Formostofthejurists,thetransactionsraiseghararbecausethegoodcannotbe
examinedatthetimeofthesaleandinmanycasestherearereasonstodoubtthatthe goodcanbedelivered.True,therearewaystoconceiveofgoods,suchasthecaseof foodthathasprotectiveshellorskin,sothatonecanclaimtohaveknowledgeofthe good’sdescription.However,ghararcanalsooccurevenwhenonecanexamineagood
andiscertaintoreceiveit. Forexample,juristsprohibitcontractingmultiplessalesin onecontract.Generally,juristsusethephrasebay’atānfī bay’a,ortwosalesinone,to describesuchatransaction,butSarakhsī employsthetermṣafqatānfī ṣafqa,ortwodeals inone.303AlthoughonlyIbnRushd,Bājī,andShīrāzī statethatthesetransactionscause
gharar,theotherjuristsalsoprohibitthem.
Onceagain,IbnRushdoffersthemostdetailedandsystematicpresentationofthis typeoftransaction.Heidentifiesthreetypesofsuchtransactions:(1)thesaleoftwo goodsfortwodifferentprices,(2)thesaleofonegoodattwodifferentprices,(3)thesale oftwogoodsatonepriceontheconditionthatoneofthetwosalesisbinding.Thefirst typeofsalemaytakeoneofthetwofollowingforms:‘AmrsellsahousetoZaydfora stipulatedpriceontheconditionthatZaydsellshimaslaveatadifferentprice,or‘Amr offerstoselleitheraspecificgoodforadīnāroranothergoodforseveraldīnārs.The secondtypegivesthebuyertheoptiontopayeitheralowercashpriceorahighercredit priceafterthecounterpartiesagreetothesale.Finally,thethirdtype,thesaleofoneof twogoodsquotedatthesameprice,isratherstraightforward.Forexample,onemight
offertoselloneoftwodressesatthesameprice.304Inthesecondandthirdtypesofsales,
theselleroffersseveraloptions,thecounterpartiesagreeonthetransaction,andafterthe transactioniscompletedthebuyerexercisesoneofhisoptions.
Bājī mentionsareportinwhichIbnWahbaskshisteacher,Ibnal-Qāsim,what thephrase“bay’atānfī bay’a”means.Ibnal-Qāsimrespondsthatthephraserefers,
Tomorethancanpossiblybeexplained,butthebasisthatitis builtuponandbywhichitsreprehensibilityiswell-knownisthat thecounterpartiestransactintwothingssuchthatifoneis invalidatedtheotherisinvalidandthiscreatesimpermissible
gharar.305
Notwithstandinghisteacher’sinabilitydescribeallofthetransactionsthatviolatethis prohibition,IbnWahbstillmanagedtoformulatesomeofitsgeneralcategories.In particular,IbnWahbdescribesthesecondandthirdcategoriesdescribedinthetypology ofIbnRushd.Bājī alsoprohibitstransactionsofthefirsttypedescribedinthetypologyof IbnRushd.Therestofourjuristsdiscussonlythefirstandsecondtypesof
transactions.306 Inaddition,IbnQudāmaandIbn Ḥazmprohibitthesaleofagoodfor
dīnārsontheconditionthat,post-sale,thebuyerexchangesthedīnārsfordirhāms.307
304IbnRushd,Bidāya,vol.3,p.1207. 305Bājī,Muntaqā,vol.6,p.394.
306Sarakhsī,Mabsūṭ,vol.12:4,p.163;Shīrāzī,Muhadhdhab,vol.3,p.47.
307Ibn Ḥazm,Muḥallā,vol,9,pp.15-16,¶1517;IbnQudāma,Mughnī,vol.4,pp.176- 177,¶¶.3097-3099
Forthejurists,theoptionalityofthecontractcreatesuncertaintyintermsofthe good,price,anddelivery.308Consideringthefactthatsellerhasquotedthepriceorgood tothebuyeritisinitiallyunclearwheretheuncertaintylies.However,accordingto Shīrāzī,whenonesellsagoodataspecifiedpriceontheconditionthatthebuyeragrees tosellaspecificgoodataspecificprice,
Thissaleisillicitduetostipulationofthejointsalesinthe contract.Ifthestipulationisremovedthepriceofthegoodmust beincreasedinproportiontotheremovedstipulationbutthis increaseisunknown.Thus,ifthepriceisincreaseditbecomes unknownandthisisillicit.Whenthepriceorgoodisunknown thesaleisinvalid.309
Inthecasewhere‘AmrofferstosellagoodtoZaydontheconditionthatZaydwillsella goodtohim,thepriceofonegoodiscontingentuponthatoftheothergood.
