Case Digest by Adonis

THE ADONIS CASES 2011

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

PHILIPPINES

DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987) MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners

was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

HELD:

NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:

“This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.”

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and effect.

The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION

GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967) CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:

The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections. And the third, proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously

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propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention.

ISSUES:

(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?

(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?

HELD:

YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES IMBONG VS. COMELEC

35 SCRA 28 (1970) FACTS:

Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates.

Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.2 which called for the Constitutional Convention to propose Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating entirely the provisions of said resolution.

Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that “xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx”

Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.

ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132 to

implement the resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?

HELD:

YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is vested by the Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power to enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not exclusively pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising its comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly) may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and compensation of its member.

The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 are as follows:

1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose by ¾ votes of each house in joint session assembled but voting separately.

2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary implication.

3. Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from

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the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution; and 4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 15, 1973 CONSTITUTION

OCCENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981 FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend.

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12, 1981.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is already in effect. Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to

propose amendments.

Whether or not the three resolutions are valid.

HELD:

1.Yes. it is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."

With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

2. Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

3. Yes.The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute amendments or revision is of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION

TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971) BARREDO, J.:

FACTS:

A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.

The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE:

Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional?

HELD:

NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith are null and void.

The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 73 SCRA 333 (1976)

FACTS:

President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“Barangay”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.

Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will be submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his (President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, 1976.

Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the

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constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution, hence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.

Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to propose amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution.

A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that:

1. Even granting him legislative powers under the martial law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution,

2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,

3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity, 4. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the people via referendum, and

5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent COMELEC, maintains that:

1. Petitioners have no standing to sue

2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the court

3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power 4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUES:

Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial?

2. Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the absence of an interim National Assembly? 3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefore a sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:

1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.

2. It is a judicial question.

3. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people.

4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that “it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such amendment or revision.” The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the people have been living with

5. them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC 270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997 FACTS:

Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this proposition to the people—“Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of

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all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?” The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.

Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents COMELEC and Delfin’s Petition to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments:

1. The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.

2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the “conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws”, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

4. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of the people’s initiative.

5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose.

TheSupremeCourtgaveduecoursetothispetitionand

granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision?

2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the said constitutional provision?

3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid? 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an amendment to the Constitution?

HELD:

NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system and accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing Constitutional changes.

2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void, as expressed

in the Latin maxim “Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation itself is valid.

3. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006 FACTS:

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum

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(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral- Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

ISSUE:

Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.

HELD:

NO. The court declared that Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will

determine the expiration of their own term of office;

3.Within45days fromthe ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

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These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. CAMPOS RUEDA (G.R. No. L-13250, Oct. 29, 1971)

FACTS:

This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, administrator of the estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency state and inheritance taxes, including interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment for estate and inheritance taxes which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner.

On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed . . . where intangible personal properties with were claimed as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes. In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment OF deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties . . . . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties. However, respondent denied this request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 . . . and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties

ISSUE:

Is Tangier a foreign country?

HELD:

Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in the light its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied, international

law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, it was specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled to exemption from the

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inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines." There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE BACANI V. NACOCO [GRN L-9657 NOVEMBER 29, 1956] BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for defendant, requested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.

Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. The respondents argue that National Coconut Corporation may be considered as included in the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a part of the Government of the

Philippines by virtue of its performance of government functions.

HELD:

No, NACOCO does not acquire that status for the simple reason that it does not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. To resolve the issue in this case requires a little digression on the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution. To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.

To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation under the Corporation Law.

But while NACOCO was organized for the ministrant function of promoting the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518).

“Government of the Republic of the Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government. entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality. separate and distinct from the government and 'which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters.

As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586- 597). "By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

San Beda College of Law

PVTA VS.CIR [GRN L-32052JULY 25, 1975]

FACTS:

Private respondents filed with the CIR a petition, alleging their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations. The then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court sustained the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. Petitioner claims that the matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of C.A. 444, invoking the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision, and the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the traditional classification of function of

government as ministrant and constituent applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:

No. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people - these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government."

Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice."

Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court, denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD (G.R. NO. L-9959, DECEMBER 13, 1916) TRENT, J.:

FACTS:

About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief board was appointed to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed and allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution. By order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila. These were later distributed up to the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85.

Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order, directed its treasurer to turn over to the former the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each and were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made, the Philippine Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and made the following contentions:

that the $80,000, given to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation, and that said donation had been cleared;

that the Government of the Philippine Islands has not subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money abovementioned;

that the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or

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the cestuis que trustent, thus, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action;

that the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular Government against the defendant appellant.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the $80,000 received by Monte de Piedad was in form of donation.

Whether or not the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty.

Whether or not the Government is a proper party to the case under the doctrine of parens patriae.

Whether or not the Philippine Government is bound by the statute of limitations.

HELD:

1.No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000. The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation.

The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor- General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without interest." Thus, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation.

2.No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government.

From the nature and class of the subject matter, it is clear that it falls within the latter class. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer.

3.Yes.The ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests on the fact that the money, being given to a charity became a public property, only applicable to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted. It is but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy.

The Supreme Court of the United States in Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital, ruled that: “insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.” Chancelor Kent says: In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)

4.No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischief to be remedied are of such a nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed fromis

affirmed.

San Beda College of Law

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH 75 PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945

FERIA, J: FACTS:

Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case no. 3012 which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings on the following grounds: (1) the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;(2) the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of enabling law granting such authority; (3) the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de facto government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the government established during the Japanese occupation was a de facto government.

2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Phil. Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US and Filipino forces.

3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur declaring “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated al judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.

4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which were the same courts existing prior to and continue during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines may continue those proceedings in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the US and Filipino forces and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished.

HELD:

1. YES. The government established under the names of Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a civil government and a de facto government of the second kind: that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. The distinguishing characteristics of this kind of de facto government are; (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

2. YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. 3. NO. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, according to the well-known principles of international law, all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto government during the Japanese occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using the phrase “processes of any government” to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes, or court proceedings, for according to a well-known statutory construction, statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.

4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice, the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but