The Ought Implies Can Objection 69 

The final two objections that I will discuss in this chapter are objections to utilitarianism in the classic sense: they are arguments that utilitarianism is

false. To begin with, Frances Howard-Snyder argues that utilitarianism is in-

compatible with the principle that “ought implies can.”77 _{Her argument, recon-}

structed with premises and a conclusion, goes as follows: THE OUGHT IMPLIES CAN OBJECTION (P1) You cannot maximize pleasure minus pain.

(P2) If you cannot maximize pleasure minus pain, then it is not the case that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain.

(P3) If it is not the case that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain, then utilitarianism is false.

(C) Utilitarianism is false.

The conclusion of the argument follows from the premises, so let us consider each premise in turn. To begin with, premise (P1) is supported by a compari- son to acts that we intuitively cannot perform. For example, you cannot defeat the Hungarian grandmaster Judith Polgár in a game of chess or open a safe to which you lack the code. In both of these cases, you lack the ability to perform the act – i.e., you cannot do it. Various explanations are available for why one suffers an inability to perform an act – although, naturally, giving such an explanation is not necessary to justify that one has the inability, since this mat- ter can be judged on intuitive grounds. Some examples of potential explana- tions of inability include: that you cannot perform an act because you do not

know how to perform it, because you would fail to perform it if you tried, or

because it is too difficult for you to perform it. Whichever explanation is cor- rect, Howard-Snyder is right in saying that if you cannot defeat Polgár or open the safe, then you cannot maximize pleasure minus pain. Any explanation that applies to the former claims must also apply to the latter. For example, you do not know how to maximize pleasure minus pain, you will fail to maximize pleasure minus pain if you try, and maximizing pleasure minus pain is too difficult for you. That is, if you cannot defeat a chess grandmaster, how could you hope to maximize pleasure minus pain?

As for premise (P2), it is plausible in virtue of the principle that ought im- plies can. The ought implies can principle states that if you ought to perform an act, then you can perform that act. That is, an obligation to φ presupposes an ability to φ. For example, it cannot be true that I ought to pick you up at the

77 _{Howard-Snyder (1997). Responses to Howard-Snyder include Carlson (1999) and Qizilbash}

(1999), to which Howard-Snyder (1999) has replied. For further discussion, see Mason (2003), Miller (2003), pp. 53-54, Moore (2006), and Andrić (2016). Bergström (1996) anticipates this discussion.

airport if I cannot pick you up. That is, if my car is being repaired or the airport is too far away, then I have no obligation to pick you up. The ought implies can principle is equivalent to the proposition that if you cannot perform an act, then it is not the case that you ought to perform the act, which straightfor- wardly gives us premise (P2).

Finally, premise (P3) is meant to be plausible in virtue of the definition of utilitarianism. If utilitarianism is true, the argument goes, you ought to max- imize pleasure minus pain. Therefore, by modus tollens, if it is not the case that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain, then utilitarianism is false.

Although Frances Howard-Snyder does not intend the ought implies can objection to constitute an action guidance objection to utilitarianism, it quali- fies as such in this discussion.78 _{While a notion of action guidance is not di-}

rectly appealed to in the objection, whether utilitarianism is doxastically guid- ing is relevant to evaluating premise (P3). Had utilitarianism been doxastically guiding for you, you would in many circumstances have the ability to maxim- ize pleasure minus pain: namely by using utilitarianism to find out which act is right according to the theory – an act which will have the property of max- imizing pleasure minus pain.79

The main problem with the ought implies can objection becomes clear when we consider how to exactly understand premise (P1).80 _{That you “cannot}

maximize pleasure minus pain” can be interpreted in either of the following two ways, and the ought implies can objection is unsuccessful on either inter- pretation:

(A) You cannot perform an act that has the property of maximizing pleasure minus pain.

(B) You cannot perform the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” On the A-interpretation of “cannot maximize pleasure minus pain,” premise (P1) is false, since I can perform an act that has the property of maximizing pleasure minus pain. In any choice situation, there is an easily performed act such as “drink a glass of water” or “open the door” that has the property of maximizing pleasure minus pain.81 _{Clearly, I can perform some such act – I}

78 _{Cf. Howard-Snyder (1997), pp. 241-242.}

79 _{This is only true if we know what utilitarianism says. The farmer who does not know what}

utilitarianism says would still be unable to maximize pleasure minus pain.

80 _{Several authors have, in various ways, noted this problem with the ought implies can objec-}

tion. See Bergström (1996), Carlson (1999), pp. 93-95, Moore (2006), pp. 84-87, and Andrić (2016), pp. 71-74.

81 _{I am assuming a fine-grained theory of act-individuation, according to which “drinking a}

glass of water” and “maximize pleasure minus pain” are different acts, even if drinking a glass of water is a way by which you maximize pleasure minus pain. On a coarse-grained view, these are one and the same acts, and the discussion would have to be presented in a slightly different

can drink a glass of water, open a door, or do some other simple act whose performance will maximize pleasure minus pain. Likewise, while I cannot perform the act “defeat Judith Polgár,” I can perform an act that would make me defeat Judith Polgár: this is just a long conjunctive act such as “move E4, D3, etc.” Few of us can defeat Polgár, but most of us can “move E4, D3, etc.” On the B-interpretation of “cannot maximize pleasure minus pain,” prem- ise (P1) states that you cannot perform a specific act – the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” However, if you cannot perform the act “maximize pleasure minus pain,” then it is not among your available alternatives, and so utilitarianism does not tell you to perform it. In this case, we should instead reject premise (P3):

(P3) If it is not the case that you ought to maximize pleasure minus pain, then utilitarianism is false.

This is because utilitarianism can be true even if it is not the case that you ought to perform the act “maximize pleasure minus pain.” As a result, the ought implies can objection fails on either interpretation.