City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 Phil 349, Johnson, J.
Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement into an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the plaintiff to exercise in fee simple of certain parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand, contends that the expropriation was not necessary as a public improvement and that the plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes. The lower court declared that there was no necessity for the said expropriation.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity of expropriation of delegate, such as the City of Manila?
Held: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. The authority of the city of Manila to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied as provided in its Charter. However, if the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there exists a necessity for expropriation. The decision of the lower court is affirmed.
Republic v PLDT 26 SCRA 620, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Facts: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
While the respondent, Philippine Long Distance Telephone has the power to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. Sometime in 1933, the defendant and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa. The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The respondent said that the bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities. The petitioner prayed commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with it, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system. The lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement. Both parties appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Telecommunications has the right to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and the PLDT.
Held: Yes. It is true that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement was made between them. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic, in the exercise of the sovereign of eminent domain, may require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject
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to the payment of just compensation. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that condemnation would be for public use.
People v. Fajardo GR 12172, Aug. 29 1958
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard .
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi GR No. 20620, Aug.15, 1974
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M.
vda. de Castellvi from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease , on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). The Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract because it would difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against the respondents over the 3 parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare.The court authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961, the trial court, rendered its decision in the ejectment case, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests.
Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.
Held: The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement.
In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
"Taking”under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof."
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
San Beda College of Law
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596);
"lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP . It is claimed that the “INTENTION” of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "INTENTION" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud the question being not what the intention wag, but what is expressed in the language used. Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air base?" It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice much less an implied notice of such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
"taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". 15 We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under
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the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever.
Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect.
To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the property of its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the "right and privilege"
to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract.
What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of
What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of