Inthischapter,Ihaveexaminedthediscursivesystemsemployedtooutline conceptualarchitectureofgharar.Atvariouspointsinthischapter,Ihavedistinguished
betweentwoformsofuncertainty:1)unknown-unknownsand2)known-unknowns.For themostpart,thischapterfocusedonanalyzingtheformsofknowledgethatjurists employtodefinetheformsofuncertainty–theknown-unknowns–associatedwithgharar.
Theseformsofknowledge—suchasdescription,mensuration,andabilitytodelivera good—arediscursivelyanteriortotheirconfigurationanddeploymentinthediscourseof
gharar. Fromuncertaintywithrespecttothedescription,thedeliverydate,andabilityto
deliverjuristsderiveandexplainthesecondarycausesofgharar.Notwithstandingthe
factthateachjuristdefinestheprimaryformsofuncertaintyinslightlydifferentways, theseformsofuncertaintyformadiscursiveregularitythatallowsforthedebatesamong juristsfromdifferentschoolsoflaw.
Returningtotheunknown-unknowns,knowledgealsogivesrisetothem.Inthe caseoftheunknown-unknownsassociatedwithgharar,theyarisefromtheboundsthat
juristsplaceondiscourse.Forexample,wesawhowjuristsignoreissuessuchasthe potentialdeathofacounterpartyorthecomplexlogisticsrequiredfordeliveringgoods.
Whendiscoursesetstheboundsonwhatwillbethoughtandhowthoughtwilloccurit alsocreatestheseunknown-unknowns.
Isthereaformofuncertaintythatknowledgedoesnotcreateandsubsumesuch thatitcanstandasatruecontrarytocertainty?Intermsoftheirdiscussionsofgharar,
juristsoffernoinsightintothisquestion.However,returningtothediscussionsof uncertaintyinworksofuṣūlal-fiqhinkalām,twointerestingpassagessuggestthatthe answertothisquestionisno.‘Alī b.‘Alī al-Āmidī (d.631/1233)dividesuncertaintyinto simpleandcomplex,orbasīṭ andmurakkabrespectively.Accordingtohim,simple uncertaintyisatotalprivationofthoughtwithrespecttowhatoneshouldknowbutdoes not.Thisprivationhasimportantimplicationsfortherepresentationofghararaswewill
seeinthefollowingchapter.Indeed,thisprivationisaformofignorancein Āmidī’s view.
Ontheotherhand,complexuncertaintyarisesfromthemismatchbetween thoughtandreferentthatIexaminedintheintroductiontothischapter.Regardlessofthe structuraldifferenceofbothformsofuncertainty, Āmidī definesthembothinrelationto certainty.Seeingthepotentialcircularityofdefininguncertaintyintermsofcertainty, Āmidī insiststhatsimpleuncertaintyisessentiallycontrarytocertaintysuchthatthey cannotcombine.Infact,heclaimsthatanabsoluteuncertainty(al-jahlal-muṭlaq),which wouldnotbedefinedinrelationtocertainty,cannotexistsincesuchuncertaintycould onlyapplytoinanimatematterdevoidofthoughtandlanguage.233Certaintyand
uncertaintyaretraitsofhumanthought,andlikemostifnotallMuslimscholars, Āmidī
agreesthatsomeformofinnatecertaintygroundstheacquisitionofallknowledge.Such aclaimaboutinnatecertaintyshoulddrawintoquestionhisclaimthatsimpleuncertainty andcertaintycanbeessentialcontraries.Eveninthecaseofsimpleuncertainty,thelack ofknowledgeisstilldefinedinrelationtotheknowledgethatsomeoneshouldorwill eventuallyhave.
Second,intheintroductiontohisAnwāral-Malakūt,theShi‘ī theologian‘Allāma al-Ḥillī (648/1250-726/1325)notesthatsomepeopleclaimthatitisimpossibletodefine certainty.234Accordingtothisgroup,whateverisnotcertaintycanonlybedefinedby
certainty,butthisdefinitionconvertsuncertaintyintocertaintysuchthatitisimpossible forthecountermomenttocertaintytoremainuncertainty.Ineffect,nothingcan
effectivelystandoutsideofcertaintyanditsidentitarianmodeofrepresentation.This positionmeansthatcertaintyiscircularsincethereisnotruecontrarytovalidateit.235 However,tosaverepresentationandthoughtfromthiscircularity, Ḥillī remarks,
Knowledgeiseitherarelationalpredicate(ṣifa)subsistinginthe knoweroraconceptcommensurablewiththereferentof
knowledge.Notwithstandingthedifferencebetweenthesetwo viewsandappraisals,thisreferentofknowledge(ma‘lūm)is onlyknownwhenitsconceptorpredicationoccurstothe knower.Knowledgeofthisconceptorpredicationmayalsobe duetoadefinitionordescriptionfromwhatwasnotknown. However,thedependencyofthereferentonknowledgeinthe firstcaseisdifferentfromthedependencyofthisconceptonthe definitionofdescriptionsuchthatthereisnocircularity
(tawaqqufal-ma‘lūm‘alā al-‘ilmfī’l-awwalmughāyirli- tawaqqufbi-tilkaal-ṣura‘alā al-ḥaddwa’l-rasm).236
234Forbiographicaldetails,seeEI2,s.v.al-Ḥillī.
