BUSTOS VS. LUCERO (GR. NO. L-2068, March 8, 1949) TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with trial court, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that he might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's counsel in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. The justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the trial court.
The Supreme Court upheld the assailed denial, saying that respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. Hence, the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. ( now Section 5(5), Article 8, 1987 Constitution)
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court, in its Resolution dated March 8, 1949 opined that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be
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informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
BP 129 (SECTION 9(3)), EO226 (ART. 82), AND SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR 1-91
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS (GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994)
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
Opositor Mariwasa moved for reconsideration of said BOI decision. This motion having been denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent court.
The CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This TRO lapsed by its own terms 20 days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. The appellate court denied the motion to dismiss. Thus, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed before this Court.
Petitioner claims that the CA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution. Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court.
Mariwasa counters that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or
"irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated four years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe rules to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
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The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O.
226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeal.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ARUELO VS. CA GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993 FACTS:
Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes. Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition protesting the same election.
Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming that: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition.
The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition. However, the trial court denied Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his answer to the petition.
Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from implementing the Order of August 11 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The CA belatedly issued a temporary restraining order. Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the CA another petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Order, which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars.
The CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit.
The CA rendered judgment, denying Gatchalian's petition, but declaring, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protest or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 6 [5]).
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a
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summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and, above the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of he people. For this reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will expressed in the election or public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT JAVELLANA VS. DILG GRN 102549,AUGUST 10, 1992 FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. In 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia sued Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80- 38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose, as required; that petitioner, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, sued Divinagracia for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; and that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several cases without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director.
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memoramdum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null and void because:
(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution and (2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 (b-l]).
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned memorandum circulars and Section 90 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No.
74-58 (in relation to Election 7[b-2) of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent.
Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90- 81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation.
Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members .may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. " If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of
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law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ
221 SCRA 464 [1993]
FACTS:
Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda seeks the review of the following orders of the office of the Ombudsman:
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991 denying ex parte motion refer to the SC filed by the Petitioner and
2.) The order dated November 22, 1951 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioners to file his counter affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint, respondent Napoleon Abiera asserts that petitioner falsely certified that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998 where in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in the cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificate of service.
Petitioner counters that he had been granted by this court an extension of 90 days to decide said cases, and that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under control of this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain criminal complaints for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain criminal complaints for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted