although it is impractical to lay out how each op- tion can be interwoven with every other one, it may be useful for comparative purposes to sketch out how a different overarching strategy from that which the obama administration has cho- sen might encompass many different options in a more integrated policy. instead of adopting Per- suasion, the obama administration might have opted to pursue regime change (it still may if its initial efforts prove fruitless). regime change is another strategy that could involve most of the other options in various roles.
First, the United states might opt to employ some version of Persuasion to set up regime change. regime change would seem far more palatable to americans, Middle easterners, europeans, and asians—and probably even to the iranian people—if they believe that iran had been offered option, one that might well be welcomed by
america’s regional allies. in these circumstances, it is also conceivable (although not likely) that saudi arabia and other Gcc states might wel- come the kind of american “tripwire” forces sug- gested under containment and that would be an important component of effective deterrence. The idea would be for the United states to “buy time” for Persuasion to work by lulling the fears of our regional allies, all of whom may grow even more alarmed if they see negotiations moving slowly while iran’s nuclear program continues to move quickly.
similarly, a regional containment strategy could also be introduced to enhance the likelihood of success for Persuasion. This is because at the same time as iran considers how to respond to the obama administration’s diplomatic overtures, it is continuing its aggressive efforts to subvert its arab neighbors and support hizballah’s and hamas’s efforts to block american peacemaking efforts. This has generated a sense of common interest between israel and its arab neighbors to counter iran’s meddling in their neighborhoods. There are also signs that iran’s ally syria is grow- ing increasingly uncomfortable with its position on the wrong side of the sunni-shi’ah divide. and as the United states begins its withdrawal from iraq, syria and iran may become rivals for influ- ence in neighboring Baghdad. a containment strategy that sought to limit iran’s influence in the Middle east heartland by working with israel and the arabs to resolve the arab-israeli conflict in all its dimensions (i.e. seeking Palestinian, syrian, and Lebanese peace agreements), and by working with iraq’s arab neighbors to reduce its influence in Baghdad, could do much to concentrate the minds of iranian leaders. if they began to feel that rather than dominate the region they were at risk of being left behind as a new more peaceful re- gional order began to emerge, they might be more inclined to take U.s. offers at the negotiating table more seriously.
was mired in an unsuccessful counterinsurgency struggle against the Kurds. in addition, applying such across-the-board pressure against tehran would strain the regime’s intelligence and secu- rity capabilities as well as its decision-making processes, and so might cause the regime to make a mistake that would allow one or another of the approaches to succeed.
a policy determined to overthrow the govern- ment of iran might very well include plans for a full-scale invasion as a contingency for extreme circumstances. certainly, if various forms of co- vert and overt support simply failed to produce the desired effect, a president determined to pro- duce regime change in iran might consider an invasion as the only other way to achieve that end. Moreover, the United states would have to expect iran to fight back against american regime change operations, as it has in the past. although the iranians typically have been careful to avoid crossing american red lines, they certainly could miscalculate, and it is entirely possible that their retaliation for U.s. regime change activities would appear to americans as having crossed just such a threshold. For example, if iran retaliated with a major terrorist attack that killed large numbers of people or a terrorist attack involving WMDs—es- pecially on U.s. soil—Washington might decide that an invasion was the only way to deal with such a dangerous iranian regime. indeed, for this same reason, efforts to promote regime change in iran might be intended by the U.s. government as deliberate provocations to try to goad the iranians into an excessive response that might then justify an american invasion.
a very good deal and turned it down. indeed, if this is the perception among iranians, more of them might be willing to oppose the regime. Thus, starting with some effort at Persuasion would be a good way to begin, but if regime change were really Washington’s goal, the United states would have to ensure that the iranians turned down the offered deal, while making sure that the deal looked attractive to others. if the iran experts are right that tehran is unlikely to compromise no matter what it is offered as long as it feels threat- ened, then a clever approach to regime change might be to simultaneously offer a good deal (al- beit not one so good that tehran might overcome its paranoia) while ratcheting up a range of regime change programs that the leadership would per- ceive as a threat. arguably, this is what the Bush 43 administration did—although that was certainly not the intention of most members of the admin- istration charged with handling iran. (Then again, it may have been the intention of others working elsewhere within the administration.)88
as far as the regime change options themselves, an american administration might choose to pursue all three of the specific routes—popular revolu- tion, insurgency, and coup—on the grounds that doing so would increase the likelihood that one of them will succeed. Moreover, employing all three simultaneously might create helpful synergies among them. For instance, if the regime becomes bogged down fighting various insurgencies, irani- an military officers might become convinced that the leadership must be replaced and that there is an opportunity to do so. This is effectively what happened in iraq in 1963 and 1968 when Baghdad
88 This kind of “poison pill” stratagem is exactly what some iranians fear the obama administration is doing, and what other iranians claim as
a way of justifying rejection of Washington’s overtures. These iranians fear that the United states is not genuine in its pursuit of compromise and cooperation with tehran, and is simply setting up iran for much tighter sanctions and/or regime change. consequently, another hurdle the obama administration will have to clear to make its preferred policy of Persuasion work will be convincing the iranians that
Washington is sincere and not just looking for an excuse to clobber tehran, either with much harsher sanctions or regime change. The obama administration will have to convince at least some key iranian leaders, probably including Khamene’i, that it is willing to take “yes” for an answer.
option would be invaluable—indeed, indispen- sible—aids to a regime change policy.