Before and After the Hartz Reforms: The Performance of Active Labour Market Policy in Germany *

The Performance of Active Labour Market Policy

in Germany

*

Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluve

Having faced high unemployment ratesfor more than a decade, the German govern-ment implegovern-mented a comprehensive set of labour market reformsduring the period 2003Ð2005. Thispaper describesthe economic and institutional context of the German labour market before and after these so-called Hartz reforms. Focussing on active policy measures, we delineate the rationale for reform and its main principles. As preliminary results of programme evaluationstudies post-reformhave become avail-able just now, we give a first assessment of the effectivenessof key elementsof German active labour market policy before and after the Hartz reforms. The evidence indicates that the re-organisation of public employmentserviceswasmainlysuccessful, with the exception of the outsourcing ofservices. Re-designing training programmes seemsto have improved their effectiveness, while job creationschemescontinue to be detrimen-tal for participants’ employment prospects. Wagesubsidiesandstart-upsubsidies show significantly positive effects. On balance, therefore, the reformseemsto be moving the German labour market in the right direction.

Contents

1 Introduction

2 Economicsituation and labour market institutionsbefore Hartz 3 Core elementsof the Hartz reforms

3.1 Increasing the effectivenessand efficiency ofservicesand measures 3.2 Activation of the unemployed

3.3 Labour market deregulation

4 Labour market policy effectivenessbefore and after Hartz

4.1 Increasing the effectivenessand efficiency of labour marketservicesand policy measures

4.2 Activating the unemployed 4.3 Labour market deregulation 4.4 Macro-level evaluation

4.5 Summary of policy effectivenessbefore and after Hartz 5 Conclusion

References

1 Introduction

In times of high unemployment, the necessity for labour market reformsisdiscussed all over Europe. Many countries have either started or already fin-ished far-reaching reforms. Also in Germany the need for reformshad become apparent over the past decades, when unemployment was rising constantly and public budgets tightened. Finally in 2002, the government took advantage of a scandal involving the Federal Employment Services1_{to overcome the} so-called reform bottleneck (“Reformstau”) and start aseriesof rather radicalÐgiven the prior re-luctance Ð changes of active and passive labour market policies.

The resulting Hartz reforms Ð named after the chairman heading the independent expert commis -sion that worked out the blueprint for the reform package2_{Ðare considered the most far-reaching} re-form endeavour in the history of the German wel-fare state, and consist of four laws, the so-called Hartz IÐIV laws, that were implemented step by step on Jan 1st _{2003 (Hartz I and II), Jan 1}st ₂₀₀₄ (Hartz III) and Jan 1st_{2005 (Hartz IV).While Hartz} IV constitutesa comprehensive modification of the unemployment benefit and social assistance schemes, Hartz IÐIII modernised the organisational structure of the public employmentservices, modi-fied many of the already existing measuresof Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) and introduced aset of new ones. The lawscontain aset ofspecific policy measuresthat merge to a three-part reformstrategy: (a) improving employment services and policy measures, (b) activating the unemployed, and (c) stimulating employment demand by deregulating the labour market.

In thiscontext, it isalso the first time in the history of the German welfarestate that a policy reform is accompanied by a comprehensivescientific evalua-tion. The government explicitly tied the implemen-tation of the Hartz lawsto an evaluation mandate. The Hartz laws IÐIII were evaluated during the years2004 to 2006, and Hartz IV will be evaluated from 2006 onwards. Given thescope of the reform endeavour, the evaluation of Hartz IÐIII was com-missioned by the government asaset of work pack-agesand modules, aiming at an evaluation of both the Hartz reformsin their entirety and each particu-lar element on its own. In practice, the Hartz IÐ III evaluation has therefore involved more than 20

1_{The Federal Employment Services were accused of massive} fraud in the reporting ofsuccessful job placements.

2_{“Commission for Modern Labour Market Services” (}

Kommis-sion für Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt).

economic andsociological research instituteswhich, using methods based on qualitative casestudy ap-proachesaswell asrigorouseconometric analysesof administrative and survey data, face the challenge of disentangling the impacts of specific measures in a setting characterised (a) by the simultaneous alteration of measuresandinstitutional context, and (b) by the fact that many of the measuresaffect ev-ery worker, i. e. no comparison group exists. First re-sultsof these evaluationstudieshave become availa-ble just now.

In thispaper, we describe the economic and ins titu-tional context of the German labour market before and after the reforms. Focussing on active policy measures, we delineate the rationale for reform and itsmain principles. We use the most recent empirical evidence to discussthe effectivenessof key elements of German ALMP before and after the Hartz re-forms. It hasto be noted, however, that at present the evidence regarding policy effectiveness after Hartz is based on rathershort observation periods, and therefore the findingsarestill preliminary at the present time.

The paper isorganised asfollows:section one gives an overview of the German economicsituationsince unification in 1990, briefly characterising the prob-lematic featuresof the eastern and western German labour markets. We also describe the institutional framework before Hartz, focussing on active labour market policiesand the organisationalstructure of public employment services, and discuss the main weaknesses of the institutional setting that moti-vated the reform. Section three delineatescore ele-mentsof the Hartz reformsand the reformstrategy in some detail. Insection four we review both the hitherto existing and the most recent evidence from evaluation research to assessthe effectivenessof ac-tive labour market policy before and after the re-form. Section five concludes.

2 Economic situation and labour

market institutions before Hartz

Since the 1990s, Germany hasproved to be unable to benefit from favourable conditionsin the global economy. From 1991 until 2003 GDP grew by only 18 %, which is half the growth of the United King-dom (35 %) or the Netherlands (34 %) during that period. At the same time, employment even de-creasedslightly (by 0.4 %) and unemployment rates are higher than ever, ranging between 9.6 % in wes t-ern and 18.6 % in eastern Germany in 2005. Certainly the unification in 1990 and its repercus -sionshave contributed to Germany’spoor

perform-ance. Unification suddenly increased the labour force by roughly one third, a largeshare of which was inadequately trained for immediate employ-ment in an open market economy. Despite the need to first retrain the labour force and reshape the for-merly centrally planned economy, however, it was a core political objective to adjust eastern German wages to the comparatively high western German levels as quickly as possible. In contrast to other Central and Eastern European transition countries having competitive wages levels to create sus tain-able growth, the eastern German economy experi-enced rising unemployment and continuing depen-dence on federal subsidies and transfer payments from West to East. In addition to the high fiscal costs of unification, the Maastricht criteria further reduced the government’s scope for expansive growth policies.

Only a small share of overall German unemploy-ment isthought to be attributable to businesscycle factors. Some studies argue that the German NAIRU has increased over the past decades (e. g. Franz 2001), indicating that structural factors play an important role in the German unemployment problem.

Figure 1showsthe trend in employment subject to social security contributions ( sozialversicherungs-pflichtige Beschäftigung) and the trend in employ-ment with low pay for which exemption fromsocial security contributionsapplies(geringfügig entlohnte Beschäftigung). In western Germany, we observe a decrease in the number of employees covered by socialsecuritysince 2002. Almost at thesame time, low-wage employment has steadily increased. In eastern Germany, the decrease in regular employ-ment and the increase in low-wage employment can already be found at the beginning of the observation period in 2000.

