Advocates of democracy and democratically-governed societies believe that a country’s state of development is a function of the extent to which individuals and groups are able to partake in the decision-making processes which determine their livelihood and humanity. Africa remains the last continent to be freed from the shackles of colonialism and imperialism. The partition of Africa into different states or countries in a manner that showed little or no regard for ethnic, religious, cultural and political differences embedded the destructive seeds of failure in these countries. The wave of political and social crises in the post-independence era reflects the inherent nature of these salient factors. The principal objective of this paper is to examine the causal nexus between historical antecedent of external influences on Africa’s political, social and cultural structures, on one hand, and the failure of democratic statebuilding in post independence Africa, on the other. The resilience of these pre-colonial differences and internecine conflicts clearly made state-building efforts in post colonial Africa complicated. Today, Africa is bedeviled with ethnic, religious and political crises in one country after the other on a perennial scale to the extent that a number of states in Africa had failed and are still failing. Democratic methods of state-building have failed and are failing in Africa. What factors are responsible? Who are chief actors, internal or external, responsible for this failure? What theoretical tools of analysis are available for understanding the situation and to what extent has political authority been eroded by crisis of legitimacy? This paper in its summation tries to identify possible leeway out of the complex statebuilding problems facing African countries.
This paper has argued that the reverse sequencing process that most developing countries are experiencing, democratizing before they have reached a point of substantial state consolidation, has important implications how they collect tax, and challenges our existing theories about the relationship between taxation and democracy. As taxation in developing countries is primarily a function of state-building, and many aspects of statebuilding are inherently coercive, democracy gives citizens the ability to resist, forcing states into lower intensity state-building activities, in the least politically divisive areas. In the context of taxation, this means that it constrains the ability of the revenue authority to widen the tax net and consolidate its ability to coerce, focusing their attention instead on the least visible forms of taxation. Democracies try to maximize taxation, with minimal state-building, while autocracies can maximize taxation, with maximum state-building. The empirical case comparison shows how governments have incentivized revenue authorities into these modes of behavior, in ways that meaningfully impact on their daily operations.
This chapter focusses on the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and on the EU’s self-perception and its actorness. Actorness is understood as how the EU developed as an actor, but also in its actions themselves; in the case of this thesis, this is with respect to its foreign policy. An attempt is made to determine how this actorness can be analysed through the help of general IR theories or Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) or even organisational studies. It examines the progression of the EU from an economic entity to a political organisation by comparing the treaties and further legislation and communications with respect to the CFSP. While a shift towards political involvement will be demonstrated in the rhetoric of the EU, this development will be called into question by the budgetary evidence. It will be demonstrated that the change in EU self-perception resulted in a development in its foreign policies. The chapter will show that the EU has evolved through a succession of treaties and that new parameters are constantly being defined, some of which could be attributed to institutional-learning. The treaties and communications form an integral part of the CFSP and represent the main feature of the EU’s external action and are analysed and described in hindsight of setting out this “EU component” for the following framework. This chapter has to be read in conjunction with the chapter on state-building, as this EU chapter provides a breakdown of the “tools” available under the CFSP to engage in state-building which in turn will be discussed in the following chapter. The EU may be seen as a “fluid” institution which constantly tackles new problems and tries to excel in them. In 2001 Ginsberg wrote: ‘A CFSP may develop over time out of individual European foreign policies that are more carefully linked to priorities, interests, preferences, and values that converge at the European level, but there is no evidence that this will happen any time soon.’ 57 In contrast to this, Solana states in his European Security Strategy that “the EU has
international presence in Kosovo, through the EULEX mission in the field of security and justice with consulting competence and in some more important even executive, it has come as a result of omissions made during the period of international administration in Kosovo. Due to the lack of expected results and according to the mission that had EULEX has increased dissatisfaction and lost confidence by the citizens of Kosovo. Despite this does not mean that the EULEX mission is utterly failed. Their role especially in consulting and advisory field was and continues to be positive. Because of the desire and determination of the people of Kosovo and other more profiled layers for integration into the European Union and acceptance of the values and the way of functioning of the Western countries, in default way the EULEX is welcome to help in state-building in Kosovo. This is verified by the local people interviewed in the field of security and justice. They despite criticism for their failure, evaluate their help at least for self-confidence and realization of specific missions.
Finance Minister is not amused. My interpretation sees the Pact revision as a further step in regulatory statebuilding. The spillover rationale proved too political in the sense that it required to call on the Council as adjudicator of first resort each time a country incurred a budget over 3 percent of its GDP. The threat of opening an EDP, at a time when a country was typically in recession and public finances in dire straits, made this a very salient issue that could hurt a government domestically. The politically salient adjudication in the Council has now given way to a low-key process in which fiscal and statistical experts talk to each other more often. For instance, every country that is about to be notified under Article 104 for an excessive deficit will be visited by a special mission beforehand, at the level of the Commissioner or the Director General of DG Ecfin.
There is a growing body of criminological and sociological work drawing attention away from the myopic, self‐obsessed and exclusionary narratives of ‘Western’ or global North thinking to highlight the importance of locally‐produced knowledges, expertise and experiences in global South countries (Carrington et al. 2015; Connell 2007; Fonseca 2017). Within this same vein, ethnographic prisons researchers working in the global South have noted and lamented the import (or export) of Western ideas about how best to run prisons (Jefferson 2005, 2007; Martin et al. 2014). Through examination of the skilled detail work of Jefferson (2010, 2014) and other prison researchers who have studied the everyday lives of prisons in the global South (Bandyopadhyay 2007; Martin 2014), it is evident that knowledge from the West is held up as a blueprint for implementing human rights protections and effective prison management. Western prison practices and ideals are prescribed as the gold standard that should be followed by those in post‐conflict or less bureaucratically developed countries which are attempting to create more democratic, transparent and politically legitimate state institutions. In these contexts, the prison is not only cast as an effective crime control tool, it is also held up as a necessary feature of effective state‐building.
(Amd) 110.1 Use and occupancy. Pursuant to subsection (a) of section 29-265 of the Connecticut General Statutes, no building or structure erected or altered in any municipality after October 1, 1970, shall be occupied or used, in whole or in part, until a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the building official, certifying that such building or structure or work performed pursuant to the building permit substantially complies with the provisions of the StateBuilding Code. Nothing in the code shall require the removal, alteration or abandonment of, or prevent the continuance of the use and occupancy of, any single-family dwelling but within six years of the date of occupancy of such dwelling after substantial completion of construction of, alteration to or addition to such dwelling, or of a building lawfully existing on October 1, 1945, except as may be necessary for the safety of life or property. The use of a building or premises shall not be deemed to have changed because of a temporary vacancy or change of ownership or tenancy.
historical references in their dialogue with the Hohenzollerns, Guelphs and House of Nassau at the same time sheds revealing light on the extent to which these elites had internalized the monarchical nationalism promoted by particularist state builders in the first half of the nineteenth century and enshrined by the constitution of the Kaiserreich. Much of this argument falls in line with Abigail Green’s and Eva Giloi’s scholarship on political regionalism and the material culture of monarchy in Germany, but this essay goes further since it contends that the Hohenzollerns—especially Wilhelm II—were more creative in their methods of monarchical self-legitimization than they have been given credit for. In contrast to the work of Giloi which posits that ‘Hohenzollern dynastic anecdotes were emotionally accessible only within Prussia’s core territories’ because royal mythology tended to revolve too much around traditional heroes of Prusso-Brandenburgian history like the Great Elector, Frederick the Great and Queen Luise, to leave space ‘for diversion into alternate political symbols’, the case studies discussed above underscore the Prussian court’s adroit appropriation of other dynasties’ accomplishments and co-optation of the deposed royal houses to enhance their own symbolic capital. 112 It speaks to a ‘remarkable consistency of political will from each
104.7.1 Material and equipment reuse. Materials, equip- ment and devices shall not be reused or reinstalled unless such elements have been reconditioned, tested and placed in good and proper working condition and approved. 104.7.2 Technical assistance. To determine the acceptabil- ity of technologies, processes, products, facilities, materials and uses attending the design, operation or use of a building or premises subject to inspection by the fire code official, the fire code official is authorized to require the owner or agent to provide, without charge to the jurisdiction, a techni- cal opinion and report. The opinion and report shall be pre- pared by a qualified engineer, specialist, laboratory or fire safety specialty organization acceptable to the fire code offi- cial and shall analyze the fire safety properties of the design, operation or use of the building or premises and the facilities and appurtenances situated thereon, to recommend neces- sary changes. The fire code official is authorized to require design submittals to be prepared by, and bear the stamp of, a registered design professional.
keyhole mounds give way to larger, and then to massive keyhole mounds, which are joined by satellite mounds both round and square (baicho). The grand kofun occupy a sancti Þ ed space de Þ ned by a moat so that visits are regulated, but the quantities of haniwa show that large number of people were involved. It is legitimate to imagine that these people had access to the terraces according to their rank and that the most important people, like the ancestors before them, occupied the focal point at the round end, which could be seen by those standing on the rising ß ange of the mound, so providing an auditorium on the same principle as the Yeavering grandstand. Thus the rationale for the ever larger kofuns should be that they had to assemble ever larger groups of people. This hypothesis is hard to prove, but it might provide an enhancement of the general model preferred in the Japanese literature — that the mounds witness a state formation process — and suggest a practical way in which they might serve it.
15 Lijphart 1977. Two major power-sharing models have been devised for divided societies, namely the consociational model (Lijphart 1969; see also McGarry and O’Leary 1993 and 2004; O’Leary 2005) and the centripetalist or integrative approach (Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2001), both of which rely on inter-ethnic cooperation and moderation. An alternative model has also emerged recently, known as the “power dividing arrangement” (Rothchild and Roader 2005). Though the two basic models aim to achieve similar ends; namely the accommodation of differing groups within a single polity, they differ on how such accommodation is translated into the political system. The consociational model recognizes and enhances the differences. The idea is “to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy” (Lijphart 1977, 42) and provide them with institutional guarantees that prevents the state-level institutions from making any decision that is contrary to their interests. This model is premised on the idea that elites are prone to inter-ethnic cooperation, provided their rights are protected. The centripetalist approach, on the contrary, works under the assumption that elites are not always predisposed to inter-ethnic cooperation, and aims at undermining the salience of the ethnic factor; it advocates building bridges across group boundaries and providing politicians with incentives (mostly electoral) to encourage them to cooperate with members of groups other that their own. The chances to introduce integrative formulas by international mediators are however often constrained by the very nature of post-conflict contexts and the highly distrusted patterns of behavior (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005). Nationalist parties may indeed be more likely to accept a consociational arrangement, as it respects and enhances their power base - namely the ethnic group.
the Public Prosecutor to the judiciary and the police, needs to be addressed. The issue of large numbers of detainees awaiting trials became a growing concern, accompanied by increasingly allegations of torture and ill treatment of prisoners. Torture and ill treatment was a common feature, with prison officers little aware of the human rights of detainees or minimum standards for imprisonment. Between March and December 2011, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had visited over 8,500 detainees in approximately 60 centers; the majority of individual’s accused of being Qaddafi loyalists. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed continuous concern over the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees. These issues and the need to tackle it in the context of Libya’s transition are of central relevance to confidence building at the governance level and within the civil society that need to regain trust into the state institutions through the implementation of the rule of law. The Libyan Prison System was already suffering from overcrowding prior to the revolution, in part due to the large numbers of migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa assigned to such facilities. In addition, around half of the prison population was subject to prolonged pre-trial detention. Also detention centers existed in the country within the armed groups and non- state security actors facilities. In the former regime, the judiciary and the executive were not clearly distinct and the judiciary were certainly subordinated to the regime and with Act No. 3 the National Transitional Council issued a law to ensure separation of powers; today the ministry of justice has no control over the judicial authority except for the preparation of trials in terms of maintenance, mobilization, and protection. The ministry of justice is authorized to check that actions pertaining to acts allegedly committed by revolutionaries or others have to be prosecuted. The MoJ has several time stressed that thwar cannot act as judicial officers; therefore, whoever handles the investigations must be a judicial officer recognized by Libyan law to conduct official investigations in respect to the legislation regulation on investigation and prosecutions. Thwar were not authorized to conduct investigations that should only be carried out through judicial authorities such as the attorney general or the military prosecution.
state. 344 This is due mainly to two factors, which are hard to disentangle. First, Serbs and Croats have constituted themselves politically as such (rather than simply as Orthodox Bosnians and Catholic Bosnians) due to the nationalist influence of Bosnia’s bigger neighbours, working as kin-state for these populations of their same confession. To the contrary, Bosnian Muslims (later politically mobilised as Bosniaks) have remained without a kin-state. At the same time, the numerical prevalence of the latter has made it easier for them to claim interest in an ethnically-blind and centralised state, in which they would constitute a relative but substantial plurality of the population. The two main reasons have made it so that the three group display a different attitude and identification towards the state – with the first ones rather more interested in “home rule” in the sub-state territories where they are majorities, and displaying the national symbols of the neighbouring countries (or derivatives), and the latter rather more able to identify with the country as a whole and its own symbols. As a multinational state by design, with clauses of special protection for its three constitutive peoples, , the current Bosnian institutions were crafted at the end of the conflict with the first task to ensure non-domineering by one group over the other in the post-conflict period. 345 Bosnia and Herzegovina thus suffers from a the lack of consensus on a long-term vision of the state among its three constitutive peoples, which bear three different political projects (a centralised and ethnic-blind state for the Bosniaks, secession via dissolution of the state for the Serbs, and a three-entity confederal polity for the Croats) – mirroring what in the studies of the EU “democratic deficit” has been referred to as the “no demos paradox”. 346
The motivation behind this new emphasis on STEM is simple. Increasing the number of students versed in STEM and growing the number of gradu- ates pursuing STEM careers or advanced studies are critical to the economic prosperity of every state and the nation. A labor force without a rich supply of STEM-skilled individuals will face stagnant or even declining wealth by failing to compete in the global economy, where discovery, innovation, and rapid adaption are necessary elements for success. To en- sure that the United States does not follow that path, governors, education leaders, and policymakers at all levels have called for a new emphasis on STEM education in our nation’s schools, from K–12 through postsecondary education. How states are working to achieve these goals is the subject of this report.
Step 5: Request the student representative contact a staff member of the state dental society assigned to work with students. The contact information for most state’s staff liaisons can be found on the ASDA website under the “For Chapters” tab and “State Dental Associations” link. Send a letter introducing ASDA to the state dental association. See appendix B for a template letter from the ASDA chapter at Virginia. In the letter, one may like to include statistics on how other states work with their respective ASDA chapter (see appendix A for these statistics). However, please understand that every state dental association is different. The representative will need to gauge the interests of the association to access whether a presentation of statistics would be effective.
Given the fact the cost of training is enormous and only few employers could afford to send staff on training on a regular basis, there should be the possibility to improving one‟s career from one‟s work place. This is why the importance of libraries in providing the enabling environment becomes important. Thus, professional development or the concept of capacity building would be enhanced if it is linked to work situation, that is one does not have to leave the site of work before one could be professionally developed. As expected, libraries could promote the development of professionals or capacity building at all levels. Whether leading to the award of certificate or gaining competences in a particular topic. Furthermore, libraries could also promote the development of professionals or the concept of capacity building through distance education, surfing the internet and professional literature. All one needs in order to access the various sources of information is a computer with internet access and a web browser.
considerable attention from the western media and in academia. However, one area which does not seem to get much attention is the on-going insurgency in the remote Indian northeast. In the area of security studies, western academic research tends to focus on conflicts in the Middle East and Sub- Saharan Africa without paying sufficient attention to on-going conflicts in contemporary Asia. The conflict in the Indian northeast is a conflict which most people in the west are not familiar with. Not much is known about this insurgency because of its geographical isolation and remote location in the eastern sector of the Himalayan mountain range in South Asia. The Indian northeast is culturally diverse and is home to a large number of India’s religious and racial minority communities. The region is home to many tribal groups, ethnic and religious minorities such as the Naga Christian community in Nagaland. India calls itself a secular democracy. One of the hallmarks of a democracy is how the state secures the rights of minority citizens. In a democracy it is the responsibility of the ethnic majority to maintain positive relations with ethnic minorities. Since the 2014 elections with the arrival of the Modi government which has strong links with Hindu nationalist groups, attacks on religious minorities have been on the rise. Rajeev Bhargava writes, ‘since the ominous growth of militant Hindu nationalism and the consequent alienation of religious minorities, only someone with blinkered vision would deny the crisis of secularism in India today.’ i
REM started in July 1997 with the implementation of Medicaid managed care. Amidst concern that medically complex individuals would not get needed care under managed care, the state and a panel of providers led the effort as part of the overall work on the 1115 waiver. REM case management services are funded through the Maryland Medicaid Program and