Debunking Arguments 89 

I will now consider another type of strategy for defending utilitarianism: namely that of so-called debunking arguments. But before I begin, let me say something about the terminology that I employ. I have stipulated that a moral intuition is epistemically significant if and only if it gives the intuiter defeasi- ble reason to believe in its content. I have also assumed that moral intuitions are epistemically significant in this way. Now, as I pointed out earlier in this chapter, even when an intuition is epistemically significant it may still lack justificatory force. That is, that a moral intuition is epistemically significant means only that it gives the intuiter a defeasible reason to believe in its con- tent. To refer to moral intuitions whose justification is not in such ways “de- feated,” let us say that a moral intuition is epistemically trustworthy if and only if it actually gives the intuiter reason to believe in its content. While I have assumed that all moral intuitions are epistemically significant, I have left it open which moral intuitions are epistemically trustworthy. Although utili- tarians cannot argue that no moral intuition is epistemically trustworthy – per the rules of the game mentioned earlier – utilitarians could still argue that some intuitions are not trustworthy and therefore pose no problem for utilitarianism. The strategy considered in this section constitutes one such argument.

Joshua Greene and Peter Singer have argued that we have evolved emo- tional responses to violence and that this renders some of our moral intuitions untrustworthy.101 In their arguments, Greene and Singer try to debunk anti-

utilitarian intuitions, by pointing to their suspect evolutionary or psychologi- cal origins. Singer writes that:

For most of our evolutionary history, human beings have lived in small groups, and the same is almost certainly true of our pre-human primate and social mammal ancestors. In these groups, violence could only be inflicted in an up- close and personal way – by hitting, pushing, strangling, or using a stick or stone as a club. To deal with such situations, we have developed immediate, emotionally based responses to questions involving close, personal interac- tions with others.102

Greene gives a more detailed account of these emotionally based responses:

First, this automatic setting responds more to harm caused as a means to an end (or as an end), rather than as a side effect […] Second, it responds more to harm caused actively, rather than passively. […] [T]hird, it responds more to harm caused directly by personal force, rather than more indirectly. [...] Put- ting these three features together, it seems that our alarm gizmo responds to

101 _{See Singer (2005) and Greene (2013), and especially Greene’s remarks on pages 264, 274}

and 328. For criticism of Singer and Greene, see Tersman (2008), Sandberg and Juth (2010), and Meyers (2015).

actions that are prototypically violent – things like hitting, slapping, punching, beating with a club, and, of course, pushing.103

Here is how the above argument could apply to one of the cases that I consid- ered earlier. In Transplant, Sarah has the option to kill a patient so that she can use the patient’s organs to save the lives of five other patients. When contem- plating whether Sarah should perform this act, its description triggers what Greene calls our “alarm gizmo” because the action is “prototypically violent.” As a consequence, we intuit that it would be wrong for Sarah to kill the patient – let’s call this the “do not kill” intuition. The argument is that because of its evolutionary and psychological origin, the “do not kill” intuition is untrust- worthy.

For the sake of the argument, let us assume that Singer and Greene get the evolutionary background and the psychological details of the “alarm gizmo” right. Even so, giving an account of why we have the “do not kill” intuition does not by itself render this intuition untrustworthy. For example, an evolu- tionary or psychological explanation for why I see colors does not by itself make my color perceptions untrustworthy; similarly, an evolutionary or psy- chological explanation for why I have moral intuitions does not by itself make these intuitions untrustworthy.

Here it is important to see that the utilitarian debunker is a selective de- bunker.104 _{The selective debunker tries to get rid of only some moral intuitions,}

while the global debunker tries to get rid of all moral intuitions. That the util- itarian is a selective debunker makes it difficult for her to employ a strategy sometimes favored by global debunkers in meta-ethics. A global debunker can argue that it is a remarkable coincidence if the evolutionary advantageous moral intuitions track truth. This fact supposedly supports that the intuitions do not in fact track truth, because it would be too unlikely for them to do so. Whatever its ultimate merits, such a global debunking argument is not readily available to the utilitarian debunker. Recall that the utilitarian debunker has already accepted that many moral intuitions are trustworthy, in particular those supporting utilitarianism, and many of these trustworthy intuitions clearly have evolutionary explanations as well. Therefore, the utilitarian must accept that there are many epistemically trustworthy intuitions that have evo- lutionary explanations. But in that case, it is neither unlikely nor surprising that a moral intuition such as the “do not kill” intuition is both explained by evolutionary facts and is epistemically trustworthy.

Another approach is to appeal to the moral relevance or salience of acts. For example, Singer asks:

103 _{Greene (2013), pp. 246-247.}

104 _{For discussion of debunking arguments targeting moral realism, see Street (2006), Enoch}

[W]hat is the moral salience of the fact that I have killed someone in a way that was possible a million years ago, rather than in a way that became possible only two hundred years ago? I would answer: none.105

Singer’s idea is that there is nothing morally special about prototypical vio- lence. Since moral intuitions produced by means of what Greene calls our “alarm gizmo” identify as wrong precisely acts of prototypical violence, the argument goes, we should not trust intuitions produced by this mechanism. It does not track something morally relevant. But to support this claim about moral relevance or salience, Singer must also make an appeal to intuitions: that there seems to be nothing special about prototypical violence. And this intuition is probably not widely shared, as many non-utilitarians surely feel that there is a clear difference between prototypical and non-prototypical vio- lence. For example, there is intuitively a moral difference between hitting a man with a club in the head than it is to either shout at him – even if the out- come in both cases is a terrible headache. Even utilitarians like myself will agree that there seems to be a difference between these cases – it is just that we for theoretical reasons do not believe that there is such a difference.

For similar reasons, it does not help to show that the utilitarian friendly intuitions are the “products of reason” and that the utilitarian unfriendly ones are the “products of emotion,” for it is far from clear whether we should trust reason-based intuitions any more or less than emotion-based ones. Moreover, many intuitions such that “pleasure is good” and that “pain is bad” do not seem to be products of reason, but have a similar emotional character as intuitions about prototypical violence. While I do not know whether these intuitions have similar psychological origins to those about prototypical violence, at least they arise intensely and suddenly in the same way.

In conclusion, what the utilitarian needs is a specific account of how moral intuitions are formed and why some of them are trustworthy and some are not. That is, we need to say something about the underlying mechanisms behind intuition formation. Having done that, the utilitarian can argue that our moral intuitions about cases such as Experience Machine, Transplant and Utility Monster fail to become epistemically trustworthy through this process, alt- hough moral intuitions which are more friendly to utilitarianism remain trust- worthy. Let us now turn to one such attempt at defending utilitarianism, which appeals to our non-conscious application of moral theories.