235Jamālal-Dīn Ḥasanb.Yūsifb.Muṭahharal-Ḥillī,Anwāral-malakūtfī sharḥ al-yāqūt (Tehran:Chāpkhānah-iDānisghāh,1959),p.12.
AlthoughtheArabicofthispassageisproblematic, Ḥillī arguesfortwoalternative momentsintheproductionofcertainty.237Thefirstistheacquisitionofaconceptora predicateofthereferent.Presumably,suchacquisitionarisesfromperceptionorsome formofreasoning.Thesecondmomentintheacquisitionofcertaintyisadefinitionor descriptionofthepreviouslyunknownreferent. Accordingto Ḥillī,thesetwowaysof obtainingcertaintyaredifferentsuchthatnocircularityoccursinthedefinitionof certainty.Again,thispositionissimilartotheclaimofIbnQudāmathatwesawin chapteronethatareferent,knowledgeofit,andcommunicationofitarenotallthesame. AlthoughIbnQudāmaestablishesthatthesethreeformsofthereferentarenotthesame, theymustbecommensurableforrepresentationtooccur.Likewise. Ḥillī stilllinks
languageandthoughtthroughtheconceptorpredicatethatissubordinatedtothereferent. Intheend, Ḥillī’sanalysisremainswithintheconfinesofthenotionofcertaintyachieved throughanidentitybetweenreferent,thoughtofit,andcommunicationofit.
Althoughneither Ḥillī nor Āmidī clarifieswhatisexactlyatstakeifcertainty subsumesuncertainty,thelitterateurAbū Ḥayyānal-Tawḥīdī (d.414/1023)offerssome insightintotheimplicationsintheintroductiontoanepistlehewroteindefenseof logic.238 Tawḥīdī remarksthat,
Bothapriorirationalknowledgeandintuitiveknowledgeaffirm thatcertaintyissuperiortouncertainty.Indeed,uncertaintydoes nothaveanysuperioritybecauseanythingissuperiorto
237 TheArabicshouldprobablyread,tawaqqufal-‘ilm‘alā al-ma‘lūm.
238ForfurtherbiographicaldetailsaboutTawḥīdī,seeEI2,s.v.Abū Ḥayyānal-Tawḥīdī; MarySt.Germain,“Abū Ḥayyānal-Tawḥīdī,”inEssaysinArabicLiteraryBiography:925- 1350.Ed.TerriDeYoungandMarySt.Germain(Wiesbaden:HarrassowitzVerlag,2011),pp. 348-356.Foradiscussionoftheroleofphilosophyinadāb,seeEverettK.Rowson,“Philosopher asLittérateur:al-Tawḥīdī andHisPredecessors,”ZeitschriftfürGeschichtederArabisch-
uncertainty.Infact,uncertaintyisthecompleteprivationofany formofsuperiority.Likewiseexistenceissaidtobesuperiorto itsprivationandcompletenessissuperiortodefectiveness.239
Thispassageoutlinesatheoryofrepresentation,whichTawḥīdī claimseveryoneknows bothintuitivelyandrationally. Tobeprecise,thispassagecoordinatesthreesetsof contraries:theontologicalcontrariesofexistenceanditsprivationornon-existence,the epistemologicalcontrariesofcertaintyanduncertainty,andtheteleologicalcategoriesof completenessanddefectiveness.Ontheonehand,thepassageequatesexistence,
certainty,andcompletenesswithvirtue.Ontheotherhand,itequatestheprivationof existence,uncertainty,anddefectivenesswithinferiorityandimmorality.
Thisshortyetfecundpassagerevealsthecomplexprocessthatensuresthe marginalizationofuncertainty.Thistheorystripsuncertaintyofanymeritasanobjectof study.Indeed,uncertaintyisathreatthatexistsonlyinitsrelationtothemorallypositive counter-momentsofexistence,certainty,andcompletion. Tostudyandthereby
acknowledgeuncertaintywouldbethebasestactthatonecouldengageinaccordingto thischargedpassage.
