a critical element of the Persuasion option, and largely what sets it apart from the engagement option, is the need to secure international agree- ment on a series of painful sanctions to be im- posed on iran if it turns down the package of benefits. The sanctions need to be made clear to iran as the punishment for refusing to take the deal at the same time it is proffered. in addition, the negotiations within the international commu- nity on the sanctions need to be an integral part of working out the details of the benefits so that the United states and other countries more willing to sanction iran (like France) can trade benefits for sanctions with those states less inclined to penal- ize iran for its recalcitrance.
These sanctions need to be more painful than those imposed on iran so far, but they probably should be graduated—meaning that they can start out less painful and grow more onerous over time if iran continues to refuse the deal. a graduated approach of ratcheting up the pressure on iran will make many countries more comfortable with the process since it would mean that iran would have ample opportunity to reverse course before the most painful measures are imposed.
so far, most of the UN security council sanctions on iran have had little impact because they have targeted the travel and foreign assets of individu- als and iranian entities connected to its nuclear program. The financial sanctions imposed on iran both multilaterally and unilaterally by the United states and a number of european coun- tries have been far more threatening to tehran, and many iranians seem to believe that they are contributing to iran’s current crop of serious eco- nomic problems.17
17 see, for example, robin Wright, “stuart Levy’s War: The sanctions That could coax iran,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, october 31,
sanctions altogether. as noted above, it takes long periods of time for economic sanctions to have their impact and persuade a recalcitrant regime to take an action it hopes to avoid. This means that for sanctions to work, they must be sustain- able for months or years. however, as history has shown—most dramatically in the case of iraq un- der saddam husayn—sanctions that are consid- ered excessively harsh and are believed to be caus- ing widespread malnutrition, starvation, medical problems, and ultimately the death of innocent people (especially children) are unsustainable, regardless of the accuracy of those perceptions. if the international community were to cut off ira- nian gasoline imports, it is virtually axiomatic that the iranians would claim that innocents were dy- ing, for example, because food could not be pro- duced or distributed, homes could not be heated, and ambulances could not rush seriously ill people to the hospital. These claims might prove entirely false, but the sight of dead children whose deaths are said to be related to the sanctions would likely undermine international support for the sanc- tions, regardless of the iranian regime’s behavior. For these reasons, sanctions against iran’s hydro- carbon economy, particularly its vulnerable gaso- line imports, probably should be used only as part of a final set of sanctions at the end of a longer process of ratcheting up the pressure on tehran— if they are employed at all.
Nail Down the Sanctions Up Front
an important lesson from the experiences of the Bush administration on iran, as well as the clin- ton administration’s efforts to deal with saddam husayn, is the need to agree on specific sanc- tions and announce them as warnings long before they are to come into effect. although the great powers all agreed during the Bush 43 years that iran should not be allowed to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, and that it should be punished for refusing to comply with various UN security council demands embodied in to the regime but would also take aim at organiza-
tions widely loathed by the iranian people, a rare and fortuitous circumstance in the history of eco- nomic sanctions.
Weighing oil and Gas Sanctions
Potentially the most devastating sanctions the international community might levy against iran would focus on its hydrocarbon economy. iran is highly dependent on its oil exports for rev- enue and its gasoline imports for transportation. Prohibiting either one could cripple the iranian economy and cause massive problems through- out iranian society. For this reason, many have advocated such sanctions as being the only sure way to exert enough pressure to motivate the ira- nian regime to give up its nuclear program. This logic may well be correct, but there are real risks if it proves otherwise. The oil market re- mains volatile right now, and the loss of iran’s 2.5 million barrels per day of exports could push oil prices back up to economically damaging levels. For this reason, there is little international ap- petite for preventing iran from exporting oil. By the same token, if the international community were to prohibit (or even limit) iranian gasoline imports, there is a real risk that the regime would respond by suspending its oil exports, causing the same problem. after all, from tehran’s perspec- tive, the restriction of gasoline imports could risk causing the collapse of the iranian economy and thus the regime itself. in such circumstances, ira- nian leaders may see little point in restraint be- cause they may not feel that the loss of their oil revenue is as important if they cannot purchase one of their most essential imports. or, they may calculate that the only way that they can persuade the international community to give up a gasoline embargo is to do the one thing that would threat- en the economy of the international community. Prohibiting gasoline sales to iran could also be so draconian that it would actually undermine the
actions. The more it is the case that new sanctions are triggered by iranian actions (with both the ac- tions and the sanctions to be imposed agreed to beforehand), the harder it will be for those who op- pose further sanctions to avoid them. as Perkov- ich points out, because iran has endlessly insisted that its nuclear program is intended only for ci- vilian energy purposes, it ought to be possible for the UN security council to forbid certain actions that are only consistent with nuclear weapons pro- duction and demand other actions that are only consistent with nuclear energy production. harsh sanctions should be used as penalties for iran’s un- willingness to do either. This scenario would make it very hard for the russians, chinese, and others to argue against the penalties.
some examples of iranian actions that could be tied to specific sanctions include:
an iranian withdrawal from the Non-Pro- liferation treaty, which could only be inter- preted as intent to build weapons with the uranium they have enriched.
iranian unwillingness to sign the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation treaty, which provides for much more aggressive and comprehensive inspections, and which tehran has repeatedly said it has accepted, although no iranian government has ever actually ratified it.
