Theprevioussectionemployedbiographicaldictionariestocontextualizethe juristsexaminedinthisstudy.Asstatedabove,thisgenrehasaformulaicstyleinorderto demonstratethecontinuityoftheschool’smasteryoverabodyofatleastprobabilisticif notcertainknowledge.Inbiographicaldictionariesknowledgeandmorespecifically certaintyareboththestartingandendpointsfortheconstructionoftheidentityofjurists. Evenanecdotesaboutgreatscholarswhowereindolentorforgetfulstudentsintheir adolescencesaffirmtheabilityoftheschooltomakegreatscholarsoutoftheseemingly mostunassumingofpeople.Inthecaseofthewaywardyouth,itisthetruthofthe school’sknowledgethatmakeshisformationintoagreatscholarpossible.Afterall,one cannothopetomakeagreatscholarfromuncertaintyanderrors.63
Thisgenre’sportrayalofknowledgeimplicitlyrestsonthefollowingthreetraits: 1)theorganicunityofArabiccreatesastablerelationshipbetweenwordsandtheir meanings;2)thesubjectknowsthisunitysuchthatheorshehasmasteryoveritsothat thereisnoambiguityinhisuseorinterpretationofArabic;and3)historyoccursonly whenboththemeaningandthesubjectchange.Accordingtothesepremises,knowledge hasfixedandstableformthatenablesitsrepetition,whereaschangeanddifferenceare themarkofuncertainty,theinessential,anderror.Thesepremisesensurenotmerelythat afixedrelationshipexistsbetweenwordsandtheirmeanings,butalsothatthemeanings ofwordsarefixedanddiscrete.True,awordwithoutacontextmaypossessseveral meanings,buttheperfectsubjectcandeterminetheintendedandthussingularlycorrect interpretationofawordwithinastatementonthebasisofnumberofhermeneutictools.
Giventhesepremises,scholarscanmoveseamlesslyfromonediscoursetoanotherwhile alwaysclaimingtofindtheoneobjectivelycorrectmeaning.AlthoughJuliaKristeva outlinesthesetraitswithrespecttotheearliestworksofEuropeanphilology,thesetraits alsoinformthenarrativestructureofthesebiographicaldictionaries.64
Forthebiographicaldictionary,theknowledgethatjuristspossessmustbe objectiveandenduringtruth. BothMuslimandWesternscholarsfrequentlycitethe famousḥadīththat,“Eachmujtahidgetsonerewardandeachcorrectmujtahidgetstwo rewards,”asanendorsementoflegalinterpretation,butinfact,thisḥadīthdoesnotgive anunrestrictedendorsementforinterpretation.Rather,itindicatesthatallinterpretation mustseektoobtaintheobjectivelycorrectanswers.True,juristsacknowledgethatwords andphrasesmayatfirstglanceseemambiguousnotwithstandingthefactthateachword hasconventionalmeanings.65Nevertheless,theyclaimthatthespeakerintendsameaning thatthelistenerorreadercanoftenifnotalwaysobtainonthebasisofcontextual
indicators.Thestabilityofmeaningmakesknowledgeafixedpointthatstandsabovethe effectsofformandcanbetransferredfromonefieldandintegratedintoanothersoasto formaunity.Thisunityexplainsboththeimportanceandabilityofjuriststoclaimthat theyhadmasteryoversomanyfieldsoflearning,whichformpartsofamuchlarger unity.
64JuliaKristeva,“FromOneIdentitytoanOther,”DesireinLanguage:ASemiotic
ApproachtoLiteratureandArt,tr.ThomasGora,AliceJardine,andLeonS.Roudiez(New York:ColumbiaPress,1980),126-127.
