The first—and potentially most problematic—re- quirement to implement this option is to identify a potential insurgent group that is willing and able to play this role with american assistance. The best candidate for such a role would be a
67 amy Belasco, “The cost of iraq, afghanistan, and other Global War on terror operations since 9/11,” rL33110, congressional research
National Council of resistance/ Mujahedin-e Khalq
Perhaps the most prominent (and certainly the most controversial) opposition group that has at- tracted attention as a potential U.s. proxy is the Ncri (National council of resistance of iran), the political movement established by the MeK (Mujahedin-e Khalq). critics believe the group to be undemocratic and unpopular, and indeed anti-american. in contrast, the group’s champi- ons contend that the movement’s long-standing opposition to the iranian regime and record of successful attacks on and intelligence-gathering operations against the regime make it worthy of U.s. support. They also argue that the group is no longer anti-american and question the merit of earlier accusations. raymond tanter, one of the group’s supporters in the United states, contends that the MeK and the Ncri are allies for regime change in tehran and also act as a useful proxy for gathering intelligence.68 The MeK’s greatest intel-
ligence coup was the provision of intelligence in 2002 that led to the discovery of a secret site in iran for enriching uranium.
Despite its defenders’ claims, the MeK remains on the U.s. government list of foreign terror- ist organizations. in the 1970s, the group killed three U.s. officers and three civilian contractors in iran.69 During the 1979-1980 hostage crisis,
the group praised the decision to take american hostages and elaine sciolino reported that while group leaders publicly condemned the 9/11 at- tacks, within the group celebrations were wide- spread.70 Undeniably, the group has conducted
terrorist attacks—often excused by the MeK’s ad- vocates because they are directed against the ira- nian government. For example, in 1981, the group identity that is not tied to the regime. The groups
have used smuggling to strengthen themselves, bringing in weapons, to the point where many are now well-armed. Geography and terrain have helped these groups resist tehran, as large parts of iran are rugged and thus good guerrilla country. although these groups are more organized than students and workers and, in the Kurdish case, represent a sizeable entity, their ability to mobilize beyond their communities is limited. Persians tend to be highly nationalistic and would have to be ex- pected to unite over any perceived attempt to frag- ment the country. Nor are there strong ties among the non-Persian groups, and in the past, these divisions have allowed them to be contained and defeated piecemeal. some large ethnic groups also have no desire to oppose the regime. For instance, iran’s azeri population, which represents roughly a quarter of the country’s overall population are well integrated (supreme Leader Khamene’i is of azeri origin) and have worked closely with Persian elites. as the above discussion suggests, the Kurds are the most likely proxy given their size, cohesive identity, and ambitions. The Kurds, however, are divided internally, and many of their leaders have been co-opted by the state, while those who have not are often subject to brutal intimidation. irani- an intelligence aggressively targets Kurdish leaders abroad, whether in iraq or europe—even to the point of assassination. The Kurds are also justifi- ably suspicious of outside promises, having been used and discarded in the past. Finally, stirring Kurdish separatism in iran would not play well in either Baghdad or ankara, two key american allies whose aid would be needed for any insur- gent campaign against iran.
68 raymond tanter, “iran Building Nuclear-capable Missiles in secret tunnels: options for the international community,” iran Policy
committee, November 21, 2005, available at <http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/iPc/perspex-ipc-tanter- nuclearcapablemissiles-112105.htm>.
69 The MeK claims the individuals responsible were executed by the shah’s regime and thus are no longer part of the movement. see slavin,
Bitter Friends, p. 168.
group, as well as to provide a safe haven where the group can train, plan, organize, heal, and resupply. This was the role that Pakistan played when the United states provided aid to the af- ghan mujahideen in the 1980s, and the shah’s iran played when the United states provided aid to the Kurds in the 1970s. Without such a part- ner, it would be far more difficult for the United states to support an insurgency. one thing that the United states would have in its favor when searching for a state to play this role is that many of iran’s neighbors dislike and fear the islamic republic.
however, balanced against that are a series of hurdles that the United states would have to over- come. even those states that loathe and fear teh- ran have left no doubt that they do not seek an open conflict with iran, and supporting an insur- gency could provoke iranian retaliation. More- over, these states fear tehran would likely retaliate through its unconventional warfare capabilities by increasing support for insurgents, terrorists, and other opposition groups in any neighboring state that supports the insurgency.
to deal with this, the United states would not only have to reassure the neighboring state, but also potentially provide real aid. The neighbor- ing state may seek american counterterrorism assistance as a way of bracing itself for iranian unconventional retaliation. it might ask for a more conventional commitment of american military protection to deter iranian aggres- sion. and, almost certainly, the state would use its fear of tehran’s response to get other things from the United states. For instance, during the 1980s, the Pakistanis demanded stepped up american arms sales and military training (for a conventional war against india) in return for its help in afghanistan, despite the fact that no one benefited more from the american aid to the bombed the headquarters of the islamic republic
Party, which was then the clerical leadership’s main political organization, killing an estimated 70 senior officials. More recently, the group has claimed credit for over a dozen mortar attacks, assassinations, and other assaults on iranian civil- ian and military targets between 1998 and 2001. at the very least, to work more closely with the group (at least in an overt manner), Washington would need to remove it from the list of foreign terrorist organizations.
The group itself also appears to be undemocratic and enjoys little popularity in iran itself. it has no political base in the country, although it appears to have an operational presence. in particular, its active participation on saddam husayn’s side during the bitter iran-iraq War made the group widely loathed. in addition, many aspects of the group are cultish, and its leaders, Massoud and Maryam rajavi, are revered to the point of obses- sion. as iran scholar ervand abrahamian claims, “it is a mystical cult. . . . if Massoud rajavi got up tomorrow and said the world was flat, his mem- bers would accept it.”71
Despite its limited popularity (but perhaps be- cause of its successful use of terrorism), the ira- nian regime is exceptionally sensitive to the MeK and is vigilant in guarding against it. During the early years of the revolution, the regime rooted out members throughout iran and massacred demonstrators who marched in the group’s name. abroad, the regime monitors the group’s activities carefully, tries to disrupt its bases, and at times has assassinated its members.