The incentives offered to iran will need to be de- termined through a process of negotiation with both iran and america’s allies and partners in the
The lifting of not only international sanc- tions but unilateral sanctions against iran as well, particularly the comprehensive unilateral sanctions imposed by the United states.
a universal settlement of all claims between iran and the United states (which include monies owed for some iranian arms pur- chases, the freezing of assets, and other matters that the iranians believe constitute a sizable amount of money.)
The provision of positive inducements for expanded international trade and invest- ment in iran, including trade credits and investment guarantees for foreign firms putting capital into iran.
Development assistance for iranian agri- culture, infrastructure, education, energy, and environmental modernization.
The lifting of american unilateral sanctions against iran—which the Bush administration was never willing to offer explicitly because of its attachment to regime change—could have a ma- jor impact on iranian thinking because the aver- age iranian and the regime’s chief economic of- ficials ardently desire it.
Security Guarantees
although tehran denies it in public, the interna- tional community assumes that iran’s pursuit of a nuclear enrichment capability is meant, at least in part, to deter attacks against iran. consequently, another set of positive incentives that the inter- national community will likely have to offer are guarantees for the security of the country and its regime.
Many americans have suggested that the United states pledge not to attack iran, as President John F. Kennedy did for cuba as part of the resolution be possible to reach a deal with iran that does not
allow it to claim that it retained an enrichment capability of some kind.
When the United states and its international partners meet to discuss this particular issue, a key consideration should be the extent, condi- tions, and intrusiveness of any inspections and monitoring regime that iran would have to accept as part of the deal. simply put, the more intrusive and comprehensive the inspections regime, the more willing the international community ought to be to compromise on this issue. Nevertheless, because the potential for a breakout capability is so worrisome, the international community should insist on an iraq-style inspections regime with a dedicated organization (perhaps within the iaea, but definitely with a separate, much larger staff and budget) to ensure that the monitoring of an iranian enrichment program remains active and vigilant.
economic Inducements
especially given the fragile state of iran’s econo- my, economic inducements are likely to be both the most straightforward and most important element of a new international overture to iran. Under the Bush administration, tehran was offered membership in the World trade orga- nization, the lifting of international sanctions (most of which exert only modest pressure on the iranian economy), and the resumption of its presanctions trade with europe and Japan. These were not enough to convince iran to take the deal.
consequently, a new strategy based on the Per- suasion approach will have to hold out the prom- ise of much greater economic rewards. These should include:
The prospect of support from other inter- national financial institutions such as the World Bank.
Persian Gulf constructed from a process of secu- rity discussions, confidence-building measures, and (eventually) real arms control agreements is probably the only realistic way to meet iran’s legitimate security concerns in a manner that would be palatable to the United states and its al- lies in the region. Thus the United states ought to be willing to offer the inauguration of just such a process (using the commission on security and cooperation in europe as a starting point), which would hold out the potential for iran to secure constraints on the deployment and operation of american military forces in the region in return for their agreement to take on different but com- mensurate limitations on their own forces.
Political Incentives
iranians of virtually every stripe aspire for their country to play a leadership role in the Middle east. indeed, many seek to dominate their imme- diate neighbors as did the Pahlavi shahs in their day. iran’s nuclear program appears to be part of that drive, although the explanation for how it would bolster iranian prestige or power, and to what end, varies from person to person. Whatev- er the rationale, convincing iran to agree to a deal that would end its nuclear program—and, ideally, its other anti-status-quo activities as well—will probably also entail conditions that allow iran to fulfill at least some of these aspirations some other way.
a key question will be whether iranians are ready to be accepted as a legitimate participant in the in- ternational politics of the Middle east, but not the dominant state in the region, as so many iranians want. again, views on this vary in tehran, but it is just unclear what the iranian leadership would be willing to accept, and direct negotiations with iran should help to ascertain whether there is room for compromise. Under no circumstances, however, should the United states grant iran a position of dominance, nor should we leave any ambiguity about what we see as iran’s role in the region. our of the cuban Missile crisis. such a pledge may
be necessary, but Washington should not assume that it will be sufficient. it is likely that tehran will want more concrete actions by the United states (and other countries) if it is to give up the safety of a potential nuclear arsenal—even a theoretical one. it is critical that the international communi- ty, and especially the United states, provide such concrete demonstrations of good faith both be- cause it is unlikely that the iranian people will be swayed otherwise, and because it can assuage the residual fears of european and asian publics that the United states is simply using the diplomatic process to set up a military operation against iran. The more difficult process will be to diminish the conventional military threat posed to iran by american forces in the Middle east and indian ocean. The United states has vital interests in the Persian Gulf region as that part of the world is both economically vital and politically unstable. consequently, even after the United states draws down its presence in iraq, it is highly likely that it will still maintain military forces in the Gulf, and those forces (which can be quickly reinforced from other regions) will always constitute a threat to iran.
The United states could make unilateral conces- sions to tehran, like agreeing to deploy no more than one aircraft carrier battle group in the Gulf or arabian sea at any time. however, tehran is unlikely to view this as much of a concession because of how easy it would be for the United states to break that agreement if it ever chose to. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the United states will not be willing to go much beyond that (assuming it is willing to go even that far) for fear of jeopardizing its ability to respond to other problems in the fragile Gulf region. Finally, few americans will want to re- strict Washington’s ability to employ force in the Gulf without reciprocal moves by iran. For all of those reasons, a new security architecture in the
Moreover, a critical element of the Persuasion option is for the United states to demonstrate that it wants better relations with iran and is willing to do everything to achieve this short of accepting iran’s nuclear ambitions, support for violent extremist groups, and efforts to overturn the regional status quo. The Bush administra- tion’s refusal to speak to iran directly conveyed precisely the opposite conviction—and so tend- ed to reinforce the perceptions of both iranians and others (including europeans, Japanese, rus- sians, chinese, and indians) that Washington was not sincere and was merely going through the motions of reaching out to tehran in the hope that tehran would reject the offer so that Washington could then pursue a more aggres- sive policy. The goal should rather be to con- vince the iranians that the United states wants them to do the right thing, not to trick them into doing the wrong thing to make more aggressive policy options more viable. consequently, this approach should express a clear desire for direct