In the absence of UN Security Council action, the General Assembly’s annual resolutions on Cambodia “regretted the armed intervention of outside forces in the internal affairs of Kampuchea,” called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and urged a political settlement to enable Cambodians “… to decide their own future and destiny free from outside interference, subversion or coercion, and to respect scrupulously the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Kampuchea.”55 They also called for international assistance to be provided “for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic development of all [s]tates in the region.”56
The General Assembly proposed an International Conference on Kampuchea and established an ad hoc Committee to pursue peace, but these were boycotted by Vietnam and the USSR. This reflected the ASEAN position on a peace settlement which was supported especially by China. However, within ASEAN, Thailand and Singapore were staunchly anti-Vietnam while Malaysia and Indonesia in particular took a more conciliatory position.57
There were other tentative peace proposals between 1980 and 1986 such as that by the Australian Foreign Minister who, concerned by the humanitarian as well as the political situation, met with Hun Sen and Vietnamese officials in 1983. However, these initiatives were blocked by China and the US.58 It was not until 1988 that the UN resolutions began to reflect other peace initiatives emerging since 1986, including the informal Jakarta talks. These produced concrete proposals for: international oversight of troop withdrawals; the creation of an interim administering authority; the leadership role of Sihanouk; (and most important of all in response to repeated calls from the Heng Samrin and Hun Sen governments) condemnation of Khmer Rouge genocide; and “the non-return to the universally condemned policies
55 A/RES/34/22 of 14 Nov 1979.
56 A/RES/35/6, 22 October 1980; A/RES/36/5, 21 October 1981.
57 Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizée, and Sorpong Peou, "Introduction," in Cambodia -The 1989
Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents, ed. Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizée, and Sorpong Peou (New York: Kraus International Publications, 1991), xxiii-xlviii. This book provides a summary of the peace process leading to the Paris Conference.
and practices of a recent past…”59 The following year the General Assembly encouraged the work of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.60
Yet the peace process advanced more through independent diplomatic efforts rather than through UN intervention. In 1986, the Chinese hosted the leaders of the three resistance factions, following which the coalition issued a “new peace proposal calling for Vietnamese troop withdrawal in two stages and an intermediary quadripartite coalition government with the PRK” and, in early 1987, the Soviet Union also indicated its openness to a four-party solution.61 The French, too, were active and organised meetings between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in December 1987, which resulted in a communiqué, agreeing to the need for a political settlement to achieve a peaceful and neutral Cambodia, and for Cambodians themselves to work out a settlement for international agreement.62 Informal meetings were held between the parties in July 1988 and February 1989 in Indonesia. At subsequent working group meetings, there was broad agreement to a framework of Vietnamese withdrawal, a ceasefire, coalition government, peacekeepers, elections, disarmament, neutrality and international organisation of the peacekeeping.63 There was also an ASEAN proposal for a Supreme National Council (SNC) under Sihanouk’s leadership comprising members of each group as an interim government.
Key issues in the negotiations included the demand from the US and coalition for full Vietnamese withdrawal. However, Phnom Penh, fearing that a Vietnamese withdrawal would leave a vacuum to be filled by the Khmer Rouge, stood firm in insisting that the Khmer Rouge not be given an opportunity to reclaim government.
59 A/RES/43/9 of 3 November 1988. Thus US Congress had only the previous month approved
a Bill referring to the “genocidal Khmer Rouge.” Fawthrop and Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide, 85. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM I and JIM II) were particularly important in leading to an agreed peace proposal. See Acharya, Lizée, and Peou, "Introduction." xl- xlv.
60 A/RES/44/22 of 16 November 1989.
61 Becker, "Stalemate," 186. Becker notes, too, Gorbachev’s statement that he wanted
improved relations with China and Thailand, which would mean prompting Vietnamese withdrawal as well. Chanda refers in addition to a CGDK 8-point proposal rejected by the Vietnamese. He also reports that Pol Pot had gone to China for cancer treatment “for good”! Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986," 121-24.
62 Elizabeth Becker, "The Progress of Peace in Cambodia," Current History 88, no. 537 (1989):
170. Sihanouk, looking to be a key player in the emerging diplomatic rounds, took leave from his Funcinpec role and as leader of the coalition to weave his own erratic path to peace and back to the throne as King. Findlay indicates a brokering role of India and Indonesia as well. Findlay, Cambodia, 4.