Ifuncertaintyweretheproductofcertaintyitwouldcollapsethesystemsof contrariesthatcoordinaterepresentation.Inparticular,itwouldunderminethenotionof truthandcertainty,whicharisesfromobjectivity,anderroranduncertainty,whicharises fromsubjectivity.Furthermore,ifcertaintyproduceduncertaintyitwouldcollapsethe moralequationthatthispassagepresents.Certaintycouldnotbethevirtuousreference
239Abū Ḥayyānal-Tawḥīdī,Al-Risālafī al-‘ulūm,inRisālatānli’l-‘allāmaal-shahīrAbī
Ḥayyānal-Tawḥīdī (Qusṭanṭīnīya:Maṭba‘atal-Jawā’ib,1884),p.201. Annahusubiqafī qaḍāyā al-‘uqūlal-ṣaḥīḥawa-thubitafī muqaddamātal-albābal-ṣarīḥaannaal-‘ilmashrafminal-jahl ballā sharaf li’l-jahlfa-yakunghayruhuashrafminhuli-annaal-jahl‘adamhākadhā.Qilaal- wujūdashrafminal-‘adamwa’l-ṣiḥḥaashrafminal-saqam.
pointifitwerealsotogiveriseuncertainty,apointofextremeimmorality.Indeed,the moralproblemthatarisesfromknowledgecreatinguncertaintyhaswell-knownparallels inIslamictheologywiththeproblemofhowanomnipotentandjustGodcouldcreate evilorallowittoexist.
Theuncertaintyassociatedwithghararandtheuncertaintydiscussedinworkof
uṣūlal-fiqhandkalāmarebothimmoral.Theuncertaintyassociatedwithgharariseven worsesinceitisillegalunlikesimpleformsofignoranceorerror.Althoughgharar
symmetricallyaffectsbothcounterpartieswhentheyenterintoatransaction,ultimately onecounterpartywillbenefitattheexpenseoftheothergiventime.Ineffect,ghararis
likeaformofgambling–ananalogywewillexamineinthenextchapter.Forjurists,gain andlossshouldfollowcertainty,albeitcertaintydefinedonlyintermsofthedescription, deliverydate,andabilitytodeliveryofthegood.
Thereremainsanotherkeydifferencebetweendiscussionsofuncertaintyin Islamiccommerciallawontheonehandandinuṣūlal-fiqhandkalām.Inthecaseofuṣūl al-fiqhandkalām,arepresentationisincorrectduetoanincorrectrelationshipbetween thoughtandthereferent.Evenmoreproblematically,onewhohasthisformof
uncertaintycannotrecognizetheerror,asituationwhichleadstomistakes.However,in thecaseoftheformsofuncertaintyassociatedwithgharar,oneisconsciousofitand
thuscanmakeinformeddecisions.Inthefollowingchapters,inordertoexplainthe differencesbetweentheformsofuncertaintyassociatedwithghararandthatadumbrated
inuṣūlal-fiqhandkalām,Iexaminetherelationshipsbetweenformsofuncertaintyand thereferentsuponwhichthoughtlabors.
Chapter Three
The Privation of Objects and Thought
Inthepreviouschapter,Iexaminedtheformsofuncertaintythatengendergharar
andhowjuristsemployavarietyofformsofknowledgeinordertoconceptualizeand definetheseformsofuncertainty.Inthischapter,Iwillbegintoexaminehowjurists applytheseformsofuncertaintytoanalyzeanddiscussspecifictransactions. Inorderto pursuethisanalysis,thischapterwillexaminetwointerconnectedissues.Thefirstissue istounderstandthesystemsofknowledgethatjuristsemploytodescribetheexistenceof goodsandvariousaspectsofcommercialtransactions.Thesecondissueistounderstand theexactwaythatjuristsemploytheformsofuncertaintyexaminedintheprevious chaptertodescribethelegalityofcommercialtransaction.Ortoputitdifferently,one mustunderstandhowtheformsofuncertaintyassociatedwithghararrelatetospecific
referentsandtransactions.Theexaminationofthesetwoissuesrevealshowgharar
enablesaccuraterepresentationsandjudgmentsaboutcommercialtransactions. Tobegintoanalyzetherelationshipbetweentheformsofuncertaintyassociated withghararandspecifictransactionsandgoodsweneedreturnonceagaintothemodel
ofrepresentationcommontoworksofkalāmanduṣūlal-fiqh.Accordingtothismodel, reality,whichmustexistin-itself,istheultimatearbiterofthevalidityofthoughtand communication.Whereas,certaintyarisesfromaperfectidentitybetweenthoughtandits referent,uncertaintyarisesfromamismatchbetweenthetwo.Withthisformof
uncertaintydetailedinworksofkalāmanduṣūlal-fiqh,oneisunconsciousofthis incorrectsynthesisandthuscannotmakeaninformeddecision.