In Figure 2 wesee the number of unemployed indi-viduals and the number of participants in training and job creation programmesfor western and eas t-ern Germany during the time period 1991 to 2005. We observe a general increase in the number of un-employed individuals in both parts of the country. Whereas in western Germany the number of pro-gramme participants was relativelystable over this period, decreasing onlyslightly, the figuresfor eas t-ern Germany document the massive use of ALMP measures during the early 1990s and a substantial decrease over recent years.

Labour market institutions

Compulsory unemployment insurance was intro-duced in Germany asearly asin 1927,

complement-ing the then already existing insurances for health, accident and old age. After World War II a generous benefitsystem emerged, financed by contributions and taxes. Active labour market measureswere in-troduced when unemploymentstarted to rise in the 1970s. Both active and passive policy measures are administered by the Federal Employment Services. In earlier years, when unemployment was still low, measureswere designed to prevent rather than com-bat unemployment, adapting the workforce tos truc-tural changesin labour demand. After unification in 1990, active labour market measuresplayed a cen-tral role in alleviating thesocial consequencesof the breakdown of the economy in eastern Germany. In 1992, for instance, the number of people participat-ing in either a job creation or trainparticipat-ing programme exceeded the number of unemployed (Figure 2). Theset-up of active and passive labour market pol-icy in Germany during the 1990scan be character-ised asfollows: from the very beginning, unemploy-ment benefitswere meant to maintain the worker’s socialstatusduring unemployment rather than pro-viding a safety net as a last resort. All payments made to the individual over the entire period of un-employment were linked to hisor her previous earn-ings. Unemployment benefits, which were paid for the first 6 to 32 monthsof unemployment (depend-ing on previous employment duration and age), amounted to 67 % of the last net income (60 % with-out children), with a maximum level of 4250 EUR per month. Unemployment assistance, which was paid after entitlement to unemployment benefit ex-pired and without a time limit, still reached 57 % (53 %) of the last net income.

The unlimited duration of unemployment benefit paymentswasan extraordinary feature of the Ger-man unemployment benefit system, leading to re-placement rates for long-term unemployed which were higher than in any other OECD country (OECD 2004). The replacement ratesofshort-term unemployed, in contrast, wereÐandstill areÐ com-parable to many other OECD countries. Unemploy-ment benefits were financed by unemployment in-surance contributions shared by employersand em-ployees, while unemployment assistance was fi-nanced by taxes. In principle, unemployment assis t-ance was means-tested on a yearly basis. It was possible tosupplement unemployment benefitswith tax-financed social assistance. Generally, every household whose income fell below a certain income threshold qualified forsocial assistance.

The German benefit system combined generous benefit levelswith high benefit reduction ratesthat taxed away most of a benefit recipient’s additional

earned income. Thus, incentives to take up a job were very low, especially for low-skilled workers. Engels (2001) calculates that a typical family with three children receivingsocial assistance in western Germany in the year 2000 received an income that

wasonly 15.3 % below that of a comparable family with asingle earner receiving an average unskilled worker’s wage. In eastern Germany the respective difference wasonly 11.5 %.

Compared with other countries, German active la-bour market policy in the 1990s was characterised by high expenditure levels and long durations of programmes. Training and public job creation meas -ureswere the most important programmesin terms

of expenditure and number of participants. Meas -ures supporting the direct integration into regular employment (e. g. wagesubsidiesandstart-upsubs i-dies) only played a minor role. Generally, jobsearch assistance and monitoring by the public employment

serviceswasgiven rather low priority. Sanctionsfor low engagement in jobsearch activitieswere rarely implemented. For most programmes, the law nar-rowly defined the type of person who was eligible for participation in a programme. Assignment to programmeswasnot based on asystematic individ-ual profiling of each client, but rather on cas ework-ers’ discretion.

3 Core elements of the Hartz reforms

As unemployment continued to increase in the 1990s, thesocialsecuritysystem ran the risk of fi-nancial collapse and the need for a comprehensive reform of the institutional setting of labour market policies became urgent. In both the political and academic debates the benefitsystem wascriticised for creating work disincentivesand increasing long-term unemployment, deteriorating skills and thus worsening the mismatch on the labour market. The public employmentserviceswere accused of operat-ing inefficiently, beoperat-ing customer-unfriendly and fail-ing to push jobseekers sufficiently tosearch for a job. The mix of active measures, focussing on train-ing measures and public job creationschemes with long durations, was criticised for keeping partici-pantsout of the open labour market instead of inte-grating them. Such criticism was based on evalua-tionstudiesof active measuresthat indicatedsevere locking-in effects and zero or even negative pos t-participation treatment effectsof many programmes (e. g. Lechner 2000; Caliendo et al. 2003).

The so-called Hartz reforms, which were subs e-quently implemented during the period 2003Ð2005, coalesce to a tripartite reformstrategy (cf. Table 1). They aimed at (a) improving labour marketservices and policy measures in terms of effectivenessand efficiency, (b) activating the unemployed by

enforc-ing the so-called principle of “rights and duties” (Fördern und Fordern), and (c)stimulating employ-ment demand by deregulating the labour market.3 To this end, the reform modified many of the al-ready existing measuresof active labour market pol-icy and introduced aset of new measures. It funda-mentally changed the general framework in which these measuresoperate and involved greater co-or-dination of institutional arrangements, especially be-tween active and passive policy measures. Deregu-lating measures concentrated on the temporary work sector, while the biggest changes entailed by the reform took place in the realm of job placement servicesand the benefitsystem.

3.1 Increasing the effectiveness and

efficiency of services and measures

The reform aimed to improve the performance of placement services and policy programmes mainly by introducing market mechanismsto the realm of placement services and bystreamlining public em-ployment services. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness in thespecific context of each regional labour mar-ket istargeted to be the key criterion when choosing programme contentsand participants.

First, regarding their organisational structure, the public employmentserviceswere modernised along the lines of New Public Management. The reform established results-based accountability and control-ling of local employment offices. Now, each employ-ment office hasto fulfil quantitative goalswhich are individuallyset for each type of agency, while at the

3_{The Federal Employment Service translates“Fördern und} For-dern” as“Challenge and Promotion”.

same time having a widerscope of discretion on the choice of policy mix. The formerly hierarchically or-ganised employment officesare to be converted into customer-orientated one-stop-centres. The range of servicesprovided hasbeen extended, ranging from advising and counselling services to social services and the administration of benefit payments. The caseload of caseworkers is targeted to be reduced and every jobseeker isassigned to a particular cas e-worker.

A second aspect regards quasi markets: the intro-duction of market forcesisexpected to improve the quality ofservicesand to break up the informal and often inefficient insider relationshipsbetween public employment management and private providers. The reform introduced, for instance, voucher sys -temsfor placementservices(Vermittlungsgutschein) and training measures(Bildungsgutschein). Each in-dividual whom the public employment service has been unable to place aftersix weeks of unemploy-ment can choose an alternative private placement service. The private service receives a lump sum payment after having placed the jobseekersuccess -fully. Providers of training measures, too, can be chosen freely by the client and paid for with a voucher.

