The terms of reference for UNTAC, which was responsible for implementation and oversight of the agreement, were contained in Annex 1 to the Paris Agreement.110 These covered general procedures; civil administration; military functions; elections; human rights; and repatriation of refugees. UNTAC was required to oversee the cessation of hostilities and in particular the cantonment, demobilisation and disarmament of factional forces and to ensure a climate conducive to free and fair elections.111 UNHCR was given the lead role for the voluntary repatriation and re- integration of refuges.112
UNTAC was not charged with undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks. Instead, a separate Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction specified that “the main responsibility for deciding Cambodia’s reconstruction needs should rest
with the Cambodian people and the government.”113 In the meantime, the UN Secretary General was requested to address immediate rehabilitation requirements
109 Ibid., 238. The Council of Ministers was well aware of the situation which had been
documented in a 1985 report to the Council.
110 Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict; Paris, 23
October 1991.
111 Ibid., Detailed military provisions were contained in Annex 2 to the Agreements. 112 Ibid., Detailed provisions were contained in Annex 4.
113 Ibid., Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Paragraph 2.
with particular attention given to “food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia’s existing basic infrastructure and public utilities.”114 The Declaration also noted the need for detailed assessment of Cambodia’s assets and reconstruction needs prior to decisions being made by a new government. It also specified that a consultative body of donors, the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), be set up to “harmonise and monitor” donor contributions.115
UNTAC faced major difficulties in completing its tasks. First, it had not been established before the peace accords were signed. The UN, therefore, hastily put in place a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to initiate oversight of the cease-fire.116 However, the delay was accompanied by ceasefire violations, lawlessness in the cities and banditry in the countryside. The factional armies did not comply with ceasefire and demilitarisation obligations, and the UNTAC military contingent was basically redeployed to protect and promote the electoral process.117 Despite Khmer Rouge attacks on villages, sporadic violence, murders and intimidation, including attacks on UN personnel, 4.6 million voters were enrolled and the election went ahead peacefully on 23-8 May 1993.118
The election was followed by charges and counter charges of electoral fraud, rumours of succession and military coup. Although Funcinpec had achieved a majority (45 per cent versus 38 per cent for CPP), Hun Sen refused to relinquish power. Cambodia’s newfound democracy stumbled at the first obstacle as Sihanouk, negotiated a Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC) which included
114 Ibid., Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Paragraph 10. 115 Ibid.
116 UNAMIC was set up in Phnom Penh on 9 November 1991. The Special Representative of
the Secretary General arrived in Phnom Penh on 15 March 1992. UNTAC would not be at full force until mid-July 1992.
117 United Nations, “Cambodia – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), Background,” www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untac.htm, accessed on 25 October 2006, provides detail of ceasefire and cantonment difficulties and eventual abandonment of this aspect of the peace process. Findlay put much of the blame for UNTAC’s failure on the delays in setting up UNTAC’s operations while Smith considers the shortcomings in civil administration and policing (rule of law not achieved) had much to do with the CPP maintaining both administration and police under their political control. Findlay, Cambodia, 94-100; Hugh Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1994).
118 United Nations, “Cambodia – UNTAC Background,” provides detail of difficulties with
Sihanouk and the SNC over preparations for the elections, continuing violations of the ceasefire, and violence associated with the election campaign. See also Findlay, Cambodia, 55 and 75-79.
members of all parties that had won seats in the election. With Sihanouk as head of state (and soon to be recrowned King), Rannarith and Hun Sen were proclaimed first and second “co-Presidents” respectively, while “co-Ministers” were appointed to the various Ministries.119 A new constitution was signed into law on 24 September 1993 and Rannarith and Hun Sen became First and Second Prime Ministers respectively.120
Cambodia’s political leaders were simply not prepared to see their positions of power determined electorally and neither the society nor the institutions of state were able to insist on the outcome of the election being respected. There was no concept of ‘loyal opposition’ in Cambodian political tradition.121 Those involved in the electoral process had been factional opponents for years and to some extent the post- election negotiations represented the continuation of war by other means.122 It also meant the sharing of wealth and power. Sihanouk’s deal defused the confrontation between the CPP and Funcinpec for the moment.123 It flared again into military conflict between forces loyal to the two parties in1997 when Hun Sen seized total control of government in a coup. Hun Sen the “strongman” has, since then, engineered the demise of Funcinpec as a viable opposition party.124
Other aspects of the UNTAC operations had mixed success. Repatriation of some 360,000 people from the border was a complex task, but completed to schedule before the election.125 Control of the SOC administration by the Civil Component
119 Ibid., 91. The US in particular was unhappy about this, demanding that the election results
be recognised fully. Their approach exacerbated the conflict and failed to recognise local political realities. The US eventually accepted the solution. Funcinpec took the lead position over the Finance, Economy and Foreign Affairs portfolios, while the CPP took Justice and Information while Defence remained with Sihanouk.
120 The same practice of sharing portfolios was retained, at least in principle and has extended to
sharing of portfolios, provincial governor appointments and senior positions in the bureaucracy.
121 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, 32-34
122 Ibid. Roberts argues that the inability to accept a electoral outcome arises in part from the
patron client structure of society and the fact that a loss of power at the top could destroy not only the patron but also feed down through the whole network with consequences for many. Therefore, he concludes, those at the top will do anything to prevent democratisation of power.
123 David Roberts, "Finishing what UNTAC Started: The Political Economy of Peace in
Cambodia," Peacekeeping and International Relations 28, no. 1 (1999): 14-17. He argues that a culture of authoritarianism and the tradition of patron clientism prevent the acceptance of democracy, and that the élite politics is removed from the population at large.
124 On Hun Sen’s aspiration to “strongman” status see Harish C Mehta and Julie B Mehta, Hun
Sen: Strongman of Cambodia (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1999).
125 United Nations, “Cambodia – UNTAC Background.” Land shortage meant that plans had to
“failed completely” while the Human Rights Component, which conducted widespread training, faltered in large part because the biased, poorly staffed and corrupt SOC administration remained intact.126
International development agencies and NGOs flooded into Cambodia to provide rural development assistance. Much of their work was based on the early studies by UN and other organisations of Cambodia’s development needs. These provide the policy and institutional framework, outlined below, and set the context for the human security case study in the next chapter.