The Problem of Two Standards of Taste

Let us now consider one related issue, called the problem of two standards of taste (Selley 1994, 437-438; Wieand 1984,129-131):

It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. (ST 229) By “a rule” Hume refers to what Hume later calls the “rules of art”, while by “a decision” he refers to the “joint verdict” of “true judges” (Selley 1994 438; Wieand 1984, 131). That is, Hume here seems to suggest two different kinds of standard of taste, which seem to be different from each other: the rules of art and the joint verdict of true judges. Then, it is natural to ask which one is his genuine standard and why it is so.

Wieand holds that rules of art are the standard of taste since the joint verdict of true judges can be wrong (Wieand 1984, 139). According to him, rules of art are “causal rules” concerning how “the object causes in us the sentiment of beauty”, but they are formulated in an ideal form (Wieand 1984,132):

A rule of art … specifies what properties of an object will cause the sentiment of beauty (or deformity) in persons who have good sense, delicacy of taste, are free from prejudice, who practice and make comparisons, and who are not subject to external hindrances or internal disorders. This is not an elitist theory; it is a theory which makes the standard of taste an expression of the best potentialities of human nature. (Wieand 1984, 136).

That is, rules of art are an expression of ideal conditions, under which particular properties of an object cause the sentiment of beauty in persons. However, according to him, the verdicts of real true judges cannot meet these ideal conditions because they can be wrong due to internal disorders or external hindrances in the actual world. Hence, he concludes that rules of art are the standard of taste, and the joint verdict of true judges are confined to “a good guide to what the rules are, and so function as a practical standard of taste” (Wieand 1984, 129).

Wieand then argues Hume’s Quixote parable supports his interpretation that the joint verdicts of true judges can be wrong: “The Quixote parable is instructive in this regard, because although Sancho’s kinsmen both have delicacy of taste, one fails to detect the taste of iron, the other the taste of leather” (Wienand 1984, 139). However, as we have seen in Chapter 6.1, the example of Quixote parable does not support Wieand’s argument because both Sancho’s kinsmen clearly catch the taste of the foreign substances in their own special areas, and hence their joint verdict that if there were not for the small taste of leather and of iron, the wine will be good is very successfully pronounced, which is justified when the hogshead is emptied and the key with the leathern thong is found (ST 235).28 _{Hence, Wieand’s interpretation of Hume’s Quixote parable seems flawed.} At this point, we could ask why Wieand believes that the real true judges’ mistakes are so defective as a standard of taste. This is because he characterizes rules of art as ideal conditions, which any real true judge cannot meet. I believe that this characterization is not what Hume meant. In my view, Hume believes that as a group of scientists successfully establish general rules concerning the relationship between cause and effect, a joint verdict of true judges can successfully establish rules of art concerning the causal relationship between art objects and responses in art-perceivers. For him, rules of art are an inductive generalization, which can be called “a logic of probability.”

By contrast, Shelley suggests that the joint verdict of true judges is the standard of taste since Hume doubts that rules of art can be established as the standard of taste:

But where are such critics to be found? By what marks distinguish them from pretenders? These questions are embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same uncertainty, from which, during the course of this essay, we have endeavored to extricate ourselves. But if we consider the matter aright, these are questions of fact, not of sentiment. (ST 241-242)

Shelley pays attention to Hume’s expression of the “uncertainty”. He points out that the “uncertainty” here is the uncertainty of establishing rules of art. According to him, the reason why Hume was so uncertain of establishing rules of art is because he thought that there is no way to “specify which properties please” by observations (Shelley 1994, 441). Hence, Shelley argues that Hume moves to appealing to the joint verdict of true judges because whereas he “only gives a procedure for formulating the rules of art, he actually specifies the five identifying properties of true judges, from whom we may obtain joint verdicts” (Shelley 1994, 443).

However, textual evidence does not seem to support Shelley’s interpretation. Hume says that there are actually established rules of art (ST 232; 237). He emphasizes that the best way of ascertaining a delicacy of taste is “to appeal to those models and principles, which have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages”, which means that there already exist established rules of art (ST 237). And he explains how to establish general rules: “Here then the general rules of beauty are of use; being drawn from established models, and from the observation of what pleases or displeases, when presented singly and in a high degree” (ST 235).

Shelley replies to this objection by arguing that Hume “is skeptical that these [established] ‘rules’ are correctly formulated” by pointing out the following passage (Shelley 1994, 444):

[T]hough poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or observation. If some negligent or irregular writers have pleased, they have not pleased by their transgressions of rule or order, but in spite of these transgressions: They have possessed other beauties, which were conformable to just criticism. … Did our pleasure really arise from those parts of his poem, which we denominate faults, this would be no objection to criticism in general: It would only be an objection to those particular rules of criticism, which would establish such circumstances to be faults, and would represent them as universally blameable. (ST 231-232) Shelley argues that the underlined sentence above supports his assertion that Hume “is skeptical that these ‘rules’ are correctly formulated”. However, Shelley does not seem to recognise Hume’s distinction between particular and general rules. In this passage, Hume holds that the pleasure of “some negligent or irregular writers” would only be “an objection to those particular rules of criticism”, but would be “no objection to criticism in general”. It follows from this that Hume looks sceptical about establishing particular rules, but he is not sceptical in regard to establishing general rules of arts. Rather, he is confident of the fact that the pleasure of “some negligent or irregular writers” would not violate the established general rules of art. Therefore, Shelley is mistaken in holding that Hume “is skeptical that these ‘rules’ are correctly formulated”.

Now let us return to my suggestion of understanding true judges as causal experts, which I believe is advantageous to reconciling two standards of taste. In my interpretation, true judges are those who establish rules of art. That is, the joint verdict of true judges and rules of art are like two sides of the same coin since what true judges establish by their verdict is rules of art. In this respect, my interpretation goes with Costelloe’s: “[true judges’] judgments are manifestations or expressions of standards presupposed by everybody, and explicitly accepted by those with sufficient experience and an educated taste” (Costelloe 2007, 21). That is, the true judge is, in a sense, “a personification of general rules” (Costelloe 2007, 21). Hence, I would argue that the issue of two standards of taste is not a real problem because if we properly understand the role of true judges,

we come to know that for Hume, the joint verdict of true judges can be equated with the rules of art. In this respect, the problem of two standards of taste is a pseudo-problem.