The public employment service can choose to out-source services fully or partly, most importantly placement services. Public tendering became com-pulsory for external contracts. One example is place-ment via temporary work: since 2003, every local employment officesetsup a “Staff Service Agency” (Personal Service Agentur(PSA)) that actsasa tem-porary work agency for the unemployed. To this end, the local employment office may either con-tract out to a private temporary work agency or, if no provider isavailable, may run a PSA itself. The local employment office may delegate hard-to-place clients to the PSA, which in return receives a monthly lumpsum fee for employing these workers. The PSA may hire out the worker temporarily to other firmsor provide a permanent placement. The PSA receivesa bonusfor each placement into em-ployment lasting at least three months and another bonusif the placed person is still employed aftersix months. During periods of inactivity, the PSA should provide training measures to the worker. Therefore, PSAsencompassaspectsof both training measuresand placementservices.

Third, the reform aimsat improving thetargetingof active measuresand theallocation of measures and resources.To thisend, thestatutory regulation of eli-gibility conditions is reduced, now leaving a wider scope for individually matching clientsto measures.

The assignment of clientsto measuresisnow based on a profiling process, which ishighlystandardised. The caseworker will assess the client’s abilities, problemsand potential labour market chancesin an interview and then assign the client to one of four types: “Market clients” (Marktkunden) are cons id-ered to have the highest chancesof finding employ-ment, “clientsfor counselling and activation” ( Bera-tungskunden aktivieren) range second and mainly need to be activated in their jobsearch. “Clientsfor counselling and support” (Beratungskunden för-dern) need more attention and are likely to be as -signed to a programme, while “clientsin need ofs u-pervision” (Betreuungskunden) need special atten-tionsince they face the lowest chancesof re-employ-ment. Each type islinked to an action programme, defining the available measuresfor that type of job seeker. Active labour market policy measures are available mainly for the types II “counselling and activating” and III “counselling and support”. The type I “market client” is expected to re-integrate without special assistance, while the fourth type, “supervision”, is deemed unlikely to benefit from any measure and excluded from participation. Many active policy measures were re-designed in termsof their target population. For example,since the reform,selection into training measures deliber-ately usescreamskimming in order to choose those clientswho will benefit most from training. Only cli-entswho are conjectured to have a 70 % probability of finding a job after the measure will be admitted. Accordingly, training providers have to produce a 70 %successrate of respective participantsin order to be commissioned by the employment agency. In contrast, job creation measures have been re-de-signed to target only the very hard-to-place unem-ployed. This means that public employment will constitute market replacement and thereby preserve employability for those who are not expected to find a way back into regular employment in the near fu-ture. Incentivesfor unemployed workersto take up public employment rather than regular employment were reduced as participants no longer regain eli-gibility for unemployment benefitsafter completing the measure. The restrictive targeting of training and job creationschemesaswell asthe reduction of programme durationsinduced a further reduction of participantsin andspending on these measures. On average, participation in training will take place at an earlierstage in the unemploymentspell.

Last but not least, the need for rigorous scientific evaluation of programme effectiveness, in order to be able to optimise existing programmes continuously on the basis of conclusive empirical evidence, was recognized by policy makers, and a corresponding

evaluation mandate was implemented with the Hartz reforms. Hence, the Hartz reformsconstitute the first major reform in the history of the German welfarestate that is accompanied by a comprehen-sive scientific evaluation on behalf of the govern-ment. The process started with two competing pilot studiesdeveloping a conceptual framework for the evaluation (Fertig et al. 2004; Hagen and Spermann 2004) and was subsequently put out to tender. Cur-rently more than 20 economic and sociological re-search instituteswith about 100 researchersare in-volved in the evaluation (cf. Bundesregierung 2006 for detailsof theset-up).

3.2 Activation of the unemployed

The principle of “rightsand duties” isthe core ele-ment of the Hartz reforms. The activationstrategy isimplemented in virtually every element of the la-bour market policy framework. Thenew policy mix is more strongly orientated towards measures for jobseekerswho activelyseek to improve theirs itua-tion in aself-responsible way. There ismore empha-sison measuresthat promote the direct integration into the labour market asopposed to training meas -uresand public job creationschemesthat keep par-ticipants out of the market for the duration of the programme. The active measuresthat best represent the new activation strategy are the start-up subs i-dies. These are a relatively new component of Ger-man active labour market policy. Though aso-called “bridging allowance” (Überbrückungsgeld) was in-troduced as early as 1986, the number of partici-pantshasincreased only recently. The benefit ispaid for 6 monthsand isequal to the unemployment ben-efit that the recipient had previously received or could have received plus a flat-rate social security contribution. In order to receive the subsidy, the chamber of commerce hasto approve the business plan. The reform introduced an alternativesubsidy, theso-called “Me, Inc.” (Ich-AG)subsidy, which is independent of prior socialsecurity contributions.4 It is paid for a maximum period of three years as long as the claimant’s income does not exceed 25,000 EUR per year. It amounts to 600 EUR per month in the first year, 360 EUR per month in the second and 240 EUR per month in the third year. Furthermore, integration into paid employment may be supported by several forms of wage subsidies which are paid to employerswhen hiring a certain type of hard-to-place worker. The idea isto

compen-4_{The Economist (Feb 2006) translatesthesubsidy as} “Me-com-pany”.

sate the firm for the presumably lower productivity of thistype of worker. The Hartz reforms simplified the eligibility conditionsofso-called integrations ub-sidiesin order to facilitate accessto wagesubsidies, giving priority to older and disabled workers. Gen-erally, the maximum duration variesbetween 6 and 24 months, depending on the target group and, asa rule, the maximum rate of subsidy should not ex-ceed 50 % of the calculable remuneration. In order to avoid substitution effects and free riding, pay-mentsare not available if the employer has appar-ently dismissed a worker in order to receive thes ub-sidy or if he had already employed the respective worker within the previousfour years. Furthermore, the Hartz reform introduced social security subs i-diesfor employerswho recruit an older worker. A firm which hiresa worker aged 55 or older isexempt from paying contributionsto the unemployments e-curitysystem for this worker. However, the contri-bution amountsto only 3.25 % of the grosswage. Finally, various reform elements intend to make work pay, aiming at increasing work incentivesfor the unemployed. The reform did not reduce the very high marginal taxeson people who move from un-employment to un-employment. Instead, new formsof wage subsidies were introduced and existing ones were modified or extended. The start-up subsidies mentioned above are one example. Furthermore, the reform introduced incentives for workers aged 50 and older to take up employment even if it pays lessthan previousemployment. In these cases, older workers may receive a wage subsidy, the so-called wage protection, when they accept a job offer that payslessthan their previousjob. Thiswagesubsidy amountsto 50 % of the difference between the pre-vious wage and the current wage. It ispaid for the same duration as the unemployment benefit would have been paid if the person had remained unem-ployed.

Before the reform, incomesof up to 325 Eurosper month were exempt from social security contribu-tions. The reform raised thisthreshold to 400 Euros, andsubstantiallysimplified the administrative pro-ceduresfor these nowso-called “minijobs”. In addi-tion, the reform introduced “midijobs”, a type of employment withreduced socialsecurity contribu-tions for the income range of 400,01 to 800 Euros per month. The amount ofsocialsecurity contribu-tions depends on the gross income and increases from zero contributionsat 400 Eurosto full contri-butions at 800 Euros. Both minijobs and midijobs are generally applicable, i. e. they are not confined to the unemployed.