Accordingly,thepriceofonegoodmightbelowerorhigherthanitsmarketvaluein ordertogettheothertobesold.Ifoneofthegoodscannotbedelivereditspayment shouldbereturned.However,sinceneithergoodwassoldatitsmarketvalueoneparty wouldbenefitattheexpenseoftheotherifonelegofsuchatransactionwerecancelled. Indeed,itiseasytoenvisionthatthecounterpartythatstandstobenefitfromthecheaper pricemightintentionallycanceltheotherpartofthetransaction.Inthiscase,thetwo transactionscreateuncertaintywithrespecttothedeliveryofbothlegsofthetrade.
However,thisreasoningdoesnotapplytotheothertypesofsaleswherethe problemistoomuchcertainty.IbnRushd,Ibn Ḥazm,andBājī forbidthesetransactions
308Bājī,Muntaqā,vol.6,p.395;IbnRushd,Bidāya,vol.3,pp.1208-1209;IbnQudāma,
Mughnī,vol.4,p.177,¶.3098;Sarakhsī,Mabsūṭ,vol.12:4,p.163;Shīrāzī,Muhadhdhab,vol.3, p.47.
sincetheyevadetherulesonribāwhenoneoffersacashpriceandhighercreditprice,or whenthecounterpartiesengageinarepurchasesale(bay‘al-‘īna).310
Finally,Bājī discusseswhathappenswhenoneoffersthebuyerthechoiceofone oftwodresseswitheachdresshavingthesameprice.However,unliketheotherjurists, Bājī definesthelegalityofthistransactionintermsoftherelationshipbetweenthetwo dressesandtheirvalues.Accordingtohim,ifthetwodressesarethesametypeandvalue thissaleispermissiblesince,
Thisisnottwosalesinonebecausethemeaningoftwosalesin oneisthateachsaleisintendedforaspecificpurposethatoccurs whenthepricesdiffer,thegenusofthegoodsdiffer,orthe qualityofthegoodsdifferssuchthatthepricedoes.311
Inotherwords,ifthesellerofferstwogoodsthatareofthesametype,quality,andvalue, hehasofferedtwoindistinguishablecopiesofthesamegoodsothatthereexistsnoreal choiceoruncertaintysincethebuyer’schoiceisirrelevantinrelationtogood’squalities. Likewise,ifdressesarethesamepricethecontractisvalid.312
Ultimately,theanalysisofBājī raisesthelargerquestionofhowonedetermines thenatureofequalityanddifferenceinordertorepresentandcategorizegoods.The notionofequalityanddifferenceloomslargeintheprocessofvaluinggoodsand services.Forexample,discussionsofribācategorizegoodssoastodeterminewhich goodsarethesametypeandthusmustbetradedinequalquantities.
310Bājī,Muntaqā,vol.6,p.394.Ibn Ḥazm,Muḥallā,vol,9,pp.15-16,¶1517;Ibn Rushd,Bidāya,vol.3,pp.1208-1209.
Theissueofdifferenceandequalityalsoplaysacentralroleintheanalysisof
ghararaswesawinthepreviouschapter’sdiscussionoffungibleandnon-fungible
goods.Torecall,juristsarguethatfungiblegoodsofthesametypehavealevelof samenessthatenablesobjectiverepresentations.Ontheotherhand,non-fungiblegoods lackasufficientlevelofsimilaritythatwouldenableobjectiverepresentations.Rather, therepresentationsofnon-fungiblegoodsreflectthesubjectivevaluesofcounterparties. Nevertheless,goodsdonotmediatethedistinctionbetweenfungibleandnon-fungible.If agooddidmediatethisdistinctionnon-fungiblegoodswouldhaveanobjective
representation.Inchaptertwo,wesawthatalthoughmustjuristspermitonetosella horseonthebasisofaverbaldescription,Sarakhsī doesnotsinceheclaimsthatahorse isanon-fungiblegoodwhosepricedependsonthesubjectivevaluesofabuyer.Thefact thatjuristsdebatewhichgoodsarefungibleandwhicharenon-fungibleindicatesthatthe categorizationofgoodsisnotinherenttothegoodsthemselves.Rather,thedistinction betweenfungibleandnon-fungiblereflectsthediscursivepracticesthatjuristsemployto analyzeandcomparegoods.Thefollowingchapterswillexamineinmoredetailthe discursivepracticesthatjuristsemploytoconceiveoftheexistenceofgoodsand representgharar.
