Values and Other Types of Reasons

Under the rhetorical approach discussed above, values are only one type of rhetorical criteria deployed by orators. An interesting area of investigation, therefore, is the relationship between values and other sorts of 'good reasons'. By this I mean investigating argumentative contexts in which values are juxtaposed against other types of reasons. Values are not necessarily regarded as the best sort of reasons in num erous argumentative contexts. It is possible to identify a whole range of rhetorical commonplaces which can be drawn upon to 'devalue values'. The most prominent rhetorical competitors to values in contemporary political debate include criteria of technical rationality, practicality and self-interest.

4 Chapter 6 provides an illustration of this point, exploring implications of the co­ existence of the values of unity and diversity within the green normative political framework.

3.2.2.I. Values and Technical Rationality

The rhetorical practices of the scientific method are built upon the superiority of facts and technical criteria as good reasons. Scientists do not publish journal articles on the basis of demonstrating that a particular conclusion is normatively preferable. Such reasons may at times be admissible, but only as supports for conclusive scientific evidence. In relation to values, a particularly influential element of scientific common sense has been the superiority of objective facts over values, in which the latter are deemed to be subjective and therefore not subject to verification. Alan Cribb (1991) has shown how this assumption provided the central plank for justifying the 'value free' approach to social sciences in general, and comparative politics in particular, during the 1950s and 1960s. Among the most strident expressions of the superiority of facts over values was the behaviorist treatment of values and normative commitments as the object of scientific investigation (Cribb 1991: 31-2). In a rather selective interpretation of Weber's dictum that value choices cannot be rationally justified, values are reduced to irrational expressions of emotional states that have no legitimate role in the formation of judgements.

This rhetorical image of technical rationality has had wide political applications. One familiar form stipulates appropriate modes of political decision-making in which decisions are taken dispassionately, on the basis of the facts at hand. Values get in the way of rational decision-making because they introduce non-rational or irrational elements into the decision-making process. This form of rhetoric is not restricted to audiences who are assumed to possess technical competence, if the orator establishes audience identity based upon trust in scientific and technically rational expertise. Another common way of juxtaposing facts and values is to claim that the latter are derived from, and subordinate to the former. The anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s frequently used the rhetorical technique of presenting the facts about nuclear power and nuclear arms as sufficient basis for negative normative evaluation (Downey 1986).

In other rhetorical circumstances, however, facts are trumped by values. Three closely related ways of turning the tables are readily drawn from

rhetorical repertoires. The m ost established of these is the com m onplace th a t technical ratio n ality is associated w ith n o rm ativ ely d istastefu l consequences. C om m entators w riting in the afterm ath of W orld W ar II, such as K enneth Burke, were particularly sensitive to the use of scientistic justifications of atrocities p erp etrated by the N azi regim e. N azi science provided a pow erful image supporting the contention that science should not be granted the autonom y from values. Such exam ples are frequently used to justify the subjection of scientific practice to norm ative and ethical e v alu atio n .

The im age of technical rationality as good servant, b u t bad m aster, has been influential in social theory. In particular, critical theory has sought to keep technical rationality in check and ensure its in teg ratio n into the m ore com prehensive project of hum an em ancipation. Ian H u n ter (1992) observes contem porary expressions of this relationship betw een technical and n o rm ativ e reason in the lan g u ag e of critiq u es of b u reau cratic practices. D eficiencies are id en tifie d in term s of the b u rea u cra tic a b an d o n m en t of m oral resp o n sib ilities associated w ith the h ead lo n g p u r s u it of tech n ical efficien cies.5 H ence, the a n tip a th y to w a rd s dispassionate m odes of decision-m aking, particularly in regard to issues such as the closure of hospitals and schools, and cutting the size of the public sector in general. H ard-headed rationalism serves as an indication of m oral callousness rather than political responsibility, given that ethical considerations are explicitly excluded from the decision-m aking calculus. More recently, the su p p o sed am orality of technical rationality has been subject to sustained attack on the basis that facts and values cannot be d istin g u ish ed from each other so easily. A ccording to this rhetorical com m onplace, values play a significant role in defining w h at can be considered as facts. Facts cannot speak for them selves, b u t m u st be m ediated th ro u g h norm atively loaded language. Follow ing this line it becomes possible to construe values as a m ore honest and authentic type of reason. Facts are suspect because they can be deployed as screens which

im p ro p erly conceal norm ative orientations. It can also be argued that claims to value neutrality are actually norm ative, regardless of w hether this is acknow ledged by those advocate it.