Ontheotherhand,withgharar,counterpartiesareawarewhenuncertaintyaffects
atransaction,andthustheycanmakeinformeddecisionsaboutthisuncertainty.Such consciousnessofuncertaintyrequiresadifferentrelationshipbetweenthoughtand referentsthantherelationshipoutlinedinworksofuṣūlal-fiqhandkalām.
Inordertounderstandgharar,intheremainingchaptersofthisstudyIwillexaminethe
useoftheformsofuncertaintywithgharartoanalyzespecifictransactions.
Notwithstandingthevarietyoftransactionsandlegalviewsthatjuristspresent,the relationshipbetweentheformsofuncertaintyandtheiremploymenttoanalyze transactionsmaybecategorizedintothreetypesofrelationships:1)privative,2) analogical,and3)hermeneutical.
Thischapterwillfocusontheprivativerelationshipsinceitisthemostbasic interactionbetweentheformsofuncertaintyandthetransactionsthatjuristsanalyzein commercialtransactions.Tounderstandtheprivation,wefirstmostbrieflyreturnto Aristotelianmodelofrepresentation,whicharguesforthecommensurabilityofa referent’sexistence,thoughtofit,andcommunicationaboutit.Notwithstandingthe commensurabilityofthesethreeformsofareferent,theexistenceofthereferentin realityisprimarywhereasthoughtofandcommunicationaboutitaresecondary.Itis realitythatdeterminestheobjectivevalidityofthoughtandlanguage.Withoutsuchan independentrealitypopulatedwithself-subsistingreferentsobjectivetruthwouldnot exist.Ibn ḤazmshedslightonthispointinhisTaqrībli-ḥaddal-manţiqwhenheremarks thatexistencehasfourmodesofmanifestation(bayān),butit“isthefirstofthesemodes ofmanifestation(bayān)ofthereferent,sinceanon-existentcannotberecognized.”In
turn,thenon-existentcannotbethoughtorspokenof,accordingtoIbn Ḥazm.240Thelack
ofareferentinrealitycausesprivationofthoughtandcommunicationaboutit.
Theprivationthatcausesghararismorecomplexthanlogicallyorempirically
impossiblereferentsliketheround-squareorunicorn.Thereferentsthatjuristsanalyzein theirdiscussionsofghararmustbeabletoexistsoastopermittheformationofthe
identitythatengenderscertainty.Inthecasewherethespecificreferentdoesnotexist thiscausestheprivationofthoughtaboutitthatengendersuncertainty.Theprivationis thusnotacompletelack.Rather,itexistsonlyinrelationtothepossibilityofthecorrect identitybetweenthereferentandthoughtthatisrequiredtoobtaincertaintywithrespect toaspecifictransaction.Uncertaintythuscanonlyexistasaby-productofcertaintyin thecaseofgharar.
240 Ibn Ḥazm,Taqrīb,pp.10-12.Theuseoftermbayānintheoriesofrepresentationhas arichandcomplexhistorythatpre-datesIbn Ḥazm’suseoftheterm.Interestingly,theearliest technicaluseofthetermappearstobeintheRisālaofShāfi‘ī whousestotermtodetailtheways thattheQur’an,sunna,andijtihādinteracttorepresenttheLaw.Forthemostsystematic
presentationofhistheoryofbayānintheRisāla,seeMuḥammadIdrīsal-Shāfi‘ī,Risāla,inal- Umm,Rif‘atFawzī ‘Abdal-Muṭṭalib,11vols.(Manṣūra,Dāral-Wafā li’l-Tiba‘awa’l-Nashr, 2005),vol.1,pp.7-22.AccordingtoLowry,theconceptofbayānisthecoreideathatstructures thelawinShāfi‘ī’sview.See,Lowry,Theory,pp.23-59.
Jāhiẓ appearstobethenextscholartousethetermbayāntooutlineatheoryof representation,whichMontgomeryreadsasaconsciouspolemicagainstShāfi‘ī usageofthe term.Jāhiẓ’stheoryofrepresentationhasfivemodes:speech,gesticulation,math,writing,and index(niṣba).Bythelastterm,index,Imeanformsofrepresentationthatarenotconventional andthusnotrestrictedtohumanproduction.Rather,thesemodesofcommunicationrelyon inferencesanddeductiontocreatemeanings.Forexample,Jāhiẓ claimsthatnatureprovides manyindexesofGod’sexistenceandthecorpseisanindexofthedeathoftheperson.Although Jāhiẓ claimsthateachofthefivemodesofrepresentationaredifferent,healsostatesthatthe indexcanreplacetheotherfourmodesofrepresentation.Indexthusgroundsallconventional humanformsofcommunication.Montgomery,whoreadsthispassageinthelightofAristotle’s
Categories,translatestheterm“niṣba”aslocationfortheAristotelianterm“tokeisthai.”