65Muslimsscholarsagreethatwordshaveconventionalmeaningsinwhattheyrefertoas
waḍ‘,buttheydisagreeaboutwhetherGodorhumanscreatedtheseconventions.Fordiscussions ofconventionalmeaningsandinterpretationinArabic,see,BernardWeiss,“Languagein
OrthodoxMuslimThought:AStudyof“Waḍ‘al-Lughah”anditsDevelopment,”(Ph.D.diss., PrincetonUniversity,1966);MohamedM.YunisAli,MedievalIslamicPragmatics(Richmond:
Themeaningsthatengenderknowledgerequireaspecialvesseltobearthem.The jurists–especiallytheexceptionalones–whombiographicaldictionariesmentionarethe bearersofthisknowledgethroughtheircommandofthestablerelationshipbetweenword andmeaning.Thisconceptionofknowledgeasencapsulatedandtransmittedinstable meaningssothatjuristscanactasfaithfultransmittersoftheknowledgeoftheearliest scholarsandmoreimportantlyoftheProphet.Admittedly,onefindssomebiographical dictionariesandjuristsclaimthataqualitativeandquantitativedeclinehadoccurredin legalthought.Nevertheless,theseremarksstillpresumethatcertaintyhasanobjective andstableexistencethattranscendshumanfailings.66Thesequalitiesensureastable referencepointagainstwhichtoarraytermslikeobjective,subjective,certainty, uncertainty,correct,andincorrect.Inturn,thedistributionofthesetermsbecomesa powerfultoolthatlegitimizestheinstitutionalauthorityofjurists.
However,juristsalsocontextualizetheirknowledge,intellectualoutput,and schools’intheirownworksoflaw.Tobesure,modernWesternscholarsofIslamiclaw haveusedworksofuṣūlal-fiqhandfiqhtoexaminehowjuristsdepicttheirrelationsto theirschoolsoflaw.Nevertheless,mostmodernWesternscholarsofIslamiclawframe thisrelationshipasoneoftherepetitionofcertainknowledgebyinvokingtheterms
ijtihādandtaqlīd.Inmanyways,thebinaryofijtihādandtaqlīdreliesonandaffirmsthe
66InhisthoughtprovokingstudyofthebiographicaldictionaryoftheShāfi‘ī juristIbn Qāḍī Shuhba(d.851/1448),RKevinJacquesstatesthatknowledgehasanobjectiveexistencefor MuslimjuristssinceitisreallyGod’sknowledgethatjuristsareattemptingobtainwhenthey derivelaw.Notwithstandinghisoccasionalcommentstothecontrary,Jacquesadoptsasimilar positionthatknowledgeandmorespecificallywordshavestablemeanings.Thispositionenables himtosuppressanydevelopmentorambiguityinthemeaningoftermsthatformthebasisofhis statisticalanalysis.R.KevinJacques,Authority,Conflict,andTransmissionsofDiversityin MedievalIslamicLaw(Boston:Brill,2006),pp.89-90,120-122,152-152.
philologicalconceptionofknowledge.Accordingtothestandardnarrativeofthe
developmentofIslamicheldbymodernWesternscholars,Islamicjuristshadarelatively shortburstofintellectualcreativitywhentheyemployedijtihād,ortheirlegalreasoning, toconfrontthesourcesoflawandderivelawsseeminglyexnihilo.Laterjurists
employedtaqlīd,orsubmittedtotheauthorityofearlierjurists.Withtaqlīd,Islamiclaw enteredaphaseofintellectualstasiswhenjuriststransmittedacorpusofcertainorat leastprobabilisticknowledge.67
AlthoughonefindsthisnarrativeinworksofIslamiclaw,Westernscholarshave enthusiasticallyadopteditinordertodetailthedevelopmentandroleofIslamiclawin society.68Inanumberofrecentarticles,severalscholarshaveattemptedtorehabilitate theportrayaloftaqlīdbyarguingthatitensuresthestabilityandcommensurabilityofall worksoflawwithintheboundsofagivenschooloflaw.69Thisapproachhasthe
67Forexamplesofthisnarrative,seeA.S.Tritton,MaterialsonMuslimEducationinthe
MiddleAges(London:Luzaz&Co.Ltd.,1957),p.163;Coulson,History,pp.75-85;H.A.R. Gibb,Mohammedanism:AnHistoricalSurvey(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1962),pp. 98-104;NormanAnderson,LawReformintheMuslimWorld(London:AthlonePress,1976),p. 7. Schacht,AnIntroduction,pp.69-75;N.J.
68Therearesomenotableexceptionstothisgeneralization.JonathanBrockoppexamines thediscursivetechniquesthatearlyMālikī legaltextsemploytosuggestthatalllawderivesfrom MālikinwhatBrockoppreferstoasthe“GreatShaykh,”theoryoflaw.JonathanBrockopp, “CompetingTheoriesofAuthorityinEarlyMālikī Texts,”inStudiesinIslamicLegalTheory,ed. BernardWeiss(Boston:Brill,2002),pp.3-22.DavidPowersanalyzesthetechniquesthatmuftīs employtoconstructtheirauthorityandsituatethelitigants.DavidPowers,Law,Society,and CultureintheMaghrib,1300-1500(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),pp.167-205. Anumberofscholarshaveshowntheimportantdiscursivedifferencesamongworksofuṣūlal- fiqhthattherebydrawintoquestionalinearrelationshipbetweenformativeandpost-formative law.Forexamples,seeDavidR.Vishanoff,TheFormationofIslamicHermeneutics:HowSunni TheoristsImaginedaRevealedLaw(AnnArbor,Mich.:AmericanOrientalSociety,2010); Lowry,Theory,pp.359-368.
69 Admittedlyandsomewhatinevitably,Ihavecondensedanumberofcomplexanalyses onthetopic.Forfurtherdetails,seeAhmedal-Shamsy,“RethinkingTaqlīdintheEarlyShāfi‘ī
advantageofrelatingthediscursivepracticesofjuriststonon-discursiveissuesof institutionalauthority.Ontheotherhand,WaelHallaqarguesforthecontinuous
developmentofIslamiclaw.70 Nevertheless,helimitsanydevelopmenttotheapplication ofqiyāstosolveasmallnumberof“new”cases,whichjuristsaddedtoastable“canon” ofacceptedlaw.71Ultimately,hehasnotstrayedfarfromthephilologicalsuppositions thathecriticizessovigorously.72
Thisconceptiontendstodownplaydifferencesamongjuristsasinsignificant issuesofformorstyle.Indeed,thisconceptionofformandcontentallowsscholarsto mineaworkoflawfor“facts”andprojectthesefactsonagroupofjuristsastheir unchangingconceptionoflaw. However,thisstaticconceptionofknowledgein
biographicaldictionariesandearlierWesternscholarshipfailstoexplainthecausesand contoursofintellectualproduction.Ifallsourcessimplyrepeatthealreadysaid,itis
Fadel,“TheSocialLogicofTaqlīdandtheRiseoftheMukhtaṣar,”IslamicLawandSociety3, no.2(1996):pp.193-233;ShermanJackson,“Taqlīd,LegalScaffoldingandtheScopeofLegal InjunctionsinPost-FormativeTheoryMuṭlaqand‘ĀmmintheJurisprudenceoftheShihābal-Dīn al-Qarāfī,”IslamicLawandSociety3,no.2(1996):165-192.
70WaelHallaq,“WastheGateofIjtihādClosed,”TheInternationalJournalofMiddle
EastStudies16,no.1(March1984):pp.3-41.Infact,thisarticleinauguratedaseriesofseminal articlesthatHallaqwrotetoshowthecreativityofIslamiclawandinterconnectedrelationship betweendifferentgenresoflegalliterature.SeeHallaq,“FromFatwāstoFurū‘,Growthand ChangeinIslamicSubstantiveLaw,”IslamicLawandSociety1,no.1(1994):pp.29-65;Hallaq, “ModelShurūṭ WorksandtheDialecticofDoctrineandPractice,”IslamicLawandSociety2,no. 2(1995):109-134.
71Hallaq,“Fatwās,”39,51-52.ForacritiqueofHallaq’sunderstandingofijtihād, methodofdiachronicanalysis,andtheaforementionedarticles,seeNormanCalder,“Al-
Nawawī’sTypologyofMuftisandItsSignificanceforaGeneralTheoryofIslamicLaw,”Islamic LawandSociety3,no.2(1996):pp.157-162.
72ForamoregeneralanalysisofthisphenomenoninHallaq’sresearch,seeDavidS. Powers,“WaelB.HallaqontheOriginsofIslamicLaw:AReviewEssay,”IslamicLawand Society17,no1(2010):126-157.
unclearwhypeoplewouldcontinuetowritenewworks.ThetypicalanswerthatWestern scholarsofIslamiclawgivetothisquestionarguesthatlaterworkslikedigestsand
commentariesmerelyrefinethetechnicalvocabularyandorganizationofpreviousworks. Althoughthereareundoubtedlychangesandrefinementsinlaterworks,thisview failstoexplainnearlyathousandyearsofintellectualproductionbythousandsof
scholars.Eithertheearliestworksweresomuddledthattheyrequiredsuchahuge amountoflabor,ortheideaofupdatingearlierworksthroughasystemofeditionsnever occurredtoanyone.Theexplanationthatpietymotivatedscholarstokeepwritingiseven worsesinceitisablackboxthattreatspietyasamonolithicforceinIslamicthoughtand life.
Notsurprisingly,contemporaryWesternscholarsofArabicliteraturehavebeen thefirsttoreassesstherelationshipbetweenformandcontentintheIslamicandArabic intellectualtraditionswhenitcomestoproductionandreceptionofcommentariesand digests.73Beyondthebiographicaldictionariesandnarrativesaboutijtihādandtaqlīd, juristsdescribetheirintellectualproductioninwaysthatsuggestamoredynamic conceptionandroleforcertaintyanduncertainty.Tobeprecise,thejuristsexaminedin thisstudymakestatementsthatbreakwiththethreefeaturesofknowledgethatKristeva outlineswithrespecttophilology:1)theorganicunityoflanguagearticulatedthrough thestablerelationshipbetweenwordsandmeanings;2)theperfectsubjectwhobearsthis unity;and3)thelackofhistoricaldevelopment.Thisbreaksuggestsalessstable
73Forexamples,seeKellyTuttle,“ExpansionandDigression:AStudyinMamlūk LiteraryCommentary.”(Ph.D.Diss.,UniversityofPennsylvania,2013);Bauer,“Mamluk,”pp. 112-116. JuliaBraycriticizesscholarswhoignoreissuesofliteraryformanditsrelationto contentmissagreatdealofthesignificanceofthetext.Bray,“Approaches,”pp.243-244.
conceptionofthemeaningsthatengenderknowledge.Consequently,thedistinction betweenformandcontentbecomeslessstable.
Thebreakwiththesephilologicalpremisesopensjuristsandtheirintellectual productiontotwoformsofuncertainty.Thefirstform,whichisgenerallyhowpeople thinkofuncertainty,arisesfromanaïvetéoramomentaryerror.Thisformofuncertainty functionsasstartingpointfortheacquisitionoftheformsofcertaintythatultimately validatethewritingofworksoflawortheauthorityofaschooloflaw.Thesecondform ofuncertaintythatarisesfromrejectingtheseaforementionedphilologicalpremises reflectsasystemicandirresolubleinstabilityincommunication.
Althoughthetwoformsofuncertaintyhavedifferentfunctionsandcauses,they bothoperateatdifferentdiscursivelevels.Moreimportantly,thesetwoformsof
uncertaintyprovidetheimpetusandjustificationintheeyesofjuristsfortheircontinued intellectualproduction.Finally,muchlikeghararaswewillseeinthefollowing
chapters,theuncertaintythatstructuresworksoflawisnotagiven,butsomethingthat knowledgecreates.Below,Iwillanalyzethestatementsthatjuristsmakethatdrawinto questionthestabilityofmeaningatthelevelofgenres,legalopinions,andfinally individualwords.
a. The Commensurability of Meaningat the Level of Genre
AccordingtothestandardnarrativeaboutthedevelopmentofIslamiclawandthe distinctionbetweenijtihādandtaqlīd,knowledgeiscontingentuponmeaningbeing stableandtransparentacrosstimeandspace.Languagecanconveymeaninginanumber
ofways,butthesewaysmustbeessentiallyequivalent.74Thejuristsexaminedinthis
studycertainlyholdthispositionwhentheydividelanguageintowordsandmeanings. Nevertheless,scatteredthroughouttheirwritings,theypointtotheinstabilityofthis divisioninimportantwaysthatopentheintellectualtraditiontointerpretationand disagreement.
Startingatthelevelofgenres,thejuristsexaminedinthisstudyemployseveral differentgenres.IbnQudāma,Shīrāzī,Bājī,Ibn Ḥazm,andSarakhsī writeeither commentaries(sharḥ)ordigests(mukhtaṣar)onearlierworksoflaw.Shīrāzī states withoutmuchadointheintroductiontotheMuhadhdhabthathisworkpresents“the
principlesoftheShāfi‘ī schoolwiththeirproofsandtheproblematiccaseswiththeir policyreasonsthatderivefromtheseprinciples.”75Sarakhsī’sworkisacommentaryon thedigestbyMuḥammadb.Muḥammadal-Marwazī (d.334/945)ontheworksof Shaybānī (132-189/750-805).76IbnQudāma’sworkisacommentaryonthedigestby Abū Qāsim‘Umarb.al-Ḥusaynb.‘AbdAllāhal-Khiraqī ofthelegalviewsofAḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal(164-241/780-855).77BothIbn ḤazmandBājī frametheirworksasdigestsof
74ThemajorexceptiontothisclaimistheviewthattheQur’āncannotbetranslated. Nevertheless,Muslimsdidthinkthatitsmeaningcouldbeexplainedandcommentedupon,which requireswordstohavecommensurableandstablemeanings.
75Abū IsḥāqIbrāhīmal-Shīrāzī,Al-Muhadhdhabfī fiqhal-imāmal-Shāfi‘ī,ed. Muḥammadal-Zuḥaylī,6vols.(Damascus:Dāral-Qalam,1992),vol.1,p.38.
76Muḥammadb.Aḥmadal-Sarakhsī,Kitābal-Mabsūṭ,30vols.in10(Cairo:Maṭba‘atal- Sa‘āda,1906-1913),vol.1:1,pp.2-4.Abū AbdAllāhMuḥammadb.al-ḤasanwasastudentAbū Ḥanifā andoneoftheearlyfoundersofthe Ḥanafī school.Forfurtherbiographicaldetails,see EI2,s.v.Muḥammadal-Shaybānī.
77‘AbdAllāhb.Aḥmadb.Muḥammadb.Qudāma,Al-Mughnī.ed. ṬahaMuḥammadal- Zaynī.10vols.(Cairo:Maktabatal-Qāhira,1968),vol.1,p.3-6.Aḥmadb. Ḥanbalistheeponym
previousworksthattheywrotethemselves.InthecaseofBājī,hisworkisadigestofhis
Istīfā’,whichisacommentaryontheMuwaṭṭā’ofMālik(d.179/795).78AsforIbn Ḥazm,oneofthelast Ẓāhirīs,heclaimsthathisMuḥallāisadigestofhisearlierwork, theMujallā.79WiththeexceptionofIbn ḤazmwhomIwilldiscussinmoredetailbelow,
theotherjuristsexaminedherethusframetheirworksasacontinuationoftheirschools’ legaltraditionnotwithstandingthedifferentgenresthattheyemploy.Tobeprecise,they frametheirwordsascommentariesanddigestsofearlierimportantworksoflawintheir respectiveschoolsoflaw.
Finally,IbnRushdframeshisworkasastudyofthelegaldisagreementsamong themajorschoolsoflaw.80Althoughworksofkhilāf,ordisputedlegalpoints,are common,IbnRushd’sworkisnotanexampleofthisgenre.Typically,ajuristusesthis genretochampionhisschool’spositionswhilepointingouttheinconsistenciesofother schools.However,IbnRushd’sworkneitherstridentlydefendstheMālikī schoolnor championsagrandsynthesisoftheotherschools.81IbnRushdgenerallycitestheopinion
acollectionofProphetic ḥadīth.Forfurtherbiographicaldetails,seeEI2,s.v.Aḥmadal-Ḥanbal;