Supporting the Theory 118 

A first piece of evidence that favors the sensory imagination theory consists of various epistemic intuitions, namely intuitions about how, in certain cir- cumstances, the trustworthiness of our moral intuitions changes. For example, in cases like that of the prison guard, it seems very plausible that sensory im- agination raises the trustworthiness of moral intuitions. Similarly, in the case of the animal activist, it seems plausible that her sensory imagination of the suffering of factory farm animals raises the trustworthiness of her moral intu- itions. In general, we seem to think that imagining the inner lives of other people can help us learn about our moral obligations to them, beyond learning new non-moral facts – the sensory imagination theory explains why this is so.

Finally, we may also have epistemic intuitions about what role sensory imag- ination plays outside of thought experimenting. For example, it seems plausi- ble that fictional works of literature can teach us about what is morally right or wrong. If sensory imagination can make moral intuitions about poverty, torture, charity, helping others, and so on more epistemically trustworthy, that could explain why reading fiction can teach us about what is right or wrong.

The sensory imagination theory is also supported by a comparison to the importance of sensory perception in making our moral intuitions more trust- worthy. To begin with, it seems plausible to think that:

(1) Sensory perception makes our moral intuitions more epistemically trustworthy.

For example, aid workers who have spent some time in poor countries will also in general have more epistemically trustworthy moral intuitions about whether, for example, it is morally obligatory to give more money to stop poverty. People who themselves have felt the effects of oppression are at least in some respects better at judging whether it is wrong to oppress others. More- over, this is not merely because these people have greater knowledge of rele- vant non-moral facts. Had they had the same non-moral knowledge, but lacked the relevant sensory perception, their moral intuitions would not have been as trustworthy. It is because they have seen the relevant acts performed up front that their intuitions are more trustworthy. Similarly, it seems plausible that seeing documentaries or playing certain computer games, both of which in- volve sensory perception, can increase the trustworthiness of our moral intui- tions beyond letting us learn non-moral facts. This too is explained by (1).

Now, there are clear similarities between sensory perception and sensory imagination. To begin with, both are intentional states. Just as I see that some- thing is the case, I sensorily imagine that something is the case. Moreover, both involve a phenomenal component, a sensory experience. But most im- portantly, what makes sensory perception epistemically important is that things are presented to us in a sensory way. Since things are presented to us in a sensory way also in the case of sensory imagination, we should expect sensory imagination to be similarly epistemically important. That is, it seems plausible that:

(2) If sensory perception makes our moral intuitions more epistemically trustworthy, then so does sensory imagination.

Taken together, (1) and (2) support the sensory imagination theory.

We can also argue for the sensory imagination theory by means of a second analogy – this time not to sensory perceptions, but to physical intuitions. For example, in arguing that thought experiments are mental models, Tamar Gen- dler claims that sensory imagination in thought experiments allows various

non-moral intuitions about physical spaces to become more trustworthy (alt- hough she does not use this piece of terminology to state her point, it seems to describe her position correctly).130 _{In her article, Gendler asks us to:}

Think about your next-door neighbor’s living room, and ask yourself the fol- lowing questions: If you painted its walls bright green, would that clash with the current carpet, or complement it? If you removed all its furniture, could four elephants fit comfortably inside? If you removed all but one of the ele- phants, would there be enough space to ride a bicycle without tipping as you turned?131

Gendler points out that we typically use sensory imagination to answer these questions:

Perhaps you believed (perhaps tacitly) that some indoor spaces are too small to ride a bike in (closets, for instance), and that others (banquet halls, for in- stance) are certainly large enough – but did you have, even tacitly, beliefs about where the border between these lay, and, in particular, beliefs about where your neighbor’s living room stood with respect to that border? Didn’t you, instead, discover something about bikes and living rooms by imagining having a cer- tain experience? Likewise with the color case. While you may have known beforehand that your neighbor’s rug looks like this, and that green looks like that, was it really a matter of deductive or inductive inference that led you to the conclusion that – were they adjacent – you would judge them to clash? Wasn’t it instead as if you performed an experiment-in-thought, on the basis of which you got some new information about your own judgments, which (perhaps because of tacit beliefs that you hold) you took to be relevant data in answering the question at hand?132

Similar ideas can be found in the writings of Nancy Nersessian, who is another defender of thought experiments as mental models.133 _{From this picture of}

mental modelling and the importance of sensory imagination, it seems plausi- ble to think that:

(3) Sensory imagination makes our physical intuitions more epistemi- cally trustworthy.

Moreover, the way in which sensory imagination makes our physical intui- tions more trustworthy in these cases seems analogous to how sensory imagi- nation (according to the sensory imagination theory) makes our moral intui- tions more trustworthy. For example, you can learn whether a bed fits through a door by sensorily imagining trying to move it past the doorway, forming a picture of it moving through, adding room for persons to lift it, and so on.

130 _{Gendler (2004). See especially pp. 1156-1161.} 131 _{Gendler (2004), p. 1156.}

132 _{Gendler (2004), p. 1159.} 133 _{Nersessian (2007).}

Your physical intuition that the bed does or does not fit through the door will clearly be more trustworthy if you have in a detailed way visualized the widths and heights of the door and the bed. That is, your physical intuitions are more epistemically trustworthy if you have sensorily imagined the physically rele-

vant features of the door and bed. With this in mind, it seems reasonable to

think that:

(4) If sensory imagination makes our physical intuitions more epistemi- cally trustworthy, then it makes our moral intuitions more trustwor- thy as well.

And taken together, (3) and (4) support the sensory imagination theory.