People vs. Vera GR 45685, Nov. 16, 1937
Facts: The instant petition stems from the application for bail filed by Co Unjieng. He claims that he is innocent of the crime charged against him, that he has no existing criminal record and that he would observe proper conduct in the future if his application for bail is granted. The application was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but was consequently denied.
The denial was premised on the ground that Act No. 4221 provides probation only to those provinces with available funds for the salary of probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds.
Thus, petitioner now comes before the Court assailing the constitutionality of the Act for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection guarantee?
Held: Yes. The probation act is in violation of the said constitutional guarantee. It constitutes as a class legislation which discriminates against persons of the same class and favor others. Person’s with similar circumstances may be afforded with the privilege of probation merely due to the discretion of the provincial officers. Hence, the Court ruled that the said order is not constitutional.
In the case at bar, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is necessarily the result in every case. In the instant case, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be able to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in al cases the necessary result. Whatever may be the case, it is clear that Section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed.
We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Act. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
We see no difference “BETWEEN A LAW WHICH DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION” and a “LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL”. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrmmination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.
Ichong vs. Hernandez GR 7995, May 31, 1957
Facts:
-supra-Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause?
Held: None. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
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VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws?
As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth.
He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike , and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
(Adonis Notes: Under the abovementioned case, the case was decided under the 1935 Constitution wherein PARITY RIGHTS were granted to U.S. Citizens.)
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho GR 29646, Nov. 10,1978
Facts: City ordinance No 6537, prohibits aliens from being employed or engaged or participate in any position or association or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila is being questioned by the private respondent for allegedly in violation of the equal protection guarantee. The trial court ruled in favor of the nullity of the ordinance. On appeal, petitioner argues that the ordinance cannot be invalidated on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation, because it apples to pure tax or revenues measures and said ordinance is not such but is an exercise of the police power of the state.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinance is unconstitutional?
Held: The ordinance is unconstitutional. The contention that it was not purely a tax or revenue measure because its principle purpose was for regulation has no merit. It is obvious that THE ORDINANCE WAS PURPOSELY FOR THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE OF A REGULATION. Further, the assailed ordinance violates the equal protection clause. To require a person to get a work permit before he can be employed from the Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to engage in a means of livelihood . Aliens once admitted cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit . While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise
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of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50. 00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
“CLEARED” for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive BUT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO CONSIDER VALID
SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN SITUATION AMONG INDIVIDUAL ALIENS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO PAY IT . Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful .
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
(Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.)
Dumlao vs. Comelec GR 52245, Jan. 22, 1980
Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official (1)who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and (2)who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not said provision violates the equal protection guarantee?
Held: No. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
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classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office , there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again . It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid
"even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
(NOTE: The questioned law is germane to the purposes for which it was enacted)
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. vs. Drillon GR 81958, June 30, 1988
Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. (PASEI), is a domestic corporation engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female for overseas employment. PASEI seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1 series of 1998 of the Department of Labor. Said order prohibited and suspended the overseas deployment of Filipina Domestic and household workers. Their main contention is that the order is invalid for the DOLE erroneously exercised police power, which is an adjunct on the powers of congress, and not executive in character. Moreover, it alleged that there was a violation of the equal protection clause for it only sought to suspend the deployment of Filipina workers, thus there was discrimination.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause?
Held: No. The Court is satisfied that the classification madeN - the preference for female workers - rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not