The Badness Objection 60 

In what follows, I distinguish action guidance objections from each other by considering their stated conclusions. Most importantly, I will need to consider objections stating that utilitarianism is false – to conclude that a theory is false is the most obvious way of objecting to it. That is the task for Sections 3.5 and 3.6. However, before considering these arguments, I want to examine other potential conclusions of action guidance objections. One such conclusion is that utilitarianism is worse as a moral theory in virtue of not being action guid- ing, whether or not it is also false. That is, we could argue that if a theory is not doxastically guiding, then it is a bad moral theory, where the badness is

pro tanto rather than all-things-considered badness. (Of course, a theory could

still be all-things-considered good in virtue of having various positive quali- ties, even if it is pro tanto bad in virtue of not being action guiding.) The above kind of view is suggested by Pekka Väyrynen, whose “guidance constraint” states that “[o]ther things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are bet- ter to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance.”55

A complication for any version of a badness objection to utilitarianism is that “badness” can mean very different things depending on the relevant con- text. The challenge is therefore to find an interpretation of “bad” that both makes it plausible to think that utilitarianism is bad in virtue of not being dox- astically guiding and that counts as a proper “objection” to the view. In other words, the conclusion of the badness argument has to be properly “problem- atic” for utilitarianism.

First, that a moral theory is “bad” could mean that there is evidence against the theory, or that we have reason to believe that the theory is false. This in- terpretation gives us a clear objection to utilitarianism. However, the objection is also subservient to the more fundamental question of whether the theory is true. In this case, we will do better to directly consider objections against the truth of utilitarianism. (Compare: It is more convenient to argue that knowledge is not justified true belief, than to argue that we have reason to believe that knowledge is not justified true belief.) Having supported an ob- jection to the truth of utilitarianism, we will have supported a badness objec- tion against it; conversely, if we cannot support an objection to the truth of utilitarianism, then neither can we support a corresponding badness objection

against it. On this first interpretation of “badness,” we get a proper objection to utilitarianism, but it is not one that we need to evaluate separately from any objections to its truth. Again, I will deal with objections to the truth of utili- tarianism in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.

Second, some philosophers have argued that it is the function or point of moral theories to be action guiding. This might provide us with a version of the badness objection.56 _{For example, Elenor Mason notes that “the most im-}

portant function of a moral theory is to guide action.”57 _{Lars Bergström writes}

that “moral norms should have practical relevance” because “[t]hat’s what they are for.”58 _{Terrance McConnell says that “one of the important functions}

of moral theories is to assess the conduct of others” and that “one of the main points of moral theories is to provide agents with guidance.”59 _{Peter Singer}

states that “the whole point of ethical judgements is to guide practice.”60 Rob-

ert Goodin writes that “[t]he point of morality is to be action-guiding” and Frank Jackson says that “the passage to action is the very business of ethics.”61

A literal interpretation of these claims gives us the following badness objec- tion to utilitarianism. To begin with, we suppose that moral theories have func- tions, and that one such function is to be doxastically guiding. Next, we draw a comparison to other entities that have functions, such as human artefacts or biological entities. For example, an umbrella that does not protect against rain fails to fulfill its function, so it is a bad umbrella; and a heart that does not pump blood fails to fulfill its function, so it is a bad heart. Similarly, we can argue, utilitarianism does not fulfill its function, which is to be doxastically guiding, so it is a bad moral theory.

The problem with the above argument is that the sentence “the umbrella is bad” seems to simply mean that “the umbrella fails to fulfill its function.” But in that case, the corresponding objection against utilitarianism concludes only that utilitarianism fails to fulfill its function: this is not by itself a problem for utilitarianism. In other words, in the context of function-talk, to say that some- thing is “bad” does not express something truly or genuinely evaluative, but gives us merely a circumspect way to talk about the functions of various ob- jects.

