Action Guiding for Us 35 

To begin with, we need to distinguish between an agent being guided by and

being able to be guided by a moral theory.27 _{For example, imagine an animal}

activist who spends his life taking care of rescue chickens, who live out their full lives on his sanctuary farm. We can suppose that the activist is able to be guided by utilitarianism – perhaps he believes this theory is true – even if he never in fact is guided by it. For example, perhaps he does not use utilitarian- ism to guide his actions because that would require him to not only rescue chickens, which he finds deeply rewarding, but also to raise millions of addi- tional chickens for the sake of maximizing pleasure minus pain, which he finds repugnant. In what follows, whenever an agent is able to be guided by a moral theory, or in a position to be guided by it, I will say that the moral theory is action guiding for the agent. Another way to explain the difference between being guided by and being able to be guided by a moral theory is this: to be guided by utilitarianism includes performing an action and to do so for dis- tinctly utilitarian reasons. In other words, being guided by a moral theory ends in an action; you cannot be guided without acting. But to be able to be guided by a moral theory need not end in an action, as one can be able to be guided by utilitarianism even if no action is performed.

When formulating action guidance objections to utilitarianism, the relevant issue is whether the theory is action guiding for us: that is, whether we have the ability to guide ourselves by means of the theory. The relevant issue is not whether we are ever actually guided by utilitarianism. To continue the analogy with the map, suppose that had you consulted the map, you would have come to know exactly where I live. But as it is, you do not consult the map, take a wild guess, and end up in the wrong part of Uppsala. In that case, the problem clearly resides with you and your behavior, not with the map. Similarly, if the

25 _{More precisely, doxastic guidance is similar to what Smith calls external guidance (1988),}

pp. 91-95, broad guidance (2012), pp. 370-378, and guidance in the extended sense (2018), pp. 11-32, and to what Carlson calls AG1 (2002), pp. 73-76.

26 _{Smith defines a weaker notion of action guidance that she calls internal guidance (1988), pp.}

91-92, narrow guidance (2012), p. 374, and guidance in the core sense (2018), pp. 12-21. These definitions of action guidance are very different from that of evidential guidance. Moreover, while utilitarianism is evidentially guiding, it is arguably not action guiding on Smith’s defini- tions.

animal activist does not guide his behavior by means of utilitarianism, then the problem resides with him and not with the theory.

When we consider whether a moral theory should be action guiding for agents, we first need to decide for which agents it should be action guiding. Perhaps we do not want to require universal guidance – i.e. that a moral theory can guide all moral agents. There is most likely no moral theory that is uni- versally guiding, and the action guidance objector may not want to put forward such a sweeping criticism of moral theories. Of course, to require only partial

guidance raises the issue of where precisely to draw the line. For example, is

a moral theory problematic if it cannot guide non-human animal or extrater- restrial moral agents? What about the ancient Egyptians or future humans? Does a moral theory need to be guiding for small children and the cognitively impaired? Is it enough if we require that a theory is action guiding for nearly all agents, with just a few exceptions? For the objections that I will discuss, we need not answer these questions, as it is enough to focus on a subgroup of all moral agents for which it is uncontroversial that a moral theory should be action guiding: namely the group of nearly all adult contemporary humans with normal human cognitive capacities.28

A related issue concerns in which choice situations a moral theory should be action guiding for agents. Let us define a choice situation as a range of alternative and mutually exclusive acts available to a particular agent at a par- ticular point in time. Examples of choice situations are deciding whether to buy fries with your meal at McDonald’s, or deciding whether to walk, bicycle, or drive to work. Here again the problem of demarcation arises – we can re- quire that a theory should be guiding with respect to all choice situations, or merely to a proper subset of these situations. Some exceptions seem plausible. For example, in choice situations where we lack the necessary time to consult a moral theory, such as when falling off a cliff when hiking in the mountains, we need not require that the theory is action guiding for agents. Other choice situations should be excluded because they are extremely unusual, such as finding yourself in a hostage situation. Finally, some choice situations are such that a normal human adult cannot reasonably be expected to focus on what a moral theory says in the situation, as in the movie Aliens when Ripley, point- ing a flamethrower, faces down an alien. Therefore, I will limit the relevant choice situations to nearly all those ordinary choice situations where we have sufficient time for deliberation and where we can reasonably be expected to focus on what the moral theory says.

Going forward, it will be useful to have a shorthand expression to sum up the above expectations on a moral theory. Therefore, I will stipulate that a moral theory is “action guiding for us” if and only if it is action guiding for (a) nearly all (b) adult, (c) contemporary (d) humans with (e) normal human cognitive capacities in (f) nearly all (g) ordinary choice situations where there

is (h) sufficient time for deliberation and (i) where the agent can reasonably be expected to focus on what the theory says.