The Is-Ought Passage and the Experimental Method of Reasoning

Let’s start with a famous but controversial passage, which seems to conflict with the reductive naturalist reading. According to Hare, the passage shows “Hume’s celebrated observation on the impossibility of deducing an ‘ought’-proposition from a series of ‘is’-propositions” (Hare 1978, 29):

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason. (T 3.1.2.27, SBN 469-470)

What Hume means to say in this passage is – Hare and Nowell-Smith argue – that the transition from an “is” to an “ought” is illegitimate:

Freely translated into modern terminology, what Hume means is this. In all systems of morality we start with certain statements of fact that are not judgements of value or commands; they contain human nature, that is to say about what men are and in fact do. We are then told that because these things are so we ought to act in such and such a way; the answers to practical questions are deduced or in some other way derived from statements about what is the case. This must be illegitimate

reasoning, since the conclusion of an argument can contain nothing which is not in the premises, and there are no ‘oughts’ in the premise. (Nowell-Smith 1954, 37)

This is the standard interpretation of Hume’s “Is-Ought” passage. And Hare names Hume’s argument of this passage Hume’s Law (Hare 1954-1955, 303). The standard interpretation makes two points:

(1) ‘Ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions

(2) The reason why the deduction is impossible is because ‘is’-propositions are matters of fact but ‘ought’- propositions are not.

Those who advocate the standard interpretation tie Hume’s Law up with Moore’s open question argument, which rejects the equating of moral properties with some non-moral properties. According to Nowell-Smith, the intuitionists who accept Moore’s argument also derive their argument from Hume:

The strength of intuitionism lies in its uncompromising insistence on the autonomy of morals. To put the point briefly and in my own way, practical discourse, of which moral discourse is a part, cannot be identified with or reduced to any other kind of discourse. Ethical sentences are not, as Moore so clearly shows, psychological or metaphysical or theological sentences. Almost all earlier theories had tended to reduce ethical concepts and sentences to those of some other subject, usually psychology; they tried to define words such as ‘good’ and ‘ought’ in terms, for example, of the satisfaction of desire or of pleasure and pain. Againt all such attempts the intuitionists produce a crushing argument which is derived (surprisingly) from Hume (Nowell-Smith 1954, 36).

That is – the standard interpretation says – Hume, like Moore and the intuitionists, believes that there exist nonreductive moral properties. The standard interpretation would be compatible with (1) the non-cognitivist reading and (2) the methodological naturalist reading. First, the standard interpretation is supported by those who regard Hume as a non-cognitivist since according to them, for him, moral judgments are merely the expressions of the speaker’s peculiar emotive reaction: “moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure” (T 3.3.1.3, SBN 574). That is, morality does not consist in a matter of fact. Hume says, “Morality … is more properly felt than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2.1, SBN 470). Second, the standard interpretation allows for the methodological naturalist reading. As we have seen, the aim of methodological naturalism is to give an a posteriori, naturalistic explanation. Thus, the gap between is and ought can remain intact even though we read Hume as a methodological naturalist.

However, the following passage in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals seems to support the cognitivist reading and the reductive naturalist reading, and, thus, conflict with the standard interpretation of the ‘is-ought’ passage. Let’s take a closer look at the passage:

these qualities [the estimable or blameable qualities of men]; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. (EPM 1.10, SBN 174)

In this passage, Hume does not seem to accept the non-cognitivist view. Here he says, “The only object of reasoning is … to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived.” Given that non-cognitivists regard moral judgments as the expressions of one’s attitude and do not attempt to establish moral principles by inferential reasoning, what Hume says in this passage leads us to regard him as cognitivist, not non-cognitivist. And he continues:

As this [the question concerning the general principles of morals] is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation. (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175)

In my view, his assertion in this passage that we should apply the experimental method of reasoning to moral subjects, and thus “deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” supports the reductive naturalist reading, not methodological naturalist one. He is now arguing that we should analyse the ontological concept of morality “by following the experimental method” of reasoning, and, thus, deduce the general principles of morals. And, furthermore, he holds that the question concerning the general principles of morals is “a question of fact” which seems to conflict with the standard interpretation of the “Is-Ought” passage that an ought cannot be deduced from an is. Thus, in my view, there is a good reason to doubt the standard reading of the “Is-Ought” passage.

Let’s come back to the two points which the standard interpretation makes: (1) ‘Ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions

(2) The reason why the deduction is impossible is because ‘is’-propositions are matters of fact but ‘ought’- propositions are not.

There are two alternative interpretations to the standard interpretation. The first one disagrees with the first point which the standard interpretation makes: ‘Ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions. The interpretative issue here is about how to interpret this sentence: “For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (T 3.1.2.27, SBN 469-470). The standard interpretation reads this

sentence as an ironical and rather rhetorical expression (MacIntyre 1959, 460; Sturgeon 2008, 518). Thus, it reads “necessary” as “impossible”, and “seems” as “is”: “For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis impossible that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what is altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it”. However, we can read the sentence in a literal sense, not in an ironical and rather rhetorical expression: What Hume says is that it is conceivable to deduce ‘ought’-

propositions from ‘is’-propositions. This reading does not seem to be implausible because it matches Hume’s expression of “deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” which we have seen above (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). However, this reading of rejecting the first point of the standard interpretation seems to be too strong because it erases the gap between “is” and “ought”. That is, it is not only reductive but also destructive about moral values or moral norms. It seems to be against Hume’s stance that his experimental method would “give advice to” and “become subservient to practical morality” (T 3.3.6.6, SBN 620-621).