32.2.2. Values and Pragmatic Rationality

A nother type of criteria regularly counterposed against values is that of p rac tic ality or p rag m a tic ra tio n a lity . The circu m stan ces in w hich arg u m en ts based u p o n practicality could be expected to prevail over reasons derived from norm ative principles w ould cover a w ide range of political contexts. Politically, a partially acceptable policy or statute that can be im plem ented and enforced m ay well be reg ard ed as preferable to a policy w ith b etter n o rm ativ e credentials b u t less chance of effective im plem entation. The sam e type of calculation is a feature of settings in which it is necessary to form coalitions w ith other political actors in order to achieve a p articular outcom e. W hen such changes are in terp reted as reducing the norm ative credentials, the practical evaluative criteria of 'som ething is better than nothing' comes into play. One m ight argue that the bounds of w hat is to be considered ethical are set by perceived range of practicable possibilities.

Political decision-m aking is frequently sh ap ed by the need to provide practical or w orkable solutions to conflicts which are highly charged and irresolvable in terms of values. In contexts w here the clash of values is the heart of the political problem , practical criteria provide a m eans of taking the heat out of such conflicts. The pursuit of practical solutions to political conflicts betw een p ro p o n en ts of incom patible value claim s m ay often necessitate com prom ise. Any achievem ent of such com prom ise signifies that 'peaceful' political outcom es have precedence over com m itm ent to principles.6

6 Perhaps the paradigmatic case here is the unprincipled but practical mechanisms that evolved in response to the religious wars of seventeenth century Germany which brought into being the Prussian political-administrative apparatus with its 'amoral' reasons of state (raison d'etat) (Koselleck 1988).

H ow ever, the rhetorical relationship betw een values and practicality can also w ork the other way. For instance, faithfulness to C hristian m oral p rin cip les m ay o v e rrid e co n sid eratio n s of p rac tic ality in decisions re g a rd in g s tu d e n t access to in fo rm atio n ab o u t c o n tracep tio n in a denom inational school. It is not difficult to im agine the circum stances in which integrity of these principles carries m ore rhetorical w eight than the adm ission th at such inform ation w o u ld in all likelihood reduce the incidence of teen ag e p reg n an cies an d a b o rtio n s. It is also w o rth co n sid erin g the n egative im age of com prom ise, in co n trast to th at p resen ted above. C om prom ise is freq u en tly associated w ith less than com plim entary connotations such as b etray als and su rren d ers. A nti­ pragm atic rhetorical com m onplaces express distaste for 'doing deals' and 'sell-o u ts’. D eal-m aking is d istastefu l precisely because n o rm ativ ely principled positions are sacrificed for practical outcomes. Here, the refusal to com prom ise signifies the triu m p h of one's conscience or value com m itm ents over m ore practical considerations.

There is also a well established cultural link in the west in which practical reasons are reg ard ed as 'w orldly' tem ptations. These are precisely the kinds of reasons th at the m orally educated should regard w ith a high degree of suspicion, and perhaps eschew altogether. W eber identified this as a characteristic habit of the cu ltu ral category he called religious intellectuals.

It is the intellectual who conceives of the "world" as a problem of meaning....As a consequence, there is a growing demand that the world and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and meaningful. The conflict of this requirement of meaningfulness with the empirical realities of the world and its institutions, and with the possibilities of conducting one's life in the empirical world, are responsible for the intellectual's characteristic flight from the world (Weber 1968: 506).

U nder such a framework, it is to be expected that practical m odes of action will be found to be unethical, and th at w ithdraw al from the realm of w orldly action is the only possible w ay of living a life of principled integrity.

3.2.2 3. Values and Self-interest

A nother pro m in en t and long established rhetorical sp arrin g p artn er for values is th at of self-interest. A rgum entative settings in w hich interests characteristically constitute better reasons than values are those w here audiences are actually defined in term s of com m on interests. W here comm on interests constitute identity, it is unlikely th at any other type of reason w ould take priority over the collective self-interest. In this sense it is not surprising that French farm ers as a group, for instance, cannot be easily exhorted to place the 'well-being of the w orld's econom y' ahead of th e ir o w n in te re s ts , seein g th a t the w h o le p u rp o s e of p o litical m obilisation is the protection of their interests.