VII. Conclusion
Inthischapter,Idetailedtherelationshipbetweentheformsofuncertainty associatedwithghararandthereferentsthatjuristsanalyzetodeterminethelegalityof
commercialtransactions.Unliketheuncertaintydetailedinworksofuṣūlal-fiqhand
lackofreferent,whichinturnleadstoalackofthoughtwithrespecttoit.Thislackof bothreferentandthoughtcreatestheprivationofidentitythatengendersgharar.
Throughoutthisstudy,Ihaveclaimedthatcertaintysubsumesandcreates uncertaintysuchthatuncertaintyisderivativeofandsecondarytoit.Intheprevious chapter,Iexaminedtheformsofknowledgethatjuristsemploytodefinethetypesof uncertaintythatcausegharar.Likewise,juristsalsoemployanumberofformsof
knowledgetorepresentandanalyzethelegalexistenceofthereferentsofcommercial transactions.Inboththecasesofthedefinitionoftheformsofuncertaintyandreferents, juristsemployavarietyofformsofknowledgetoendowghararwithanexistence.
Inamorecomplexsense,theprivationalsodependsonthecorrectidentity betweenthoughtandreferent.Intheintroductiontothepreviouschapter,Iremarkedthat theformsofuncertaintydiscussedintheintroductiontoworksofuṣūlal-fiqhandkalām
presentapotentiallyinfinitenumberofincorrectcombinationsofthoughtsandreferents inreality.Furthermore,thisformofuncertaintydoesnotsignalinanyessentialmanner thecorrectidentity.Duetothisdissonancebetweenthisformofuncertaintyand
certainty,theuncertaintyhasnovalueforhelpingonetomakeinformedjudgmentssince therepresentationisincorrectwhenjudgedagainstreality.Ontheotherhand,theforms ofuncertaintyassociatedwithghararenablecounterpartiestomakeinformedlegaland
commercialdecisionsaboutspecifictransactions. Furthermore,theseformsof
uncertaintyimplicitlyindicatewhatthecounterpartiesmustdotoacquirecertaintywith respecttoatransaction.
Thus,theuncertaintyassociatedwithghararandtheuncertaintydetailedinworks
subtleyetsignificantdistinctionbetweenthetwoformsofuncertainty,weneedto understandtheformsofdifferencethatrelateseachformofuncertaintytocertainty.To beprecise,ontheonehand,contraryrelatescertaintytotheuncertaintydetailedinworks
kalāmanduṣūlal-fiqh.Ontheotherhand,theprivationrelatescertaintytotheforms uncertaintyassociatedwithgharar.
Fortunately,IbnRushdandAbū NaṣrMuḥammadal-Fārābī (d.339/950)discuss boththecontraryandprivationastheyrelatetorepresentationingreatdetailintheir commentariesofAristotle’sDeInterpretatione,orKitābal-‘ibāra. 313IbnRushd analyzestheprivationinresponsetothequestion;whatisthemostperfectandmaximal differenceintermsofthought:aprivationofidentityoritscontrary?Forexample,which phrase,“nooneisjust,”or “everyoneisunjust,”differsthemostfromthephrase, “everyoneisjust?”314Initially,IbnRushdclaimsthattheanswermaynotnecessarily reflectthedifferencethatexistsinreality.Forexample,thestatements,“lifeisgood”and “deathisbad”arecontrariesontologicallyandlogically,butfromtheperspectiveofthe mindthesetwostatementsarenotdifferent,butareactuallymutuallyentailed
(talāzum).315Thepositionthatthegreatestdifference–whetherthecontraryorprivation– maynotreflectrealitywouldupendthetraditionalsubordinationofrepresentationto existencebymakingthethoughtprimaryinthevalidationofrepresentation.
IbnRushd,however,savestheprimacyofexistenceinrepresentationbyarguing thatthegreatestdifferencebetweentwostatementsistheprivation.Unlikeacontrary,