The second alternative interpretation is to accept the first point of the standard interpretation, but deny the second point. That is, this interpretation suggests that although for Hume it is true that ‘ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions, ‘ought’-propositions are also matters of fact as ‘is’-propositions are. The reason why the deduction is impossible is simply because ‘is’-propositions and ‘ought’-propositions are different kinds of matters of fact:

Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469).

In this passage, Hume says that “a sentiment of disapprobation” is “a matter of fact”, but it is “the object of feeling, not of reason”. That is, according to this interpretation, for him, there are two sorts of matters of fact: “the object of reason” and “the object of feeling”. And he puts a logical gap between is and ought between two sorts of matters of fact (Sturgeon 2008, 519).

According to this interpretation, Hume is a cognitivist in that he regards moral sentiments as matters of fact. But he is a subjectivist in that you can find them as matters of fact only when you “turn your reflection into your own breast”. This is the reason why Hunter asserts that “Hume’s analysis of moral judgments is mistaken” (Hunter 1962, 151):

For, among other things, it has the consequence that if one person says of an action that it is wholly virtuous and another person says of the same action that it is wholly vicious, these two people would not be contradicting each other, since one is saying the logical equivalent of ‘I [Smith] feel a peculiar sort of pleasure, and I do not feel a peculiar sort of pain, on contemplating this action’, while the other is saying the equivalent of ‘I [Jones] feel a peculiar sort of pain, and I do not feel a peculiar sort of

pleasure, on contemplating this action’, and both these statements could be true. If they were both true, and Hume's analysis were correct, then one and the same action would be both wholly virtuous and wholly vicious, which, in the ordinary senses of the words used, is absurd. (Hunter 1962, 151- 152).

That is, according to this interpretation, although Hume regards “ought”-propositions as matters of fact, we cannot establish the standard of morals since our moral feelings are subjective.

I agree with the second alternative interpretation that for Hume, there are two sorts of matters of fact: “the object of reason” and “the object of feeling”, and he puts the logical gap between is and ought between two sorts of matters of fact. However, I disagree with Hunter’s assertion that it implies subjectivism. Hume clearly says that we can deduce general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances by following the

experimental method (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175).

Let’s start from his distinction between particular facts and general facts. According to him, Matters of Fact can be divided into particular facts and general facts. He, first, names our reasonings concerning causes and effects of matters of fact moral reasoning as opposed to demonstrative reasoning concerning the relation of ideas, in which “the steps of the argument proceed with absolute certainty based on the logical relations between the ideas concerned” (Millican 2007, xxxvii): “It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour” (EHU 12.29, SBN 164).

Secondly, he divides the objects of moral reasoning into particular and general facts:

Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former … The science, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry, etc. where the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into (EHU 12.30-31, SBN 165).

That is, the objects of our moral reasoning concerning particular facts are “all our deliberations in life,” while the objects of our moral reasoning concerning general facts are “the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects.”

Now, then, Hume examines whether or not morals and criticism can be properly the objects of moral reasoning: Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment.

Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry (EHU 12.33, SBN 165).

At first glance, morals and criticism do not seem to be the proper objects of moral reasoning because they are “the object of feeling, not of reason” (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469). That is, they are felt rather than perceived. But according to him, we can still reason concerning “beauty, whether moral or natural” and try to fix its standard.

For him, our reasoning concerning morals is regarded as moral reasoning concerning general facts such as science because our endeavor to fix the standard of morals is concerning the general taste of mankind. Thus, I argue that for Hume, one’s feelings of approbation or disapprobation are regarded as particular matters of fact. But they are obtained not by inferential reasoning but by feeling. At first glance, it seems to lead him to a subjectivist. However, he argues that we can still reason concerning the particular matters of fact of our own feelings of approbation or disapprobation and “fix its standard,” and, thus, “we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.” Thus, we now understand what he means by his assertion that “As this [the question concerning the general principles of morals] is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). We reason and try to fix the principles of morals as general matters of fact by following the

experimental method of reasoning concerning the particular matters of fact of one’s own feelings of approbation or disapprobation.

However, this reading raises one question. According to Hume, in order to “find a sentiment of disapprobation” as “a matter of fact” which is “the object of feeling, not of reason”, we should turn our reflection into our own breast (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469). The question is this: given that the sentiments of approbation or

disapprobation as particular matters of fact are my own feelings and that the only way of scrutinising them is introspection, how can we overcome subjectivism and, thus, deduce “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances”? As Russell Hardin says, it seems that all of this is “strictly personal and it is not generalizable” (Hardin 2007, 14).

In my view, here is one of the important roles of Hume’s concept of sympathy. He explains the mechanism of sympathy as follows:

When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317)

That is, the mechanism of sympathy allows us to experience others’ feelings. It is important to note that for Hume, the essence of science is generalisation. Our scientific reasoning derives the general facts from the various particular facts by conducting observations and experiments on experience. As Hazony points out, “Less attention has been paid to the fact that for Hume, experience and observation are not, in and of themselves, science. They only provide the materials for science, which in fact advances only with our attempts to construct a scheme of simple, general concept (“principles” or “causes”) in terms of which the phenomena can be understood” (Hazony 2014, 161). According to Hume, experience and observation “are the only solid

foundation we can give this science” (Ibid., p. xvi)). Hence, if we can experience and observe others’ feelings by the use of sympathy, we can conduct scientific reasoning, hence deducing general facts.

but it does not lead to subjectivism since we share others’ feelings of approbation or disapprobation as matters of fact with the help of the mechanism of sympathy. This is the reason why he argues that “by following the