A related rhetorical com m onplace in w hich self-interest trum ps values is th at w hich p o rtray s norm ative considerations as a luxury th at cannot necessarily be afforded by those struggling to m eet their m aterial needs. Brecht’s one-liner of 'Erst kommt das Fressen, dann die M oral’ (first grub, then ethics) succinctly captures this com m onplace, fitting neatly into the m ateria list fram ew o rk of w o rk in g class m o v em en t politics. Those struggling to make ends m eet cannot be expected to place the interests of others ahead of their ow n. This fo rm u latio n is also expressed m ost fam ously in A braham M aslow's hierarchy of hum an needs, in which the m eeting of physical needs is an essential prerequisite for the p u rsu it of aesthetic and spiritual fulfilm ent (Maslow 1968).7

The m ost em phatic way in which self-interest takes priority over values is w here a p p ro p ria te norm ative rationality is derived from self-interest. Over recent years, m any w estern democracies have w itnessed the rise to prom inence of a political discourse based u p o n the assu m p tio n th at ratio n ality is fu n d am en tally d eriv ed from self-interest. N eo-classical economics, and its political correlate of public choice theory, is hardly a novel form of rhetoric in this respect. The significant change over the past tw en ty years has been the d ev elo p m en t of new au d ien ces th at are

7 Maslow's theory is one of the main building blocks of Inglehart's distinction between materialism and postmaterialism.

receptive to this form of rhetoric, particularly in the public sectors of these countries. These perspectives em phasise that the p u rsu it of self-interest is a highly ethical activity, and ultim ately m ore ethical than the fruits of practices which restrain the free hand of m arket forces. In fact, norm ative preferences and interest-based rationality are synonym ous according to m any rational choice m odels. From this definition of rationality, values not d eriv ed from self-interest are am ong the m ost significant of the irrational factors that im pede the developm ent of rational forces.

The reversal of this hierarchy, in w hich norm ative criteria are clearly separated from, and given priority over self-interest is the defining feature of altruism . Altruistic them es in w estern societies are strongly shaped by C hristian traditions. These influences can be easily seen in the political rh eto ric fre q u e n tly a d o p te d by relig io u s, p h ila n th ro p ic an d n o n ­ g o v ern m en t w elfare agencies, all of w hich invoke the denial of self- in terest in o rd e r to help o th ers as a 'g o o d reaso n '. H ow ever, the com m onplaces of altruism are hardly lim ited to contexts of earthquake relief and Salvation Army Christm as appeals. 'Ask not w hat your country can do for you, but w hat you can do for your country' presents the appeal to altruism in its clearest and most cliched form.

Politically, altru ism is reg u larly in voked th ro u g h the accusation of selfishness. Em ployer groups criticise trade unions on the basis that the d em ands of the latter m ay be good for unions b u t bad for the w hole country. According to this form of rhetoric, unions are m orally culpable for their refusal to behave altruistically. Of course, such an instance m ay be dism issed as 'mere rhetoric', especially w here altruism on the p art of u n io n s just h ap p en s to coincide w ith the self-interest of em ployers. A ltruism also enters political debate in the form of the reluctance to consider negotiatory politics as a legitim ate exercise.8 The characteristic form here is that you cannot agree to give up w h at is not yours to give aw ay, and th at any p rep ared n ess to negotiate and com prom ise only constitutes a subm ission to the tem ptation of self-interest.

Closely related to altruism is the rhetoric that claims m ade in term s of self-interest are m orally inferior to claim s based u p o n w ider, or m ore universal interests. U niversalist claims are presented as unencum bered by partial perspectives, and this 'im partiality' can, am ong other things, be equated w ith m oral high ground, as w orking for the benefit of all is self- evidently better than prom oting the interests of the few. At tim es, this rhetorical form ulation has been used to different effect by intellectuals w ho take u p the cause of particular groups. It can be a useful strategy to override the actual political claims of particular g ro u p w hen they appear to be out of kilter w ith the historical telos of th at group as perceived by in te llectu als. For ex am p le, L enin c o n te n d e d th a t the p ro le ta ria t’s v u ln erab ility to self-interested o p p o rtu n ism w as an indication of its inability to transcend economic concerns for ideal goals w ithout the help of a vanguard that could correctly perceive the trajectory of history (Sadri 1992: 136).