The reform also introducedsanction elements, i. e. additional waysto effectively monitor the jobs

eek-er’sjobsearch activities and personal efforts to re-integrate into the labour market. The job seeker is obliged to accept any offer of suitable work. The definition ofsuitable work was broadened, e. g. in-cluding the obligation to move to a different area under certain circumstances. Benefit receipt is strictly conditional on the availability for work and the availability for programme participation. The in-dividual action plan that results from the profiling processis set out in a binding integration agreement (Eingliederungsvereinbarung). This written agree-mentstatesboth theservicesthat will be provided to the jobseeker aswell asthe jobseeker’sobligation regarding jobsearch activitiesand programme par-ticipation, where required. An unemployed individ-ual will be threatened withsanctionsin the form of temporary benefit reductions if he orshe deviates from the integration agreement or doesnot cooper-ate appropricooper-ately. A person’s availability can addi-tionally be tested by training or by workfare meas -ures in the public sector (the so-called 1-EURO-Jobs) or assignment to PSAs.

Although in this paper we focus on active labour market policy (Hartz IÐIII), for thesake of com-pletenesswe will also briefly comment on thes trat-egy for reforming the benefit system (Hartz IV). Whereasbefore the reform previous socialsecurity contributionswere the key criterion for benefit ac-cess, now accessto benefitsand participation in ac-tive labour market policy programmes is strictly conditional on a person’sability to work. Thisis de-fined asbeing able to work at least 15 hoursa week. Those capable of working are assigned to the em-ployment agenciesand will besubject to activation policieson the basisof the principle of “rightsand duties”. An unemployed person receives so-called benefit type I (Arbeitslosengeld I,orALG I) for the first 6 to 12 months of unemployment. Thereafter, the person receivesa flat-rate means-tested benefit type II (Arbeitslosengeld II,orALG II). Individuals who have never paid social security contributions but who are deemed capable of working will receive benefit type II right from the beginning. Benefit type II isnot earnings-based, asthe unemployment assistance was in the previous system, and is less generousthansocial assistance. Only those who are not capable of working due tosickness, disability or care responsibilities receive means-testedsocial as -sistance from the local authorities and are exempt from “duties”. Whereas benefit type I is adminis -tered by the local employment office, benefit type II isadministered at municipal level, either by a co-operation of the employment office and the munici-pality (Arbeitsgemeinschaft, ARGE) or by the mu-nicipality alone (Optierende Kommune).

3.3 Labour market deregulation

Deregulation of labour market institutions took place regarding temporary work, dismissal protec-tion and the regulaprotec-tion of fixed-term contracts. The wage setting process, on the other hand, remains highly centralised.

Regardingtemporary work regulations, the reform in-tended to facilitate the expansion of the already boomingsector of temporary worksignificantly. Tem-porary work agencieswere legalised in 1967 and for-mally regulated in 1972. Since then, temporary work had been regulated rather restrictively for many years, and had been forbidden completely in the con-struction industry. Since the late 1990s, the law has gradually been liberalised. The Hartz reform finally abolished restrictionsonsynchronisation, re-ass ign-ment, fixed-term contractsand the maximum dura-tion of temporary employment. A new rule was intro-duced requiring that a temporary work agency must either guarantee equal pay and equal treatment of temporary workersand regular workersor join a col-lective bargaining agreement between trade unions and employers. Temporary work isnow also allowed in the construction industry, provided that a collective bargaining agreement applies. So far, however, no such contract hasbeen agreed upon. Asalready men-tioned, the law introduced publiclysponsored Staff Service Agenciesasa new form of placement-orien-tated temporary work for hard-to-place individuals. With respect todismissal regulationsandfixed-term contract regulations, the reform did not deregulate standard employment relationsin a general way. In-stead, itsimplified and widened the number of cases for which exemptionsfrom the generally rather re-strictive regulationsapply. Before the reform, for in-stance, exemptions from restrictions on fixed-term contractsapplied for employeesaged 58 and over. For these employees, fixed-term contracts could be re-newed repeatedly without justification. The reform reduced the minimum age for which this regulation appliesto 52 years.5_{Furthermore, exemptionsfrom} dismissal protection, which before the reform were conceded tosmall firmswith 5 employeesor less, will now apply to firmswith up to 10 employees.

4 Labour market policy effectiveness

before and after Hartz

For a long time the evaluation of German ALMP suffered from a lack ofsuitable data. Only very

re-5_{The reduction of the age threshold for exemptionsregarding} fixed-term contractshasmeanwhile been declared null and void by a ruling of the EU Court of Justice.

cently has good quality data become relatively widely available to researchers. Early studies on ALMP effectiveness were usually based on the GSOEP (German SocioEconomic Panel) or, for eastern Germany, the Labour Market Monitor East. The main drawback of these data is that, due to rather small overallsample sizes and panel mortal-ity, they contain only few observations on partici-pantsof active labour market policy measures. Re-searchers often had to group together heteroge-neousmeasuresandsome programmescould not be evaluated at all because participation wasnot docu-mented in the data.

It wasonly at the end of the 1990sthat the govern-ment started to acknowledge the need for a thor-ough evaluation of active labour market policies, and, in the following years, considerable effort was made to derive large datasets from administrative data at local employment office level (Bender et al. 2005). These data provide a large number of obs er-vations and cover rather long time periods. They therefore make it possible to detect short-term as well aslong-term effectsand provide enough infor-mation to better distinguish different typesof treat-ment and to analyse the optimal timing of events. These merged administrative data have recently been made available to researchersandseem to be able to provide robust results. Most of the evalua-tion studiesof the Hartz reforms make use of this type of data.

Early evaluation studies mainly concentrated on training and job creationschemes, which for a long time were the most important measuresin termsof expenditure and number of participants(recall Fig-ure 2). Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2000) provide a survey on early evaluation studies in Germany, most of which are based on the above-mentioned rather poor data. Caliendo and Steiner (2005), who update that review, and Wunsch (2005), who dis -cussesthe development of the German labour mar-ketsince unification, include recentpre-Hartzs tud-ies based on the new and better data. The post-Hartz studies we discuss in the following sections are first resultsof the evaluationsof the Hartz laws IÐIII. The evaluation of Hartz IV, which basically comprisesthe reform of the benefitsystem and the introduction of benefit type II combining unemploy-ment andsocial assistance, will not begin until the autumn of 2006.

4.1 Increasing the effectiveness and

efficiency of labour market services

and policy measures

Major policy changes aiming at improving the ef-fectivenessand efficiency of existing measurestook

place in the realm of placement services, training and job creationschemes. In the following, we will discuss findings from evaluation studies of these measuresbefore and after the reform. Other active policy measuresthat were re-designed under the re-form are discussed in the nextsections.