63 Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1988: The Curved Road to Settlement," 74; and Acharya,
In 1988, under Soviet and Chinese pressure, Vietnam eventually agreed to the need for withdrawal from Cambodia while also accepting an assurance, finally supported by the US, that the Khmer Rouge would never be allowed to become the government in Cambodia. A subsequent announcement of withdrawal by Vietnam led the way for all external parties to halt their material support for the Khmer Rouge, which would, nevertheless, be included in the political process.64 Even as the peace process was unfolding, and after the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989, the Khmer Rouge, still seeking a military solution, was able to consolidate control over significant areas of western Cambodia and to launch intensive attacks on Battambang, destroy rail links and conduct widespread raids in Banteay Meanchey and Pursat Provinces. Nevertheless, the international impetus for resolution of the situation in Cambodia remained firm, and the UN Security Council, which was finally engaged in the issue of Cambodia, approved a peace plan based on a comprehensive Framework Document in late 1990.65 The Framework Document called for the formation of a Supreme National Council (SNC) including two members from each of the three resistance factions and six members from the State of Cambodia (SOC). This body, under Sihanouk’s leadership, was able to progress the peace plan despite early divisions over a number of issues including the membership of the SNC, its relation with a proposed interim UN transition authority which would oversee elections, the disarmament process and how to deal with past Khmer Rouge crimes against humanity.66 In June 1991, the Cambodian parties finally agreed the outstanding issues and, following acceptance by the Security Council, a final agreement was eventually reached and the Paris Peace Agreement signed in October 1991 and adopted by the UN.67
64 Becker, "The Progress of Peace," 171-72 and 200-1. A/RES/43/9 of 3 November 1988. 65 Security Council Resolution 668 (1990). For the framework, see Commonwealth of
Australia, "Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal," (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1990).
66 The issue of genocide and crimes against humanity have persisted and a joint
international/Cambodia tribunal for the trial of former leader for crimes against humanity only recently commenced. See Fawthrop and Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide? Pol Pot and Ieng Sary had been convicted in absentia of genocide and other crimes by a court in Phnom Penh in August 1979. See also Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 60-66.
67 Findlay, Cambodia; and Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 337. It seems that
pressures were brought to bear to get a Khmer Rouge signature despite their consistent opposition to the plan and subsequent reneging on its conditions. About 80,000 refugees were relocated inside Cambodia to establish a Khmer Rouge ‘liberated zone.’ See van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," 97-8; and Frederick Z Brown, "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace," Asian Survey 32, no. 1 (1992): 93.
All four Cambodian factions were signatories to the Agreement along with the eighteen countries which had participated in the Paris Conference.68 Although they had reached a consensus, the Cambodian parties to the agreement were not jubilant, but rather resigned to the withdrawal of patronage by members of the P-5 and Vietnam which had, in the end, forced the agreement on them.69 The preamble to the Agreement called for elections, acknowledged the prior formation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) and recognised the need for a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to administer the country until a new government and constitution were in place.70 In typical diplomatic speak, it also recognised Cambodia’s “tragic recent history” and the need for “special measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices of the past.” In other words, the Khmer Rouge had been relieved of more serious charges of genocide and war crimes. Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge saw its grip on what power it had slipping away and engaged in fierce fighting in early 1991. Soon, the factions began to manoeuvre for political advantage. Hun Sen’s government in Phnom Penh had begun early with the introduction in 1989 of economic reforms – including the privatisation of government enterprises – in anticipation of a peace agreement. However, despite the accords, fighting continued along the border with occasional incursions deep into Cambodia from mainly Khmer Rouge strongholds. Khmer Rouge strikes would continue, albeit diminishing, until the death of Pol Pot and demise of the Khmer Rouge in 1999.
Thus, from a human security perspective, the peace agreement did not immediately lift the spectre of war and related violence but did promise hope for the people of
68 Signatories included the permanent member of the Security Council – USA, Great Britain,
France, China and the Soviet Union; members of ASEAN – Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines; India, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Brunei Darusalam, Australia, Canada and a representative of the Non-Aligned Movement.
69 Findlay, Cambodia, 3, 16-17. It was suggest that without the international community there
may have been no Pol Pot and no war and in the first place! Sihanouk is quotes by Vickery as saying that “To save Cambodia … all you had to do [in 1979] was to let Pol Pot die. Pol Pot was dying and you brought him back to life.” Michael Vickery, "Cambodia after the Peace," Thai-Yunan Project Newsletter, no. 17 (1992): 12. Quoted in David Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 30, Ott argued that the agreement was “not about Cambodia itself – Paris provided a useful opportunity to jettison some embarrassing baggage. For many in the US, the agreements were a means to artfully disengage from a nasty little problem” and central to this nasty little problem had been the issue of KR genocide.
70 The final Agreement (Part 1) specified that while the sovereignty and source of authority was
enshrined in the SNC, it would delegate all necessary powers to UNTAC to enable it to complete its mandate (effectively reducing the SNC to an advisory role only). This was to overcome legal issues of the UN appearing to assume sovereignty of Cambodia.
Cambodia. In addition to free and fair elections, it committed the parties to the withdrawal of all foreign forces, a ceasefire and a cessation of outside military assistance to the parties, voluntary repatriation of refugees, and a new constitution which would incorporate respect for human rights and Cambodian neutrality and be approved by the elected Assembly (leaving little to chance, a full set of principles for a constitution were included at Annex 5 to the Agreement). It also included principles for future economic development and a promise of international support. From an international perspective, the agreement transformed the thrust of international security practice in relation to Cambodia. An anti-communist national security and balance of power politics, backed by military and strategic might, was replaced by a new security practice based on an assumption that democracy and economic development would bring long-term peace and stability, as well as human rights and human development. The international community would be firmly engaged in the development process through global institutions. In other words, international relations and the security of states would continue to assert a powerful and direct influence over human security in Cambodia.