313 Forfurtherbiographicaldetails,seeEI2,s.v.al-Fārābī. 314 IbnRushd,‘Ibāra,vol.1,p.127.
privationpreservestheconceptandreferentofaspecificidentity.Theonlydifference betweentheprivationandtheidentityisthatformerdeniestheexistenceofthe
relationshipthatoccurswiththelatter.Ortoputdifferently,theprivationissimplythe negationoftheidentitybetweenaspecificthoughtandreferent.Theidentitythusmust precedeitsprivation.Furthermore,theidentityisdiscursivelysimplerthanitsprivation. Infact,IbnRushdcomparestherelationshipbetweenidentityandprivationtothat betweenexistenceandnon-existence.Thislastpointreaffirmsthesubordinationof differenceandmorebroadlyrepresentationtoexistence.316
Ontheotherhand,IbnRushdclaimsthatwithacontrarymultiplereferents, concepts,andstatementsoccursuchthatthereisnoguaranteethatthemindwill
recognizethedifferencesbetweenthestatementsaswiththecaseofthelifeanddeath.317 Tounderstandthatlifeanddeatharecontrariesandessentiallydifferent,onewouldneed toknownthehierarchicallysuperiorconceptthatopposeslifetodeath.Thuswithidentity andprivationthereismerelyoneviewpointthatismodifiedbymeansofanegation,but withcontrariestheviewpointsproliferateastheconceptsandreferentsdo.
AlthoughIbnRushddoesnotcommentonhowaprivationrelatestouncertainty, al-Fārābī offerssometantalizingremarkintothisrelation.InhiscommentaryonDe
Interpretatione,al-Fārābī (d.339/950)arguesthatprivationismoredifferentthan
contrarysinceprivationandidentityengenderagreaterlevelofshubha,tashakkuk,and
316IbnRushd,‘Ibāra,vol.1,pp.128-131.
317IbnRushd,‘Ibāra,vol.1,pp.128-131.AccordingtoIbnQudāmaonecannotdefine somethingbyeitherbyusingitself,sincethisistautology,orbynegatingitscontrary.He unfortunately,doesnotexplainthelastreason,butitispossiblethatheagreeswithIbnRushd abouttheambiguityofcontraries.IbnQudāma,Rawḍat,7.
ḥayra,oruncertaintyandconfusion.Accordingtohim,inthecaseofprivationand identityoneknowsthateithertheprivationoridentityisessentiallycorrect.Ontheother hand,inthecaseofthecontraries,nocontrarymaybecorrectsuchthatthecorrect viewpointisnevernecessarilyentailedasinthecaseofidentityandprivation.
Admittedly,Fārābī’sargumentissomewhatcounterintuitiveandstrained.Inthecaseof theprivationandidentity,apersonmustknowthatoneofthetwooptionsiscorrect accordingtothereasoningofFārābī.Ontheotherhand,withcontraries,noneofthe optionsmaybecorrect.Indeed,thecontraryshouldpresentmoreuncertainty.318
Nevertheless,Fārābī’sopinionissignificantsinceitindicatesthatprivationand identityareessentiallyboundtoasingleviewpoint.Ingharar,theprivationofidentity
thatengendersuncertaintyisboundtothecorrectidentitythatengenderscertaintywith respecttotransaction.Tosaythatonehasuncertaintywithrespecttothedescriptionof thegood,istoacknowledgethathehasnotseenorreceivedaverbaldescriptionofthe generaldescriptionofthegood.Isay“generaldescription,”becausethejudgmentthat onehasuncertaintywithrespecttothedescriptionofagooddoesnotindicatetheexact referentsthatoneneedstoknowwithrespecttoaspecifictransaction.Theformsof uncertaintyassociatedwithghararthusrevealbothamimeticqualitybasedonan
identity,ormorecorrectlyaprivationofidentitybetweenaspecificreferentandthought ofit;andahierarchythatrelatesuncertaintywithrespecttospecificreferentstogetherin thelargercategoriesoftheprimaryformsoftheuncertaintythatIexaminedinthe
318Abū NaṣrMuḥammadal-Fārābī,Sharḥ al-Fārābī l-kitābarisṭūṭālīsfī’l-‘ibāra,ed. WilhelmKutschandStanleyMarrow,2ed.(Beirut:Dāral-Mashriq,1971),p.203.
previouschapter.Themimeticandhierarchicalqualitiesofghararindicateaformof
rationalitythatIwillexamineinmoredetailinthefollowingchapter.
Ontheotherhand,Fārābī andIbnRushdindicatethatinthecaseofcontraries,the differencebetweeneachidentitydoesnotnecessarilyimplythecorrectidentity.Infact, withcontraries,onemightnotevenrecognizethattheyaredifferent.Theinabilityto recognizethedifferencebetweencontrariesdoesnotpointthemindtothecorrect identity.Indeed,eachidentitymaybeincorrectatFārābī states.Asthecontraries multiply,sodotheviewpointsjustlikewithinfiniteviewpointsoftheuncertainty elaboratedtheworksofuṣūl al-fiqh and kalām.