Further enrichment of low-enriched ura- nium (LeU), which is adequate for energy generation, to highly enriched uranium (heU), which is really only necessary for nuclear weapons.18
a failure to convert the LeU that iran now possesses into fuel rods for reactors. The resolutions enacted under chapter Vii of the UN
charter (which makes them binding upon all member states), whenever it came time to actual- ly impose such sanctions on iran, reluctant coun- tries were able to weaken the actual resolutions to the point where they had little bite.
it is always easier to agree on harsher sanctions if the negotiations are conducted well before any sanctions are likely to be imposed. The key is then to codify those sanctions—and ideally write them into the very resolutions making the demands—so that they cannot be watered down when it comes time to impose them. of course, the iranians and their supporters would doubtless try even then, but the best chance that the United states has of secur- ing harsh international sanctions is unquestionably to codify them and secure public, international consensus on them long before they actually need to be implemented. codifying the sanctions to be incurred for failure to comply at each step of the process is also critically important so that the ira- nians have a clear sense of the pain they will suffer if they fail to comply. only in this way and only if the sanctions were very painful would those irani- ans arguing for accommodation with the interna- tional community be able to demonstrate that the price iran would pay for continued intransigence would be too high. The repeated ability of iran’s al- lies in the security council to water down sanc- tions resolutions has convinced most of the iranian leadership that their allies will be able to do so in the future. only if tehran sees that the sanctions are daunting and were agreed to ahead of time would it be likely to reconsider its course of action.
Unambiguous Triggers
George Perkovich of the carnegie endowment has compellingly argued that another critical element of any new sanctions on iran is to tie them, to the extent possible, to detectable iranian
18 heU does have some other esoteric uses, but it is not necessary for iran’s declared purposes. and given the danger of heU as an explosive,
is important is securing international support and convincing the iranians to accept the deal on of- fer; everything else ought to be incidental from an american perspective.
some americans have argued that the deal ought to be part of a “grand bargain” between tehran and the West (or the whole international commu- nity) because iran will only be able to make the necessary concessions in the context of securing its needs on a host of other issues. others have argued that such a grand bargain would simply be too much for the iranian system to handle, and so the United states and the international commu- nity should instead seek incremental agreements and/or deals on various pieces of the whole, both of which could be more easily digested by teh- ran. Ultimately, it should be left to the iranians to decide which approach is most palatable for them, and the United states and its allies should make very clear that they are amenable to either approach. it should not matter how the United states gets to the outcome, only that it gets there. Given how many hurdles the United states will face, it should not add more unnecessarily. For the same reasons, the United states should be willing to allow the iranians to define who and how they meet, as well as where. some analysts argue that americans must be present at the table when offers are put to the iranians to demonstrate U.s. commitment to them. others have insisted that an american presence at the table would make it impossible for tehran to accede to any such offer. again, all that matters is whether the
Iranians want americans at the table.
The one related element of process that does transcend the general rule that the United states should focus on function, not form, is whether the offer should be made to tehran secretly or security council, working through the
iaea, should demand that iran convert all of its LeU into fuel rods—which ought to be acceptable to tehran given its claims that it wants nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons.
continued storage of LeU near iran’s cen- trifuge cascades—where it could easily be enriched to heU for weapons. indeed, the iaea should demand that iran estab- lish a storage facility for all of its LeU far from its centrifuge plants, with appropriate safeguards and regular inspections by the iaea to account for all of the LeU iran has produced.19
Under circumstances in which tehran may be attempting to sow confusion and create ambigu- ity, this is an extremely useful approach to the problem of how to impose sanctions on iran for its misbehavior. however, it cannot be the only method of imposing new sanctions on iran. as noted above, negotiations over a deal cannot be allowed to become a means by which iran simply avoids any penalties. consequently, other sanc- tions will have to be tied to certain deadlines— iran must accept either key pieces of or the entire deal being offered by the international commu- nity by a prescribed time, or it will face other pen- alties. otherwise, tehran may have no incentive to ever take the deal or reject it, and it will simply be able to keep playing for time.