of morals, the feelings of approbation and disapprobation as particular matters of fact can be the object of reason. This is the reason why he says as follows:

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry (EHU 12.33, SBN 165).

At first glance, morals and criticism do not seem to be the proper objects of moral reasoning because they are “the object of feeling, not of reason” (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469). That is, they are felt rather than perceived. But according to him, we can still reason concerning morals and try to fix its standard. For him, our reasoning concerning morals is regarded as moral reasoning concerning general facts such as science because our endeavor to fix the general rules of morals is concerning the general taste of mankind.

The problem with this reading is that it seems hard to avoid subjectivism. The problem is this: given that the sentiments of approbation or disapprobation as particular matters of fact are my own feelings and that the only way of scrutinising them is introspection, how can we overcome subjectivism and, thus, deduce “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances”? This is the place where one of the important roles of Hume’s concept of sympathy is raised. According to him, the mechanism allows us to feel “an equal emotion, as any original affection” of others. Thus, we can regard the feelings of approbation or disapprobation of not just myself but also others as matters of fact and, hence, “by following the experimental method” derive “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175).

Reading Hume as a moral cognitivist leads us to consider whether he is a common sense moralist or an ideal observer theorist. Especially his concept of universality of sentiments prompts us to regard him as an ideal observer theorist. But we should carefully make a distinction between two concepts of “universal” and “ideal”. As we have seen, the concept of “ideal” is a qualification which is required for moral judgers. In order to make a moral judgement, we need to be able to an ideal observer. However, for Hume, the universality of sentiments are the one we should find by following the experimental method of reasoning concerning experience.

As we have seen, this reading of Hume as a moral cognitivist seems to raise the Metaethical Problem since his Motivation Argument and his Belief-Desire model prompt us to read him as a noncognitivist. In order to solve this problem, I argued that the Humean Theory of Motivation is not Hume’s genuine view. We need to be aware that he makes a distinction between a bare idea and a vivid belief. Although it is true that a bare idea alone is inert and cannot motivate, a vivid belief can motivate. Moral rationalists’ concept of speculative reasoning alone can produce only bare ideas. But Hume’s experimental method of reasoning concerning experience can produce vivid beliefs. Especially when our experimental reasoning finds not just general resemblance but particular resemblance, it triggers the mechanism of sympathy and, thus, converting the beliefs into impressions, which would motivate our actions.

Lastly, we raised the question concerning the source of normativity in Hume’s moral philosophy. My reading Hume as a reductive naturalist and a moral cognitivist would cause some worries as to whether we can find any source of normativity in his moral philosophy. Interestingly, Korsgaard tries to find a Kantian version of the source of normativity in Hume’s moral philosophy. First, she tries to understand Hume’s concept of reflective endorsement as a Kantian concept of self-legislative rationality. However, in my view, Hume’s concept of

reflection is a kind of experimental method of reasoning concerning experience. Thus, it by itself cannot be the source of Kantian normativity. Second, she presupposes that the Kantian concept of normativity is the only source of normativity. It is true that Hume’s concept of reflective endorsement does not meet the Kantian requirement of normativity. However, we should bear in mind that Hume does not attempt to establish the Kantian concept of normativity. For Kant, the reason why universality can be the source of normativity is because it is the result of a formal, procedural reasoning. By contrast, for Hume, the reason why universality of sentiments can be the source of normativity is because it is found in experience by following the experimental method of reasoning.