Third, we can understand the “badness” as “moral badness.” In doing so, we will need to argue that utilitarianism is extrinsically or instrumentally mor- ally bad (in virtue of not being doxastically guiding) because it is deeply im- plausible that a moral theory is bad in the sense that, for example, pain is bad – that is, moral theories are never intrinsically or finally morally bad.

56 _{Cf. Smith (2018), pp. 53-54.} 57 _{Mason (2003), p. 327.} 58 _{Bergström (1996).} 59 _{McConnell (1989), p. 445; (2018).} 60 _{Singer (1993), p. 2.} 61 _{Goodin (2009), p. 3; Jackson (1991), p. 467.}

In support of the claim that “if utilitarianism is not doxastically guiding, then it is morally bad,” we can appeal to the notion of autonomy.62 _{Holly M.}

Smith, who was first to discuss autonomy in the context of moral theories being action guiding, says that a person lacks autonomy if she cannot “trans- late her moral values into a choice of what to do.”63 _{Similarly, Pekka Väyrynen}

argues that if moral theories should be action guiding for us “the best expla- nation of this fact features certain forms of autonomy and fairness,” with the latter referring to “fairness in the provision of the opportunity for morally committed moral agents to act well autonomously.”64 It is not clear what ex-

actly Smith and Väyrynen have in mind here. In an earlier text Smith says that a kind of action guidance is “valuable” because it “makes possible an im- portant form of autonomy,” but she does not explicitly state that we are dealing with moral value.65 Väyrynen is more forthcoming on the issue:

[W]e must also be open to the idea that if ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance, then the best explanation of that fact features some morally substantive ideals.66

Väyrynen’s reference to “morally substantive ideals” suggests that we are dealing with specifically moral value. In any case, I will assume this for the sake of the argument. Clearly, Smith and Väyrynen cannot be concerned with the truth of non-guiding theories, since that requires a premise to the effect that we are in fact autonomous (which is why the true moral theory must make possible such autonomy), and that seems implausible. Moreover, it is not clear what kind of non-moral badness could be intended.

Let us assume that the concern is about moral value: that utilitarianism is a morally bad theory because it does not allow us to be autonomous, and that it does not allow us to be autonomous because it is not doxastically guiding. Now, there are two interpretations of autonomy that we could have in mind when talking about the “autonomy” of agents. On the first interpretation, for an agent to be autonomous is for her to be able to act according to her own values. As I have argued elsewhere, this interpretation does not seem to be problematic for utilitarianism, because most people are not utilitarians.67

Therefore, that these people cannot use utilitarianism to guide their actions will not prevent them from being autonomous and able to act according to their own (non-utilitarian) values.

62 _{See Smith (1988), pp. 105-106; (2018), pp. 55-56, 196-202 and Väyrynen (2006). For dis-}

cussion, see van Someren Greve (2014).

63 _{Smith (2018), p. 219.}

64 _{Väyrynen (2006), pp. 297-301.} 65 _{Smith (1988), p. 105.}

66 _{Väyrynen (2006), p. 307.} 67 _{Rosenqvist (2019), p. 355.}

On the second interpretation, for an agent to be autonomous is for her to be able to act according to the true values, whatever they are. But this interpreta- tion is not a problem for utilitarianism either. On the one hand, if utilitarianism is true, then its moral badness will depend on how conducive it is to produce pleasure minus pain – something that we, because of reasons familiar at this point, cannot know.68 _{On the other hand, if utilitarianism is false, then its ina-}

bility to guide our actions will not stop anyone from acting according to the “true values” – since in that case utilitarianism will not give us the true values. Finally, it is far from clear that we cannot live our lives according to utili- tarian values – which presumably means to live one’s life, in some sense, ac-

cording to the utilitarian theory – just because utilitarianism is not doxas-

tically guiding. It is still possible to let our decision making be informed by utilitarianism. Since the theory is evidentially guiding for us, we can think about what it says and come to have reason to believe that an act is right ac- cording to it. This may appear sufficient to let us live our lives according to the utilitarian theory.