SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.
(G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1998) PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R.
Osmeña as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader.
He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan, as Senate President, comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate
"minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches.
Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad later instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to settle the controversy?
2. In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
HELD:
1. Yes. This Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
2. No. While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
AVELINO VS. CUENCO (G.R. NO. L-2821, MARCH 4, 1949) FACTS:
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof. When the meeting was called to order, Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but Senator Tirona opposed said motion. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery. Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, moved for adjournment of session. Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate
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President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record
— it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz which was approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
HELD:
None. The constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens.
And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
OSMEÑA VS. PENDATUN (G.R. NO. L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960) BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. He also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges of bribery against then President Garcia with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The Special Committee during the pendency of his petition, found said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House approved House Resolution No. 175 declaring him suspended from office for 15 months.
ISSUE: Can the House of Representatives discipline its members as in the case at bar?
HELD:
Yes. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The
San Beda College of Law
theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
The Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair. In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PAREDES, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 118364. JANUARY 28, 1997 FACTS:
While Congressman was still Provincial Governor, charges of violations of the Anti-Graft Law were filed against him before the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, he was elected to Congress. During his second term in Congress, the Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive suspension on him pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law. Paredes challenged the authority of the Sandiganbayan to suspend a district representative.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be suspended.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alias to ‘punish its members of Congress for disorderly behavior ‘ and suspend or expel a member’ by a vote of two0thirds of the members subject to the qualification that the penalty of the suspension spoken of in Sec. 13 of RA 3019 which is not penalty by a preliminary preventive measure presenting from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on the petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representative.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT US VS. PONS
34 PHIL 729. 1916 FACTS:
The respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of opium. Pons and Beliso were tried separately on motion of counsel. Lasarte had not yet been arrested. Each was found guilty of the crime, charged and sentenced accordingly. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final. Respondent’s motion alleged to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February, that Act No.2381 under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed nor approved on the 28 th of February but on March 1 of that year. Also, counsel for Pons alleged that the Assembly’s clock was stopped on February 18, 1914 at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters among which was Act NO. 2381. to prove aid allegations, counsel argued the court to go beyond the proceedings of the Legislature as recorded in the journals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may go beyond the recitals of legislature journals or just take judicial notice of said journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journal are clear and explicitly.
HELD:
YES. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary. And to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine government was brought into existence, to invade and coordinate and independent department of the Government and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENEZ
7 SCRA 347 (1963) FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank issued Circular NO. 95 fixing a unified margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transaction and a memorandum establishing the procedure for application for exemption from payment of said fee. In November and December 1959, and in May 1960, Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., brought foreign exchange for
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the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid for the margin fee therefore. Then as petitioner, the Central Bank declaring that separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. When the back issue corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund, the auditor of the back issue the said vouchers upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is in violation of Sec. 2(18_ of RA 2609, according to the pertinent portion of the Act, “urea formaldehyde” is exempted from the margin fee. The National Institute of Science and Technology further affirms that “urea formaldehyde” is different from urea and formaldehyde. Hence, the separate importations of these two raw materials are not excluded from margin fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “urea formaldehyde” as used in the statute should be read as “urea” and “formaldehyde.”
HELD:
NO. Hence, “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde” as used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde.” Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the term
“urea” and “formaldehyde”, not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” is a conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO
227 SCRA 703. 1993 FACTS:
The Philippine Postal Corporation implemented RA 7534, a measure withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC and MTC along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the aforementioned measure. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the measure on the ground inter alia that it is discriminatory and encroached on the independence of the judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is tenable.
HELD:
YES. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The aforementioned measure is declared unconstitutional insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC and MTC and other government offices.
It is alleged that RA No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege of the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections, former president of he Philippines, widows of former presidents of the Philippines, the national census and statistics Office and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of the due process, as unfair discrimination offends the requirement of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Section I of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause .but if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
SEPARATION OF POWERS; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
(G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997) MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.
They brought this suit against the respondents charging them violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The present petition also challenges the validity of RA No.
8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called *sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H.
No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing