[PDF] Top 20 Essays On Dynamic Incentive Design

... To study the regulator’s problem, I construct a dynamic principal-agent model in which a stream of projects arrives over time, one for each period. The agent (he) wants to under- take the projects, but needs the ... See full document

... other design decisions — like the total quota available or its initial ...those design decisions, we provide an extensive analysis of ITQ equilibria and full comparative statics for steady-state ...not ... See full document

... a dynamic setting as it lays bare the incentives at ...a dynamic setting with a unidimensional policy space, and single peaked legislators’ preferences over ... See full document

... We discuss three types of mechanisms and consider the revenue maximization prob- lem under these mechanisms, and compare their effectiveness in revenue maximization under a dynamic setting where buyers may change ... See full document

... Next in Section 3.2 and motivated by workers’ dynamic perfomance in online labor markets, we study a setting where the behavior of market participants changes over time. In (Heidari et al., 2016a), my coauthors ... See full document

... In most of the literature on mechanism design, agents are assumed to have a given amount of informa- tion and their incentives to acquire more information are not modeled. However, in many practical settings, this ... See full document

... With respect to centralized settings, Roth (1989) is possibly the closest to the current paper. He offers an example of a market with incomplete information on both sides in which there exists no stable mechanism ... See full document

... Furthermore, the two methods of game description are compared to study how the description method influences subjects’ behaviours. A counterintuitive finding is found that the direct-response method is more helpful for ... See full document

... If one generalises the distribution of shocks, then this no longer holds true. In Appendix (A.4) I generalise the distribution of shocks and consider how the comparative static with respect to b b could be affected by ... See full document

... an incentive to experiment with a risky reform policy in the presence of future elections? I study a continuous-time game between two political parties with heterogeneous preferences and a median ... See full document

... In Chapter 2, we focus on information search on the landing page of an online store in order to test boundedly rational models of eye movements and choice. Like the physical entrance of a brick-and-mortar store, the ... See full document

... to design simple rules for noncooperative policy makers to achieve cooperative allocations in the linear-quadratic framework with technology shocks, markup shocks and government spending ... See full document

... One natural extension would be to characterize equilibria under BA and DA when truth-telling does not constitute part of an equilibrium under either mechanism. This is the case when school qualities are close to one ... See full document

... Ball’s analyses focus on the case where the underlying information process is exogenous whereas we study the problem of revealing information that is endogenously generated. Kremer et al. (2014) and Che and Hörner (2017) ... See full document

... In determination of the lag structure, construction spending and maintenance spending were separately regressed on the explanatory socioeconomic and political variables using alternative lag lengths from one year to five ... See full document

... Another strand of the literature shares with the current model the feature that the observations of short-lived players are restricted, but we focus on different aspects of what kind information is available. Liu (2011) ... See full document

... formulated dynamic adverse selection model on the irregularly shaped ...very-high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models as well as to perform uncertainty ...so-called design points, and do so without ... See full document

... This study examines the ways that capacity constraint affects firms. Osborne and Pitchik (1986) characterize the Nash equilibria in a duopoly that has limited capacity, showing that limited capacity could be beneficial ... See full document

... optimal dynamic linear contract model which combined explicit incentive mechanism and reputation incentive ...reputation incentive and enhance the reputation incentive ...the ... See full document

... The design idea of the dynamic RO unit based on the mesh model proposed in this paper can generate a variety of oscillation frequency and path deadlock, which makes the PUF's incentive response ... See full document