4.1.1 Placement services

There are only two studies on the effectivenessof placement services before the reform. The DEA-based benchmarking study by Mosley et al. (2003) comparesthe relative efficiency in termsof activity (number of placementsand programme entrantsin relation to staff inputs) and effectiveness (trans i-tionsinto regular employment) of western German local employment offices. The analysis is s upple-mented with casestudiesof eight employment offi-ces. The results indicatestrong differencesin rela-tive efficiency. The authorsfind that exogenousand endogenous factors each explain roughly 50 % of variation in efficiency. Theysuggest that the average efficiency of labour market offices could be in-creased by 19 %. Hujer et al. (2005)study the effects of two pilot measuresof jobsearch assistance ( Stel-lenmarktoffensive) in 2001Ð2002 in the western Ger-man federalstate of Hesse. The regional employ-ment office published a magazine for employers containing employment-wanted advertisements among other things. Thestudy findspositive effects of thismeasure, especially for women. Furthermore, the employment offices offered courses on job search activitiesthat provide advice on writing ap-plication letters, CVs, participating in job interviews etc. Although the effectsvary acrossgroups, in gen-eral these measuresdo not produce positive results. The Hartz reform converted the former employ-ment offices into customer-orientated service cen-tres (Kundenzentrum). These are assessed in the study by WZB and infas(2005) using a conditional difference-in-differences-analysiswhich exploitsthe fact that the customer service centres were intro-duced at different points in time. Ten employment service offices that have already been transformed into customerservice centresare matched with ten officesthat have not. Data is used from the inflow into unemployment of the respective offices. The re-sults indicate positive effects of customer service centreson the integration into regular employment, though the effectsare notsignificant. Thismight be due to the fact that the number of officesused in the analysis is small and the observation period at the present time isa maximum of nine months. The effectsare more positive in eastern Germany, where labour market conditions are worse, and seem to work better for men than for women.

Furthermore, the report studies the outsourcing of placement services by comparing clients who have made use of external placementserviceswith clients who have remained under the public employment service. External placementservicescan be utilised either by the client himself, using a placement voucher (Vermittlungsgutschein), or by the public employmentservice who can assign clientsto exter-nal providers (Beauftragung Dritter). Selection is controlled for by performing a combination of exact matching with propensityscore matching. The ana-lysisisbased on administrative data which is s upple-mented by survey data from telephone interviews for a sub-sample. For placement vouchers, the re-sults fail to find any significant effect on the prospects of entering employment. It appears that many clientswho had received placement vouchers did not actually use them. In eastern Germany, those who found a job using a placement voucher remained in employment for asignificantlyshorter period than those who did not use placement vouch-ers. The assignment of clientsto private placement providers by the public employment service does not show significant effects either. Finally, the as -signment to PSAsproduces significant locking-in ef-fectsthat delay the integration of workersinto regu-lar, non-PSA employment.

4.1.2 Training measures

Training measures have been evaluated by numer-ous studies. Since studies mostly focus on either eastern or western Germany, we present resultsfor each region separately. Early evaluationstudies on training ineastern Germanyinclude Lechner (1998, 1999), Hujer and Wellner (2000) and Lechner (2000), which are based on the GSOEP. Studies based on the Labour Market Monitor East include Hübler (1997) and Fitzenberger and Prey (1998). Bergemann et al. (2000) use the Labour Market Monitor East of the federalstate of Saxony-Anhalt, as do Bergemann et al. (2004). Reinowski et al. (2003, 2004) use the Saxony microcensus. Recent studies based on merged administrative data are Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss(2004), Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) and Lechner et al. (2005). Many of the earlystudieseither find positive effects or are unable to find anysignificant effectsof train-ing programmesineastern Germany. One exception is Hübler (1997), who finds negative effects for women. This result contrasts with the finding ob-tained by Bergemann et al. (2000) of significantly positive effects of second treatments for women only. Bergemann et al. (2004) find positive effectsin the early 1990sand negative effectsin later years. In general, studies published from 2000 onwards tend

to be more pessimistic. Besides Bergemann et al. (2004), also Lechner (2000) and Reinowski et al. (2003) find negative effectsof training participation. By and large, the resultsare mixed and it israther unclear what lesson can be drawn from thesestudies on the programmes’ effectiveness.

Recentstudiesbased on better administrative data seem to derive more consistent results. Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss(2004) use data from the period 1999Ð2002 and Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) cover the period 1993Ð1997. The most comprehen-sivestudy isthe one by Lechner et al. (2005), who use data covering the period of 1993 to 2002. Due to the richnessof the data, varioustypesof training can be distinguished. Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) concentrate on the “provision ofspecific pro-fessional skills” which is a special type of further vocational training programmes. Lechner et al. (2005) distinguish between short training (up to 6 months), long training (over 6 months), retraining, and training in practice firms.

All of thestudiesbased on the new data finds ignifi-cant evidence of locking-in effects for virtually all typesof training, i. e. the labour market performance isworse for participantscompared with non-partici-pants during and shortly after participation. The central question iswhether there are positive effects in the medium and long run that are big enough to compensate for these negativeshort-run effects. The answer seems to depend on the outcome variable. For unemployment duration, Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss(2004) do not findsignificant long-term effects ofshort and medium training programmesbut find negative effects of long programmes, which means they increase unemployment duration (here, a par-ticipating person is considered unemployed). This contrasts with the other studies, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) and Lechner et al. (2005), who take the employment rate as the outcome measure and find positive effects in the long run for pro-grammes that provide specific professional skills (Fitzenberger and Speckesser 2005) as well as for short training and retraining programmes(Lechner et al. 2005). Lechner et al. (2005) also use monthly earningsasan outcome variable and again find pos i-tive effectsin the long run.

Early studies on training in western Germany in-clude Pannenberg (1995), Hujer et al. (1998) and Hujer and Wellner (2000). Thesestudiesuse models of unemployment duration and are based on GSOEP data covering thesecond half of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Again, the results are mixed: Pannenberg (1995) and Hujer et al. (1998) do not find significant positive effects, while Hujer and

Wellner (2000) do find positive effects, but fors hort-term programmes only. More recent studies based on administrative data are Klose and Bender (2000), Lechner et al. (2004) and Fitzenberger and Speck-esser (2005). Klose and Bender (2000) use a prelimi-nary version of the data. Fitzenberger and Speck-esser (2005) use the final data covering the period 1993Ð1997, while Lechner et al. (2004) base their study on data covering the larger period of 1993 to 2002.

Klose and Bender (2000) do not find any positive effects, which might be due to the preliminary char-acter of their data. In contrast, Lechner et al. (2004) aswell asFitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) come to quite optimistic results. Fitzenberger and Speck-esser (2005) find negative locking-in effects on the employment rate in the short run andsignificantly positive effects in the long run for training pro-grammes providingspecific professional skills. The findingsof Lechner et al. (2004)suggest thatshort and long training have positive effects on employ-ment rates in the short run. In the long run short training and retraining show positive results. Fur-thermore, they find significantly positive effectson monthly earningsforshort and long training. Asdelineated insection 3, the reform changed the usage andset up of training in variousaspects. First, positive effects might be expected from the reduc-tion of participantsand deliberate creamskimming aspart of theselection process. Second, the duration of programmeshasbeen reduced and participation takes place, on average, at an earlier stage in the unemployment spell. Third, course quality is ex-pected to improve due to increased competition be-tween providersand the priority of efficiency crite-ria.

The study evaluating training measures post-Hartz was conducted by IZA, DIW and infas(2005) and usesadministrative data andsurvey data to compare the effect of training measuresbefore the reform in the period 2000 to 2003 with effectsafter the reform in the period 2003 to 2005. The results confirm the previous results of severe locking-in effects. They suggest that the positive resultsin the medium and long run are based on the positive employment ef-fect on people who otherwise would have drifted into non-participation. Furthermore, effectsof pre-reform measures seem to be lesspositive when tak-ing employmentstability into account. Asexpected, the resultsindicate that the reformsucceeded ins ig-nificantly reducing locking-in effects, though evi-dence on long-term effectsof the modified training measures are not yet available at the present time. The cost-effectiveness of measures before the

re-form was negative. Byshortening course durations and better targeting, the reform wasable to reduce the gap between costsand benefits, though the bal-ance is still negative.

4.1.3 Job creation schemes

For a long time, job creation schemes could be evaluated only for eastern Germany because data sourcesthat provide information on participation in job creationschemes were limited to eastern Ger-many only. These are the Labour Market Monitor East which is used by Hübler (1997), the Labour Market Monitor of the federalstate of Saxony-An-halt, which isused by Bergemann et al. (2000), Eich-ler and Lechner (2002) and Bergemann (2005), and the Saxony microcensus used by Reinowski et al. (2003).

None of thestudiesfindspositive effectson the em-ployment rate, apart from Eichler and Lechner (2002) who find positive employment effects, al-though for men only. Reinowski et al. (2003) use the hazard rate of transition from unemployment to employment asa dependent variable, where unem-ployment spells include periods of participation. They do not find positive effectsof programme par-ticipation. Bergemann (2005) finds that for women participationsignificantly increases the re-employ-ment probability. Furthermore, she reports s ignifi-cantly positive effectson men’sand women’s prob-ability of remaining employed. Caliendo et al. (2003) use the recently derived administrative data for the years 2000Ð2002, which provides informa-tion on programme effectsin western Germany for the first time. Their resultsare pessimistic, revealing negative mean employment effects. Positive employ-ment effectsare limited to a fewsocio-demographic groups, namely women over 50, the long-term un-employed and hard-to-place women in western Ger-many as well as female long-term unemployed in eastern Germany. However, since the observation period israthershort, the negative effectsmight rep-resent locking-in effects similar to those found for training programmes.

The evaluationstudy by SÖSTRA, Compass, IMU, PIW (2005) provides new evidence for the period 2000Ð2004. At the present time, the resultson job creation schemes after Hartz are still preliminary. The authorsuse administrative data of people who entered job creation measuresin April of the years 2000 to 2004. Control groupsare constructed using matching methods. The programme effect on the probability of leaving unemployment isassessed by comparing thesurvival functionsof treated and non-treated groups, where unemploymentspellsinclude

the time spent in unemployment before participa-tionstarted. Thestudy confirmsthe generally nega-tive effectsof participation in job creation measures for time periodsbefore Hartz, though effects seem to be positive in the long run in western Germany. The results suggest that the detrimental effects of job creation measuresregarding unemployment du-ration are entirely caused by the locking-in of parti-cipants, while stigma effectsdo not seem to play a role. Regarding the effectsof the Hartz reforms, the study findsnegative treatment effectsfor the pos t-reform period, too, although the magnitude of the effects seems to have decreased. Since 2004 it has been a statutory objective of job creationschemes to generate or preserve the “employability” of par-ticipants, rather than providing actual employment only.

4.2 Activating the unemployed

The Hartz reform shifts priority towards measures that require active behaviour of the unemployed and promote their direct integration into regular employment (cf.section 3.2). To thisend, the reform re-designed integration subsidies, introduced new formsof wagesubsidies,start-upsubsidiesand jobs with reducedsocialsecurity contributions. In the fol-lowingsection we review evaluationstudiesofsuch measuresbefore the reform, if applicable, ands ub-sequently focuson the novel evidence post-reform.

4.2.1 Wage subsidies to employers

The challenge of controlling adequately forselfs e-lection is especially difficult in the context of inte-gration subsidies. Here, selection into treatment does not only depend on the characteristics of the participant, but also on characteristicsof the poten-tial employer who will receive thesubsidy. The case worker, moreover, hasa widescope of discretion for determining whether the characteristicsof employer and employee jointlysatisfy the criteria required for thesubsidy. There are only twostudieson the effects of integration subsidies (Eingliederungszuschüsse) before Hartz. Jaenichen (2002) collectsadminis tra-tive data and survey data for a cohort of unem-ployed workersthatstartedsubsidised employment between January and April 1999 and a control group fromselected Federal Employment Service districts throughout Germany. She findsthat participating in integration subsidy programmes significantly redu-ces the probability of a worker being registered as unemployed. However, thismight be partly due to the fact that, upon entering the programme, partici-pants are no longer counted as unemployed and

many participantsarestill in the programme at the end of the observation period. In the long run, when the subsidy has usually expired, the effect is still positive, although significantly so only in eastern Germany. Hujer, Caliendo and Radi (2004) use firm data to examine whether employing subsidized workers affects the employment development of firms. Based on the IAB establishment panel data covering the years1995Ð1999 they cannot find any significant effects.

The Hartz reform provided the opportunity to cir-cumvent theselection problemsthat were outlined above, by changing the eligibility conditionsfor inte-grationsubsidies. Thestudy by ZEW, IAB and IAT (2005) usesadministrative data of the years2000 to 2003 and exploits the fact thatsince the beginning of 2002 older unemployed workers no longer need to satisfy the condition of being long-term unem-ployed in order to be eligible for integrationsubs i-dies. The effect of wage subsidies on the employ-ment prospectsof older workersisassessed using a difference-in-differencesestimator. The results indi-cate that integrationsubsidiesincrease the probabil-ity of being employed 6 months after entering un-employment by 2 percentage points. These effects seem tostem fromsignificant positive effectsin eas t-ern Germany only, while in western Germany the effectsare insignificant. Within the target group the number of windfall beneficiaries seems to be low. The longer-term effects of integrationsubsidies on the probability of being employed after thesubsidy ends is assessed using propensity score matching. The results suggest that, depending on the type, length and target group of thesubsidy, this probabil-ity is20 to 50 percentage pointshigher for the treat-ment group than for the comparison group. How-ever, there aresome indicationsof windfall gains.

4.2.2 Start-up subsidies

Only little empirical evidence existson the effective-ness of the “bridging allowance” start-up subsidy (Überbrückungsgeld) for the unemployed. Thestudy by Pfeiffer and Reize (2000) comparesfirmsurvival and employment growth ofstart-upsby unemployed personsreceiving the bridging allowance and other, regularstart-ups, based on firm data from 15 regions in eastern and western Germany. The results indi-cate that thesurvival rate and employment effectsof subsidisedstart-upsdo not differ from unsubsidised start-ups. The Hartz evaluationstudy by IAB, DIW, Sinus, GfA, and infas(2005) also providesresultson the effectivenessof the bridging allowance before the reform. The analysisisbased on administrative data of cohorts entering unemployment in 2000 which are observed until 2002. The effectivenessof

start-upsubsidies isassessed using matching meth-ods. The authors suspect, however, thatsomes elec-tion biasmight remain due to unobservable charac-teristics of unemployed people who decide tostart up a business. The results show that 6 monthsafter the bridging allowance expires participants have a lower probability of being unemployed. The effect is significant at a high level, especially for women. For the period after the reform, the data is s upple-mented bysurvey data for the treatment and control groups. The study confirms the positive results of the bridging allowance after the reform.

For thesecond, new type ofstart-upsubsidy, thes o-called “Me, Inc.” (Ich-AG) subsidy, most partici-pants are still receiving the subsidy at the end of the observation period. Information on effectsafter eligibility expires is therefore not available yet. However, thesubsidy, which decreasesgradually, is generally very low at the end of the observation pe-riod. Therefore, thesignificantly positive effectsthat can be observed at thatstage might be expected to persist further aswell. At thesame time thestudy reportsindicationsof windfall gainsasasubstantial number of start-up subsidy recipients report that they would havestarted a businesseven without the subsidy. These figures amount to around 25Ð60 % for bridging allowance recipients, and to 60Ð70 % of individualsin the “Me, Inc.”scheme. Even for these businesses, however, thesubsidy mightstill have ex-erted a positive effect during the first months in business, rather than on businesscreationper se.

4.2.3 Wage protection for older workers

Wage protection (Entgeltsicherung) is a wage s ub-sidy for workersaged 50 and older who take up em-ployment in a job that payslessthan their previous job. The effect of the subsidy on the employment prospectsof older workersis studied by ZEW, IAB and IAT (2005). The analysisemploysa difference-in-differences estimator using administrative data from the years 2002 and 2003, where workersaged 50 or 51 are the treatment group and workersaged 48 or 49 are the control group. The resultsindicate a positive though insignificant effect of thesubsidy on employment probabilities. The authors suggest that the insignificance might be due to low take-up of wage protection.

4.2.4 Employment with reduced social security contributions (minjob/midijob)

Variousreform elements, including the introduction of minijobsand midijobs, are evaluated in termsof their impact on the general structure of employ-ment. Thesestudiesare part of the report by RWI

et al. (2005). The introduction of jobswith reduced social security contributions for the income range between 400 and 800 EUR (midijobs), and the re-form of marginal employment waivingsocial s ecu-rity contributions for incomes below 400 EUR (minijobs) is expected to increase the number of people working in these earnings segments. Mini-jobs and midijobs constitute a “universal treat-ment”, i. e. everybody in the labour market is af-fected, and no comparison group without treatment exists. Its effects are examined by first estimating the individual probability of each worker being em-ployed in the respective earnings segment before the reform, using a fixed-effects linear probability model. Then, assuming that structural parameters would have remained identical without the reform, the counterfactual probability of employment in thesesegmentsisestimated on the basisof pos t-re-form data utilising the estimated pre-reform param-eters. The reform effect isthen given by the differ-ence between the estimated post-reform probabili-ties using pre-reform coefficients and the actual post-reform probabilities.

The results show that the introduction of midijobs caused asignificant increase of about 125,000 in the number of employees in this income range, while the minijob reform caused a huge expansion of em-ployment in this earnings segment (+1.8 million minijobsdue to the reform). However, thisincrease includesapproximately 250,000 personsemployed in the income range of 326 to 400 Euros prior to the reform, who by definition became “minijobbers”. Also included are around 850,000 personswho hold their minijob in addition to regular employment, a statusnot previously captured in the data.

Moreover, the incidence of intra-enterprise dis -placement of regular jobscannot be ruled out, and employees who benefit from the regulations were rarely previously unemployed, inspite of hopesas -sociated with thispolicy that especially unemployed individualswould increasingly take on minijobsand midijobs. Thismight be due to the fact that the mar-ginal tax on people who move from unemployment to employment is still very high.

4.3 Labour market deregulation

Asisthe case for the evaluation of the minijobsand midijobs reforms, deregulation policies regarding temporary work and fixed-term contractsare evalu-ated with respect to the general employments truc-ture. The exemption of small firms from dismissal protection regulations, however, wasnot subjected to an evaluation.

4.3.1 Deregulation of temporary work

The reform of temporary work regulationsis evalu-ated in the report by RWI et al. (2005) applying the same methodology for universal treatments as for the minijob/midijob evaluation outlined above. The results indicate that the reform significantly in-creased the number of employeesin the temporary worksector in the two quartersafter the reform. No data isavailable yet for longer periods.

4.3.2 Fixed-term contracts for older workers

The effect of older workers being exempt from re-strictions on fixed-term contracts(erleichterte Befris-tung älterer Arbeitnehmer/innen) isassessed by RWI et al. (2005) using a difference-in-differenceses tima-tor. Workers just above the minimum age for ex-emption (52 to 53 years old) constitute the treat-ment group, while workersjust below thisage (50Ð 51 yearsold) are the control group. The exemption of workers over 52 years of age from restrictions on fixed-term contracts isexpected to increase the number of older workers holding fixed-term con-tracts. The analysis does not reveal any significant treatment effects. Thismight be due, however, to the short observation period, since currently data are available for only three monthsafter the exemption wasintroduced.

4.4 Macro-level evaluation

In the evidence presented above, we have concen-trated on micro-econometric studies dealing with single instruments of ALMP and their isolated ef-fects. These kindsof studies have their virtues, but the evidence they provide isalso limited. They are unable to uncover substitution and displacement processesand other effectsthat affect labour market performance at aggregate level. This could be the case in regionslike eastern Germany, where labour market programmes are implemented on a very largescale. A considerable number ofstudiestry to graspsuch indirect effectsin Germany, focusing on the macroeconomic impact of active labour market policies. Recentstudiesinclude Schmid et al. (2001), Fertig et al. (2006), Hagen (2003), Blien et al. (2003), Vollkommer (2004) and Hujer et al. (2005). All of thesestudiesuse administrative data from re-gional employment offices. Most studies focus on some indicators of matching efficiency. Exceptions are Pannenberg and Schwarze (1996), who examine wage effects, and Blien et al. (2003), who use re-gional employment growth asa dependent variable. Thestudy by Pannenberg and Schwarze (1996) indi-cates asmall negative impact of training measures

on monthly wagesin eastern Germany. Blien et al. (2003) provide evidence of positive effectsof train-ing and job creation programmes on employment growth in eastern Germany. Thereseemsto be evi-dence of displacement effects by job creation schemes, as Hagen (2003)suggests. Further results regarding the effect on matching efficiency and un-employment ratesare very mixed and rather incon-clusive.

The report by RWI et al. (2005) assessesthe macro-economic effectsof ALMP after the Hartz reforms using administrative data of labour market out-comes and the respective “policy mix” at regional level. Regionsare constructed aslocal labour mar-ketson the basisof commuter flowsin order to con-trol forspill-over effectsof regional policies. The re-sults suggest thatspending a larger amount ons tart-up subsidies significantly increases the number of net exitsfrom unemployment. The introduction of a new form of start-up subsidy by the Hartz reform reduced itsmagnitude, but the effect is still positive. In contrast,spending on job creation measureshas asignificantly negative effect on net exitsfrom un-employment in eastern Germany and no effect in western Germany. Also integration subsidies have no effectson net exits. Generally, the entire reform, regardlessof thespecific policy mix,seemsto have had positive effectson the net exit rate of thes hort-term unemployed, while no effectscould be found for the long-term unemployed. The positive results are mainly driven by positive effectson men.

4.5 Summary of policy effectiveness

before and after Hartz

Table 2 presentsan overview of the effectivenessof variouspolicy measuresbefore and after Hartz. The table follows the previous structure of section 4 (also used in section 3) in distinguishing between reform elementsthat aim at a) increasing the effec-tivenessand efficiency of labour marketservicesand policy measures, b) activating the unemployed, and c) deregulating the labour market. Thesecond col-umnsummarisesthe estimated effectsof the res pec-tive policy arising from the availableset of evalua-tionstudiesconducted before Hartz. Obviously, for several policies,such asthe newly introduced place-ment vouchers,such an assessment isnot applicable. The third column summarises the results obtained for each measure in the comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the Hartz reforms (cf. also Bundesregierung 2006 and Kaltenborn et al. 2006). Column 4 is then intended to assess the “before-after difference”, which Ð with explicit caution Ð

could be interpreted as a “reform effect” of the measure. The caution results from the fact that, whereas the before-after difference may indeed be caused by the redesign of the measure, it isalso con-ceivable that the overall change in the institutional

framework of the labour and placement markets is responsible for differentially effective policies pre-Hartzandpost-Hartz. Also,some evaluationstudies before Hartz are quite distinct in theirspecific focus from those conducted after HartzÐe. g. thestudies

concerning general placementservicesÐand hence are not directly comparable. Another caveat when interpreting the results is the fact that the pos t-re-form observation period is short-term only.

The tablesummarizesthe resultsdiscussed in more detail in the previous sections. Training and public job creation schemes, both of which were already used and evaluated extensively before the reform, appear to have been improved. The “improvement” of public job creation schemes, however, unfortu-nately merely impliesthatsince the reform they ap-pear lessdetrimental for participants’ employment prospects than before. For another re-designed measure, wage subsidies, the reform provided the first opportunity to consistently evaluate its effects and thusto reveal itsapparently high effectiveness. Several new measures Ð placement vouchers, as -signment to private placement providers, fixed-term contractsfor older workersÐdo not displays ignifi-cant effects, which may be due tode factoineffective or small-scale policies, or perhaps due to the fact that the post-reform observation period is not yet long enough. While placement via temporary work (PSA) shows negative treatment effects, the new start-upsubsidysignificantly reducesthe risk of un-employment. Both the deregulation of the tempo-rary work sector and the introduction and reform, respectively, of jobs with reduced social security contributions (midijobs and minijobs) appear to have created additional employment opportunities in the respective labour marketsegments. However, intra-enterprise displacement effects cannot be ruled out. The redesign of the customer service of public employment officesappearspromising. On balance, we therefore find that the Hartz re-formsin their entiretyseem to have contributed to a better functioning of the German labour market and the effectivenessofspecific active labour mar-ket policies. Thispositive assessment, however, has to be qualifiedsomewhat in the light of the fact that the starting situation upon which the reforms in-tended to improve wasquite dismal.

5 Conclusion

In thispaper we have described the featuresof Ger-man labour market policy and delineated the ration-ale for the Hartz reformsimplemented in the years 2003Ð2005. We have described the main underlying principles and the corresponding policy changes. Following this we have surveyed the existing evi-dence on the effectsof active labour market policy before and after the reforms.

German ALMP before Hartz was dominated by training and public job creation measures. These measures were characterised by a long duration compared with other countries. Especially in eastern Germany the extensive use of job creation measures created a sheltered labour market of substantial magnitude. In contrast, measuresdirectlysupporting integration into regular employment (e. g. wages ub-sidiesandstart-upsubsidies) were introduced rela-tively recently and played a minor role before. As -signment to programmeswasnot based on asys tem-atic profiling of clients. Generally, jobsearch assis t-ance and monitoring by the public employment agency wasgiven rather low priority. It wasargued that the main weaknessesof the former labour mar-ket policy in Germany were, firstly, public employ-mentservices operating inefficiently, and secondly, the fact that the interplay of active policy measures with the generousbenefitsystem created work dis in-centives that retained the unemployed in passivity rather than stimulating them to integrate into the regular labour market.

The Hartz reformsaimed at improving employment servicesand policy measures, and activating the un-employed. First, public employment services were modernised along the linesof New Public Manage-ment. This includes results-based accountability of local employment offices, the outsourcing of many servicesand open competition between privates er-vice providers. The former employment officeswere converted into customer-orientated one-s top-cen-tres, offering individual profiling, jobsearch assis t-ance, social services and administration of benefit payments. Second, various policy changes imple-ment an activationstrategy according to the princi-plesof “rightsand duties”. The entire benefitsystem was re-designed. Unemployment benefit levels and durations were reduced. Eligibility for subsistence allowancesnow differsaccording to a person’s abil-ity to work rather than according to previous contri-bution payments, aswasthe case before. Benefit re-cipients may also be subject to sanctions, mainly benefit reductions, if duties are not complied with. Priority is given to measures that support unem-ployed workers who are pro-actively seeking inte-gration into regular employment, most importantly wagesubsidiesandstart-upsubsidies. Jobswith re-ducedsocialsecurity contributionswere introduced (midijobs), and the regulation for jobsexempt from any social security contributions was reformed (minijobs), both with the intention of providing greater incentivesfor individualsto take up employ-ment in the low-wagesector. Third, the temporary worksector wasderegulated and exemptions from restrictions on fixed-term contracts and dismissal protection were introduced.

Results of evaluationstudies of German active la-bour market policies have been rather inconsistent for many years. Thiswasprobably due to a lack of appropriate data, or to thesensitivity of resultswith respect to different identification strategies. How-ever, due to better data, advances in methodology and a higher consensus on identificationstrategies, recent evaluationstudies seem to be able to provide more robust and consistent results. For the pre-Hartz period, it can be concluded for example that most training measures seem to show considerable dynamics in programme effects, having negative (locking-in) effectsin theshort run and a tendency towardspositive employment effectsin the long run. Based on such results, future cost-benefit analyses might be able to trade costs of negativeshort-run effectsagainst benefitsof positive long-run effects. Moreover, there is evidence that job creation schemesperform badly on average in theshort run, and actually result in impaired employment prospectsfor participants. The (limited) evidence on wagesubsidiesandstart-upsubsidiespre-Hartz indi-catesmodestly positive effectsofsuch measures. The comprehensive evaluation of the Hartz reforms, which involves more than 20 research institutions and a total of about 100 researchers, hasproduced rich evidence giving the general impression that the effectiveness of measures has improved modestly. The results, which arestill preliminary at the present time, indicate that the re-organisation of public em-ployment services was mainly successful, with the exception of the outsourcing ofservices. Re-des ign-ing trainign-ing programmes seems to have improved their effectiveness, while job creationschemes con-tinue to be detrimental to the probability of re-em-ployment. Policy measures such as the redesigned wage subsidies and start-up subsidies show s ignifi-cantly positive effects. Thus, the newstrategy, with more emphasison wagesubsidiesandstart-upsubs i-dies and less emphasis on training and public job creation schemes, seems to be a promising mix of active labour market policies, moving the German labour market in the right direction. Itseemsclear, however, considering the continuing crisis of the German economy, that further steps have to be taken.

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